Files
accounted/extensions/general/woocommerce/lib/api-client.ts
T
Jakob Wennberg f266c386f3 chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers (#2150)
* chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers

Remove 33 dead files, ~270 unreferenced exports/types, 13 dead i18n
namespaces and 4 unused dependencies; fold byte-identical helper copies
into one canonical home each (lib/utils chunk/sleep/utcDateStamp,
lib/dates/iso, lib/invariants/uuid, lib/xml/escape, lib/reports/sru/format,
lib/pdf/number-text, lib/browser/panel-request, lib/api/v1/body +
v1ValidationError rolled out to ~55 v1 routes, booking-template schemas).

No behaviour change: v1 bodies and status codes, MCP tool schemas, DB
writes and money math are untouched. Naive ore rounding was deliberately
not swapped for roundOre; see DECISIONS.md 2026-09-02 for the full list
of things left alone on purpose.

tsc, lint, 19588 unit tests and check:guards green; antipattern baseline
ratcheted (naive-ore-round 622 -> 620, hand-rolled-invariant 115 -> 113).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(transactions): import RawTransaction from @/types after the ingest re-export removal

CI's type ratchet (check:types, full tsconfig) caught the one test file
that still imported the type through lib/transactions/ingest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 11:51:16 +02:00

372 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript

import { sleep } from '@/lib/utils'
import { isUnsafeUrlError, safeFetch } from '@/lib/http/safe-fetch'
import type { WooOrder, WooRefund, WooStoreInfo } from '../types'
/**
* Minimal WooCommerce REST API (wc/v3) client for the order feed.
*
* Auth is HTTP Basic (consumer key as username, secret as password) over
* HTTPS only. Some hosts (Apache CGI, security plugins) strip the
* Authorization header, so a 401 is retried once with the documented
* query-string credential fallback; that fallback is why plain-http stores
* are refused outright (keys in a cleartext URL are a credentials leak).
*
* The store URL is tenant input that the server connects to, and members can
* write `woocommerce_connections.store_url` directly through PostgREST
* (bypassing the connect route's normalisation), so every request here
* re-normalises the stored URL and goes through `safeFetch`: public
* addresses only, checked at request time, and no redirects followed. The
* nightly cron runs this under the service role, which is exactly the
* network position an SSRF would want.
*
* Typical WooCommerce hosts are slow shared PHP boxes: requests run
* sequentially, pages are capped at 100 rows, and 429/5xx responses get a
* short exponential backoff before the error is surfaced.
*/
const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000
const RETRYABLE_STATUS = new Set([429, 502, 503, 504])
const RETRY_DELAYS_MS = [1_000, 3_000]
/** wc/v3 hard maximum for per_page. */
export const WC_PAGE_SIZE = 100
export interface WooCredentials {
storeUrl: string
consumerKey: string
consumerSecret: string
}
export class WooCommerceApiError extends Error {
constructor(
message: string,
/** HTTP status, or 0 for network-level failures. */
readonly status: number,
/** WooCommerce error code (e.g. woocommerce_rest_cannot_view), if any. */
readonly wooCode: string | null = null,
) {
super(message)
this.name = 'WooCommerceApiError'
}
}
/**
* Whether an API error means the credentials themselves are dead (key deleted
* or demoted in wp-admin), as opposed to a transient failure. Used to flip a
* connection to status 'revoked' so the UI offers a reconnect instead of the
* cron retrying forever.
*/
export function isRevokedCredentialsError(error: unknown): boolean {
if (!(error instanceof WooCommerceApiError)) return false
return error.status === 401 || error.status === 403
}
/**
* Hostnames the server must never fetch: the store URL is user input that we
* probe server-side, so loopback/link-local/private ranges and internal
* naming conventions are refused outright (SSRF guard). Hostname-level only,
* and cheap enough to run synchronously at connect time; a public DNS name
* resolving to a private address is caught later by `safeFetch`, which
* resolves and classifies every A/AAAA record at request time.
*/
function isDisallowedHost(hostname: string): boolean {
const h = hostname.toLowerCase()
if (h === 'localhost' || h.endsWith('.localhost')) return true
if (h.endsWith('.local') || h.endsWith('.internal')) return true
// IPv6 literals (URL.hostname strips the brackets): never a real store.
if (h.includes(':')) return true
const v4 = /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/.exec(h)
if (v4) {
const a = Number(v4[1])
const b = Number(v4[2])
if (a === 0 || a === 10 || a === 127) return true
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true
}
return false
}
/**
* Normalize and validate a user-entered store URL to an https origin plus
* optional subdirectory path (WordPress installs under a path are common),
* lowercased host, no trailing slash, no query/fragment/credentials, and no
* private/internal hosts. Returns null for anything invalid, including
* plain http.
*/
export function normalizeStoreUrl(input: string): string | null {
const trimmed = input.trim()
if (!trimmed) return null
const withScheme = /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i.test(trimmed) ? trimmed : `https://${trimmed}`
let url: URL
try {
url = new URL(withScheme)
} catch {
return null
}
if (url.protocol !== 'https:') return null
if (url.username || url.password || url.search || url.hash) return null
if (isDisallowedHost(url.hostname)) return null
const path = url.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, '')
return `https://${url.host.toLowerCase()}${path}`
}
/** Error code on a WooCommerceApiError when the stored store URL fails re-normalisation. */
export const INVALID_STORE_URL_CODE = 'accounted_invalid_store_url'
/** Error code on a WooCommerceApiError when the SSRF guard refused to connect. */
export const UNSAFE_STORE_URL_CODE = 'accounted_unsafe_store_url'
/**
* Re-run the connect-time normalisation on the STORED store URL at use time.
* The connect route normalises what the user typed, but a member can PATCH
* `store_url` straight into the row through PostgREST, so the value in the
* database is not trusted to still be an https public-host origin. A row that
* fails here is refused with a clear, non-retryable error instead of fetched.
*/
function storeOriginOf(creds: WooCredentials): string {
const normalized = normalizeStoreUrl(creds.storeUrl)
if (!normalized) {
throw new WooCommerceApiError(
`WooCommerce store URL is not a valid https store address (${creds.storeUrl}); reconnect the store`,
0,
INVALID_STORE_URL_CODE,
)
}
return normalized
}
function buildUrl(
creds: WooCredentials,
path: string,
params: Record<string, string>,
credentialsInQuery: boolean,
): string {
const url = new URL(`${storeOriginOf(creds)}/wp-json/wc/v3${path}`)
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) url.searchParams.set(key, value)
if (credentialsInQuery) {
url.searchParams.set('consumer_key', creds.consumerKey)
url.searchParams.set('consumer_secret', creds.consumerSecret)
}
return url.toString()
}
async function requestOnce(
creds: WooCredentials,
path: string,
params: Record<string, string>,
credentialsInQuery: boolean,
): Promise<Response> {
const headers: Record<string, string> = { Accept: 'application/json' }
if (!credentialsInQuery) {
const basic = Buffer.from(`${creds.consumerKey}:${creds.consumerSecret}`).toString('base64')
headers.Authorization = `Basic ${basic}`
}
// safeFetch: public address only (checked now, not at connect time), no
// redirects. A 3xx from the store is a failure, never a hop.
return safeFetch(buildUrl(creds, path, params, credentialsInQuery), {
headers,
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS),
})
}
/**
* Map a failure from requestOnce to the error the retry loop should see.
* Guard refusals (bad stored URL, private address, redirect) are terminal:
* retrying the same URL cannot succeed and must not spend the backoff budget.
*/
function asTerminalGuardError(err: unknown): WooCommerceApiError | null {
if (err instanceof WooCommerceApiError) return err
if (isUnsafeUrlError(err)) {
return new WooCommerceApiError(
`WooCommerce store refused by outbound URL guard: ${err.detail}`,
0,
UNSAFE_STORE_URL_CODE,
)
}
return null
}
async function parseError(response: Response): Promise<WooCommerceApiError> {
let wooCode: string | null = null
let detail = ''
try {
const body = (await response.json()) as { code?: string; message?: string }
wooCode = body.code ?? null
detail = body.message ?? ''
} catch {
// Non-JSON error body (host error page); the status is enough.
}
return new WooCommerceApiError(
`WooCommerce API ${response.status}${detail ? `: ${detail}` : ''}`,
response.status,
wooCode,
)
}
/**
* GET a wc/v3 path. Retries the header-stripped-auth case (401 → query-string
* credentials) once, and 429/5xx with a short backoff.
*/
export async function wcGet<T>(
creds: WooCredentials,
path: string,
params: Record<string, string> = {},
): Promise<T> {
let credentialsInQuery = false
let lastError: unknown
for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length; attempt++) {
let response: Response
try {
response = await requestOnce(creds, path, params, credentialsInQuery)
} catch (err) {
const terminal = asTerminalGuardError(err)
if (terminal) throw terminal
// Network/timeout errors: retry on the same backoff schedule.
lastError = new WooCommerceApiError(
`WooCommerce request failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
0,
)
if (attempt < RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length) {
await sleep(RETRY_DELAYS_MS[attempt])
continue
}
throw lastError
}
if (response.ok) return (await response.json()) as T
if (response.status === 401 && !credentialsInQuery) {
// Host may be stripping the Authorization header; the documented
// fallback is credentials in the query string (HTTPS enforced upstream).
credentialsInQuery = true
lastError = await parseError(response)
continue
}
if (RETRYABLE_STATUS.has(response.status) && attempt < RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length) {
lastError = await parseError(response)
await sleep(RETRY_DELAYS_MS[attempt])
continue
}
throw await parseError(response)
}
throw lastError instanceof Error
? lastError
: new WooCommerceApiError('WooCommerce request failed', 0)
}
export interface ListOrdersOptions {
/** ISO timestamp; interpreted as UTC (dates_are_gmt is always sent). */
modifiedAfter: string
page: number
}
/**
* One page of orders modified after the cursor, oldest-modified first so the
* caller's cursor advances chronologically. Requires WooCommerce 5.8+
* (modified_after); older stores fail with a woocommerce_rest_invalid_param
* style error surfaced to the connection's error state.
*/
export async function listOrdersPage(
creds: WooCredentials,
options: ListOrdersOptions,
): Promise<WooOrder[]> {
return wcGet<WooOrder[]>(creds, '/orders', {
modified_after: options.modifiedAfter,
dates_are_gmt: 'true',
status: 'any',
orderby: 'modified',
order: 'asc',
per_page: String(WC_PAGE_SIZE),
page: String(options.page),
})
}
/** Hard cap on refund pages per order; a real order never approaches this. */
const MAX_REFUND_PAGES = 10
/**
* All refunds of one order. Terminates on an EMPTY batch, not a short one
* (hosts may cap per_page below our request, same as the order pagination),
* dedupes by id so a host that ignores `page` cannot loop forever, and caps
* total pages as a final backstop.
*/
export async function listOrderRefunds(
creds: WooCredentials,
orderId: number,
): Promise<WooRefund[]> {
const refunds: WooRefund[] = []
const seen = new Set<number>()
for (let page = 1; page <= MAX_REFUND_PAGES; page++) {
const batch = await wcGet<WooRefund[]>(creds, `/orders/${orderId}/refunds`, {
per_page: String(WC_PAGE_SIZE),
page: String(page),
})
if (batch.length === 0) return refunds
const fresh = batch.filter((r) => !seen.has(r.id))
if (fresh.length === 0) return refunds
for (const refund of fresh) seen.add(refund.id)
refunds.push(...fresh)
}
// Cap exhausted with data still flowing: returning the partial list would
// let the sync advance its cursor past refunds it never saw. Throwing
// routes into the caller's refund-failure path instead (order held, cursor
// capped, retried next run).
throw new WooCommerceApiError(
`Refund pagination cap exceeded for order ${orderId}`,
0,
)
}
/**
* Verify credentials and read store metadata. The one-order probe is the
* authoritative credential check (it exercises the read scope the feed
* needs); title and settings lookups are best-effort extras.
*/
export async function testConnectionAndFetchStoreInfo(
creds: WooCredentials,
): Promise<WooStoreInfo> {
await wcGet<unknown[]>(creds, '/orders', { per_page: '1' })
const info: WooStoreInfo = {
name: null,
currency: null,
prices_include_tax: null,
wc_version: null,
}
try {
const settings = await wcGet<Array<{ id: string; value: unknown }>>(
creds,
'/settings/general',
)
const currency = settings.find((s) => s.id === 'woocommerce_currency')?.value
if (typeof currency === 'string' && currency) info.currency = currency.toUpperCase()
const pricesIncludeTax = settings.find((s) => s.id === 'woocommerce_prices_include_tax')?.value
if (typeof pricesIncludeTax === 'string') info.prices_include_tax = pricesIncludeTax === 'yes'
} catch {
// Settings need broader permissions on some setups; the feed works without.
}
try {
const status = await wcGet<{ environment?: { version?: string } }>(creds, '/system_status')
if (status.environment?.version) info.wc_version = status.environment.version
} catch {
// system_status is admin-capability data and often blocked; optional.
}
try {
// The WP REST index is public and carries the site title.
const response = await safeFetch(`${storeOriginOf(creds)}/wp-json/`, {
headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS),
})
if (response.ok) {
const body = (await response.json()) as { name?: string }
if (body.name) info.name = body.name
}
} catch {
// Cosmetic only.
}
return info
}