aabddb592f
* feat(billing): multi-user seat gate: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy Multiple people in one company becomes a paid capability (multi_user, the eighth PAID key). Derived at access time from capability_grants, no status column, no enforcement cron: - entitled: active grant (trial/stripe/team/manual/comp), everyone works - grace: newest grant expired < 20 days ago; countdown banner for everyone in companies with > 1 user; invites still allowed - frozen: only role=owner resolves; other memberships go dormant (rows untouched, paying reactivates instantly); invites 403 with paid-plan upsell Enforcement: new resolve_active_company_gated RPC (zero-arg RPC and RLS twin untouched: they also run on self-hosts, where the gate never bites), gated query fallback for service-role/API-key paths, setActiveCompany guard, MCP company-access check, invite route. Middleware routes all-frozen users to a new /paused page; the switcher greys locked companies. Migration 20260901081417 (applied to staging): trial trigger seeds multi_user, backfills for mid-trial companies, active Stripe subs, team agreements, and a grandfather grant (expires now, i.e. grace = deploy + 20 days) for existing unpaid multi-member companies. Daily cron mails owners at grace start and last day. Strings in sv+en; pg-real + unit tests included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): multi-user seat gate hardening from skeptic review - Stripe cancel now EXPIRES the multi_user stripe grant instead of deleting it: the 20-day grace window hangs on an expired row, so a deleted one froze churned payers' staff instantly with no banner and no mail. Other stripe grants keep the freeze-and-retain delete. - New SECURITY DEFINER company_multi_user_state() RPC (migration 20260901083726, applied to staging) and RPC-first getMultiUserState: capability_grants RLS hides team-scoped rows from non-team users, so user-client reads misread byra-covered companies as frozen (switch refusal, wrong switcher locks). - Byra-kind teams get a standing team-scoped multi_user grant (backfill + teams trigger): byra client companies have no company-scoped trial by design, so a grantless byra team would freeze every consultant and client user. - Comped/manual companies with active PAID-key grants extend to multi_user (a comped company must not read as paying while locking out user two). - /api/v1 gets the same dormancy gate as MCP (frozen non-owner -> 403). - PGRST202 on resolution fails OPEN (pre-migration DB has zero multi_user rows; the gated fallback would have frozen every non-owner mid-deploy). - Grace cron: covers team-scoped lapses (byra agreement ending) and skips the start mail for the hand-mailed grandfather cohort. - Tests updated/added across all touched surfaces; pg tests for the new RPC and byra trigger; trial-suppression pg test extended to 8 keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): decouple seat-gate env check and fail open on gate read throws CI round 1 on #2099: - isMultiUserEnforced no longer imports has-capability: several route test suites partially mock that module and the vitest mock guard threw from inside the v1 seat gate, turning expected 4xx responses into 500s. multi_user is never a connector capability, so the bypass reduces to the same env reads, now inlined. - getMultiUserState wraps its resolution in a fail-open try/catch: a client without .rpc or a thrown network error must never lock users out. - no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 -> 393 with reasons: the seat gate's .or() scope filter (server-resolved UUIDs) and the Stripe cancel expiry update's timestamp .or(); all columns in both strings are literals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): membership-guard the multi-user entitlement RPCs (Superagent P3) company_multi_user_ok and company_multi_user_state are SECURITY DEFINER and were granted to authenticated with a caller-supplied company UUID: any logged-in user could probe an arbitrary company's billing state and grace deadline across tenants. Migration 20260901091752 (applied to staging) requires an auth.uid() membership in the target company when a JWT is present, keeps service-role/definer contexts unrestricted, and clamps the grace window to [0, 20] days. pg tests: stranger gets false/NULL, member reads normally, oversized p_grace_days cannot widen the probe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
131 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript
131 lines
4.6 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import {
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parseCompanyMembersPayload,
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parseTeamMembersPayload,
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} from '@/components/settings/members-payload'
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// Read-side guards for the member rosters. A 200 whose body does not carry
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// the expected lists is a failed read, not an empty roster: the original bug
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// was `setMembers(data.data.members)` straight off `res.json()`, so a
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// wrong-shape 200 rendered an apparently member-less company, and a
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// consultant looking at that list re-invites people who are already members.
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describe('parseCompanyMembersPayload', () => {
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const valid = {
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data: {
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members: [{ id: 'm1', email: 'anna@example.se' }],
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invitations: [{ id: 'i1', email: 'bo@example.se' }],
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canInvite: true,
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},
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}
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it('passes a well-formed payload through', () => {
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expect(parseCompanyMembersPayload(valid)).toEqual({
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members: [{ id: 'm1', email: 'anna@example.se' }],
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invitations: [{ id: 'i1', email: 'bo@example.se' }],
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canInvite: true,
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inviteRequiresUpgrade: false,
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})
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})
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it('accepts a confirmed-empty roster (that is data, not a failure)', () => {
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expect(
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parseCompanyMembersPayload({ data: { members: [], invitations: [], canInvite: false } }),
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).toEqual({ members: [], invitations: [], canInvite: false, inviteRequiresUpgrade: false })
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})
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it('rejects a 200 with no data envelope instead of fabricating an empty roster', () => {
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expect(parseCompanyMembersPayload({})).toBeNull()
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expect(parseCompanyMembersPayload(null)).toBeNull()
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expect(parseCompanyMembersPayload('ok')).toBeNull()
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})
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it('rejects a 200 whose data lacks the lists', () => {
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expect(parseCompanyMembersPayload({ data: {} })).toBeNull()
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expect(parseCompanyMembersPayload({ data: { members: [] } })).toBeNull()
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expect(
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parseCompanyMembersPayload({ data: { members: 'oops', invitations: [] } }),
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).toBeNull()
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})
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it('only grants canInvite on an explicit boolean true', () => {
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// A truthy non-boolean must not unlock the invite form.
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expect(
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parseCompanyMembersPayload({ data: { members: [], invitations: [], canInvite: 'yes' } }),
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).toEqual({ members: [], invitations: [], canInvite: false, inviteRequiresUpgrade: false })
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})
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it('only swaps the invite form for the upsell on an explicit boolean true', () => {
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// Multi-user seat gate: an older server without the field (or junk) keeps
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// the form; the invite POST's own 403 is the real enforcement.
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expect(
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parseCompanyMembersPayload({
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data: { members: [], invitations: [], canInvite: true, inviteRequiresUpgrade: 'yes' },
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}),
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).toEqual({ members: [], invitations: [], canInvite: true, inviteRequiresUpgrade: false })
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expect(
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parseCompanyMembersPayload({
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data: { members: [], invitations: [], canInvite: true, inviteRequiresUpgrade: true },
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}),
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).toEqual({ members: [], invitations: [], canInvite: true, inviteRequiresUpgrade: true })
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})
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})
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describe('parseTeamMembersPayload', () => {
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it('passes a well-formed payload through', () => {
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expect(
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parseTeamMembersPayload({
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data: {
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members: [{ id: 'm1' }],
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invitations: [{ id: 'i1' }],
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teamName: 'Byrån AB',
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teamId: 'team-1',
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teamKind: 'byra',
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isOwner: true,
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canInvite: true,
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},
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}),
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).toEqual({
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members: [{ id: 'm1' }],
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invitations: [{ id: 'i1' }],
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teamName: 'Byrån AB',
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teamId: 'team-1',
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teamKind: 'byra',
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isOwner: true,
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canInvite: true,
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})
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})
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it('accepts a confirmed-empty roster and missing management fields', () => {
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expect(parseTeamMembersPayload({ data: { members: [] } })).toEqual({
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members: [],
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invitations: [],
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teamName: null,
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teamId: null,
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teamKind: null,
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isOwner: false,
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canInvite: false,
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})
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})
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it('rejects wrong-shape 200s instead of fabricating an empty roster', () => {
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expect(parseTeamMembersPayload({})).toBeNull()
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expect(parseTeamMembersPayload(null)).toBeNull()
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expect(parseTeamMembersPayload({ data: {} })).toBeNull()
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expect(parseTeamMembersPayload({ data: { members: 'oops' } })).toBeNull()
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})
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it('drops a non-string team name instead of rendering it', () => {
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expect(
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parseTeamMembersPayload({ data: { members: [], teamName: 42 } }),
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).toMatchObject({ members: [], teamName: null })
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})
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it('only grants management affordances on explicit boolean true', () => {
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expect(
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parseTeamMembersPayload({
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data: { members: [], invitations: 'oops', isOwner: 'yes', canInvite: 1 },
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}),
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).toMatchObject({ invitations: [], isOwner: false, canInvite: false })
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})
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})
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