Files
accounted/app/api/documents/verify/cron/route.ts
T
Jakob Wennberg 77becf3d65 fix(documents): record archive integrity checks in their own ledger so the nightly control advances again (#2108)
The 03:00 WORM verification cron stamped last_integrity_check_at on
document_attachments. enforce_period_lock_documents() fires on any UPDATE of a
row whose journal entry sits in a closed or locked period, without checking
whether the entry link actually changed, so a read-only integrity stamp was
rejected. The queue orders last_integrity_check_at ASC NULLS FIRST, so the
rejected rows re-sorted to the head every night and the batch became
permanently 200/200 blocked. Both call sites discarded the update error, so
nothing logged and nothing alerted.

Prod state: 34 557 current-version documents, 24 083 never checked, last
successful stamp 2026-08-31 03:00, nightly successes already decayed to
single digits.

Migration 017's enforcement triggers are legally required and never-touch, so
this does not narrow the trigger. The verification outcome moves to its own
document_integrity_checks table and the cron stops writing document_attachments
altogether, which takes the trigger off the write path. The legacy column stays
in place. Failures are now counted, logged and reported in the route's summary:
the silence is why this went unnoticed for weeks.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 14:23:05 +02:00

273 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript

import { createServiceRoleClient } from '@/lib/supabase/service-client'
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import { withCronContext } from '@/lib/api/with-cron-context'
import { downloadDocumentObject } from '@/lib/core/documents/document-service'
import { errorResponse, errorResponseFromCode } from '@/lib/errors/get-structured-error'
/**
* GET /api/documents/verify/cron: nightly 03:00 UTC (schedule in vercel.json).
* Spot-checks WORM archive integrity by recomputing SHA-256 for the next
* batch of documents and appending the outcome to document_integrity_checks.
* Hash mismatches and unreadable storage objects additionally get an
* INTEGRITY_FAILURE row in the audit log, which is the durable incident
* surface.
*
* Both the queue and the stamp live in document_integrity_checks and NOT in
* document_attachments.last_integrity_check_at (now legacy): any UPDATE of a
* document linked to an entry in a closed/locked period is rejected by
* enforce_period_lock_documents() (migration 017, legally required and never
* touched), which had this cron wedged at 200 of 200 rejected per night with
* both write errors discarded. See
* supabase/migrations/20260901130000_document_integrity_checks.sql.
*/
// Vercel function budget; verification is sequential, see batch size below.
export const maxDuration = 300
// Measured ~0.8s per document (download + hash + ledger append), so 200
// documents finish in ~160s with headroom inside the 300s budget. The previous
// default of 500 hit the platform timeout around item ~250 every night, so the
// tail of the queue was never reached.
const DEFAULT_VERIFY_BATCH_SIZE = 200
type ServiceClient = ReturnType<typeof createServiceRoleClient>
type IntegrityResult = 'passed' | 'hash_mismatch' | 'object_missing'
/** One row of public.next_documents_for_integrity_check(). */
interface QueuedDocument {
id: string
user_id: string
company_id: string
storage_path: string
sha256_hash: string
file_name: string
last_checked_at: string | null
}
/**
* Append the outcome of one check to the integrity ledger. The write error is
* returned, never swallowed: a lost ledger row leaves the document at the head
* of the queue, and discarding exactly this error is why the control stayed
* dead for weeks without anyone noticing.
*/
async function recordCheck(
supabase: ServiceClient,
doc: QueuedDocument,
result: IntegrityResult,
computedHash: string | null,
detail: string | null
): Promise<{ error: { message: string } | null }> {
const { error } = await supabase.from('document_integrity_checks').insert({
company_id: doc.company_id,
document_id: doc.id,
checked_at: new Date().toISOString(),
expected_sha256: doc.sha256_hash,
computed_sha256: computedHash,
storage_path: doc.storage_path,
result,
detail,
})
return { error }
}
export const GET = withCronContext('cron.documents_verify', async (_request, ctx) => {
const supabaseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL
const supabaseServiceKey = process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
if (!supabaseUrl || !supabaseServiceKey) {
return errorResponseFromCode('INTERNAL_ERROR', ctx.log, {
requestId: ctx.requestId,
details: { reason: 'Missing Supabase configuration' },
})
}
const supabase = createServiceRoleClient(supabaseUrl, supabaseServiceKey)
const batchSize =
parseInt(process.env.DOCUMENT_VERIFY_BATCH_SIZE || '', 10) || DEFAULT_VERIFY_BATCH_SIZE
// Least-recently-checked first, never-checked ahead of those, tie-broken on
// created_at so the drain is a deterministic FIFO rather than heap order.
const { data, error: fetchError } = await supabase.rpc('next_documents_for_integrity_check', {
p_limit: batchSize,
})
if (fetchError) {
ctx.log.error('failed to fetch documents for verify', fetchError)
return errorResponse(fetchError, ctx.log, { requestId: ctx.requestId })
}
const documents = (data ?? []) as QueuedDocument[]
if (documents.length === 0) {
return NextResponse.json({ message: 'No documents to verify', processed: 0 })
}
let verified = 0
let failures = 0
let missingObjects = 0
// Ledger and audit writes the database rejected. Counted, logged and shipped
// in the response so a broken write path shows up on the first run instead
// of weeks later.
let writeFailures = 0
const summary = await ctx.forEach('document', documents, async (doc, itemCtx) => {
// Dual-layout download: the batch is snapshotted up front, and a
// concurrent Phase B backfill (scripts/backfill-document-storage-paths.ts)
// can re-home an object from the legacy uploader-scoped key to the
// company-scoped key (and later remove the source) mid-batch, leaving
// doc.storage_path stale. Trusting the stale pointer here wrote a
// PERMANENT false DOCUMENT_OBJECT_MISSING INTEGRITY_FAILURE row into the
// immutable audit log for a healthy document. The helper tries the
// stored pointer first, then the alternate layout.
const { blob: fileData, error: downloadError } = await downloadDocumentObject(
supabase,
doc.storage_path,
doc.company_id
)
if (downloadError || !fileData) {
// The storage object is unreadable: surface it as an incident in the
// audit log. The action stays INTEGRITY_FAILURE because the DB check
// constraint audit_log_action_check allows a fixed set of actions;
// the DOCUMENT_OBJECT_MISSING marker in description and new_state
// distinguishes a missing object from a hash mismatch.
const reason = downloadError?.message || 'download_failed'
const { error: auditError } = await supabase.from('audit_log').insert({
user_id: doc.user_id,
company_id: doc.company_id,
action: 'INTEGRITY_FAILURE',
table_name: 'document_attachments',
record_id: doc.id,
description: `DOCUMENT_OBJECT_MISSING: storage object for document "${doc.file_name}" at "${doc.storage_path}" could not be downloaded: ${reason}`,
old_state: { sha256_hash: doc.sha256_hash },
new_state: { reason: 'DOCUMENT_OBJECT_MISSING', download_error: reason },
})
if (auditError) {
// Append no ledger row, so the document keeps its place at the head of
// the queue and the incident write is re-attempted on the next run.
writeFailures++
itemCtx.log.error('audit insert failed for missing object', new Error(auditError.message), {
documentId: doc.id,
})
throw new Error(`audit insert failed for missing object: ${auditError.message}`)
}
const { error: ledgerError } = await recordCheck(
supabase,
doc,
'object_missing',
null,
`DOCUMENT_OBJECT_MISSING: ${reason}`
)
if (ledgerError) {
writeFailures++
itemCtx.log.error('integrity ledger write failed', new Error(ledgerError.message), {
documentId: doc.id,
result: 'object_missing',
})
throw new Error(`integrity ledger write failed: ${ledgerError.message}`)
}
missingObjects++
itemCtx.log.error('document object missing', new Error(reason), {
documentId: doc.id,
fileName: doc.file_name,
storagePath: doc.storage_path,
})
throw new Error(`DOCUMENT_OBJECT_MISSING: ${reason}`)
}
const buffer = await fileData.arrayBuffer()
const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', buffer)
const hashArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))
const computedHash = hashArray.map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')
const isValid = computedHash === doc.sha256_hash
if (!isValid) {
// Audit row before ledger row: if the ledger row landed first and the
// audit write then failed, the document would leave the queue with the
// incident lost. This order re-checks it tomorrow instead.
const { error: auditError } = await supabase.from('audit_log').insert({
user_id: doc.user_id,
company_id: doc.company_id,
action: 'INTEGRITY_FAILURE',
table_name: 'document_attachments',
record_id: doc.id,
description: `Integrity check failed for document "${doc.file_name}": stored hash ${doc.sha256_hash}, computed hash ${computedHash}`,
old_state: { sha256_hash: doc.sha256_hash },
new_state: { computed_hash: computedHash },
})
if (auditError) {
writeFailures++
itemCtx.log.error('audit insert failed for hash mismatch', new Error(auditError.message), {
documentId: doc.id,
})
throw new Error(`audit insert failed for hash mismatch: ${auditError.message}`)
}
}
const { error: ledgerError } = await recordCheck(
supabase,
doc,
isValid ? 'passed' : 'hash_mismatch',
computedHash,
isValid ? null : `stored hash ${doc.sha256_hash}, computed hash ${computedHash}`
)
if (ledgerError) {
writeFailures++
itemCtx.log.error('integrity ledger write failed', new Error(ledgerError.message), {
documentId: doc.id,
result: isValid ? 'passed' : 'hash_mismatch',
})
throw new Error(`integrity ledger write failed: ${ledgerError.message}`)
}
if (!isValid) {
itemCtx.log.error('integrity failure', new Error('hash_mismatch'), {
documentId: doc.id,
fileName: doc.file_name,
storedHash: doc.sha256_hash,
computedHash,
})
failures++
} else {
verified++
}
})
ctx.log.info('document verify summary', {
processed: summary.total,
verified,
failures,
missingObjects,
writeFailures,
downloadErrors: summary.failed,
})
if (writeFailures > 0) {
// Loud on its own line: a rejected ledger write means the queue does not
// advance, which is exactly the silent stall this cron just came out of.
ctx.log.error('integrity ledger writes rejected', new Error('integrity_write_failed'), {
processed: summary.total,
writeFailures,
})
}
return NextResponse.json({
processed: summary.total,
verified,
failures,
missingObjects,
writeFailures,
errors: summary.failed,
})
})