* feat(white-label): invite-only signup for brand domains
A brand domain belongs to the partner's people (founder decision
2026-08-27): only allowlisted or invited users may create an account on
an invite-only brand domain; everyone else is shown an interstitial that
sends them to the canonical Accounted signup.
- brands.signup_mode ('open' default / 'invite_only') +
brand_signup_allowlist (lowercase emails, team-scoped RLS, owner/admin
writes) + create_company_for_brand_signup RPC, with pg-real coverage
- server-side gate (lib/auth/brand-signup-gate.ts) enforced on every
signup path: email signup moved to POST /api/auth/signup (the browser
used to call GoTrue directly, so a client-side check would be
bypassable), BankID gated in /bankid/complete, Google covered by the
dashboard layout's brand-domain bounce
- company invites bypass the allowlist: the invite is the authorization
- register page interstitial on gated brands (no email in the outbound
URL), sv+en strings
- dashboard layout bounces non-belonging sessions off gated brand hosts
to the canonical domain (navigation rule like WL-01, not a security
boundary)
- allowlisted signups' onboarding-created companies attach to the
brand's byra team via the new RPC, so WL-01 homes them on the brand
domain; the allowlist entry recorded by an owner/admin stands in for
the WL-15 admin gate
- byra cockpit page /clients/access + /api/clients/signup-access to
manage the mode and the allowlist
All existing brands default to 'open': behavior is byte-identical until
a brand is flipped to invite_only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByL5dQXG8gGLtNBPj8g2C4
* fix(white-label): rollback brand-signup company with the service client
Skeptic (correctness) found that a brand-signup company created under the
service role rolled back with the cookie-session client: `companies` has
RLS and no FOR DELETE policy, so the delete was a silent 0-row no-op,
stranding a member-less ghost company on the partner's byra team. Pass an
optional rollbackClient to createCompanyCore and hand it the service
client on that path; user_preferences.active_company_id then clears itself
via its ON DELETE SET NULL FK once the company row is actually deleted.
Also map a validateBody 400 (flat envelope, no code) on the register page
to the specific email-invalid field message instead of the generic one,
since the client already pre-gates password strength.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByL5dQXG8gGLtNBPj8g2C4
* fix(white-label): fail-safe brand lookup, pg-test seed, anonymize fixtures
Second resolve-pr cycle: skeptic + CodeRabbit findings and a green-up.
- Fail safe on a brands-table error (CodeRabbit CWE-285): the gate treated a
failed resolveBrandByHost as an unbranded host, opening invite-only signup
during a transient DB blip. resolveBrandResultByHost now distinguishes
"no brand" from "lookup failed"; the gate returns lookupFailed and the
email + BankID routes answer 503 (retry), never creating an account.
- pg-real: the RLS delete test seeded its row inside withUserContext, which
always rolls back, so the owner DELETE saw zero rows. Seed on the superuser
pool instead.
- Anonymize every test/fixture brand to the repo's existing synthetic
placeholder (Siffra / app.siffra.se): no real partner names in code.
- SignupAccessManager: functional setData updates so a concurrent mode
toggle and an add/remove do not clobber each other's snapshot (CodeRabbit).
- Route a transient-error message through i18n instead of the raw envelope
(raw-user-error guard); new register.error_temporary sv+en.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByL5dQXG8gGLtNBPj8g2C4
* test(white-label): anonymize new signup-gate fixtures; log oracle residual
Rename the placeholder brand in the four new brand-signup test files to a
clearly-fake, partner-unrelated name (Testbrand / app.testbrand.example);
the previous placeholder echoed a real partner. Scoped to files this PR
creates; the repo-wide legacy placeholder is left for a separate cleanup.
Also record in DECISIONS.md that the feature ships accepting the
low-severity allowlist-enumeration residual (captcha-free 403 vs 200 on
the signup endpoint), with rate-limiting as the follow-up option.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByL5dQXG8gGLtNBPj8g2C4
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
221 lines
6.8 KiB
TypeScript
221 lines
6.8 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { requireAuth } from '@/lib/auth/require-auth'
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import { createServiceClientNoCookies } from '@/lib/auth/api-keys'
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import { getByraMembership } from '@/lib/clients/fetch-client-overview'
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import { clearBrandCache, resolveBrandForTeam, type Brand } from '@/lib/branding/resolve'
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import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import { validateBody } from '@/lib/api/validate'
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import {
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BrandAllowlistAddSchema,
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BrandAllowlistRemoveSchema,
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BrandSignupModeSchema,
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} from '@/lib/api/schemas'
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/**
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* /api/clients/signup-access: the byrå cockpit's management surface for
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* invite-only signup on the team's brand domain (2026-08-27).
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*
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* GET signup mode + allowlist entries (any byrå team member)
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* PATCH { signup_mode } flip open/invite_only (owner/admin)
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* POST { email, note? } add an allowlist entry (owner/admin)
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* DELETE { id } remove an allowlist entry (owner/admin)
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*
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* Uses requireAuth() directly (the sanctioned withRouteContext opt-out, MFA
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* still enforced): byrå staff without a company of their own are the
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* cockpit's primary persona, and this surface needs no active company.
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*
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* Allowlist reads/writes go through the caller's client so RLS enforces the
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* same team/role rules a second time. The signup_mode flip uses the service
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* client because brands rows are ops-managed (no user write policies); the
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* owner/admin check here is the authorization for that single column.
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*/
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type Access =
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ok: true
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supabase: SupabaseClient
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userId: string
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role: 'owner' | 'admin' | 'member'
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brand: Brand
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}
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| { ok: false; response: NextResponse }
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async function resolveAccess(opts: { write: boolean }): Promise<Access> {
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const auth = await requireAuth()
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if (auth.error) return { ok: false, response: auth.error }
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const { user, supabase } = auth
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const membership = await getByraMembership(supabase, user.id)
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if (!membership) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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response: NextResponse.json(
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{
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error: {
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code: 'FORBIDDEN',
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message: 'Endast byråteam har åtkomst till registreringsinställningarna.',
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message_en: 'Signup access settings are only available to byrå teams.',
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},
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},
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{ status: 403 },
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),
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}
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}
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if (opts.write && membership.role !== 'owner' && membership.role !== 'admin') {
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return {
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ok: false,
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response: NextResponse.json(
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{
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error: {
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code: 'FORBIDDEN',
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message: 'Endast byråns ägare och administratörer kan ändra registreringsåtkomst.',
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message_en: 'Only byrå owners and admins can change signup access.',
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},
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},
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{ status: 403 },
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),
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}
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}
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const brand = await resolveBrandForTeam(membership.teamId)
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if (!brand) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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response: NextResponse.json(
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{
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error: {
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code: 'NOT_FOUND',
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message: 'Byrån har ingen egen domän ännu.',
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message_en: 'The byrå has no white-label domain yet.',
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},
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},
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{ status: 404 },
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),
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}
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}
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return { ok: true, supabase, userId: user.id, role: membership.role, brand }
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}
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export async function GET() {
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const access = await resolveAccess({ write: false })
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if (!access.ok) return access.response
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const { data: entries, error } = await access.supabase
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.from('brand_signup_allowlist')
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.select('id, email, note, created_at')
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.eq('brand_id', access.brand.id)
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.order('created_at', { ascending: false })
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if (error) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: { code: 'INTERNAL', message: 'Kunde inte hämta listan.', message_en: 'Could not load the list.' } },
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{ status: 500 },
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)
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}
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return NextResponse.json({
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data: {
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brand: {
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domain: access.brand.domain,
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appName: access.brand.appName,
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signupMode: access.brand.signupMode,
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},
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role: access.role,
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entries: entries ?? [],
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},
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})
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}
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export async function PATCH(request: Request) {
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const access = await resolveAccess({ write: true })
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if (!access.ok) return access.response
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const validation = await validateBody(request, BrandSignupModeSchema)
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if (!validation.success) return validation.response
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const service = createServiceClientNoCookies()
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const { error } = await service
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.from('brands')
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.update({ signup_mode: validation.data.signup_mode })
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.eq('id', access.brand.id)
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if (error) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: { code: 'INTERNAL', message: 'Kunde inte spara.', message_en: 'Could not save.' } },
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{ status: 500 },
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)
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}
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// The host-resolution cache holds the old mode for up to ~60s; drop it so
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// the gate on this server instance flips immediately. Other instances
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// converge within the TTL, same as every other brand edit.
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clearBrandCache()
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return NextResponse.json({ data: { signupMode: validation.data.signup_mode } })
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}
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export async function POST(request: Request) {
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const access = await resolveAccess({ write: true })
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if (!access.ok) return access.response
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const validation = await validateBody(request, BrandAllowlistAddSchema)
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if (!validation.success) return validation.response
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const { data: entry, error } = await access.supabase
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.from('brand_signup_allowlist')
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.insert({
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brand_id: access.brand.id,
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email: validation.data.email,
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note: validation.data.note ?? null,
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created_by: access.userId,
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})
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.select('id, email, note, created_at')
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.single()
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if (error) {
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if (error.code === '23505') {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{
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error: {
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code: 'CONFLICT',
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message: 'E-postadressen finns redan i listan.',
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message_en: 'That email is already on the list.',
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},
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},
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{ status: 409 },
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)
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}
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: { code: 'INTERNAL', message: 'Kunde inte lägga till.', message_en: 'Could not add the email.' } },
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{ status: 500 },
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)
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}
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return NextResponse.json({ data: entry })
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}
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export async function DELETE(request: Request) {
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const access = await resolveAccess({ write: true })
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if (!access.ok) return access.response
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const validation = await validateBody(request, BrandAllowlistRemoveSchema)
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if (!validation.success) return validation.response
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const { error } = await access.supabase
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.from('brand_signup_allowlist')
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.delete()
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.eq('id', validation.data.id)
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.eq('brand_id', access.brand.id)
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if (error) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: { code: 'INTERNAL', message: 'Kunde inte ta bort.', message_en: 'Could not remove the email.' } },
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{ status: 500 },
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)
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}
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return NextResponse.json({ data: { removed: validation.data.id } })
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}
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