Files
accounted/app/api/auth/signup/__tests__/route.test.ts
T
Mattsson 4f6ecad549 feat(white-label): invite-only signup for brand domains (#1995)
* feat(white-label): invite-only signup for brand domains

A brand domain belongs to the partner's people (founder decision
2026-08-27): only allowlisted or invited users may create an account on
an invite-only brand domain; everyone else is shown an interstitial that
sends them to the canonical Accounted signup.

- brands.signup_mode ('open' default / 'invite_only') +
  brand_signup_allowlist (lowercase emails, team-scoped RLS, owner/admin
  writes) + create_company_for_brand_signup RPC, with pg-real coverage
- server-side gate (lib/auth/brand-signup-gate.ts) enforced on every
  signup path: email signup moved to POST /api/auth/signup (the browser
  used to call GoTrue directly, so a client-side check would be
  bypassable), BankID gated in /bankid/complete, Google covered by the
  dashboard layout's brand-domain bounce
- company invites bypass the allowlist: the invite is the authorization
- register page interstitial on gated brands (no email in the outbound
  URL), sv+en strings
- dashboard layout bounces non-belonging sessions off gated brand hosts
  to the canonical domain (navigation rule like WL-01, not a security
  boundary)
- allowlisted signups' onboarding-created companies attach to the
  brand's byra team via the new RPC, so WL-01 homes them on the brand
  domain; the allowlist entry recorded by an owner/admin stands in for
  the WL-15 admin gate
- byra cockpit page /clients/access + /api/clients/signup-access to
  manage the mode and the allowlist

All existing brands default to 'open': behavior is byte-identical until
a brand is flipped to invite_only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByL5dQXG8gGLtNBPj8g2C4

* fix(white-label): rollback brand-signup company with the service client

Skeptic (correctness) found that a brand-signup company created under the
service role rolled back with the cookie-session client: `companies` has
RLS and no FOR DELETE policy, so the delete was a silent 0-row no-op,
stranding a member-less ghost company on the partner's byra team. Pass an
optional rollbackClient to createCompanyCore and hand it the service
client on that path; user_preferences.active_company_id then clears itself
via its ON DELETE SET NULL FK once the company row is actually deleted.

Also map a validateBody 400 (flat envelope, no code) on the register page
to the specific email-invalid field message instead of the generic one,
since the client already pre-gates password strength.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByL5dQXG8gGLtNBPj8g2C4

* fix(white-label): fail-safe brand lookup, pg-test seed, anonymize fixtures

Second resolve-pr cycle: skeptic + CodeRabbit findings and a green-up.

- Fail safe on a brands-table error (CodeRabbit CWE-285): the gate treated a
  failed resolveBrandByHost as an unbranded host, opening invite-only signup
  during a transient DB blip. resolveBrandResultByHost now distinguishes
  "no brand" from "lookup failed"; the gate returns lookupFailed and the
  email + BankID routes answer 503 (retry), never creating an account.
- pg-real: the RLS delete test seeded its row inside withUserContext, which
  always rolls back, so the owner DELETE saw zero rows. Seed on the superuser
  pool instead.
- Anonymize every test/fixture brand to the repo's existing synthetic
  placeholder (Siffra / app.siffra.se): no real partner names in code.
- SignupAccessManager: functional setData updates so a concurrent mode
  toggle and an add/remove do not clobber each other's snapshot (CodeRabbit).
- Route a transient-error message through i18n instead of the raw envelope
  (raw-user-error guard); new register.error_temporary sv+en.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByL5dQXG8gGLtNBPj8g2C4

* test(white-label): anonymize new signup-gate fixtures; log oracle residual

Rename the placeholder brand in the four new brand-signup test files to a
clearly-fake, partner-unrelated name (Testbrand / app.testbrand.example);
the previous placeholder echoed a real partner. Scoped to files this PR
creates; the repo-wide legacy placeholder is left for a separate cleanup.

Also record in DECISIONS.md that the feature ships accepting the
low-severity allowlist-enumeration residual (captcha-free 403 vs 200 on
the signup endpoint), with rate-limiting as the follow-up option.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ByL5dQXG8gGLtNBPj8g2C4

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 18:32:52 +02:00

180 lines
5.7 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest'
import { parseJsonResponse } from '@/tests/helpers'
const signUpMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn())
vi.mock('@/lib/supabase/server', () => ({
createClient: vi.fn(async () => ({ auth: { signUp: signUpMock } })),
}))
const gateMock = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn())
vi.mock('@/lib/auth/brand-signup-gate', async (importOriginal) => {
const actual =
await importOriginal<typeof import('@/lib/auth/brand-signup-gate')>()
return {
...actual,
evaluateBrandSignupGate: (...args: unknown[]) => gateMock(...args),
}
})
import { POST } from '../route'
function makeRequest(
body: unknown,
headers: Record<string, string> = {},
): Request {
return new Request('https://internal/api/auth/signup', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...headers },
body: JSON.stringify(body),
})
}
const validBody = { email: 'kund@example.com', password: 'Str0ng!Pass' }
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks()
gateMock.mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true, brand: null, via: 'no_brand' })
signUpMock.mockResolvedValue({
data: { user: { identities: [{ id: 'i1' }] }, session: null },
error: null,
})
})
describe('POST /api/auth/signup', () => {
it('400s on invalid body', async () => {
const res = await POST(makeRequest({ email: 'not-an-email', password: 'x' }))
expect(res.status).toBe(400)
expect(signUpMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('403s with signup_not_allowed when the gate blocks', async () => {
gateMock.mockResolvedValue({ allowed: false, brand: { id: 'brand-1' } })
const res = await POST(
makeRequest(validBody, { host: 'app.testbrand.example' }),
)
const { body: json } = await parseJsonResponse<{ error: { code: string } }>(res)
expect(res.status).toBe(403)
expect(json.error.code).toBe('signup_not_allowed')
expect(signUpMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('503s (fail safe) when the brand lookup errors, without creating an account', async () => {
gateMock.mockResolvedValue({ allowed: false, brand: null, lookupFailed: true })
const res = await POST(
makeRequest(validBody, { host: 'app.testbrand.example' }),
)
const { body: json } = await parseJsonResponse<{ error: { code: string } }>(res)
expect(res.status).toBe(503)
expect(json.error.code).toBe('brand_lookup_failed')
expect(signUpMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('feeds the gate the forwarded host, normalized email and invite cookie', async () => {
await POST(
makeRequest(
{ ...validBody, email: ' Kund@Example.COM ' },
{
host: 'internal',
'x-forwarded-host': 'app.testbrand.example',
cookie: 'gnubok-invite-token=gnubok_inv_x',
},
),
)
expect(gateMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
host: 'app.testbrand.example',
email: 'kund@example.com',
inviteToken: 'gnubok_inv_x',
})
})
it('signs up with a confirmation callback on the originating host', async () => {
const res = await POST(
makeRequest(validBody, {
'x-forwarded-host': 'app.testbrand.example',
'x-forwarded-proto': 'https',
}),
)
const { body: json } = await parseJsonResponse<{ data: { status: string } }>(res)
expect(res.status).toBe(200)
expect(json.data.status).toBe('confirmation_sent')
expect(signUpMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
email: 'kund@example.com',
password: 'Str0ng!Pass',
options: {
emailRedirectTo: 'https://app.testbrand.example/auth/callback',
},
})
})
it('forwards the captcha token and a safe next path', async () => {
await POST(
makeRequest(
{ ...validBody, captchaToken: 'tok', next: '/api/mcp-oauth/authorize?x=1' },
{ host: 'app.accounted.se' },
),
)
const call = signUpMock.mock.calls[0][0]
expect(call.options.captchaToken).toBe('tok')
expect(call.options.emailRedirectTo).toBe(
'https://app.accounted.se/auth/callback?next=%2Fapi%2Fmcp-oauth%2Fauthorize%3Fx%3D1',
)
})
it('drops an unsafe next path instead of forwarding it', async () => {
await POST(
makeRequest(
{ ...validBody, next: 'https://evil.example.com/phish' },
{ host: 'app.accounted.se' },
),
)
const call = signUpMock.mock.calls[0][0]
expect(call.options.emailRedirectTo).toBe(
'https://app.accounted.se/auth/callback',
)
})
it('maps a GoTrue error to the canonical envelope', async () => {
signUpMock.mockResolvedValue({
data: { user: null, session: null },
error: { code: 'weak_password', message: 'Password is too weak', status: 422 },
})
const res = await POST(makeRequest(validBody, { host: 'app.accounted.se' }))
const { body: json } = await parseJsonResponse<{ error: { code: string; message: string } }>(res)
expect(res.status).toBe(422)
expect(json.error.code).toBe('weak_password')
})
it('reports duplicate for the obfuscated existing-account response', async () => {
signUpMock.mockResolvedValue({
data: { user: { identities: [] }, session: null },
error: null,
})
const res = await POST(makeRequest(validBody, { host: 'app.accounted.se' }))
const { body: json } = await parseJsonResponse<{ data: { status: string } }>(res)
expect(json.data.status).toBe('duplicate')
})
it('reports session for auto-confirmed signups', async () => {
signUpMock.mockResolvedValue({
data: { user: { identities: [{ id: 'i1' }] }, session: { access_token: 'x' } },
error: null,
})
const res = await POST(makeRequest(validBody, { host: 'app.accounted.se' }))
const { body: json } = await parseJsonResponse<{ data: { status: string } }>(res)
expect(json.data.status).toBe('session')
})
})