* fix(sales-orders): pin the sales_order_items embed FK and teach the embed guard composite keys Migration 20260902180000_sales_orders_hardening added a composite (sales_order_id, company_id) foreign key from sales_order_items to sales_orders next to the original single-column one. PostgREST then saw two relationships and answered every `items:sales_order_items(*)` embed with HTTP 300 / PGRST201, so kundorder list, detail, create and the MCP list tool all failed on prod and staging with "Oväntat serverfel". - Hint the three embeds with `!sales_order_items_sales_order_id_fkey` (route, load service, MCP list tool). - scripts/checks/ambiguous-embed.mjs only parsed single-column `FOREIGN KEY (col)`, which is why the ratchet reported 0 for this pair. It now reads composite column lists (named or default constraint name) in both CREATE TABLE and ALTER TABLE, derives the same 17 ambiguous pairs prod's pg_constraint reports, and flags all three shipped sites on main. - Unit tests for the composite shapes: alongside a single-column key, replacing one, and inline in CREATE TABLE. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q7xJQL2aZo6iRHxCZNntUq * fix(checks): drop composite embed edges when DROP COLUMN removes a member column Postgres drops every foreign key a column takes part in, so the ambiguous-embed parser must release a composite edge (and its constraint name) when one of its columns is dropped, not only the single-column key. Otherwise a later migration would keep a pair armed for a relationship that no longer exists and reject valid embeds. Regression case added. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q7xJQL2aZo6iRHxCZNntUq --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Accounted MCP server
JSON-RPC 2.0 server exposing the Accounted bookkeeping engine to MCP clients (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, etc.). Endpoint: /api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp. Add ?tool_namespace=accounted for the Accounted tool names. Requests without it retain the legacy Gnubok namespace. OAuth and stdio bridges live alongside the API surface: see app/api/mcp-oauth/, packages/accounted-mcp/, and the compatibility package in packages/gnubok-mcp/.
Tool authoring contract
Enforced by tests in __tests__/: these are not style preferences, they're guard rails.
additionalProperties: falseon everyinputSchema. Guarded bystrict-schemas.test.ts. Forces clear rejections on hallucinated fields instead of silent ignores.- Descriptions ≤ 280 chars. Guarded by
output-schema.test.ts. NoArgs:/Returns:/Examples:prose: those belong in JSON Schema. Use agent-native hints ("Use to…", "Call X first", "HIGH risk"). - Staged-operation envelope for write tools:
outputSchema: STAGED_OPERATION_SCHEMA(server.ts). Fields:staged, risk_level, actor, message, preview, period_status?, next?. Thestaged: trueboolean is the explicit completion signal; agents must not infer completion from prose. Do NOT introduce a parallel{ success, shouldContinue, output }envelope. period_statusthreading: any tool that ties to a fiscal-period-bound date (categorize, mark paid, create voucher, correct/reverse entry, approve supplier invoice) passesdateForPeriodChecktostagePendingOperation. Response then includesperiod_status: { period_id, status: open|locked|closed, lock_date }so widgets and agents disable writes without round-trips.- Scope mapping: every new tool needs an entry in
lib/auth/api-keys.tsTOOL_SCOPE_MAP. Missing entries default to deny. - Tests for new write tools: add staging-gate coverage to
__tests__/voucher-tools.test.ts(or a sibling) plus executor coverage tolib/pending-operations/__tests__/voucher-executors.test.tsif the tool stages a newoperation_type.
Determinism / cache stability
Tool definitions (name, description, inputSchema, outputSchema, annotations) are declared as static object literals at module load: no timestamps, no UUIDs, no Date/Math.random in the definition layer. This makes the tools/list JSON payload byte-stable across requests, which lets agent-side prompt caches stay warm. Do not introduce per-request non-determinism into the definitions block. Anything time-bound or random belongs inside execute().
For internal Anthropic API usage (the SDK is called from lib/ai/provider.ts and lib/ai/services/anthropic-family.ts; features such as extensions/general/invoice-inbox/lib/extract-invoice-fields.ts go through getAiService() in lib/ai rather than the SDK directly): annotate stable prefixes with cache_control: { type: 'ephemeral' } and log usage.cache_read_input_tokens for hit-ratio observability. The 1h TTL from the agent-native API plan (item 10) requires the direct Anthropic API; Accounted's Bedrock path defaults to a shorter TTL.
Payload-size watchdog
payload-size.bench.test.ts enforces a tools/list JSON payload ceiling. If the test fires, the right answer is rarely "raise the ceiling". Instead, trim descriptions or set specialized wide tools to catalogVisibility: 'search'. Those tools remain discoverable with full schemas through gnubok_search_tools and callable through tools/call on the wire without bloating the default catalog. Claude.ai only calls tools present in tools/list, so a tool that a user or a skill must call directly stays in the default catalog.
Where things live
server.ts: the tools array + JSON-RPC dispatchertool-result.ts:withNext(),toToolError()response helpersresources/: read-onlyAccounted://URIs, registered inresources/index.ts:company/current,period/active,recent-activity,capabilities,attention,chart-of-accounts,settings/vat-treatments,booking-templates,ledger/context,reconciliation/summarywidgets/: inline HTML widgets (receipt-matcher, vat-review, pending-operations)prompts/: slash-command-style promptsskills/: domain-knowledge skill bodies served viagnubok_load_skillpublic-tools.ts: lazy authentication (issue #1814).ANONYMOUS_METHODS(initialize, ping, tools/prompts/resources listing) and the threePUBLIC_TOOLS(gnubok_search_tools,gnubok_list_skills,gnubok_load_skill) answer without credentials, rate-limited per truncated IP; every othertools/callgets a transport-level 401 +WWW-AuthenticatefromhandleMcpRequestinserver.ts, which is the challenge clients turn into their Connect prompttasks.ts: MCP Tasks extension (io.modelcontextprotocol/tasks): durable handles for long-running tool calls, rows inmcp_tasks(service-role writes only)origin-guard.ts: Origin-header validation on the Streamable HTTP endpoint (DNS-rebinding defence required by the MCP spec)staging-pii-guard.ts: refuses a plaintext personnummer in stagedpending_operationsparams/preview, so every staging tool inherits the encrypt-at-staging ruletool-namespace.ts:?tool_namespace=accountedhandling (accounted_*aliases for the canonicalgnubok_*ids)__tests__/: strictness guards + per-tool coverage