d708a85d4c
* feat: cloud backup to Google Drive + full-archive all-scope Adds a cloud-backup extension that uploads a full-company backup ZIP to the user's own Google Drive via OAuth (drive.file scope only). Refresh tokens are AES-256-GCM encrypted before being stored in extension_data. The full-archive export gains a scope=all mode for whole-company backups (per-period SIE under sie/, per-period rapporter/ subfolders, flat dokument/ manifest tagged with fiscal_period_id). An 80 MB size guard short-circuits generation before the platform response limit. Also fixes a latent bug in lib/core/audit/audit-service.ts where the parameter was named userId while the query filtered by company_id; the audit-trail API route was passing user.id so audit queries returned empty unless user and company shared a UUID. Drive-by: scope the dashboard "fresh start" localStorage key per companyId so dismissing the setup checklist in one company no longer carries over to others. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review comments on cloud backup + archive export - Extend audit trail to_date to end-of-day so last-day entries aren't silently excluded from period-scoped archives. - Apply 413 size-limit guard regardless of include_documents, using the overhead-only figure when documents are excluded. - Use crypto.randomUUID() for Drive multipart boundary to eliminate any collision risk with ZIP payload bytes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: migrate legacy setup-gate localStorage keys on dashboard Users who previously dismissed the setup checklist via the old global erp_setup_fresh_start or erp_checklist_dismissed keys were re-gated after the switch to a company-scoped key. Fall back to the legacy keys on read and migrate them to the scoped key on first hit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: update customer email handling and anonymization rules in supportmail-to-ticket skill * test: update audit trail to_date expectation for end-of-day timestamp Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
78 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
78 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'crypto'
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/**
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* AES-256-GCM encryption for long-lived refresh tokens stored in
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* extension_data. Key is derived from SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY (same
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* trust boundary as the database itself — anyone who can exfiltrate the
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* key can already read the data).
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*/
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const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm'
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function getKey(): Buffer {
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const secret = process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
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if (!secret) throw new Error('SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY is required')
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// Scope the key with a purpose string so this can't be confused with
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// oauth-codes.ts's derivation if both are ever compromised together.
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return crypto
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.createHash('sha256')
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.update('cloud-backup:v1:' + secret)
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.digest()
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}
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export function encryptToken(plaintext: string): string {
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const key = getKey()
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const iv = crypto.randomBytes(12)
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const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)
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const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()])
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const tag = cipher.getAuthTag()
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return Buffer.concat([iv, tag, encrypted]).toString('base64url')
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}
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export function decryptToken(ciphertext: string): string {
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const key = getKey()
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const combined = Buffer.from(ciphertext, 'base64url')
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const iv = combined.subarray(0, 12)
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const tag = combined.subarray(12, 28)
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const encrypted = combined.subarray(28)
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const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)
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decipher.setAuthTag(tag)
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const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(encrypted), decipher.final()])
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return decrypted.toString('utf8')
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}
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/**
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* Short-lived signed state parameter for OAuth CSRF protection.
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*
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* The state encodes `{userId, companyId, exp}` and is verified on the
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* callback. Stateless (no DB round-trip) and self-expiring.
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*/
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const STATE_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000
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interface StatePayload {
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u: string
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c: string
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e: number
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}
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export function createOAuthState(userId: string, companyId: string): string {
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const payload: StatePayload = {
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u: userId,
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c: companyId,
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e: Date.now() + STATE_TTL_MS,
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}
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return encryptToken(JSON.stringify(payload))
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}
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export function verifyOAuthState(
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state: string
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): { userId: string; companyId: string } | null {
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try {
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const payload = JSON.parse(decryptToken(state)) as StatePayload
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if (Date.now() > payload.e) return null
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return { userId: payload.u, companyId: payload.c }
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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}
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