b6332e9ff4
* feat(salary): one-click AGI submission with filing state machine and success feedback The AGI panel required users to know that "Ladda ner AGI-fil" was the generate step, then click submit, signing link, and kvittens manually. A nollkorning filing stalled on "AGI-XML saknas" pointing at a UI path that does not exist. - New primary button "Lamna in till Skatteverket" chains the existing endpoints client-side: generate XML if missing, POST underlag, poll kontrollresultat, create signing link, open Mina Sidor in a tab opened synchronously at click (popup-blocker safe). Inline stepper shows each step; the four old buttons become collapsed advanced/recovery actions, auto-expanded in stale-draft and rejected states. XML download stays visible and free for manual filing. - deriveAgiFilingState() + useAgiSubmission() lift the per-period submission record to the run page: the progress rail and salary hero now render the real state machine (generated, underlag inskickat, vantar pa BankID-signatur, inlamnad med kvittensnummer) instead of telling users to "lamna in" an already-submitted declaration. - Success card with kvittensnummer and signature metadata once signed, plus a toast when a poll flips the state while the page is open. - AGI kvittens cron every 15 min instead of every 2 h so filings signed on another device get stamped and emailed promptly. - Advanced submit also auto-generates, and the stale "Lon -> AGI -> Generera" error text now points at the real buttons. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(enable-banking): instant OAuth callback feedback and dead-attempt cleanup The bank redirect landed on a blank page for the several seconds the callback spent exchanging the PSD2 session and mirroring accounts, and every failed connect attempt left a status='error' row that rendered forever as an "Atgard kravs" card next to a successful retry, showing duplicate connections to the same bank. - Stream a branded "Slutfor bankanslutningen" progress page from the callback: the shell flushes before the session exchange starts and a script/meta redirect follows when the work completes, with a 30s slow-work escape hatch. Fast outcomes (denial, bad params, unknown state) keep their plain redirects. - Delete never-activated connection rows (no session_id, no accounts_data) on denial or exchange failure, and sweep leftovers for the same bank on the next connect. Established connections keep their "Atgard krävs" card via the accounts_data guard; FKs are ON DELETE SET NULL so deletion has no dependents. - Show "Banken ar ansluten: hamtar dina konton" while the settings panel loads after the callback instead of an anonymous spinner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): reject re-send of issued invoices and gate bookkeeping on the sent flip A direct POST to /api/invoices/[id]/send against an already-issued invoice re-emailed the customer and posted a second revenue verifikat (createInvoiceJournalEntry has no dedup), overwriting journal_entry_id and orphaning the first entry. Only the UI hid the button; the v1 route and the MCP commit executor already rejected non-drafts. - Non-draft invoices now return 409 INVOICE_ALREADY_SENT. - The draft to sent status flip is an optimistic lock (status guard plus row-count check); journal entry, accrual schedules, PDF archival and the invoice.sent event only run for the request that won the flip. - On a flip failure the journal entry is deferred: the row stays draft and a retry re-runs the pipeline, ending with exactly one verifikat. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): payment links, failure visibility and sandbox guard for recurring auto-send - sendInvoiceFromSchedule now auto-creates an online payment link via applyPaymentLinkToInvoice before rendering and passes the payment link QR to the PDF: parity with the dashboard and v1 send routes, which recurring invoices silently lacked. - The recurring cron persists last_run_warning both when a claimed run throws (hourly retries stay visible on the schedule) and when a stale schedule is rolled forward, so a deterministic failure can no longer skip a month silently. - Auto-send is blocked for sandbox companies at the email chokepoint (freeze-and-retain: the invoice is still generated as a draft), covering both the cron and the run-now route with one guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(salary): close the Fortnox payroll API gaps (phases 1-4) Payroll now runs end-to-end through the open API, including onboarding a client from another payroll system, with every write staged for approval. - v1: per-employee payslips (list/detail/PDF), payslip line writes, run roster attach/remove, absence ranges (per-day storage), jamkning fields, cutover opening balances (single + atomic bulk PUT), vacation balance + vacation-year-close. PUT added to the wrapper's idempotency/ test-key set (test keys could otherwise write through PUT). - MCP: 10 new tools (get_employee/get_payslip/list_absence/ get_vacation_balance reads + staged update_payslip_line, register_absence, create_employee, update_employee, set_employee_opening_balances, close_vacation_year), executors, risk tiers, op-type CHECK expansions. create_employee encrypts personnummer at staging: pending_operations never holds plaintext. - Scope-map audit retrofit: 11 formerly unmapped tools now scoped; BREAKING for keys that relied on the 4 default-allow writes. - Cutover: employee_opening_balances (derived lock trigger, self-unlocks on run correction), engine YTD/karens/liability integration, Ingaende saldon section in the employee editor. - Arbetsschema-lite: employees.hours_per_week/workdays_per_week drive the hourly/daily divisors; legacy 173/21 preserved exactly at defaults so existing pay math is byte-identical. - Vacation ledger + semesterberedning/arsavslut: recomputed per-year day balances (synced on book/correct, non-fatal), year-close with the min-20 floor, 5-year sparade-dagar expiry to forced payout, and a 2920/2940 drift adjustment via the bookkeeping engine; Semester dashboard card with preview-then-confirm dialog. - Fix: Zod 4 defaults leak through .partial(), which made every sparse employee PATCH fail validation and reset defaulted columns. Migrations 20260713100000/101000/110000/121000/122000 (applied to staging with version rows; prod via merge). vacation_ledger renamed from 20260713120000 to avoid colliding with vat_declaration_totals_rpc. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: cut dashboard page-load latency (region, round trips, caching, VAT RPC) The dominant cost was infrastructure: Vercel functions ran in iad1 (Washington D.C.) while Supabase (DB + auth) lives in eu-north-1 (Stockholm), so every request paid 4-5 transatlantic round trips of auth + company resolution before doing any real work (measured 530-1900ms for single-query GETs in prod logs). Pin functions to arn1 and cut the redundant work on top: - vercel.json: functions to arn1, same city as the database - getActiveCompanyId: preference + first-membership queries run in parallel; the fallback result doubles as validation in the common single-company case (one round trip instead of two sequential) - withRouteContext: Server-Timing header and authMs/companyMs/handlerMs in the op-completed log, so latency is attributable per phase - dashboard layout: nav badge counts off the critical path; DashboardNav loads them client-side via the new use-worklist-badges SWR hook with debounced realtime revalidation - swr (new dependency, approved): global provider; useCompanySettings shares one cache entry across consumers and renders from cache on back-navigation instead of re-showing skeletons - /pending: realtime refetch debounced; bulk operations previously fired 4 requests per row-change event - VAT declaration: new get_vat_declaration_totals RPC returns per-account totals, settlement-shape detection (#984) and source_type counts in ONE round trip instead of paging every entry+line through PostgREST. Account lists stay TS-side parameters so ACCOUNT_RUTA remains the single source of truth. Shape-exclusion coverage moved to tests/pg/vat-declaration-totals-rpc.pg.test.ts; DDL already applied to staging. - bundle: CommandPalette lazy-mounts on first Ctrl/Cmd+K, AgentChat dynamic-imports the markdown parser, @vercel/speed-insights (new dependency, approved) added for real-user timings The /salary fetch-waterfall fix from the same effort already landed inside 2084a756. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): settle öre-rounded payments from the mark-paid flow An invoice with öresavrundning shows a rounded "Att betala" on the PDF; the customer pays that amount (up to 50 öre off the stored öre total) and the invoice-page mark-paid flow rejected it with MATCH_AMOUNT_EXCEEDS_REMAINING: a dead end, while the bank-transaction match flow already absorbed the residual to 3740. - PaymentBookingDialog now proposes the rounded bank leg plus the 3740 residual line (credit when rounded up, debit when rounded down), resolved via getDisplayTotal from the per-invoice override and company_settings.ore_rounding. - settleInvoicePayment and the v1 mark-paid route absorb the sub-krona residual, gated by planInvoicePaymentForLines: absorption applies ONLY when the caller lines carry the exact residual on 3740; otherwise the strict plan applies (sub-krona partials stay partial, no-3740 overshoots keep the 400), so the GL can never diverge from the AR sub-ledger. - planInvoicePayment absorb-band boundary tightened to >= 1 kr: an exactly-1-kr overshoot used to slip past both the guard and the absorb branch and silently over-record paid_amount (pre-existing on the bank-match path). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): resolve all 7 PR compliance findings - ASVS V3.3: per-request CSP nonce on the enable-banking finalize page (mirrors the mcp-oauth consent page); inline scripts are nonce-bound - ASVS V16: decouple callback finalize work from the response stream (eager promise + next/server after()) so a client disconnect cannot drop session persistence or the consent_granted audit emit - ISO 27001 A.8.15: failed audit-event emits log through the structured logger with a stable message for log-based alerting - ASVS V2.3: recurring-invoice cron and run-now routes resolve isSandboxCompany themselves and pass an explicit suppressAutoSend flag (defence in depth around the email chokepoint, freeze-and-retain kept) - ISO 27001 A.8.11: stagePendingOperation rejects plaintext personnummer-bearing keys in params/preview_data (key-based guard; EF org numbers make value-matching unsafe) - ASVS V4.5: employee PATCH body is truly sparse; cleared number fields are omitted instead of resetting DB values to hardcoded fallbacks - ASVS V8.2.1: route-level tests pin the v1 cross-company deny (404 by convention, not 403) on the payslip PDF endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: implement vacation-year basis change validation and error handling - Added tests to block vacation-year basis changes when open balances exist. - Implemented error handling for open-balances guard query failures in the settings route. - Enhanced absence route to reject reversed date ranges with a validation error. - Updated absence handling to use atomic upserts instead of delete+insert for better performance and reliability. - Refactored salary calculation logic to correctly handle age-based avgifter rates according to Skatteverket's rules. - Improved error messaging for vacation year closure adjustments. - Adjusted employee opening balances handling to preserve audit information during upserts. * feat(settings): add validation to block vacation-year basis change with open balances feat(absence): reject reversed date ranges in absence queries fix(absence): update absence handling to use atomic upserts instead of delete+insert fix(employee): improve validation for jamkning dates in employee updates fix(opening-balances): ensure created_by field is preserved during upserts test(absence): enhance tests for absence range and date validations test(calculation): add tests for age-based avgifter rates and edge cases test(semesterberedning): validate vacation year closure adjustments and error handling test(employee-opening-balances): update tests to reflect changes in salary_run_employees schema * fix(migrations): implement NOT VALID constraints for pending_operations and add validation migration --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
461 lines
24 KiB
TypeScript
461 lines
24 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'crypto'
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import { createClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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const KEY_PREFIX = 'gnubok_sk_'
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const REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX = 'gnubok_rt_'
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// ── API Key Scopes ──────────────────────────────────────────
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export const API_KEY_SCOPES = {
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'transactions:read': { label: 'Transaktioner: läs', description: 'Lista transaktioner, mallförslag, kategoriförslag (3 verktyg)' },
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'transactions:write': { label: 'Transaktioner: skriv', description: 'Kategorisera, av-kategorisera, kvittomatchning, koppling mot faktura (4 verktyg)' },
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'customers:read': { label: 'Kunder: läs', description: 'Lista kunder (1 verktyg)' },
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'customers:write': { label: 'Kunder: skriv', description: 'Skapa kunder (1 verktyg)' },
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'articles:read': { label: 'Artiklar: läs', description: 'Lista artiklar i artikelregistret (1 verktyg)' },
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'articles:write': { label: 'Artiklar: skriv', description: 'Skapa och uppdatera artiklar (2 verktyg)' },
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'invoices:read': { label: 'Fakturor: läs', description: 'Lista fakturor (1 verktyg)' },
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'invoices:write': { label: 'Fakturor: skriv', description: 'Skapa, skicka, markera betald/skickad (4 verktyg)' },
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'suppliers:read': { label: 'Leverantörer: läs', description: 'Lista leverantörer och leverantörsfakturor, hitta verifikat-kandidater (3 verktyg)' },
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'suppliers:write': { label: 'Leverantörer: skriv', description: 'Skapa leverantörer; godkänn, kreditera, betal-länka och hantera leverantörsfakturor (6 verktyg)' },
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'reports:read': { label: 'Rapporter: läs', description: 'Kontoplan, huvudbok, balansräkning, resultaträkning, moms, KPI, reskontra, perioder, bankavstämning, SIE-export (12 verktyg)' },
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'bookkeeping:write': { label: 'Bokföring: skriv', description: 'Stänga/låsa perioder, ingående balans, bokslut, SIE-import, voucher-gap-förklaringar' },
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'payroll:read': { label: 'Löner: läs', description: 'Lista anställda, lönekörningar, lönejournal (3 verktyg)' },
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'payroll:write': { label: 'Löner: skriv', description: 'Skapa lönekörning, beräkna, generera AGI (3 verktyg)' },
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// v1 REST API: added Phase 1
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'companies:read': { label: 'Företag: läs', description: 'Lista och visa företagsprofiler som API-nyckeln har tillgång till' },
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'events:read': { label: 'Händelser: läs', description: 'Polla händelseloggen (event_log) som webhook-fallback' },
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'webhooks:manage': { label: 'Webhooks: hantera', description: 'Skapa, lista, uppdatera och radera webhook-prenumerationer' },
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'operations:read': { label: 'Operationer: läs', description: 'Hämta status för långkörande operationer (importer, bokslut, omvärdering)' },
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'documents:read': { label: 'Dokument: läs', description: 'Lista och hämta dokumentbilagor' },
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'documents:write': { label: 'Dokument: skriv', description: 'Ladda upp och koppla dokument till verifikationer' },
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'compliance:read': { label: 'Compliance: läs', description: 'Pre-flight-kontroller: momsstängning, bokslutsberedskap, voucher-gap, IB/UB-kontinuitet; Skatteverket-status (moms + AGI)' },
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'skatteverket:write': { label: 'Skatteverket: skriv', description: 'Lämna momsdeklaration och arbetsgivardeklaration (AGI) till Skatteverket (stagas; signeras med BankID)' },
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'agent:read': { label: 'Agent: läs', description: 'Specialiserad bokföringsassistent: profil, laddade specialister/atomer, minnen (briefing + skill-katalog)' },
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'agent:write': { label: 'Agent: skriv', description: 'Spara och ta bort agentens minnen om företaget (remember_fact, forget_fact)' },
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'pending_operations:read': { label: 'Stagade operationer: läs', description: 'Lista pending_operations (staged writes awaiting approval)' },
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'pending_operations:approve': { label: 'Stagade operationer: godkänn', description: 'Godkänn eller avvisa stagade operationer via API/MCP: agenten ersätter web-UI:s granskning' },
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} as const
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export type ApiKeyScope = keyof typeof API_KEY_SCOPES
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export const ALL_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = Object.keys(API_KEY_SCOPES) as ApiKeyScope[]
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/** The read-only scopes assigned to keys with no explicit scopes (legacy/null). */
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export const DEFAULT_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [
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'transactions:read',
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'customers:read',
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'articles:read',
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'invoices:read',
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'suppliers:read',
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'reports:read',
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]
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/**
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* Default scope grant for OAuth-issued keys when the client did not pass an
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* explicit `scope` parameter at /authorize. Read-only by design: every
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* write or approval scope must be requested explicitly by the client AND
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* affirmatively ticked by the user on the consent screen.
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*
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* Rationale (do not weaken without a documented security decision):
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* - GDPR Art. 25(2) data-protection-by-default: the minimum-necessary
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* access set must be the silent baseline.
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* - ISO 27001:2022 A.5.18 / A.8.2 / SOC 2 CC6.3: privileged capabilities
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* (write, approve) must not be bundled into a default grant.
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* - Segregation of Duties (findStageApproveConflict below): granting any
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* STAGING_SCOPES member together with `pending_operations:approve` on a
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* single key lets an automated agent both stage AND commit financial
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* postings without a human-in-the-loop review. Keeping the default
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* read-only prevents this combination from being silently issued.
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* - BFL 5 kap 5§ / BFNAR 2013:2 behandlingshistorik: write paths that
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* create or modify verifikationer must be opt-in at the authorization
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* layer; conversational acknowledgement at the agent layer is not an
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* auditable substitute.
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*/
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export const DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [
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'transactions:read',
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'customers:read',
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'articles:read',
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'invoices:read',
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'suppliers:read',
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'reports:read',
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'companies:read',
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'events:read',
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'operations:read',
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'documents:read',
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'compliance:read',
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'payroll:read',
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'pending_operations:read',
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]
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/**
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* Scopes advertised in the RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata document
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* (/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server). Restricted to the same set that
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* /authorize will grant by default: destructive scopes still work when
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* requested explicitly, they just aren't enumerated for unauthenticated
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* callers (defense-in-depth against scope-escalation reconnaissance).
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*/
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export const PUBLIC_OAUTH_METADATA_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [...DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES]
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/**
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* Scopes that allow staging a pending_operation. Used to detect a
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* segregation-of-duties conflict when paired with `pending_operations:approve`
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* on the same API key (ISO 27001:2022 A.5.3, SOC 2 CC6.1).
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*
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* Documented system control (BFNAR 2013:2 systemdokumentation): `agent:write`
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* is deliberately NOT a staging scope. The memory tools it gates
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* (gnubok_remember_fact/forget_fact) write advisory agent context: they
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* cannot create, mutate, or stage räkenskapsinformation, so memory-write +
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* approve on one key does not let an agent both stage and commit bookkeeping.
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* If a future memory surface ever feeds DIRECTLY into voucher generation
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* (rather than via a separately staged-and-approved operation), revisit this
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* classification.
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*/
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export const STAGING_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [
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'transactions:write',
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'customers:write',
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'articles:write',
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'invoices:write',
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'suppliers:write',
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'bookkeeping:write',
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'payroll:write',
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'documents:write',
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// Skatteverket submit tools stage submit_vat_declaration / submit_agi, so a
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// key holding both this and pending_operations:approve is a SoD conflict:
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// findStageApproveConflict picks it up automatically from this list.
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'skatteverket:write',
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]
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/**
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* Detect a segregation-of-duties conflict between staging and approval scopes
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* on the same key. Returns the offending staging scope, or null when the
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* combination is clean. Callers may choose to block, warn, or record an
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* acknowledged risk acceptance.
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*
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* Granting both stage+approve to the same actor lets an automated agent both
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* stage AND commit financial postings without a human-in-the-loop review,
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* which is the explicit control surface for BFNAR 2013:2 (behandlingshistorik)
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* and BFL 5 kap 5§ traceability requirements.
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*/
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export function findStageApproveConflict(scopes: ApiKeyScope[]): ApiKeyScope | null {
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if (!scopes.includes('pending_operations:approve')) return null
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return scopes.find((s) => STAGING_SCOPES.includes(s)) ?? null
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}
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/** Scope domain groups for UI rendering */
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export const SCOPE_GROUPS = [
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{ domain: 'transactions', label: 'Transaktioner', read: 'transactions:read' as const, write: 'transactions:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'customers', label: 'Kunder', read: 'customers:read' as const, write: 'customers:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'articles', label: 'Artiklar', read: 'articles:read' as const, write: 'articles:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'invoices', label: 'Fakturor', read: 'invoices:read' as const, write: 'invoices:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'suppliers', label: 'Leverantörer', read: 'suppliers:read' as const, write: 'suppliers:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'reports', label: 'Rapporter', read: 'reports:read' as const, write: null },
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{ domain: 'bookkeeping', label: 'Bokföring', read: null, write: 'bookkeeping:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'payroll', label: 'Löner', read: 'payroll:read' as const, write: 'payroll:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'pending_operations', label: 'Stagade operationer', read: 'pending_operations:read' as const, write: 'pending_operations:approve' as const },
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{ domain: 'agent', label: 'Agent', read: 'agent:read' as const, write: 'agent:write' as const },
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{ domain: 'skatteverket', label: 'Skatteverket', read: null, write: 'skatteverket:write' as const },
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] as const
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/** Map MCP tool name → required scope. Tools omitted from this map are available to any authenticated key (e.g. discovery/search/skill loading). */
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export const TOOL_SCOPE_MAP: Record<string, ApiKeyScope> = {
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// Transactions
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gnubok_list_uncategorized_transactions: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_list_transactions_without_documents: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_create_transactions: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_categorize_transaction: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_receipt_matcher: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_get_counterparty_templates: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_suggest_categories: 'transactions:read',
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gnubok_match_transaction_to_invoice: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_link_transaction_to_journal_entry: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_match_batch_allocate: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_bulk_book_transactions: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_bulk_book_inbox_items: 'transactions:write',
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gnubok_auto_match_period: 'transactions:write',
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// Customers
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gnubok_list_customers: 'customers:read',
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gnubok_create_customer: 'customers:write',
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// Articles (artikelregister)
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gnubok_list_articles: 'articles:read',
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gnubok_create_article: 'articles:write',
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gnubok_update_article: 'articles:write',
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// Invoices
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gnubok_list_invoices: 'invoices:read',
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gnubok_create_invoice: 'invoices:write',
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gnubok_send_invoice: 'invoices:write',
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gnubok_mark_invoice_as_paid: 'invoices:write',
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gnubok_mark_invoice_as_sent: 'invoices:write',
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// Suppliers
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gnubok_list_suppliers: 'suppliers:read',
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gnubok_list_supplier_invoices: 'suppliers:read',
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// Reports
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gnubok_get_trial_balance: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_vat_report: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_vat_review_widget: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_vat_close_check: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_kpi_report: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_income_statement: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_list_accounts: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_balance_sheet: 'reports:read',
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gnubok_get_general_ledger: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_query_journal: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_get_ar_ledger: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_get_supplier_ledger: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_list_fiscal_periods: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_get_reconciliation_status: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_list_accrual_schedules: 'reports:read',
|
|
// Dimensions (kostnadsställe/projekt) registry: reads next to the report
|
|
// tools; the staged value-create is a bookkeeping write (dimensions PR3).
|
|
gnubok_list_dimensions: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_list_dimension_values: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_create_dimension_value: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_get_dimension_pnl: 'reports:read',
|
|
// Staged bulk retag of posted-line dimensions (dimensions PR6).
|
|
gnubok_tag_journal_lines: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
// Document inbox
|
|
gnubok_upload_document: 'transactions:write',
|
|
gnubok_list_inbox_items: 'transactions:read',
|
|
gnubok_get_inbox_item: 'transactions:read',
|
|
gnubok_list_unmatched_documents: 'transactions:read',
|
|
gnubok_get_document_content: 'transactions:read',
|
|
gnubok_attach_document_to_transaction: 'transactions:write',
|
|
gnubok_link_document_to_voucher: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
// Payroll
|
|
gnubok_list_employees: 'payroll:read',
|
|
gnubok_get_salary_run: 'payroll:read',
|
|
gnubok_get_salary_journal: 'payroll:read',
|
|
gnubok_create_salary_run: 'payroll:write',
|
|
gnubok_calculate_salary_run: 'payroll:write',
|
|
gnubok_generate_agi: 'payroll:write',
|
|
// Payroll gap-closure: reads + staged writes (1.6-1.8, 2.4)
|
|
gnubok_get_employee: 'payroll:read',
|
|
gnubok_get_payslip: 'payroll:read',
|
|
gnubok_list_absence: 'payroll:read',
|
|
gnubok_update_payslip_line: 'payroll:write',
|
|
gnubok_register_absence: 'payroll:write',
|
|
gnubok_create_employee: 'payroll:write',
|
|
gnubok_update_employee: 'payroll:write',
|
|
gnubok_set_employee_opening_balances: 'payroll:write',
|
|
gnubok_get_vacation_balance: 'payroll:read',
|
|
gnubok_close_vacation_year: 'payroll:write',
|
|
// Bookkeeping write (Stream 1 Phase 1): high-risk, always staged
|
|
gnubok_close_period: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_lock_period: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_unlock_period: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_run_year_end: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_year_end_readiness: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_set_opening_balances: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_run_currency_revaluation: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_explain_voucher_gap: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_list_voucher_gaps: 'reports:read',
|
|
// Transaction reversal (medium-risk)
|
|
gnubok_uncategorize_transaction: 'transactions:write',
|
|
// SIE export (read-only) + import (write)
|
|
gnubok_export_sie: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_audit_package: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_import_sie: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
// Rot/rut begäran om utbetalning (records a payout request on generate)
|
|
gnubok_generate_rot_rut_file: 'invoices:write',
|
|
// Supplier CRUD
|
|
gnubok_create_supplier: 'suppliers:write',
|
|
// Supplier invoice lifecycle
|
|
gnubok_approve_supplier_invoice: 'suppliers:write',
|
|
gnubok_credit_supplier_invoice: 'suppliers:write',
|
|
gnubok_create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox: 'suppliers:write',
|
|
gnubok_set_inbox_extracted_data: 'suppliers:write',
|
|
// Supplier invoice payment via existing verifikat (no new bokföring)
|
|
gnubok_find_voucher_candidates_for_supplier_invoice: 'suppliers:read',
|
|
gnubok_link_supplier_invoice_to_voucher: 'suppliers:write',
|
|
// Invoice conversion + crediting
|
|
gnubok_convert_invoice: 'invoices:write',
|
|
gnubok_credit_invoice: 'invoices:write',
|
|
// Phase 4: arbitrary-line bookkeeping primitives (high-risk, always staged)
|
|
gnubok_create_voucher: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_correct_entry: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_reverse_journal_entry: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
// Agent surface (Phase 6 MCP parity): briefing tool exposes company-specific
|
|
// profile + memory so it's scoped; gnubok_list_skills / gnubok_load_skill
|
|
// stay unscoped (discovery + static Markdown bodies + globally-readable atom
|
|
// registry: no per-company data).
|
|
gnubok_get_agent_briefing: 'agent:read',
|
|
// Agent memory write (previously UNMAPPED → callable by any key). Mapping to
|
|
// agent:write; existing non-revoked keys are grandfathered in the
|
|
// 20260619140000 migration so this does not regress them.
|
|
gnubok_remember_fact: 'agent:write',
|
|
gnubok_forget_fact: 'agent:write',
|
|
// Pending operations approval (mirrors the /pending web UI)
|
|
gnubok_list_pending_operations: 'pending_operations:read',
|
|
gnubok_approve_pending_operation: 'pending_operations:approve',
|
|
gnubok_reject_pending_operation: 'pending_operations:approve',
|
|
// Skatteverket filing (PR5). Reads are compliance:read (status of moms/AGI);
|
|
// the two submit tools require the opt-in skatteverket:write staging scope.
|
|
gnubok_vat_declaration_validate: 'compliance:read',
|
|
gnubok_vat_declaration_status: 'compliance:read',
|
|
gnubok_agi_status: 'compliance:read',
|
|
gnubok_vat_declaration_submit: 'skatteverket:write',
|
|
gnubok_agi_submit: 'skatteverket:write',
|
|
|
|
// ── Audit retrofit (agent-native audit P0: unmapped = default-allow) ──
|
|
// These tools shipped without a scope mapping, making them callable by ANY
|
|
// authenticated key. Mapping them is accept-the-break by decision
|
|
// (2026-07-13): keys that relied on the default-allow hole lose access
|
|
// until granted the proper scope. Release-note callout required for the
|
|
// four WRITES below.
|
|
gnubok_link_invoice_to_voucher: 'invoices:write',
|
|
gnubok_undo_sie_import: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_post_annual_depreciation: 'bookkeeping:write',
|
|
gnubok_import_rot_rut_beslut: 'invoices:write',
|
|
gnubok_list_verifikat_without_documents: 'transactions:read',
|
|
gnubok_find_voucher_candidates_for_invoice: 'invoices:read',
|
|
gnubok_propose_dispositioner: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_propose_accruals: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_propose_annual_depreciation: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_preview_arsredovisning: 'reports:read',
|
|
gnubok_preview_ef_declaration: 'reports:read',
|
|
// Deliberately UNSCOPED (available to any authenticated key):
|
|
// gnubok_search_tools, gnubok_list_skills, gnubok_load_skill,
|
|
// gnubok_feedback. Discovery + static skill bodies + feedback channel
|
|
// carry no per-company data; keeping them open is what lets an agent
|
|
// orient itself before its key's scopes are known.
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function validateScopes(scopes: unknown): ApiKeyScope[] | null {
|
|
if (scopes === null || scopes === undefined) return null
|
|
if (!Array.isArray(scopes)) return null
|
|
const valid = scopes.filter((s): s is ApiKeyScope => s in API_KEY_SCOPES)
|
|
return valid.length > 0 ? valid : null
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Create a Supabase service client that doesn't require cookies.
|
|
* Used for API key validation (MCP, webhooks) where there's no browser session.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function createServiceClientNoCookies() {
|
|
return createClient(
|
|
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
|
|
process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY!
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function generateApiKey(mode: ApiKeyMode = 'live'): { key: string; hash: string; prefix: string } {
|
|
const random = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
|
|
// Test keys carry an explicit `test_` infix so integrators can tell at a
|
|
// glance which environment a key targets (matches the llms.txt contract:
|
|
// `gnubok_sk_test_<random>`). The infix is purely cosmetic: the authoritative
|
|
// mode is the `mode` column on api_keys, read back by hash in validateApiKey,
|
|
// so nothing trusts the key string. Both variants keep the `gnubok_sk_`
|
|
// prefix so the `startsWith(KEY_PREFIX)` check in validateApiKey still holds.
|
|
const key = mode === 'test' ? `${KEY_PREFIX}test_${random}` : `${KEY_PREFIX}${random}`
|
|
const hash = hashApiKey(key)
|
|
// First 18 chars: 'gnubok_sk_test_xyz' for test keys, 'gnubok_sk_xxxxxxxx'
|
|
// for live: the stored prefix is what the settings UI shows, so the test_
|
|
// infix is visible in the key list without exposing the secret.
|
|
const prefix = key.slice(0, KEY_PREFIX.length + 8)
|
|
return { key, hash, prefix }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function hashApiKey(key: string): string {
|
|
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(key).digest('hex')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function generateRefreshToken(): { token: string; hash: string } {
|
|
const random = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
|
|
const token = `${REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX}${random}`
|
|
const hash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex')
|
|
return { token, hash }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function hashRefreshToken(token: string): string {
|
|
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function isRefreshToken(token: string): boolean {
|
|
return token.startsWith(REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function extractBearerToken(request: Request): string | null {
|
|
const authHeader = request.headers.get('authorization')
|
|
if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) return null
|
|
return authHeader.slice(7)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Validate an API key and enforce rate limiting.
|
|
* Uses the DB RPC for atomic check + increment.
|
|
* Returns the user_id, company_id, api_key_id, name, and effective scopes on
|
|
* success, or an error with HTTP status.
|
|
* null scopes in DB → DEFAULT_SCOPES (read-only).
|
|
*
|
|
* api_key_id and api_key_name are returned so callers (e.g. the MCP server)
|
|
* can record actor attribution on pending_operations and audit_log.
|
|
* They may be undefined when the deployed DB hasn't yet run the migration
|
|
* that adds them to the RPC return shape.
|
|
*/
|
|
/**
|
|
* Operating mode of the API key. 'live' keys see real company data; 'test' keys
|
|
* are bound to deterministic sandbox companies. Keys created before the Phase 1
|
|
* migration default to 'live' for backwards compatibility.
|
|
*/
|
|
export type ApiKeyMode = 'live' | 'test'
|
|
|
|
export async function validateApiKey(
|
|
key: string
|
|
): Promise<
|
|
| {
|
|
userId: string
|
|
companyId: string
|
|
apiKeyId?: string
|
|
apiKeyName?: string
|
|
scopes: ApiKeyScope[]
|
|
mode: ApiKeyMode
|
|
}
|
|
| { error: string; status: number }
|
|
> {
|
|
if (isRefreshToken(key)) {
|
|
return {
|
|
error: 'Refresh token cannot be used as access token; exchange it at /api/mcp-oauth/token',
|
|
status: 401,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!key.startsWith(KEY_PREFIX)) {
|
|
return { error: 'Invalid API key format', status: 401 }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const hash = hashApiKey(key)
|
|
const supabase = createServiceClientNoCookies()
|
|
|
|
const { data, error } = await supabase.rpc('validate_and_increment_api_key', {
|
|
p_key_hash: hash,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
if (error || !data || data.length === 0) {
|
|
return { error: 'Invalid API key', status: 401 }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const row = data[0]
|
|
|
|
if (row.rate_limited) {
|
|
return { error: 'Rate limit exceeded', status: 429 }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
userId: row.user_id,
|
|
companyId: row.company_id,
|
|
apiKeyId: row.api_key_id,
|
|
apiKeyName: row.api_key_name,
|
|
scopes: validateScopes(row.scopes) ?? DEFAULT_SCOPES,
|
|
// `mode` may be undefined when the deployed DB hasn't yet run the Phase 1
|
|
// migration that adds it to the RPC return. Default to 'live' so existing
|
|
// keys behave unchanged.
|
|
mode: (row.mode === 'test' ? 'test' : 'live') as ApiKeyMode,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Check if a given scope is allowed by the key's scopes.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function hasScope(keyScopes: ApiKeyScope[], required: ApiKeyScope): boolean {
|
|
return keyScopes.includes(required)
|
|
}
|