* Implement company and account deletion features - Add event types for company and account deletion to CoreEvent. - Enhance Supabase middleware to handle company context resolution and cookie management for archived companies. - Create API routes for deleting accounts and companies, including necessary validations and event emissions. - Implement tests for account and company deletion endpoints to ensure proper functionality and error handling. - Add retention notice component to inform users about bookkeeping data retention during destructive actions. - Create database migrations to support soft deletion of companies and anonymization of user accounts, ensuring compliance with retention laws. * feat: enhance account deletion process and update user notifications * Add service client for onboarding completion check and update escape hatch visibility * Enhance invite flow and email handling for company members * Refactor company context and RLS policies for active company isolation - Update `switchCompany` to remove unnecessary revalidation as client handles navigation. - Revise `getActiveCompanyId` to prioritize `user_preferences` and validate against non-archived memberships. - Modify `setActiveCompany` to ensure `user_preferences` is the authoritative source while maintaining cookie compatibility. - Enhance middleware to resolve active company using `user_preferences` and fallback to first non-archived membership. - Introduce new API route `/api/company/current` to fetch the active company ID for cross-tab synchronization. - Implement `CompanyTabSync` component for real-time active company enforcement across tabs. - Create migration for RLS policies to enforce single-active-company isolation using `current_active_company_id()`. * feat: implement viewer role enforcement for write permissions - Added `useCanWrite` hook to determine if the current user has write permissions based on their role in the active company. - Updated various components (JournalEntryForm, CustomerForm, DeadlineForm, etc.) to disable write actions and show a lock icon with a tooltip for users without write permissions. - Introduced `requireWritePermission` function to enforce write permissions at the API level, returning a 403 response for viewers. - Created tests to verify the behavior of the viewer role and write permissions. - Added database migration to enforce read-only access for viewers at the database level.
138 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript
138 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { createClient, createServiceClient } from '@/lib/supabase/server'
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import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { z } from 'zod'
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import { ensureInitialized } from '@/lib/init'
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import { validateBody } from '@/lib/api/validate'
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import { eventBus } from '@/lib/events'
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import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
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const log = createLogger('api/account/delete')
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ensureInitialized()
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const DeleteAccountSchema = z.object({
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confirm_email: z.string().email(),
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})
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/**
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* POST /api/account/delete
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*
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* Anonymizes the calling user's account. The auth.users row is retained
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* (banned for ~100 years) as a tombstone so FKs into BFL-retained
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* bookkeeping data (companies.created_by, audit_log.user_id, etc.) stay
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* valid. Memberships are removed, profile PII is stripped, and a global
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* signout forces all sessions to end.
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*
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* Precondition: the user must own zero non-archived companies. The RPC
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* enforces this at the DB level and raises SQLSTATE P0001 with a message
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* if the precondition fails — we return 409 in that case.
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*/
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export async function POST(request: Request) {
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const supabase = await createClient()
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const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
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if (!user) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
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}
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const result = await validateBody(request, DeleteAccountSchema)
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if (!result.success) return result.response
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const { confirm_email } = result.data
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if (!user.email || confirm_email.trim().toLowerCase() !== user.email.toLowerCase()) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'E-postadressen stämmer inte överens med ditt konto.' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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// Anonymize in the DB. Runs as SECURITY DEFINER and checks auth.uid()
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// internally, so we don't need service role here.
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const { error: rpcError } = await supabase.rpc('anonymize_user_account', {
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target_user_id: user.id,
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})
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if (rpcError) {
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// P0001 = precondition violation from our RPC: user still owns active
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// companies. Re-fetch the blockers and return 409 so the UI can show
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// the list inline.
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if (rpcError.code === 'P0001') {
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const service = createServiceClient()
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const { data: blockers } = await service
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.from('company_members')
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.select('company_id, companies!inner(id, name, archived_at)')
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.eq('user_id', user.id)
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.eq('role', 'owner')
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.is('companies.archived_at', null)
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const list = (blockers ?? []).map((b) => {
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const company = (b.companies as unknown) as { id: string; name: string }
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return { id: company.id, name: company.name }
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})
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return NextResponse.json(
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{
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error: 'Du måste radera eller överlåta dina företag innan du kan radera kontot.',
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blockers: list,
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},
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{ status: 409 }
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)
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}
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log.error('anonymize_user_account failed', { userId: user.id, error: rpcError.message })
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'Kunde inte radera kontot. Försök igen.' },
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{ status: 500 }
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)
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}
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// Wipe PII in auth.users metadata and ban the tombstone row ~100 years.
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// DB functions can't reach supabase.auth.admin, so we do it here.
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//
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// Note: auth.users.email is intentionally NOT scrubbed. The original
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// address is retained as a legitimate-interest tombstone so that:
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// (1) re-signup with the same email is blocked by Supabase's unique
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// constraint — deletion must feel permanent, not trivially
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// reversible by re-registering
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// (2) support can verify identity when a former user asks to recover
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// BFL-retained räkenskapsinformation
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// This must be documented in the privacy policy under legitimate
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// interest (GDPR Art. 6(1)(f)). The email is never read by the app
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// after this point — login is impossible (row is banned) and the
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// profile is anonymized, so no UI ever surfaces it.
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//
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// user_metadata / app_metadata ARE wiped — they may contain display
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// name, avatar, or provider info that isn't needed for recovery.
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// The admin API replaces (not merges) these, so passing {} clears them.
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const service = createServiceClient()
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try {
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await service.auth.admin.updateUserById(user.id, {
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user_metadata: {},
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app_metadata: {},
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ban_duration: '876000h',
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})
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} catch (err) {
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log.error('Failed to wipe metadata and ban anonymized user', { userId: user.id, err })
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}
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try {
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await service.auth.admin.signOut(user.id, 'global')
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} catch (err) {
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log.error('Failed to global sign out anonymized user', { userId: user.id, err })
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}
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const deletedAt = new Date().toISOString()
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await eventBus.emit({
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type: 'account.deleted',
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payload: { userId: user.id, deletedAt },
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})
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// Best-effort: clear the caller's session cookie too.
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await supabase.auth.signOut().catch(() => {})
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// Request body is consumed; avoid unused-var lint.
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void request
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return NextResponse.json({ success: true })
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}
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