Files
accounted/lib/auth/__tests__/session-timeout.test.ts
T
Mattsson 1c9d378df8 feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts (#1387)
* feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts

Hosted browser sessions now carry an HMAC-signed, HttpOnly cookie holding
session start, last activity and sign-in method, bound to the Supabase
session. Middleware enforces a 30 min idle and 12 h absolute limit
(reason-coded redirects to /login), a heartbeat route advances idle
activity from real user input, and a client controller warns 2 minutes
before expiry. BankID users are routed back to BankID on re-auth via a
short-lived method hint. API-key and MCP bearer surfaces are exempt;
self-hosted installs default off and can opt in via env vars.

Fixes #362

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): derive session-timeout signing key via HKDF

The HMAC key is now HKDF-derived with a purpose-bound info string, so
the SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY fallback never uses the privileged
credential directly as a signing key. Addresses the security review
finding on PR #1387.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): back signature bytes with a plain ArrayBuffer

crypto.subtle.verify requires a BufferSource; Uint8Array.from is typed
over ArrayBufferLike, which the Vercel TypeScript build rejects. Decode
base64url into a Uint8Array constructed over a fresh ArrayBuffer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): address session-timeout review findings

- signSessionTimeoutState returns null on signing failure instead of
  throwing, so a missing secret degrades the timeout feature in line
  with verifySessionTimeoutState rather than crashing authenticated
  requests; middleware and heartbeat skip the cookie write when null
- heartbeat initializes a fresh signed state for a missing or
  session-mismatched cookie, mirroring middleware, instead of
  returning SESSION_EXPIRED during normal initialization
- sessionStateMatchesUser treats an unresolved current session id as
  a mismatch for session-bound state so another session's cookie is
  never accepted on the userId fallback alone
- drop aria-live from the countdown DialogDescription so screen
  readers are not interrupted every second

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 09:59:42 +02:00

194 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import {
apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout,
createSessionTimeoutState,
evaluateSessionTimeout,
getSessionTimeoutConfig,
sessionStateMatchesUser,
signSessionTimeoutState,
verifySessionTimeoutState,
} from '../session-timeout'
const SIGNING_ENV = { SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET: 'test-session-timeout-secret' }
describe('session timeout configuration', () => {
afterEach(() => vi.unstubAllEnvs())
it('uses banking-style defaults for hosted deployments', () => {
expect(getSessionTimeoutConfig({})).toEqual({
enabled: true,
idleTimeoutMs: 30 * 60 * 1000,
absoluteTimeoutMs: 12 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
warningMs: 2 * 60 * 1000,
})
})
it('is disabled by default for self-hosted deployments', () => {
expect(getSessionTimeoutConfig({ NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED: 'true' })).toEqual({
enabled: false,
idleTimeoutMs: 0,
absoluteTimeoutMs: 0,
warningMs: 0,
})
})
it('allows self-hosted deployments to opt in and bounds the warning', () => {
expect(getSessionTimeoutConfig({
NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED: 'true',
NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: '60000',
NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS: '120000',
})).toEqual({
enabled: true,
idleTimeoutMs: 60000,
absoluteTimeoutMs: 0,
warningMs: 60000,
})
})
it('warns when only the absolute limit is enabled', () => {
expect(getSessionTimeoutConfig({
NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED: 'true',
NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS: '60000',
NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS: '10000',
})).toEqual({
enabled: true,
idleTimeoutMs: 0,
absoluteTimeoutMs: 60000,
warningMs: 10000,
})
})
it('ignores negative and non-integer overrides', () => {
expect(getSessionTimeoutConfig({
NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: '-1',
NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS: '12.5',
})).toMatchObject({
idleTimeoutMs: 30 * 60 * 1000,
absoluteTimeoutMs: 12 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
})
})
})
describe('signed session timeout state', () => {
it('round-trips an authentic state', async () => {
const state = createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: 'session-1',
method: 'bankid',
now: 1000,
})
const signed = await signSessionTimeoutState(state, SIGNING_ENV)
expect(signed).not.toBeNull()
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(signed!, SIGNING_ENV)).resolves.toEqual(state)
})
it('returns null instead of throwing when no signing secret is configured', async () => {
const state = createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: 'session-1',
method: 'password',
now: 1000,
})
await expect(signSessionTimeoutState(state, {})).resolves.toBeNull()
})
it('rejects payload and signature tampering', async () => {
const state = createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: 'session-1',
method: 'password',
now: 1000,
})
const signed = await signSessionTimeoutState(state, SIGNING_ENV)
const [payload, signature] = signed!.split('.')
await expect(
verifySessionTimeoutState(`${payload}x.${signature}`, SIGNING_ENV),
).resolves.toBeNull()
await expect(
verifySessionTimeoutState(`${payload}.${signature.slice(0, -1)}x`, SIGNING_ENV),
).resolves.toBeNull()
})
it('binds state to both the user and Supabase session', () => {
const state = createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: 'session-1',
method: 'password',
now: 1000,
})
expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(state, 'user-1', 'session-1')).toBe(true)
expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(state, 'user-2', 'session-1')).toBe(false)
expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(state, 'user-1', 'session-2')).toBe(false)
})
it('treats an unresolved current session id as a mismatch for bound state', () => {
const bound = createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: 'session-1',
method: 'password',
now: 1000,
})
const unbound = createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: null,
method: 'password',
now: 1000,
})
expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(bound, 'user-1', null)).toBe(false)
expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(unbound, 'user-1', null)).toBe(true)
expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(unbound, 'user-1', 'session-2')).toBe(true)
})
})
describe('session expiry', () => {
const config = {
enabled: true,
idleTimeoutMs: 30_000,
absoluteTimeoutMs: 60_000,
warningMs: 10_000,
}
it('uses inclusive boundaries and gives absolute expiry precedence', () => {
const state = {
...createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: 'session-1',
method: 'password' as const,
now: 1000,
}),
lastActivityAt: 31_000,
}
expect(evaluateSessionTimeout(state, config, 60_999)).toBeNull()
expect(evaluateSessionTimeout(state, config, 61_000)).toBe('absolute')
})
it('expires an otherwise valid session after the idle limit', () => {
const state = createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: null,
method: 'password',
now: 1000,
})
expect(evaluateSessionTimeout(state, config, 30_999)).toBeNull()
expect(evaluateSessionTimeout(state, config, 31_000)).toBe('idle')
})
})
describe('API exclusions', () => {
it('only lets bearer-authenticated machine surfaces bypass timeouts', () => {
expect(apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices', true)).toBe(true)
expect(apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices', false)).toBe(false)
expect(apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout('/api/invoices', true)).toBe(false)
expect(apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout('/api/mcp-oauth/token', false)).toBe(true)
expect(apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout('/api/health', false)).toBe(true)
})
})