Files
accounted/lib/supabase/middleware.ts
T
Mattsson 237b77a366 feat: custom inbound mail domains, rot/rut payout file, invoice email texts, security hardening (#878)
* fix(security): guard MCP test keys, RLS role gate + voucher RPC guards, /api MFA gate, deps

- MCP: force dry-run / block writes for test-mode API keys in tools/call (extensions/general/mcp-server)
- DB: current_user_can_write role gate on write policies (40 tables) + tenant guards, SET search_path, REVOKE anon on commit_journal_entry / next_voucher_number / detect_voucher_gaps (migration 20260702093000)
- Middleware: MFA (AAL2) gate on cookie-authenticated /api routes via apiPathSkipsMfaGate
- Deps: npm audit fix clears mailparser/linkify-it/nodemailer/svix/uuid highs; xlsx -> SheetJS 0.20.3

Adds unit + pg-real tests. Does not touch in-progress ROT/RUT or invoice-email-texts work.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(invoices): rot/rut begäran om utbetalning — HUS XML (V6), payout tracking + settlement, MCP tool

Generates Skatteverkets begäran-om-utbetalning file (schema V6) from paid
ROT/RUT invoices — no submission API exists, the file is uploaded manually
at skatteverket.se. Headless by design for now: API routes + MCP tool
(gnubok_generate_rot_rut_file), no UI surfaces.

- lib/invoices/rot-rut-file.ts: pure XML generator with deterministic
  per-invoice blockers (hours, work type, personnummer, property info,
  mixed rot+rut, XSD limits) + 31 January deadline warnings
- rot_rut_payout_requests(+items) tables: one active begäran per invoice
  (DB triggers incl. reactivation guard), RLS, audit, pg-real tests
- Settlement: POST /settle books debit 1930 / credit 1513 via the engine
  (source_type rot_rut_payout); partial payouts → partially_paid
- Work-type lists corrected against Begaran.xsd: IT-tjänster is rut-only,
  snöskottning/tillsyn/tvätt added (schablontjänster utfört-only)
- Fix: invoice-level fastighetsbeteckning was validated but never
  persisted — now stamped onto rot lines in build-invoice-write; API
  accepts bostadsrätt pair (lägenhetsnr + BRF orgnr, editor UI deferred)
- invoice_items.brf_org_number migration + MCP scope invoices:write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(invoices): per-company editable invoice email texts

Add an "E-posttexter" section under Settings -> Fakturering where the
subject, greeting, body and sign-off of the standard invoice email can
be customized per company in Swedish and English. Fields pre-fill with
the standard texts and only diffs from the standard are stored
(company_settings.invoice_email_texts JSONB), so future improvements to
the stock wording still reach companies that have not customized. Each
field has a reset-to-standard button; cleared fields snap back.

Texts support a fixed placeholder set (invoice number, customer name,
first name, company, due date, amount) substituted at send time in a
single pass; unknown placeholders stay literal. Custom texts are
HTML-escaped after substitution, newlines become <br> in the HTML
variant, and subject lines are flattened to a single header line.
Overrides apply to standard invoices only - credit notes, proforma and
delivery notes keep the stock texts. All send paths (UI, v1 API, MCP
approval, recurring) pick the texts up via the existing settings row.

The Zod schema half of this change (InvoiceEmailTextsSchema in
lib/api/schemas.ts) was inadvertently included in 8291f745.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(documents): accept PDFs with preamble before %PDF- header, surface content rejections as 400

detectFileMagic required the %PDF- signature at byte 0 (BOM aside),
rejecting genuine PDFs that carry a leading newline or junk bytes —
files every ISO 32000 reader opens fine. Now scan the first 1024 bytes
for the signature, matching real-reader behavior. Image types stay
strict at offset 0 to keep the anti-placeholder defense tight.

Magic-byte rejections were also mislabeled as DOC_UPLOAD_STORAGE_FAILED
(500 'Filen kunde inte sparas'), blaming storage for a client-side file
problem. Both upload routes now map them to a new
DOC_UPLOAD_INVALID_CONTENT (400) with an accurate message.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(bookkeeping): full keyboard flow for manual journal entry

Enter now drives the whole verifikat flow: verifikationstext drops into
the first row missing an account, konto commits advance to debet, Enter
on an empty debet hops to kredit, and an entered amount jumps to the
next row. Once the voucher balances, Enter opens the review (unchanged
gate) and the auto-focused confirm posts it — including through the
no-underlag warning dialog. Escape in the inline review goes back to
the form.

Also fixes an Enter footgun in AccountCombobox: a bare Enter on a
freshly focused field no longer selects the first account in the list —
selection now requires typing or arrow navigation; otherwise Enter
re-commits the current value or bubbles to the form-level handler.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add custom inbound domains management for companies

- Implemented functionality to allow companies to claim and manage their own inbound email domains via Resend's API.
- Created a new table `company_inbound_domains` to store domain information, including status and DNS records.
- Added necessary RLS policies to restrict access based on user roles (owner/admin).
- Developed functions for domain normalization, validation, claiming, verification, and removal.
- Implemented webhook handling for domain status updates from Resend.
- Added comprehensive tests for RLS, constraints, and triggers related to the new domain management feature.

* fix: address PR #878 review findings and CI failures

- migrations: drop the ai_usage_tracking policy block from the role-gate
  migration — the table was removed by 20260504120000_remove_ai_subsystem
  and only lingers on staging as drift; a from-scratch chain (pg-real,
  Supabase preview) failed on it
- invoice-inbox: never flip a custom domain to verified off a domain.updated
  webhook alone — confirm the receiving capability with Resend first
  (fail-closed); normalize both sides of the orphan-adoption domain match
- rot/rut: block files where begärt belopp exceeds what the buyer paid
  (DEDUCTION_EXCEEDS_PAYMENT); tighten brf_org_number validation to real
  orgnr shapes; parameterize the settlement bank account (19xx, default 1930)
- rot/rut routes: log acting user on financial mutations, stop swallowing
  item mirror errors, narrow response projections (no customer ids through
  the invoice join); document the deliberate inline-XML decision
- documents: stop echoing raw storage-layer error messages to clients

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: round-2 CI + compliance findings on PR #878

- migrations: the role-gate migration targeted automation_webhooks, which
  20260515170000_webhooks_v2 renamed to webhooks on the canonical chain
  (staging kept the old name — drift); gate public.webhooks instead,
  dropping legacy schema-sync policy names defensively. Restore the
  20260623130000 owner fallback in next_voucher_number that the stale
  copied-verbatim body silently reverted (caught by engine.pg locally).
  Full migration chain verified from scratch against supabase/postgres:15.
- mcp: bump the tools/list payload ceiling 44K -> 45K — main's #877
  qualified-identifier schemas plus this branch's rot/rut tool crossed the
  ceiling only in combination; documented in the test's history log.
- rot/rut: refuse partial settlement before Skatteverkets beslut is
  recorded (would bypass the PATCH lifecycle and strand the request);
  block zero-kronor ärenden (ZERO_DEDUCTION); require sekelsiffra 16 on
  12-digit brf orgnr in both schema validation and normalizeBrfOrgNr

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: rename branch migrations off main's colliding versions

After the merge with main, two versions were shared by two files each
(20260702100000: rot_rut_payout_requests vs company_settings_dimensions_
enabled; 20260702130000: invoice_email_texts vs pending_operations_add_
create_dimension_value). psql-based CI applies by filename and doesn't
care, but Supabase branching records migrations by version (PK) — the
second file with the same version breaks the preview with a
schema_migrations_pkey duplicate. Neither branch migration is version-
recorded on staging or prod, so renaming to fresh 20260703 versions is
safe; nothing between the old and new positions depends on these objects.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): scope the /api MFA-gate bypass to real Bearer-auth surfaces

Any Authorization header — attacker-controlled — used to skip the AAL2
gate for every /api route, so a stolen-password AAL1 cookie session could
reach cookie-authenticated routes (which ignore the header) by attaching
`Authorization: x`. The skip is now scoped to the surfaces whose auth
contract IS the header (/api/v1 API keys, the MCP endpoint's OAuth
tokens); pure Bearer callers elsewhere (cron secret, signed webhooks)
carry no cookie session and were never touched by the gate, which only
fires for cookie users. Superagent P2 on PR #878.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: normalize path separators in dimension statutory guard scan

The route scan compared walked file paths against a POSIX-path allowlist,
so the suite failed on Windows (backslash separators) while passing on
Linux CI. Normalize the scanned paths to forward slashes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 13:57:59 +02:00

329 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript

import { createServerClient } from '@supabase/ssr'
import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from 'next/server'
import { shouldEnforceMfa } from '@/lib/auth/mfa'
import { apiPathSkipsMfaGate } from '@/lib/auth/api-mfa-gate'
import { DEFAULT_LOCALE, LOCALE_COOKIE, isLocale } from '@/i18n/config'
import { userHasPassword } from '@/lib/auth/has-password'
export async function updateSession(request: NextRequest) {
let supabaseResponse = NextResponse.next({
request,
})
const supabase = createServerClient(
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY!,
{
cookies: {
getAll() {
return request.cookies.getAll()
},
setAll(cookiesToSet) {
cookiesToSet.forEach(({ name, value }) =>
request.cookies.set(name, value)
)
supabaseResponse = NextResponse.next({
request,
})
cookiesToSet.forEach(({ name, value, options }) =>
supabaseResponse.cookies.set(name, value, options)
)
},
},
}
)
// IMPORTANT: Avoid writing any logic between createServerClient and
// supabase.auth.getUser(). A simple mistake could make it very hard to debug
// issues with users being randomly logged out.
const {
data: { user },
error: authError,
} = await supabase.auth.getUser()
// Get the pathname
const pathname = request.nextUrl.pathname
// ── API routes ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// API routes authenticate themselves (requireAuth, API-key Bearer, cron
// secret, webhook signatures). Middleware runs on them for ONE reason: to
// close the MFA gap. Many legacy routes hand-roll supabase.auth.getUser()
// instead of requireAuth(), so without this an authenticated-but-not-MFA-
// verified (AAL1) cookie session could reach them on the hosted product.
// Gate ONLY cookie sessions. Bearer-auth SURFACES (/api/v1, the MCP
// endpoint) and the AAL1 escape-hatch / OAuth routes pass straight through
// (see apiPathSkipsMfaGate) — header presence alone never skips the gate,
// since the header is attacker-controlled and cookie-authenticated routes
// ignore it. Pure Bearer callers (cron, webhooks) carry no cookie session,
// so the `user` guard below already excludes them. Everything else about
// /api auth stays the route's own responsibility.
if (pathname.startsWith('/api')) {
const skipMfaGate = apiPathSkipsMfaGate(
pathname,
request.headers.get('authorization') !== null,
)
if (!skipMfaGate && user && shouldEnforceMfa(user)) {
const { data: aal } =
await supabase.auth.mfa.getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel()
if (aal?.nextLevel === 'aal2' && aal?.currentLevel === 'aal1') {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'MFA-verifiering krävs.' }, { status: 403 })
}
}
return supabaseResponse
}
// If the refresh token is stale/invalid, clear the session cookies
// so the browser stops sending them on every request.
// Skip on auth routes — the callback needs PKCE cookies intact.
if (authError && !user && !pathname.startsWith('/auth')) {
await supabase.auth.signOut()
}
// Invite pages — accessible to everyone, signed in or not. A user who
// already has an account and is signed in should still be able to land on
// /invite/[token] to accept the invite with one click (see
// app/invite/[token]/page.tsx). If we bounce them to '/', they never see
// the invite at all.
if (pathname.startsWith('/invite')) {
return supabaseResponse
}
// Reset-password is reachable in both auth states. The recovery flow lands
// here with a fresh session (created by the OTP exchange in /auth/callback)
// precisely so the user can call supabase.auth.updateUser({ password }). If
// we bounce authenticated users to '/', the recovery email link silently
// fails. An already-logged-in user typing /reset-password directly just gets
// the same "change password" experience as in settings — no security loss.
if (pathname.startsWith('/reset-password')) {
return supabaseResponse
}
// Public auth routes — allow access
if (
pathname.startsWith('/login') ||
pathname.startsWith('/register') ||
pathname.startsWith('/auth') ||
pathname.startsWith('/sandbox')
) {
// If user is logged in and trying to access auth pages, redirect to dashboard
if (user) {
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL('/', request.url))
}
return supabaseResponse
}
// Protected routes - require authentication
if (!user) {
const url = request.nextUrl.clone()
url.pathname = '/login'
return NextResponse.redirect(url)
}
// /mfa/enroll: gate behind has-password. BankID-only users who reach this
// page can lock themselves out — Supabase requires AAL2 to change password
// or unenroll MFA, and AAL2 needs a prior password sign-in. Force them to
// set a password first. The /account/set-password page does that and routes
// back here via ?returnTo. Thread the inner returnTo through so the user
// ends up on their original destination after the full chain completes.
if (pathname.startsWith('/mfa/enroll')) {
if (!userHasPassword(user)) {
const innerReturnTo = request.nextUrl.searchParams.get('returnTo')
const mfaTarget = `/mfa/enroll${
innerReturnTo ? `?returnTo=${encodeURIComponent(innerReturnTo)}` : ''
}`
return NextResponse.redirect(
new URL(
`/account/set-password?returnTo=${encodeURIComponent(mfaTarget)}`,
request.url,
),
)
}
return supabaseResponse
}
// Other MFA pages — accessible to authenticated users (AAL1+), skip MFA enforcement
if (pathname.startsWith('/mfa/')) {
return supabaseResponse
}
// /account/set-password is the escape hatch from the BankID/MFA lockout
// and must be reachable even when the user has no company yet (e.g. mid-
// onboarding) and is at AAL1.
if (pathname.startsWith('/account/set-password')) {
return supabaseResponse
}
// MFA enforcement (application-side only, not RLS)
if (shouldEnforceMfa(user)) {
const { data: aal } = await supabase.auth.mfa.getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel()
// User has MFA enrolled but hasn't verified this session → redirect to verify
if (aal?.nextLevel === 'aal2' && aal?.currentLevel === 'aal1') {
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL('/mfa/verify', request.url))
}
// MFA required but user has no factor enrolled yet → force enrollment
// Skip for users with no companies (still setting up)
const { companyId: companyIdForMfa } = await resolveCompanyForMiddleware(supabase, user.id, request)
if (companyIdForMfa) {
const { data: factors } = await supabase.auth.mfa.listFactors()
const hasVerifiedFactor = factors?.totp?.some(f => f.status === 'verified')
if (!hasVerifiedFactor) {
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL('/mfa/enroll', request.url))
}
}
}
// Forward the pathname so server layouts can branch on it (e.g. render a
// no-company shell for /settings/account).
supabaseResponse.headers.set('x-pathname', pathname)
// Company context resolution
const cookieCompanyId = request.cookies.get('gnubok-company-id')?.value
const { companyId, locale: dbLocale } = await resolveCompanyForMiddleware(supabase, user.id, request)
// If the cookie pointed at a company we can no longer resolve (e.g.
// archived), clear it so the browser stops sending it.
if (cookieCompanyId && cookieCompanyId !== companyId) {
supabaseResponse.cookies.set('gnubok-company-id', '', { path: '/', maxAge: 0 })
}
// Sync the locale cookie from user_preferences. This keeps next-intl's
// request config (which reads the cookie) consistent with the DB value
// without forcing every RSC render to query the database itself.
const cookieLocale = request.cookies.get(LOCALE_COOKIE)?.value
const effectiveLocale = isLocale(dbLocale) ? dbLocale : DEFAULT_LOCALE
if (cookieLocale !== effectiveLocale) {
supabaseResponse.cookies.set(LOCALE_COOKIE, effectiveLocale, {
path: '/',
sameSite: 'lax',
secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
maxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 365,
})
}
// Routes that stay accessible when the user has no active company.
// Needed so a user who archived their last company can still delete
// their account without being trapped on /onboarding forever.
const isNoCompanyAllowed =
pathname.startsWith('/onboarding') ||
pathname.startsWith('/select-company') ||
pathname.startsWith('/settings/account') ||
pathname.startsWith('/api/account/') ||
pathname.startsWith('/api/company')
// No companies — redirect to the picker if we have BankID enrichment for
// this user, otherwise the manual wizard. Either way, allow the escape-hatch
// routes to pass through.
if (!companyId) {
if (isNoCompanyAllowed) {
return supabaseResponse
}
const { data: enrichmentRow } = await supabase
.from('extension_data')
.select('id')
.eq('user_id', user.id)
.eq('extension_id', 'tic')
.eq('key', 'bankid_enrichment')
.maybeSingle()
const destination = enrichmentRow ? '/select-company' : '/onboarding'
return NextResponse.redirect(new URL(destination, request.url))
}
// Set company cookie on the response so downstream requests have it
supabaseResponse.cookies.set('gnubok-company-id', companyId, {
path: '/',
httpOnly: true,
secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
sameSite: 'lax',
maxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 365,
})
// Allow access to onboarding (for adding new companies), select-company, and companies/new
if (pathname.startsWith('/select-company') || pathname.startsWith('/companies/new') || pathname.startsWith('/onboarding')) {
return supabaseResponse
}
return supabaseResponse
}
/**
* Resolve the active company for the authenticated user.
*
* Resolution: user_preferences → first non-archived membership.
*
* `user_preferences.active_company_id` is the authoritative source for
* the active company on both the Next.js and Postgres RLS side. The
* `gnubok-company-id` cookie is still refreshed for legacy read paths
* but it is no longer READ here, because RLS (via
* `current_active_company_id()`) cannot see cookies — so letting the
* cookie override the database would re-introduce the divergence this
* entire migration exists to fix.
*
* When we fall back to "first membership" (no user_preferences row yet),
* we also upsert user_preferences so subsequent RLS lookups agree with
* us without needing the fallback scan.
*
* Cannot use lib/company/context.ts because middleware runs on Edge.
*/
async function resolveCompanyForMiddleware(
supabase: ReturnType<typeof createServerClient>,
userId: string,
_request: NextRequest
): Promise<{ companyId: string | null; locale: string | null }> {
// 1. user_preferences (authoritative)
const { data: prefs } = await supabase
.from('user_preferences')
.select('active_company_id, locale')
.eq('user_id', userId)
.maybeSingle()
const locale = (prefs?.locale as string | undefined) ?? null
if (prefs?.active_company_id) {
const { data: membership } = await supabase
.from('company_members')
.select('company_id, companies!inner(archived_at)')
.eq('company_id', prefs.active_company_id)
.eq('user_id', userId)
.is('companies.archived_at', null)
.maybeSingle()
if (membership) return { companyId: membership.company_id, locale }
}
// 2. Fallback: first non-archived membership by created_at
const { data: firstCompany } = await supabase
.from('company_members')
.select('company_id, companies!inner(archived_at)')
.eq('user_id', userId)
.is('companies.archived_at', null)
.order('created_at', { ascending: true })
.limit(1)
.maybeSingle()
if (!firstCompany) return { companyId: null, locale }
// Write the fallback back to user_preferences so future RLS lookups
// see the same active company without needing this fallback scan.
// Non-fatal on failure: resolution for this request already succeeded,
// the write-back is an optimization — but log it so silent persistence
// failures (#701) are observable.
const { error: writeBackError } = await supabase
.from('user_preferences')
.upsert(
{ user_id: userId, active_company_id: firstCompany.company_id },
{ onConflict: 'user_id' }
)
if (writeBackError) {
console.error('[middleware] active company write-back failed', writeBackError)
}
return { companyId: firstCompany.company_id, locale }
}