1c9d378df8
* feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts Hosted browser sessions now carry an HMAC-signed, HttpOnly cookie holding session start, last activity and sign-in method, bound to the Supabase session. Middleware enforces a 30 min idle and 12 h absolute limit (reason-coded redirects to /login), a heartbeat route advances idle activity from real user input, and a client controller warns 2 minutes before expiry. BankID users are routed back to BankID on re-auth via a short-lived method hint. API-key and MCP bearer surfaces are exempt; self-hosted installs default off and can opt in via env vars. Fixes #362 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): derive session-timeout signing key via HKDF The HMAC key is now HKDF-derived with a purpose-bound info string, so the SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY fallback never uses the privileged credential directly as a signing key. Addresses the security review finding on PR #1387. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): back signature bytes with a plain ArrayBuffer crypto.subtle.verify requires a BufferSource; Uint8Array.from is typed over ArrayBufferLike, which the Vercel TypeScript build rejects. Decode base64url into a Uint8Array constructed over a fresh ArrayBuffer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): address session-timeout review findings - signSessionTimeoutState returns null on signing failure instead of throwing, so a missing secret degrades the timeout feature in line with verifySessionTimeoutState rather than crashing authenticated requests; middleware and heartbeat skip the cookie write when null - heartbeat initializes a fresh signed state for a missing or session-mismatched cookie, mirroring middleware, instead of returning SESSION_EXPIRED during normal initialization - sessionStateMatchesUser treats an unresolved current session id as a mismatch for session-bound state so another session's cookie is never accepted on the userId fallback alone - drop aria-live from the countdown DialogDescription so screen readers are not interrupted every second Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
194 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript
194 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
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import {
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apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout,
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createSessionTimeoutState,
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evaluateSessionTimeout,
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getSessionTimeoutConfig,
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sessionStateMatchesUser,
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signSessionTimeoutState,
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verifySessionTimeoutState,
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} from '../session-timeout'
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const SIGNING_ENV = { SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET: 'test-session-timeout-secret' }
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describe('session timeout configuration', () => {
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afterEach(() => vi.unstubAllEnvs())
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it('uses banking-style defaults for hosted deployments', () => {
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expect(getSessionTimeoutConfig({})).toEqual({
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enabled: true,
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idleTimeoutMs: 30 * 60 * 1000,
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absoluteTimeoutMs: 12 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
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warningMs: 2 * 60 * 1000,
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})
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})
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it('is disabled by default for self-hosted deployments', () => {
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expect(getSessionTimeoutConfig({ NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED: 'true' })).toEqual({
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enabled: false,
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idleTimeoutMs: 0,
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absoluteTimeoutMs: 0,
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warningMs: 0,
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})
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})
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it('allows self-hosted deployments to opt in and bounds the warning', () => {
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expect(getSessionTimeoutConfig({
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NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED: 'true',
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NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: '60000',
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NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS: '120000',
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})).toEqual({
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enabled: true,
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idleTimeoutMs: 60000,
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absoluteTimeoutMs: 0,
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warningMs: 60000,
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})
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})
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it('warns when only the absolute limit is enabled', () => {
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expect(getSessionTimeoutConfig({
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NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED: 'true',
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NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS: '60000',
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NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS: '10000',
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})).toEqual({
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enabled: true,
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idleTimeoutMs: 0,
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absoluteTimeoutMs: 60000,
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warningMs: 10000,
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})
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})
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it('ignores negative and non-integer overrides', () => {
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expect(getSessionTimeoutConfig({
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NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS: '-1',
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NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS: '12.5',
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})).toMatchObject({
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idleTimeoutMs: 30 * 60 * 1000,
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absoluteTimeoutMs: 12 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
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})
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})
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})
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describe('signed session timeout state', () => {
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it('round-trips an authentic state', async () => {
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const state = createSessionTimeoutState({
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userId: 'user-1',
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sessionId: 'session-1',
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method: 'bankid',
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now: 1000,
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})
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const signed = await signSessionTimeoutState(state, SIGNING_ENV)
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expect(signed).not.toBeNull()
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await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(signed!, SIGNING_ENV)).resolves.toEqual(state)
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})
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it('returns null instead of throwing when no signing secret is configured', async () => {
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const state = createSessionTimeoutState({
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userId: 'user-1',
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sessionId: 'session-1',
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method: 'password',
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now: 1000,
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})
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await expect(signSessionTimeoutState(state, {})).resolves.toBeNull()
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})
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it('rejects payload and signature tampering', async () => {
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const state = createSessionTimeoutState({
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userId: 'user-1',
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sessionId: 'session-1',
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method: 'password',
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now: 1000,
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})
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const signed = await signSessionTimeoutState(state, SIGNING_ENV)
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const [payload, signature] = signed!.split('.')
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await expect(
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verifySessionTimeoutState(`${payload}x.${signature}`, SIGNING_ENV),
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).resolves.toBeNull()
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await expect(
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verifySessionTimeoutState(`${payload}.${signature.slice(0, -1)}x`, SIGNING_ENV),
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).resolves.toBeNull()
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})
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it('binds state to both the user and Supabase session', () => {
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const state = createSessionTimeoutState({
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userId: 'user-1',
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sessionId: 'session-1',
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method: 'password',
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now: 1000,
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})
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expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(state, 'user-1', 'session-1')).toBe(true)
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expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(state, 'user-2', 'session-1')).toBe(false)
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expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(state, 'user-1', 'session-2')).toBe(false)
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})
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it('treats an unresolved current session id as a mismatch for bound state', () => {
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const bound = createSessionTimeoutState({
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userId: 'user-1',
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sessionId: 'session-1',
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method: 'password',
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now: 1000,
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})
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const unbound = createSessionTimeoutState({
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userId: 'user-1',
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sessionId: null,
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method: 'password',
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now: 1000,
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})
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expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(bound, 'user-1', null)).toBe(false)
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expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(unbound, 'user-1', null)).toBe(true)
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expect(sessionStateMatchesUser(unbound, 'user-1', 'session-2')).toBe(true)
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})
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})
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describe('session expiry', () => {
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const config = {
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enabled: true,
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idleTimeoutMs: 30_000,
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absoluteTimeoutMs: 60_000,
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warningMs: 10_000,
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}
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it('uses inclusive boundaries and gives absolute expiry precedence', () => {
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const state = {
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...createSessionTimeoutState({
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userId: 'user-1',
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sessionId: 'session-1',
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method: 'password' as const,
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now: 1000,
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}),
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lastActivityAt: 31_000,
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}
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expect(evaluateSessionTimeout(state, config, 60_999)).toBeNull()
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expect(evaluateSessionTimeout(state, config, 61_000)).toBe('absolute')
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})
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it('expires an otherwise valid session after the idle limit', () => {
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const state = createSessionTimeoutState({
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userId: 'user-1',
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sessionId: null,
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method: 'password',
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now: 1000,
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})
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expect(evaluateSessionTimeout(state, config, 30_999)).toBeNull()
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expect(evaluateSessionTimeout(state, config, 31_000)).toBe('idle')
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})
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})
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describe('API exclusions', () => {
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it('only lets bearer-authenticated machine surfaces bypass timeouts', () => {
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expect(apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices', true)).toBe(true)
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expect(apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices', false)).toBe(false)
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expect(apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout('/api/invoices', true)).toBe(false)
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expect(apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout('/api/mcp-oauth/token', false)).toBe(true)
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expect(apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout('/api/health', false)).toBe(true)
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})
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})
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