Files
accounted/lib/supabase/__tests__/middleware.test.ts
T
Mattsson 828628d882 fix(auth): land stock email-change links on the status page and stop retries voiding pending mails (#2199)
* fix(auth): land stock email-change links on the status page and stop retries voiding pending mails

A secure email change needs one click in each mailbox. Stock GoTrue links
verify on the GoTrue host and return to /auth/callback through redirect_to
with ?message= (first click), ?error= (dead link) or ?code= (completing
click); none carries a token_hash, so the callback bounced every one of
them to /login with no message. Users read that as a failure and pressed
"Byt" again, and because the claims fast path carries no new_email, the
route re-issued both tokens on every press and voided the links they were
about to click.

- /api/account/email stamps flow=email_change on emailRedirectTo and reads
  pending state from GoTrue when the session claims lack it, so a repeat
  request inside the 30-minute window is a no-op instead of a re-send.
- /auth/callback routes flow=email_change redirects to
  /auth/email-change?status=partial|done|failed; hook-style token_hash
  links keep using the existing verifyOtp branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LMFybWJqw8vScQiEDwKXGi

* fix(auth): let signed-in stock email-change redirects through the proxy and treat a minted code as done

Skeptic findings on e5639fb43:

- The proxy bounced authenticated /auth/callback requests to / unless they
  carried type=email_change. Stock GoTrue links return with only the
  flow=email_change marker, so the new status branch was unreachable from
  the signed-in browser the change usually starts in. Exempt the marker too.
- A completing click opened in a browser without the PKCE verifier (phone
  mail app) failed the code exchange and, with no session to inspect, was
  reported as a failed change although GoTrue had already flipped the
  address. A code is only minted after that verify, so report done.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LMFybWJqw8vScQiEDwKXGi

* fix(auth): gate email-change requests with an atomic per-user claim

CodeRabbit on PR #2199: the pending-state read from GoTrue is not atomic,
so two concurrent POST /api/account/email calls (two tabs, a retried
fetch) could both see nothing pending and both re-issue the confirmation
tokens, voiding each other's mails.

Migration 20260903083000 adds email_change_requests (one row per auth
user, RLS with no policies) and two SECURITY DEFINER RPCs:
claim_email_change_request(p_email, p_window_seconds) is a single
INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE whose row lock serialises concurrent
claimers, so exactly one caller per address per window wins; a different
address always wins; release_email_change_request drops the claim when
GoTrue refuses the change so the user can retry.

The route claims right before updateUser, answers resent:false when the
claim is held, releases on GoTrue failure, and falls through to GoTrue if
the RPC itself errors. pg-real test covers sequential, windowed,
concurrent, per-user, release and RLS behaviour. Applied to staging with
the same version.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LMFybWJqw8vScQiEDwKXGi

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 10:55:12 +02:00

1319 lines
49 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest'
import { NextRequest } from 'next/server'
/**
* Middleware redirect-destination tests.
*
* Focus: every auth bounce must (a) remember where the user was heading,
* (b) reject an off-origin destination, and (c) not leak the original query
* string onto the auth page. MFA enforcement decides on server-authenticated
* data only (the getUser() factor list and the signature-verified `aal`
* claim), never on the editable cookie session.
*/
const state = vi.hoisted(() => ({
user: null as null | {
id: string
email?: string
app_metadata?: Record<string, unknown>
// What GoTrue returns on /user: the server-side factor list.
factors?: Array<{ id: string; status: string; factor_type: string }>
},
sessionId: 'session-1' as string | null,
authError: null as unknown,
// `aal` claim of the (mock) signature-verified access token, i.e. what
// getClaims() reports. null = the token carries no aal claim.
jwtAal: null as string | null,
// Make getClaims() fail: an error result or a throw.
claimsFailure: null as null | 'error' | 'throw',
// The cookie-derived assurance lookup and the listFactors round trip. The
// proxy must call NEITHER any more: the first computes nextLevel from the
// editable cookie session, the second is a getUser() the proxy has already
// paid for. Spies so tests can prove it. getAal answers the way a cookie
// with `user.factors` stripped would: "nothing to step up to".
getAal: vi.fn(async () => ({
data: { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal1' },
error: null,
})),
listFactors: vi.fn(async () => ({ data: { totp: [] }, error: null })),
company: {
data: [{ company_id: 'company-1', locale: 'sv', used_fallback: false }],
error: null as unknown,
} as {
data: Array<{
company_id: string | null
locale: string | null
used_fallback: boolean
}>
error: unknown
},
// Rows the team_members query resolves to (the byrå exception in the
// no-company branch and the home-domain guard both await eq-terminated
// chains, so the from() mock makes exactly that table thenable).
byraMemberships: [] as Array<{
role?: string
teams: { kind: string; brands?: { domain: string } | Array<{ domain: string }> | null }
}>,
// Rows any awaited company_members filter chain resolves to: the Rule 2
// home-domain client lookup AND the Rule 1 canonical personal-company
// exemption both land here (each scenario exercises only one of them).
clientMemberships: [] as Array<Record<string, unknown>>,
clientMembershipsError: null as unknown,
// What the mocked resolveBrandByHost returns for the request host.
hostBrand: null as null | { teamId: string; id?: string },
// What the mocked isEmailOnBrandAllowlist returns (Rule 2 exemption).
allowlisted: false,
signOut: vi.fn(async () => ({ error: null })),
// Cookies auth-js writes through the `cookies.setAll` callback while
// getUser() runs: the ROTATED tokens after a successful refresh, and the
// maxAge-0 deletions when it removes a dead session. The middleware has to
// carry these onto whatever response it returns.
cookieWrites: [] as Array<{
name: string
value: string
options?: Record<string, unknown>
}>,
// Row returned for user_preferences reads (the auto_logout mint lookup).
userPreferences: null as null | { auto_logout: boolean },
userPreferencesError: null as unknown,
}))
vi.mock('@supabase/ssr', () => ({
createServerClient: vi.fn((
_url: string,
_key: string,
options: {
cookies: {
setAll: (
cookies: Array<{
name: string
value: string
options?: Record<string, unknown>
}>,
) => void
}
},
) => ({
auth: {
getUser: vi.fn(async () => {
if (state.cookieWrites.length > 0) options.cookies.setAll(state.cookieWrites)
return {
data: { user: state.user },
error: state.authError,
}
}),
getClaims: vi.fn(async () => {
if (state.claimsFailure === 'throw') throw new Error('jwks fetch failed')
if (state.claimsFailure === 'error') {
return {
data: null,
error: { name: 'AuthInvalidJwtError', message: 'Invalid JWT signature' },
}
}
return {
data: {
claims: {
...(state.sessionId ? { session_id: state.sessionId } : {}),
...(state.jwtAal ? { aal: state.jwtAal } : {}),
// Satisfy the iss/aud pinning the MFA gates apply (lib/auth/claims.ts).
iss: `${(process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL ?? '').replace(/\/+$/, '')}/auth/v1`,
aud: 'authenticated',
sub: state.user?.id,
},
},
error: null,
}
}),
signOut: state.signOut,
mfa: {
getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel: () => state.getAal(),
listFactors: () => state.listFactors(),
},
},
rpc: vi.fn(async () => state.company),
from: vi.fn((table: string) => {
const chain: Record<string, unknown> = {}
const self = new Proxy(chain, {
get: (_t, prop) => {
if (prop === 'then') {
// The byrå-membership lookup and the home-domain client lookup
// await their filter chains directly (no .maybeSingle terminal),
// so those tables must be thenable.
if (table === 'team_members') {
return (resolve: (v: unknown) => void) =>
resolve({ data: state.byraMemberships, error: null })
}
if (table === 'company_members') {
return (resolve: (v: unknown) => void) =>
resolve({
data: state.clientMembershipsError ? null : state.clientMemberships,
error: state.clientMembershipsError,
})
}
return undefined
}
if (prop === 'maybeSingle' || prop === 'single') {
return async () => ({
data:
table === 'user_preferences' && !state.userPreferencesError
? state.userPreferences
: null,
error:
table === 'user_preferences' ? state.userPreferencesError : null,
})
}
return () => self
},
})
return self
}),
})),
}))
const logState = vi.hoisted(() => ({ info: vi.fn() }))
vi.mock('@/lib/logger', () => {
const logger = {
info: (...args: unknown[]) => logState.info(...args),
warn: vi.fn(),
error: vi.fn(),
debug: vi.fn(),
child: () => logger,
}
return { createLogger: () => logger }
})
vi.mock('@/lib/branding/resolve', async (importOriginal) => ({
...(await importOriginal<typeof import('@/lib/branding/resolve')>()),
resolveBrandByHost: vi.fn(async () =>
state.hostBrand
? { id: state.hostBrand.id ?? 'brand-host', teamId: state.hostBrand.teamId }
: null,
),
}))
vi.mock('@/lib/auth/brand-signup-gate', async (importOriginal) => ({
...(await importOriginal<typeof import('@/lib/auth/brand-signup-gate')>()),
isEmailOnBrandAllowlist: vi.fn(async () => state.allowlisted),
}))
import { updateSession } from '../middleware'
import {
createSessionTimeoutState,
signSessionTimeoutState,
verifySessionTimeoutState,
} from '@/lib/auth/session-timeout'
import { SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE } from '@/lib/auth/session-timeout-shared'
const ORIGIN = 'http://localhost:3000'
const SIGNED_IN = { id: 'user-1', app_metadata: {} }
const VERIFIED_TOTP = { id: 'f1', status: 'verified', factor_type: 'totp' }
/** A user whose server-side record carries a verified TOTP factor. */
const MFA_USER = { ...SIGNED_IN, factors: [VERIFIED_TOTP] }
function locationOf(response: Response) {
return response.headers.get('location')
}
function run(path: string, init?: RequestInit) {
return updateSession(new NextRequest(`${ORIGIN}${path}`, init))
}
function runAt(origin: string, path: string, headers?: Record<string, string>) {
return updateSession(new NextRequest(`${origin}${path}`, { headers }))
}
describe('updateSession redirect destinations', () => {
const envBackup = {
require: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA,
selfHosted: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED,
signingSecret: process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET,
idleTimeout: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS,
absoluteTimeout: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS,
warning: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS,
}
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks()
logState.info.mockClear()
state.listFactors.mockClear()
state.getAal.mockClear()
state.user = null
state.sessionId = 'session-1'
state.authError = null
state.cookieWrites = []
state.jwtAal = null
state.claimsFailure = null
state.company = {
data: [{ company_id: 'company-1', locale: 'sv', used_fallback: false }],
error: null,
}
state.byraMemberships = []
state.clientMemberships = []
state.clientMembershipsError = null
state.hostBrand = null
state.allowlisted = false
state.userPreferences = null
state.userPreferencesError = null
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED
process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET = 'middleware-test-secret'
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS
})
afterEach(() => {
if (envBackup.require === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = envBackup.require
if (envBackup.selfHosted === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED = envBackup.selfHosted
if (envBackup.signingSecret === undefined) delete process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET
else process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET = envBackup.signingSecret
if (envBackup.idleTimeout === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = envBackup.idleTimeout
if (envBackup.absoluteTimeout === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS = envBackup.absoluteTimeout
if (envBackup.warning === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS = envBackup.warning
})
describe('session timeout enforcement', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = '30000'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS = '60000'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS = '10000'
})
async function signedCookie(args?: {
startedAt?: number
lastActivityAt?: number
method?: 'password' | 'bankid'
userId?: string
sessionId?: string | null
autoLogout?: boolean
legacy?: boolean
}) {
const stateValue = {
...createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: args?.userId ?? 'user-1',
sessionId: args?.sessionId === undefined ? 'session-1' : args.sessionId,
method: args?.method ?? 'password',
// Default the opt-in to true: these tests exercise enforcement.
autoLogout: args?.autoLogout ?? true,
now: args?.startedAt ?? Date.now(),
}),
...(args?.lastActivityAt === undefined
? {}
: { lastActivityAt: args.lastActivityAt }),
}
if (args?.legacy) {
// Pre-toggle cookies carry no auto_logout snapshot.
delete (stateValue as { autoLogout?: boolean }).autoLogout
}
const signed = await signSessionTimeoutState(stateValue)
if (!signed) throw new Error('test signing secret missing')
return signed
}
it('initializes a signed, session-bound cookie for an existing session', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: 'gnubok-auth-method=bankid' },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
const encoded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
expect(encoded).toBeTruthy()
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(encoded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: 'session-1',
method: 'bankid',
})
expect(response.cookies.get('gnubok-auth-method')?.value).toBe('')
})
it('rejects a tampered cookie and revokes only the current session', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=tampered.value` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).searchParams.get('reason')).toBe('absolute')
expect(state.signOut).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ scope: 'local' })
expect(response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value).toBe('')
})
it('redirects an idle session with its original method and deep link', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({
startedAt: now - 40_000,
lastActivityAt: now - 30_000,
method: 'bankid',
})
const response = await run('/reports/vat?period=2026-01', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('reason')).toBe('idle')
expect(url.searchParams.get('method')).toBe('bankid')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
expect(state.signOut).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ scope: 'local' })
})
it('gives absolute expiry precedence and returns structured API errors', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({
startedAt: now - 60_000,
lastActivityAt: now - 30_000,
})
const response = await run('/api/invoices', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(401)
expect(response.headers.get('x-session-timeout-reason')).toBe('absolute')
await expect(response.json()).resolves.toMatchObject({
error: { code: 'SESSION_EXPIRED', reason: 'absolute' },
})
})
it('does not let a forged Authorization header bypass normal APIs', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({ lastActivityAt: now - 30_000, startedAt: now - 40_000 })
const headers = {
authorization: 'Bearer forged',
cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}`,
}
expect((await run('/api/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(401)
expect((await run('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(200)
})
it('mints the cookie with the auto_logout opt-out default for new sessions', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
const encoded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(encoded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
autoLogout: false,
})
})
it('snapshots an opted-in preference at mint time', async () => {
state.userPreferences = { auto_logout: true }
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
const encoded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(encoded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
autoLogout: true,
})
})
it('persists no snapshot when the preference read fails', async () => {
state.userPreferencesError = { message: 'connection reset' }
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {})
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
// Unknown preference: nothing minted, nobody logged out; the next
// request retries the read.
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)).toBeUndefined()
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
errorSpy.mockRestore()
})
it('never logs out a session that has not opted in', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
// Far past both limits: without the opt-in the session must survive.
const encoded = await signedCookie({
startedAt: now - 600_000,
lastActivityAt: now - 600_000,
autoLogout: false,
})
const response = await run('/reports/vat', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('upgrades a pre-toggle cookie in place instead of treating it as forged', async () => {
state.userPreferences = { auto_logout: true }
const startedAt = Date.now() - 5_000
const encoded = await signedCookie({ startedAt, legacy: true })
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
const upgraded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
// Timers survive the upgrade: only the opt-in snapshot is added.
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(upgraded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
startedAt,
autoLogout: true,
})
})
it('starts a new timeout window when the Supabase session changes', async () => {
const encoded = await signedCookie({ sessionId: 'old-session' })
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
const renewed = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(renewed)).resolves.toMatchObject({
sessionId: 'session-1',
})
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
})
// ── Public agent-discovery + docs surfaces ────────────────────────────
describe('anonymous access to agent-discovery and docs surfaces', () => {
it.each(['/llms.txt', '/llms-full.txt', '/docs/api', '/docs/api.md', '/docs/api/reference.md', '/docs/api/cookbook/quickstart.md'])(
'serves %s without a login bounce',
async (path) => {
const response = await run(path)
expect(response.status).not.toBe(307)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
},
)
it('does not treat a /docs prefix on another route as public', async () => {
// /docsy-dashboard must still bounce: only /docs and /docs/* are public.
const response = await run('/docsy-dashboard')
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/login')
})
it('serves docs to a signed-in user without redirecting away', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
const response = await run('/docs/api')
expect(response.status).not.toBe(307)
})
})
// ── Site 1: protected-route bounce ────────────────────────────────────
describe('protected route bounce to /login', () => {
it('preserves the deep link the anonymous user was heading for', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/settings/tax')
})
it('does not leak the original query string onto /login', async () => {
// The Stripe Checkout return: /settings/billing?success=1. Overwriting
// only the pathname used to carry ?success=1 onto /login.
const response = await run('/settings/billing?success=1')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('success')).toBeNull()
expect([...url.searchParams.keys()]).toEqual(['next'])
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/settings/billing?success=1')
})
it('keeps ?org_number= on a logged-out /onboarding link', async () => {
const response = await run('/onboarding?org_number=5566778899')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/onboarding?org_number=5566778899')
})
it('sends no destination parameter when the target is the dashboard root', async () => {
const response = await run('/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/login`)
})
it('carries the cookies that clear a dead session', async () => {
// auth-js removes the session inside getUser() and queues the deletion
// on the response. Dropping it on the bounce made the browser replay
// the dead refresh token on /login, spending a second GoTrue 400 per
// expiry (paired 400s ~100 ms apart in production).
state.authError = { name: 'AuthApiError', code: 'refresh_token_not_found' }
state.cookieWrites = [
{ name: 'sb-test-auth-token', value: '', options: { path: '/', maxAge: 0 } },
]
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: {
cookie: `sb-test-auth-token=dead; ${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=stale`,
},
})
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/login')
const cleared = response.cookies.get('sb-test-auth-token')
expect(cleared?.value).toBe('')
expect(cleared?.maxAge).toBe(0)
expect(response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value).toBe('')
})
it('drops a request path that normalises to a protocol-relative URL', async () => {
// /..//evil.com normalises to the pathname //evil.com. Reflecting that
// back as ?next= would hand the login page an off-origin destination.
const response = await run('/..//evil.com')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBeNull()
})
})
// ── Site 4: authenticated user on an auth page ────────────────────────
describe('authenticated user landing on /login or /register', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
})
it('honours ?next= instead of discarding the query string', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/settings/tax`)
})
it('honours ?next= on /register too', async () => {
const response = await run('/register?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/settings/tax`)
})
it('falls back to the dashboard when there is no destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects an absolute URL as the destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.com%2Fx')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects a protocol-relative destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=%2F%2Fevil.com')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects an encoded traversal that normalises off-origin', async () => {
// /..//evil.com and /%2e%2e//evil.com both normalise to //evil.com.
for (const hostile of ['%2F..%2F%2Fevil.com', '%2F%252e%252e%2F%2Fevil.com']) {
const response = await run(`/login?next=${hostile}`)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
}
})
it('still bounces /auth and /sandbox to the dashboard, query and all', async () => {
expect(locationOf(await run('/sandbox?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax'))).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
expect(locationOf(await run('/auth/callback?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax'))).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
// Email-change confirmation links are usually clicked while still logged
// in (the change starts in settings), and the completing verify mints a
// session before the status page renders. Bouncing either request off the
// /auth prefix silently swallowed the confirmation.
it('lets an authenticated email-change confirmation reach the callback', async () => {
const response = await run('/auth/callback?token_hash=abc&type=email_change')
expect(response.status).not.toBe(307)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
})
// Stock GoTrue links (no Send Email hook) come back through redirect_to
// with only the flow=email_change marker: ?message= after the first of
// the two confirmations, ?code= after the completing one, ?error= for a
// dead link. None carries type=, and the change usually starts in a
// signed-in settings tab.
it('lets an authenticated stock email-change redirect reach the callback', async () => {
for (const query of [
'flow=email_change&message=Confirmation+link+accepted',
'flow=email_change&code=pkce',
'flow=email_change&error=access_denied&error_code=otp_expired',
]) {
const response = await run(`/auth/callback?${query}`)
expect(response.status).not.toBe(307)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
}
})
it('lets an authenticated user see the email-change status page', async () => {
const response = await run('/auth/email-change?status=done')
expect(response.status).not.toBe(307)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
})
it('still bounces other authenticated token types off the callback', async () => {
expect(locationOf(await run('/auth/callback?token_hash=abc&type=signup'))).toBe(
`${ORIGIN}/`,
)
})
})
// ── Sites 2 and 3: MFA step-up and forced enrollment ──────────────────
describe('MFA step-up bounce to /mfa/verify', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
// Verified factor on the server-side user, single-factor token.
state.user = MFA_USER
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
})
it('preserves the destination as ?returnTo=', async () => {
const response = await run('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBe('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
expect([...url.searchParams.keys()]).toEqual(['returnTo'])
})
it('still fires the step-up when the request carries its own returnTo', async () => {
// A crafted ?returnTo= must never be mistaken for a completed step-up.
const response = await run('/settings/tax?returnTo=%2Fanywhere')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
})
it('does not reflect a request path that normalises off-origin', async () => {
const response = await run('/..//evil.com')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBeNull()
})
it('carries the rotated auth cookie instead of re-minting it next request', async () => {
state.cookieWrites = [
{ name: 'sb-test-auth-token', value: 'rotated', options: { path: '/' } },
]
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(response.cookies.get('sb-test-auth-token')?.value).toBe('rotated')
})
it('decides on the server-side factor list, never on the cookie session', async () => {
// The attack: the sb-*-auth-token cookie is unsigned JSON, so the
// password holder strips `user.factors` and the local assurance lookup
// reports nextLevel aal1 ("nothing to step up to"). state.getAal is
// that view; the proxy must not even ask for it.
const response = await run('/invoices')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(state.getAal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it.each(['error', 'throw'] as const)(
'fails closed when getClaims reports %s',
async (failure) => {
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {})
state.claimsFailure = failure
const response = await run('/invoices')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled()
errorSpy.mockRestore()
},
)
it('fails closed when the verified claims carry no aal', async () => {
state.jwtAal = null
const response = await run('/invoices')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
})
})
describe('forced enrollment bounce to /mfa/enroll', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
// No factor on the server-side user, single-factor token.
state.user = SIGNED_IN
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
})
it('preserves the destination as ?returnTo=', async () => {
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/enroll')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBe('/invoices/new')
})
it('steps up instead of enrolling when the server-side user already has a verified factor', async () => {
// Previously this scenario (cookie says no factor, server says one
// exists, token at aal1) rendered the page at AAL1: the verify bounce
// trusted the cookie and the enrolment check then found the factor.
state.user = MFA_USER
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
})
it('skips enrollment for a user with no company, as before', async () => {
state.company = { data: [{ company_id: null, locale: null, used_fallback: false }], error: null }
const response = await run('/select-company')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('reads the factor list off the getUser() round trip, not a second auth call', async () => {
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/enroll')
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(state.getAal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('lets an aal2 token through even when the server-side user has no factor left', async () => {
// A user who unenrols their last factor mid-session keeps aal2 until
// the next token refresh; the enrolment bounce lands on the refresh,
// not on the next click (unchanged deferral, PR #1922).
state.jwtAal = 'aal2'
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('does not spend an MFA lookup on RSC and prefetch requests at aal2 either', async () => {
state.jwtAal = 'aal2'
await run('/invoices', { headers: { rsc: '1' } })
await run('/invoices', { headers: { 'next-router-prefetch': '1', rsc: '1' } })
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(state.getAal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
})
// ── API branch: the MFA gate for cookie sessions ──────────────────────
describe('API MFA gate for cookie sessions', () => {
const FORBIDDEN = { error: 'MFA-verifiering krävs.' }
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
state.user = MFA_USER
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
})
it('returns 403 for an AAL1 session whose server-side user has a verified factor', async () => {
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(403)
await expect(response.json()).resolves.toEqual(FORBIDDEN)
})
it('never consults the cookie-derived assurance level or a second factor lookup', async () => {
// state.getAal reports nextLevel aal1: the answer a cookie with
// `user.factors` stripped produces. It must not be asked at all.
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(403)
expect(state.getAal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('lets an AAL2 session through', async () => {
state.jwtAal = 'aal2'
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it.each(['error', 'throw'] as const)(
'fails closed when getClaims reports %s',
async (failure) => {
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {})
state.claimsFailure = failure
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(403)
expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled()
errorSpy.mockRestore()
},
)
it('fails closed when the verified claims carry no aal', async () => {
state.jwtAal = null
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(403)
})
it("passes a user with nothing to step up to (enrolment stays the page gate's job)", async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
expect((await run('/api/invoices')).status).toBe(200)
state.user = {
...SIGNED_IN,
factors: [{ id: 'f2', status: 'unverified', factor_type: 'totp' }],
}
expect((await run('/api/invoices')).status).toBe(200)
expect(state.getAal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('keeps the AAL1 escape hatches and the OAuth endpoints open', async () => {
for (const path of ['/api/account/delete', '/api/company/current', '/api/mcp-oauth/token']) {
expect((await run(path)).status).toBe(200)
}
})
it('skips Bearer-auth surfaces by path, and only with the header present', async () => {
const headers = { authorization: 'Bearer key' }
expect((await run('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(200)
expect((await run('/api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp', { headers })).status).toBe(200)
// A cookie session on a v1 path without the header is still a cookie session.
expect((await run('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices')).status).toBe(403)
// A forged header on a cookie-authenticated route never disables the gate.
expect((await run('/api/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(403)
})
it('does not gate BankID-linked users, nor anyone when MFA is off', async () => {
state.user = { ...MFA_USER, app_metadata: { bankid_linked: true } }
expect((await run('/api/invoices')).status).toBe(200)
state.user = MFA_USER
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA
expect((await run('/api/invoices')).status).toBe(200)
})
it('carries the rotated auth cookie on the 403', async () => {
state.cookieWrites = [
{ name: 'sb-test-auth-token', value: 'rotated', options: { path: '/' } },
]
const response = await run('/api/invoices')
expect(response.status).toBe(403)
expect(response.cookies.get('sb-test-auth-token')?.value).toBe('rotated')
})
})
// ── No-company branch: the byrå cockpit exception ─────────────────────
describe('byrå team members with zero companies', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
// No resolvable company at all (fresh byrå, no client memberships).
state.company = {
data: [{ company_id: null, locale: 'sv', used_fallback: true }],
error: null,
}
})
it('steers a byrå owner from the dashboard root to the empty cockpit, not onboarding', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [{ role: 'owner', teams: { kind: 'byra' } }]
const response = await run('/')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/byra')
})
it('lets a byrå admin through to cockpit routes', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [{ role: 'admin', teams: { kind: 'byra' } }]
for (const path of ['/byra', '/clients', '/companies/new-client', '/settings/brand']) {
const response = await run(path)
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
}
})
it('steers a plain byrå member to the cockpit too (any role counts)', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [{ role: 'member', teams: { kind: 'byra' } }]
const response = await run('/')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/byra')
})
it('keeps the onboarding redirect for non-byrå users', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = []
const response = await run('/')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/onboarding')
})
})
// ── Home-domain affinity (WL): the domain corrects itself ─────────────
describe('home-domain affinity', () => {
const ARBORE = 'https://arbore.accounted.se'
const ACOUNT = 'https://acount.accounted.se'
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
})
it('redirects a byrå member on a foreign byrå domain to their own domain', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'acount.accounted.se' } } },
]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ACOUNT}/`)
})
it('redirects a byrå member on the platform domain to their byrå domain', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ARBORE}/`)
})
it('preserves path and query across the affinity redirect', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/invoices/abc?tab=payments')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ARBORE}/invoices/abc?tab=payments`)
})
it('lets a byrå member through on their own domain and caches the verdict', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/byra')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie')).toContain(
'gnubok-home-ok=user-1~arbore.accounted.se',
)
})
it('keeps a byrå member with a brandless personal company on the canonical host', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
// A personal company with no team at all: homed on canonical.
state.clientMemberships = [{ companies: { team_id: null, teams: null } }]
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie')).toContain(
'gnubok-home-ok=user-1~app.gnubok.se',
)
})
it('counts a company whose team has no brand as canonical-homed too', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
state.clientMemberships = [
{ companies: { team_id: 'team-personal', teams: { brands: null } } },
]
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie')).toContain(
'gnubok-home-ok=user-1~app.gnubok.se',
)
})
it('still redirects a byrå member whose companies are all brand-homed', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
state.clientMemberships = [
{ companies: { team_id: 'team-arbore', teams: { brands: { id: 'brand-1' } } } },
]
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ARBORE}/`)
})
it('still redirects off a FOREIGN byrå domain even with a canonical personal company', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'acount.accounted.se' } } },
]
state.clientMemberships = [{ companies: { team_id: null, teams: null } }]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ACOUNT}/`)
})
it('stays put without caching when the canonical-company lookup fails', async () => {
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {})
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
state.clientMembershipsError = { message: 'connection reset' }
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
// Fail open: no redirect, and no home-ok cookie so the next request
// re-runs the check instead of freezing the error verdict for the TTL.
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie') ?? '').not.toContain('gnubok-home-ok')
expect(errorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled()
errorSpy.mockRestore()
})
it('tolerates the array shape for the embedded brand', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: [{ domain: 'acount.accounted.se' }] } },
]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ACOUNT}/`)
})
it('redirects a user with no byrå ties off a brand domain to the platform', async () => {
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore' }
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe('https://app.gnubok.se/')
})
it('keeps an allowlisted email on the brand domain before any membership exists', async () => {
// The partner owner between allowlisted signup and team provisioning:
// no team_members row, no company, only a brand_signup_allowlist entry.
const { isEmailOnBrandAllowlist } = await import('@/lib/auth/brand-signup-gate')
state.user = { ...SIGNED_IN, email: 'owner@partner.example' }
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore', id: 'brand-arbore' }
state.allowlisted = true
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie')).toContain(
'gnubok-home-ok=user-1~arbore.accounted.se',
)
expect(isEmailOnBrandAllowlist).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'brand-arbore',
'owner@partner.example',
)
})
it('still redirects a non-allowlisted email off the brand domain', async () => {
state.user = { ...SIGNED_IN, email: 'stranger@example.com' }
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore', id: 'brand-arbore' }
state.allowlisted = false
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe('https://app.gnubok.se/')
})
it('skips the allowlist lookup for a user without an email', async () => {
const { isEmailOnBrandAllowlist } = await import('@/lib/auth/brand-signup-gate')
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore' }
state.allowlisted = true
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe('https://app.gnubok.se/')
expect(isEmailOnBrandAllowlist).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('keeps a byrå client user on the byrå domain their company lives under', async () => {
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore' }
state.clientMemberships = [{ company_id: 'company-1' }]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does nothing on the platform domain for regular users', async () => {
const response = await runAt('https://app.gnubok.se', '/')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does nothing on localhost and direct Vercel hosts', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'arbore.accounted.se' } } },
]
for (const origin of [ORIGIN, 'https://erp-base-abc123.vercel.app']) {
const response = await runAt(origin, '/byra')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
}
})
it('skips the check while this user\'s OK cookie for this host is fresh', async () => {
state.byraMemberships = [
{ teams: { kind: 'byra', brands: { domain: 'acount.accounted.se' } } },
]
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/', {
cookie: 'gnubok-home-ok=user-1~arbore.accounted.se',
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('ignores an OK cookie left behind by a DIFFERENT user and still bounces', async () => {
// The amnas account-switch repro (2026-08-31): the byrå owner signs in
// on the brand host (cookie set), signs out, and a second account with
// no ties to the brand signs in within the TTL window. The inherited
// host-only verdict skipped the bounce; the user-scoped value must not.
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore', id: 'brand-arbore' }
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/', {
cookie: 'gnubok-home-ok=user-OTHER~arbore.accounted.se',
})
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe('https://app.gnubok.se/')
})
it('ignores a stale host-only cookie from the pre-user-scoped format', async () => {
state.hostBrand = { teamId: 'team-arbore', id: 'brand-arbore' }
const response = await runAt(ARBORE, '/', {
cookie: 'gnubok-home-ok=arbore.accounted.se',
})
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe('https://app.gnubok.se/')
})
})
// ── MFA semantics that must not change ────────────────────────────────
describe('per-request timing header and log line', () => {
const TIMING_RE =
/^mw-auth;dur=\d+, mw-session;dur=\d+, mw-company;dur=\d+, mw-mfa;dur=\d+, mw-total;dur=\d+$/
function lastLog() {
expect(logState.info).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
const [msg, ctx] = logState.info.mock.calls[0] as [string, Record<string, unknown>]
expect(msg).toBe('proxy completed')
return ctx
}
it('page responses carry Server-Timing and log kind=page with the route', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
const res = await run('/invoices')
expect(res.status).toBe(200)
expect(res.headers.get('server-timing')).toMatch(TIMING_RE)
expect(res.headers.get('x-proxy-timing')).toBeNull()
const ctx = lastLog()
expect(ctx.kind).toBe('page')
expect(ctx.route).toBe('/invoices')
expect(ctx.status).toBe(200)
expect(typeof ctx.totalMs).toBe('number')
expect(typeof ctx.authMs).toBe('number')
expect(typeof ctx.companyMs).toBe('number')
})
it('classifies prefetch and RSC requests from the app-router headers', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
await run('/invoices', { headers: { 'next-router-prefetch': '1', rsc: '1' } })
expect(lastLog().kind).toBe('prefetch')
logState.info.mockClear()
await run('/invoices', { headers: { rsc: '1' } })
expect(lastLog().kind).toBe('rsc')
})
it('/api responses use X-Proxy-Timing and leave Server-Timing to the route wrapper', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
const res = await run('/api/settings')
expect(res.headers.get('x-proxy-timing')).toMatch(TIMING_RE)
expect(res.headers.get('server-timing')).toBeNull()
expect(lastLog().kind).toBe('api')
})
it('redirect responses also carry the header and log their status', async () => {
const res = await run('/invoices')
expect(res.status).toBe(307)
expect(res.headers.get('server-timing')).toMatch(TIMING_RE)
expect(lastLog().status).toBe(307)
})
it('never logs a token-carrying path or a raw entity id', async () => {
const res = await run('/invite/9f8e7d6c5b4a3928171605f4e3d2c1b0')
expect(res.status).toBe(200)
expect(lastLog().route).toBe('/invite/*')
logState.info.mockClear()
state.user = SIGNED_IN
await run('/invoices/6f1c2a3e-1234-4bcd-9abc-0123456789ab')
expect(lastLog().route).toBe('/invoices/:id')
})
})
describe('MFA-disabled and self-hosted paths are unchanged', () => {
it('does not redirect when NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA is unset', async () => {
state.user = MFA_USER
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does not redirect on self-hosted even with MFA required', async () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED = 'true'
state.user = MFA_USER
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does not redirect BankID-linked users, who are already 2FA', async () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
state.user = { ...MFA_USER, app_metadata: { bankid_linked: true } }
state.jwtAal = 'aal1'
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
})
})