f31eeaa603
* feat(connect): peppol connector foundation: capability, ledger/budget service, quota Adds the storage + package shape for brokering Peppol through the connector with the same one-address + rate-budget model as bank/skatteverket: a peppol capability (connector-gated, free on hosted), peppol as a ledger + upstream service, a conservative rate budget, and a migration extending the ledger service CHECK and the per-key limits (peppol_connections_per_company). Proxy route + instance-side Qvalia reroute follow. Switch-on gated on the Qvalia brokering-terms check. (cherry picked from commit 3cc0da6a3, migration renumbered 20260902190000) Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io> Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat * feat(connect): Peppol through the connector: hosted proxy, instance transport, ownership ledger Completes the Peppol upstream for self-hosted instances on the connector (WS3): an instance with a connector key carrying the peppol scope and no Qvalia keys of its own sends and receives e-invoices through Arcim's contracted access point, the same way bank and Skatteverket already route. Hosted: app/api/connect/peppol/[...path] speaks the PeppolTransport operations (lookup, submit, status, evidence, recipient PUT/DELETE, inbound list/xml) rather than proxying Qvalia paths, because the Qvalia account is shared by every hosted company and every instance: reads must be scoped to what the caller owns, and the inbound read endpoint is destructive for the whole account. Ownership: a receiving registration is a ledger row (service peppol, participant id in account_uids, sha256 in handle_hash so one key holds a participant at a time); outbound submissions land in the new connector_peppol_submissions table and gate status/evidence; inbound documents are served from the hosted archive filtered by the participants the key holds. Per-company quota (peppol_connections_per_company), the shared PEPPOL_RECEIVING_MAX_REGISTRATIONS cap, and the global peppol rate budget apply. Provider failures cross as CONNECTOR_UPSTREAM_ERROR with the adapter's retryable flag (422 or 502). Instance: lib/invoices/transports/connector.ts implements PeppolTransport over that API and registers itself in connector mode (key present, no QVALIA_* keys); getPeppolTransportAvailability() defaults to it when no provider is selected, so an instance needs no PEPPOL_TRANSPORT_PROVIDER. Webhooks are not brokered; the existing outbound status poll covers it. Hosted is byte-identical: it has its own keys, so connector mode is never on. Docs: SELF-HOSTING.md, SOVEREIGN.md, .env.example. Switch-on for third-party instances stays gated on the Qvalia brokering-terms check; without the scope every operation answers 403. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(connect): authorize Peppol participants per key, harden the proxy after review Review follow-ups on #2177. Authorization: a key may only register (and send as) participant identifiers Arcim recorded on the key at issuance (connector_keys.peppol_participants, migration 20260902191000) or the licensee's own org number, and a document may only be submitted as a sender the key has registered; X-Connector-Company stays an opaque per-company ref. Cap: the shared access-point cap now counts fresh pending reservations and is re-checked after this request's own reservation, so concurrent registrations cannot both pass. Inbound: both halves of the participant id are filtered in the archive query (over-fetched, then exact-pair checked), so foreign rows sharing an identifier cannot consume the limit. Delete: deregistration is a required transport capability, checked before the ledger row is revoked, and registration refuses an access point that cannot deregister. Instance transport: the hosted URL must be https (loopback http only, same rule as getConnectorConfig), and the response body is read inside the timeout window with body-read failures mapped to retryable transport errors. issue-connector-key.ts gains --peppol-participants and --peppol-connections-per-company. Declined: NOT VALID on the ledger CHECK (the table is empty until keys are issued; the validated scan is instant). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(connect): bind Peppol ownership to the instance company, query exact participant pairs Second review round on #2177. Ownership is now (key, company_ref), not key alone: a sender must be registered under the same company header, status and evidence reads look the submission up under the header company, DELETE and re-registration refuse a participant the key holds for another company, so one company on a multi-company instance cannot act on another company's registration through the shared key. The instance transport resolves the owning company from its own peppol_deliveries / peppol_registrations rows before status, evidence and deregistration calls (deps.companyFor, deps.companyForParticipant, wired in transports/index.ts). Inbound listing stays key-wide (the instance routes documents to its own companies by its own registrations). The archive query now runs one exact-pair query per scheme (scheme fixed, that scheme's identifiers), so neither foreign nor cross-pair rows can consume the limit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io> Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
103 lines
4.2 KiB
TypeScript
103 lines
4.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, vi } from 'vitest'
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import {
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MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP,
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PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP,
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PAID_CAPABILITIES,
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CAPABILITY,
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} from '../keys'
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/**
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* These maps are the contract that gates the paid MCP/agent path (dispatch +
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* commit). Locking the exact entries is the guard against a future paid
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* external-service tool silently bypassing the paywall: mirrors the
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* TOOL_SCOPE_MAP assertions in the mcp-server tests.
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*/
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beforeEach(() => {
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vi.clearAllMocks()
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})
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/**
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* MCP tools that invoke a paid capability directly (no stage→commit round-trip),
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* so they are gated at DISPATCH only and have no commit-time (operation-map)
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* counterpart. The document upload tools run Bedrock OCR inline via
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* extractInvoiceFields: they never stage a pending_operation.
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*/
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const DISPATCH_ONLY_MCP_TOOLS = new Set<string>([
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'gnubok_upload_document',
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'gnubok_create_document_upload',
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'gnubok_complete_document_upload',
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// Onboarding connect-link tools: read status + hand out a browser link; no commit counterpart.
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'gnubok_connect_bank',
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'gnubok_connect_skatteverket',
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// Agent-triggered PSD2 sync: inline Enable Banking call, no staged operation.
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'gnubok_sync_bank',
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])
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describe('MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP', () => {
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it('gates exactly the paid MCP tools (3 external-service staging tools + the AI OCR tools)', () => {
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expect(MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP).toEqual({
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gnubok_send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
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gnubok_vat_declaration_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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gnubok_agi_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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gnubok_connect_bank: CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
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gnubok_sync_bank: CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
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gnubok_connect_skatteverket: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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// Dispatch-only AI tools: inline Bedrock OCR, no staged operation. The
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// signed-URL pair is gated at create AND complete so a free-tier key can
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// neither reserve nor finalize a paid extraction.
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gnubok_upload_document: CAPABILITY.ai,
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gnubok_create_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
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gnubok_complete_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
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})
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})
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it('only maps tools to PAID capabilities', () => {
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for (const key of Object.values(MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP)) {
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expect(PAID_CAPABILITIES).toContain(key)
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}
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})
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})
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describe('PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP', () => {
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it('gates exactly the three paid pending-operation types', () => {
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expect(PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP).toEqual({
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send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
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submit_vat_declaration: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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submit_agi: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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})
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})
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it('only maps operations to PAID capabilities', () => {
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for (const key of Object.values(PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP)) {
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expect(PAID_CAPABILITIES).toContain(key)
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}
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})
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it('covers the same capabilities as the STAGING MCP tools (dispatch ↔ commit parity)', () => {
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// Parity applies to staging tools only: an op that can be staged via MCP OR
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// approved in the UI must be gated on both transports. Dispatch-only tools
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// (inline AI OCR) have no commit counterpart and are excluded.
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const stagingMcpCaps = new Set(
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Object.entries(MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP)
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.filter(([tool]) => !DISPATCH_ONLY_MCP_TOOLS.has(tool))
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.map(([, cap]) => cap),
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)
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expect(new Set(Object.values(PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP))).toEqual(stagingMcpCaps)
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})
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})
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describe('CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES', () => {
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it('names only real capability keys, with the two connector-only keys outside the paid set', async () => {
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const { CAPABILITY, CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES, PAID_CAPABILITIES, isConnectorCapability } = await import('../keys')
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const all = new Set(Object.values(CAPABILITY))
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for (const key of CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES) expect(all.has(key), key).toBe(true)
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expect(CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES).toEqual(['bank_sync', 'skatteverket', 'org_lookup', 'migration', 'peppol'])
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// org_lookup and migration stay free on hosted (not PAID) but still need
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// Accounted's services, hence connector-gated on a self-host.
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expect(PAID_CAPABILITIES).not.toContain('org_lookup')
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expect(PAID_CAPABILITIES).not.toContain('migration')
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expect(isConnectorCapability('ai')).toBe(false)
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expect(isConnectorCapability('bank_sync')).toBe(true)
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})
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})
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