Files
accounted/lib/connect/hosted/upstream-budget.ts
T
f31eeaa603 feat(connect): Peppol through the connector (hosted proxy, instance transport, ownership ledger) (#2177)
* feat(connect): peppol connector foundation: capability, ledger/budget service, quota

Adds the storage + package shape for brokering Peppol through the connector with
the same one-address + rate-budget model as bank/skatteverket: a peppol
capability (connector-gated, free on hosted), peppol as a ledger + upstream
service, a conservative rate budget, and a migration extending the ledger
service CHECK and the per-key limits (peppol_connections_per_company). Proxy
route + instance-side Qvalia reroute follow. Switch-on gated on the Qvalia
brokering-terms check.

(cherry picked from commit 3cc0da6a3, migration renumbered 20260902190000)

Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat

* feat(connect): Peppol through the connector: hosted proxy, instance transport, ownership ledger

Completes the Peppol upstream for self-hosted instances on the connector
(WS3): an instance with a connector key carrying the peppol scope and no
Qvalia keys of its own sends and receives e-invoices through Arcim's
contracted access point, the same way bank and Skatteverket already route.

Hosted: app/api/connect/peppol/[...path] speaks the PeppolTransport
operations (lookup, submit, status, evidence, recipient PUT/DELETE, inbound
list/xml) rather than proxying Qvalia paths, because the Qvalia account is
shared by every hosted company and every instance: reads must be scoped to
what the caller owns, and the inbound read endpoint is destructive for the
whole account. Ownership: a receiving registration is a ledger row (service
peppol, participant id in account_uids, sha256 in handle_hash so one key
holds a participant at a time); outbound submissions land in the new
connector_peppol_submissions table and gate status/evidence; inbound
documents are served from the hosted archive filtered by the participants
the key holds. Per-company quota (peppol_connections_per_company), the
shared PEPPOL_RECEIVING_MAX_REGISTRATIONS cap, and the global peppol rate
budget apply. Provider failures cross as CONNECTOR_UPSTREAM_ERROR with the
adapter's retryable flag (422 or 502).

Instance: lib/invoices/transports/connector.ts implements PeppolTransport
over that API and registers itself in connector mode (key present, no
QVALIA_* keys); getPeppolTransportAvailability() defaults to it when no
provider is selected, so an instance needs no PEPPOL_TRANSPORT_PROVIDER.
Webhooks are not brokered; the existing outbound status poll covers it.
Hosted is byte-identical: it has its own keys, so connector mode is never on.

Docs: SELF-HOSTING.md, SOVEREIGN.md, .env.example. Switch-on for third-party
instances stays gated on the Qvalia brokering-terms check; without the scope
every operation answers 403.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(connect): authorize Peppol participants per key, harden the proxy after review

Review follow-ups on #2177. Authorization: a key may only register (and send
as) participant identifiers Arcim recorded on the key at issuance
(connector_keys.peppol_participants, migration 20260902191000) or the
licensee's own org number, and a document may only be submitted as a sender
the key has registered; X-Connector-Company stays an opaque per-company ref.
Cap: the shared access-point cap now counts fresh pending reservations and is
re-checked after this request's own reservation, so concurrent registrations
cannot both pass. Inbound: both halves of the participant id are filtered in
the archive query (over-fetched, then exact-pair checked), so foreign rows
sharing an identifier cannot consume the limit. Delete: deregistration is a
required transport capability, checked before the ledger row is revoked, and
registration refuses an access point that cannot deregister. Instance
transport: the hosted URL must be https (loopback http only, same rule as
getConnectorConfig), and the response body is read inside the timeout window
with body-read failures mapped to retryable transport errors.
issue-connector-key.ts gains --peppol-participants and
--peppol-connections-per-company. Declined: NOT VALID on the ledger CHECK
(the table is empty until keys are issued; the validated scan is instant).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(connect): bind Peppol ownership to the instance company, query exact participant pairs

Second review round on #2177. Ownership is now (key, company_ref), not key
alone: a sender must be registered under the same company header, status and
evidence reads look the submission up under the header company, DELETE and
re-registration refuse a participant the key holds for another company, so
one company on a multi-company instance cannot act on another company's
registration through the shared key. The instance transport resolves the
owning company from its own peppol_deliveries / peppol_registrations rows
before status, evidence and deregistration calls (deps.companyFor,
deps.companyForParticipant, wired in transports/index.ts). Inbound listing
stays key-wide (the instance routes documents to its own companies by its
own registrations). The archive query now runs one exact-pair query per
scheme (scheme fixed, that scheme's identifiers), so neither foreign nor
cross-pair rows can consume the limit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io>
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 20:57:57 +02:00

78 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript

import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
import type { ConnectorService } from './ledger'
/**
* Global upstream rate budget for the connector proxy.
*
* Enable Banking's quotas (Annex 1 §5: 20 rps / 300 rpm / 10 000 per hour) are
* shared by ALL of Arcim's traffic, hosted included. So connector traffic gets
* a ceiling well under those, reserved atomically in the DB (RPC
* connector_reserve_upstream) so two proxy requests can't both slip past. A
* self-hoster that hits the ceiling gets a 429 with Retry-After; hosted bank
* sync is never starved because the connector ceiling is a fraction of the
* provider quota.
*
* Configurable per service via env; the defaults sit around 30% of the EB
* per-minute quota.
*/
export type UpstreamService = ConnectorService
interface Budget {
minuteMax: number
hourMax: number
}
function intFromEnv(name: string, fallback: number): number {
const v = Number(process.env[name])
return Number.isFinite(v) && v > 0 ? Math.floor(v) : fallback
}
export function budgetFor(service: UpstreamService): Budget {
if (service === 'bank') {
return {
minuteMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_BANK_RPM_BUDGET', 90), // ~30% of EB's 300/min
hourMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_BANK_RPH_BUDGET', 3000), // ~30% of EB's 10 000/h
}
}
if (service === 'peppol') {
// Peppol is low-volume (invoices, not polling), so a modest ceiling well
// under Qvalia's limits is plenty; tune via env if a busy byrå needs more.
return {
minuteMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_PEPPOL_RPM_BUDGET', 60),
hourMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_PEPPOL_RPH_BUDGET', 1000),
}
}
return {
minuteMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_SKV_RPM_BUDGET', 120),
hourMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_SKV_RPH_BUDGET', 4000),
}
}
export type BudgetResult = { ok: true } | { ok: false; scope: 'minute' | 'hour'; retryAfterSec: number }
/**
* Reserve one upstream call. Returns ok:false with a Retry-After when the
* global budget for this service is exhausted. A DB error fails OPEN (ok:true):
* the budget is a protective cap, not an auth boundary, and blocking every
* connector call because the counter table hiccuped would be worse than a
* brief overshoot the provider itself also rate-limits.
*/
export async function reserveUpstream(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
service: UpstreamService,
): Promise<BudgetResult> {
const { minuteMax, hourMax } = budgetFor(service)
const { data, error } = await supabase.rpc('connector_reserve_upstream', {
p_service: service,
p_minute_max: minuteMax,
p_hour_max: hourMax,
})
if (error) return { ok: true }
const row = (data ?? {}) as { ok?: boolean; scope?: 'minute' | 'hour'; retry_after_sec?: number }
if (row.ok === false) {
return { ok: false, scope: row.scope ?? 'minute', retryAfterSec: row.retry_after_sec ?? 60 }
}
return { ok: true }
}