* feat(connect): peppol connector foundation: capability, ledger/budget service, quota Adds the storage + package shape for brokering Peppol through the connector with the same one-address + rate-budget model as bank/skatteverket: a peppol capability (connector-gated, free on hosted), peppol as a ledger + upstream service, a conservative rate budget, and a migration extending the ledger service CHECK and the per-key limits (peppol_connections_per_company). Proxy route + instance-side Qvalia reroute follow. Switch-on gated on the Qvalia brokering-terms check. (cherry picked from commit 3cc0da6a3, migration renumbered 20260902190000) Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io> Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat * feat(connect): Peppol through the connector: hosted proxy, instance transport, ownership ledger Completes the Peppol upstream for self-hosted instances on the connector (WS3): an instance with a connector key carrying the peppol scope and no Qvalia keys of its own sends and receives e-invoices through Arcim's contracted access point, the same way bank and Skatteverket already route. Hosted: app/api/connect/peppol/[...path] speaks the PeppolTransport operations (lookup, submit, status, evidence, recipient PUT/DELETE, inbound list/xml) rather than proxying Qvalia paths, because the Qvalia account is shared by every hosted company and every instance: reads must be scoped to what the caller owns, and the inbound read endpoint is destructive for the whole account. Ownership: a receiving registration is a ledger row (service peppol, participant id in account_uids, sha256 in handle_hash so one key holds a participant at a time); outbound submissions land in the new connector_peppol_submissions table and gate status/evidence; inbound documents are served from the hosted archive filtered by the participants the key holds. Per-company quota (peppol_connections_per_company), the shared PEPPOL_RECEIVING_MAX_REGISTRATIONS cap, and the global peppol rate budget apply. Provider failures cross as CONNECTOR_UPSTREAM_ERROR with the adapter's retryable flag (422 or 502). Instance: lib/invoices/transports/connector.ts implements PeppolTransport over that API and registers itself in connector mode (key present, no QVALIA_* keys); getPeppolTransportAvailability() defaults to it when no provider is selected, so an instance needs no PEPPOL_TRANSPORT_PROVIDER. Webhooks are not brokered; the existing outbound status poll covers it. Hosted is byte-identical: it has its own keys, so connector mode is never on. Docs: SELF-HOSTING.md, SOVEREIGN.md, .env.example. Switch-on for third-party instances stays gated on the Qvalia brokering-terms check; without the scope every operation answers 403. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(connect): authorize Peppol participants per key, harden the proxy after review Review follow-ups on #2177. Authorization: a key may only register (and send as) participant identifiers Arcim recorded on the key at issuance (connector_keys.peppol_participants, migration 20260902191000) or the licensee's own org number, and a document may only be submitted as a sender the key has registered; X-Connector-Company stays an opaque per-company ref. Cap: the shared access-point cap now counts fresh pending reservations and is re-checked after this request's own reservation, so concurrent registrations cannot both pass. Inbound: both halves of the participant id are filtered in the archive query (over-fetched, then exact-pair checked), so foreign rows sharing an identifier cannot consume the limit. Delete: deregistration is a required transport capability, checked before the ledger row is revoked, and registration refuses an access point that cannot deregister. Instance transport: the hosted URL must be https (loopback http only, same rule as getConnectorConfig), and the response body is read inside the timeout window with body-read failures mapped to retryable transport errors. issue-connector-key.ts gains --peppol-participants and --peppol-connections-per-company. Declined: NOT VALID on the ledger CHECK (the table is empty until keys are issued; the validated scan is instant). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(connect): bind Peppol ownership to the instance company, query exact participant pairs Second review round on #2177. Ownership is now (key, company_ref), not key alone: a sender must be registered under the same company header, status and evidence reads look the submission up under the header company, DELETE and re-registration refuse a participant the key holds for another company, so one company on a multi-company instance cannot act on another company's registration through the shared key. The instance transport resolves the owning company from its own peppol_deliveries / peppol_registrations rows before status, evidence and deregistration calls (deps.companyFor, deps.companyForParticipant, wired in transports/index.ts). Inbound listing stays key-wide (the instance routes documents to its own companies by its own registrations). The archive query now runs one exact-pair query per scheme (scheme fixed, that scheme's identifiers), so neither foreign nor cross-pair rows can consume the limit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io> Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
78 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
78 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript
import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import type { ConnectorService } from './ledger'
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/**
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* Global upstream rate budget for the connector proxy.
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*
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* Enable Banking's quotas (Annex 1 §5: 20 rps / 300 rpm / 10 000 per hour) are
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* shared by ALL of Arcim's traffic, hosted included. So connector traffic gets
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* a ceiling well under those, reserved atomically in the DB (RPC
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* connector_reserve_upstream) so two proxy requests can't both slip past. A
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* self-hoster that hits the ceiling gets a 429 with Retry-After; hosted bank
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* sync is never starved because the connector ceiling is a fraction of the
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* provider quota.
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*
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* Configurable per service via env; the defaults sit around 30% of the EB
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* per-minute quota.
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*/
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export type UpstreamService = ConnectorService
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interface Budget {
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minuteMax: number
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hourMax: number
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}
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function intFromEnv(name: string, fallback: number): number {
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const v = Number(process.env[name])
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return Number.isFinite(v) && v > 0 ? Math.floor(v) : fallback
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}
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export function budgetFor(service: UpstreamService): Budget {
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if (service === 'bank') {
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return {
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minuteMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_BANK_RPM_BUDGET', 90), // ~30% of EB's 300/min
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hourMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_BANK_RPH_BUDGET', 3000), // ~30% of EB's 10 000/h
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}
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}
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if (service === 'peppol') {
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// Peppol is low-volume (invoices, not polling), so a modest ceiling well
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// under Qvalia's limits is plenty; tune via env if a busy byrå needs more.
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return {
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minuteMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_PEPPOL_RPM_BUDGET', 60),
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hourMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_PEPPOL_RPH_BUDGET', 1000),
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}
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}
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return {
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minuteMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_SKV_RPM_BUDGET', 120),
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hourMax: intFromEnv('CONNECT_SKV_RPH_BUDGET', 4000),
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}
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}
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export type BudgetResult = { ok: true } | { ok: false; scope: 'minute' | 'hour'; retryAfterSec: number }
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/**
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* Reserve one upstream call. Returns ok:false with a Retry-After when the
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* global budget for this service is exhausted. A DB error fails OPEN (ok:true):
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* the budget is a protective cap, not an auth boundary, and blocking every
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* connector call because the counter table hiccuped would be worse than a
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* brief overshoot the provider itself also rate-limits.
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*/
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export async function reserveUpstream(
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supabase: SupabaseClient,
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service: UpstreamService,
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): Promise<BudgetResult> {
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const { minuteMax, hourMax } = budgetFor(service)
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const { data, error } = await supabase.rpc('connector_reserve_upstream', {
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p_service: service,
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p_minute_max: minuteMax,
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p_hour_max: hourMax,
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})
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if (error) return { ok: true }
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const row = (data ?? {}) as { ok?: boolean; scope?: 'minute' | 'hour'; retry_after_sec?: number }
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if (row.ok === false) {
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return { ok: false, scope: row.scope ?? 'minute', retryAfterSec: row.retry_after_sec ?? 60 }
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}
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return { ok: true }
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}
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