Files
accounted/lib/connect/hosted/ledger.ts
T
Jakob Wennberg f31eeaa603 feat(connect): Peppol through the connector (hosted proxy, instance transport, ownership ledger) (#2177)
* feat(connect): peppol connector foundation: capability, ledger/budget service, quota

Adds the storage + package shape for brokering Peppol through the connector with
the same one-address + rate-budget model as bank/skatteverket: a peppol
capability (connector-gated, free on hosted), peppol as a ledger + upstream
service, a conservative rate budget, and a migration extending the ledger
service CHECK and the per-key limits (peppol_connections_per_company). Proxy
route + instance-side Qvalia reroute follow. Switch-on gated on the Qvalia
brokering-terms check.

(cherry picked from commit 3cc0da6a3, migration renumbered 20260902190000)

Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat

* feat(connect): Peppol through the connector: hosted proxy, instance transport, ownership ledger

Completes the Peppol upstream for self-hosted instances on the connector
(WS3): an instance with a connector key carrying the peppol scope and no
Qvalia keys of its own sends and receives e-invoices through Arcim's
contracted access point, the same way bank and Skatteverket already route.

Hosted: app/api/connect/peppol/[...path] speaks the PeppolTransport
operations (lookup, submit, status, evidence, recipient PUT/DELETE, inbound
list/xml) rather than proxying Qvalia paths, because the Qvalia account is
shared by every hosted company and every instance: reads must be scoped to
what the caller owns, and the inbound read endpoint is destructive for the
whole account. Ownership: a receiving registration is a ledger row (service
peppol, participant id in account_uids, sha256 in handle_hash so one key
holds a participant at a time); outbound submissions land in the new
connector_peppol_submissions table and gate status/evidence; inbound
documents are served from the hosted archive filtered by the participants
the key holds. Per-company quota (peppol_connections_per_company), the
shared PEPPOL_RECEIVING_MAX_REGISTRATIONS cap, and the global peppol rate
budget apply. Provider failures cross as CONNECTOR_UPSTREAM_ERROR with the
adapter's retryable flag (422 or 502).

Instance: lib/invoices/transports/connector.ts implements PeppolTransport
over that API and registers itself in connector mode (key present, no
QVALIA_* keys); getPeppolTransportAvailability() defaults to it when no
provider is selected, so an instance needs no PEPPOL_TRANSPORT_PROVIDER.
Webhooks are not brokered; the existing outbound status poll covers it.
Hosted is byte-identical: it has its own keys, so connector mode is never on.

Docs: SELF-HOSTING.md, SOVEREIGN.md, .env.example. Switch-on for third-party
instances stays gated on the Qvalia brokering-terms check; without the scope
every operation answers 403.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(connect): authorize Peppol participants per key, harden the proxy after review

Review follow-ups on #2177. Authorization: a key may only register (and send
as) participant identifiers Arcim recorded on the key at issuance
(connector_keys.peppol_participants, migration 20260902191000) or the
licensee's own org number, and a document may only be submitted as a sender
the key has registered; X-Connector-Company stays an opaque per-company ref.
Cap: the shared access-point cap now counts fresh pending reservations and is
re-checked after this request's own reservation, so concurrent registrations
cannot both pass. Inbound: both halves of the participant id are filtered in
the archive query (over-fetched, then exact-pair checked), so foreign rows
sharing an identifier cannot consume the limit. Delete: deregistration is a
required transport capability, checked before the ledger row is revoked, and
registration refuses an access point that cannot deregister. Instance
transport: the hosted URL must be https (loopback http only, same rule as
getConnectorConfig), and the response body is read inside the timeout window
with body-read failures mapped to retryable transport errors.
issue-connector-key.ts gains --peppol-participants and
--peppol-connections-per-company. Declined: NOT VALID on the ledger CHECK
(the table is empty until keys are issued; the validated scan is instant).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(connect): bind Peppol ownership to the instance company, query exact participant pairs

Second review round on #2177. Ownership is now (key, company_ref), not key
alone: a sender must be registered under the same company header, status and
evidence reads look the submission up under the header company, DELETE and
re-registration refuse a participant the key holds for another company, so
one company on a multi-company instance cannot act on another company's
registration through the shared key. The instance transport resolves the
owning company from its own peppol_deliveries / peppol_registrations rows
before status, evidence and deregistration calls (deps.companyFor,
deps.companyForParticipant, wired in transports/index.ts). Inbound listing
stays key-wide (the instance routes documents to its own companies by its
own registrations). The archive query now runs one exact-pair query per
scheme (scheme fixed, that scheme's identifiers), so neither foreign nor
cross-pair rows can consume the limit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io>
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 20:57:57 +02:00

204 lines
7.8 KiB
TypeScript

import crypto from 'node:crypto'
import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
/**
* The connector connection ledger: proof, without secrets, that a connection
* belongs to a given connector key. Every bank/SKV connection is born through
* the proxy (the consent redirect is ours), so the proxy records it at
* creation and checks ownership on every later use. The upstream handle (EB
* session id, SKV access token) is hashed; the value never rests here.
*/
export type ConnectorService = 'bank' | 'skatteverket' | 'peppol'
export function hashHandle(handle: string): string {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(handle).digest('hex')
}
export interface LedgerRow {
id: string
connector_key_id: string
service: ConnectorService
company_ref: string
provider: string | null
account_uids: string[]
status: 'pending' | 'active' | 'revoked'
}
/**
* Pending rows count toward quota only while their consent window is open:
* the signed connector state expires after 15 minutes, so an abandoned
* consent stops reserving capacity once its state can no longer activate it.
*/
export const PENDING_QUOTA_WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000
/**
* Rows currently holding or reserving quota for (key, service, company):
* active connections plus fresh pending reservations. Used by the /auth
* quota check both before insert (fast reject) and after insert (the
* reservation re-count that closes the concurrent-auth race).
*/
export async function countHeldConnections(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
keyId: string,
service: ConnectorService,
companyRef: string,
now: Date = new Date(),
): Promise<number> {
const freshPendingSince = new Date(now.getTime() - PENDING_QUOTA_WINDOW_MS).toISOString()
const { count, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.select('id', { count: 'exact', head: true })
.eq('connector_key_id', keyId)
.eq('service', service)
.eq('company_ref', companyRef)
.or(`status.eq.active,and(status.eq.pending,created_at.gte.${freshPendingSince})`)
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger count failed: ${error.message}`)
return count ?? 0
}
/** Roll back a just-created pending reservation (lost the quota re-count). */
export async function deletePendingConnectionById(supabase: SupabaseClient, id: string): Promise<void> {
await supabase.from('connector_connections').delete().eq('id', id).eq('status', 'pending')
}
export async function createPendingConnection(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; service: ConnectorService; companyRef: string; provider: string | null; pendingState: string },
): Promise<string> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.insert({
connector_key_id: params.keyId,
service: params.service,
company_ref: params.companyRef,
provider: params.provider,
pending_state: params.pendingState,
status: 'pending',
})
.select('id')
.single()
if (error || !data) throw new Error(`ledger insert failed: ${error?.message}`)
return (data as { id: string }).id
}
/**
* The pending row a signed state belongs to, under the presenting key.
* Precondition for the code exchange at POST /sessions: exchanging a code
* against a state with no pending row would mint an upstream session the
* ledger never records (and cross-flow substitution could smuggle a code
* into a foreign state). The state's own TTL bounds freshness.
*/
export async function findPendingByState(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; pendingState: string },
): Promise<LedgerRow | null> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.select('id, connector_key_id, service, company_ref, provider, account_uids, status')
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('pending_state', params.pendingState)
.eq('status', 'pending')
.maybeSingle()
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger pending lookup failed: ${error.message}`)
return (data as LedgerRow | null) ?? null
}
/**
* The ACTIVE row whose refresh-token hash matches, under the presenting key.
* Ownership precondition for the SKV refresh exchange: without it the broker
* was an open refresh oracle for any leaked refresh token.
*/
export async function findByRefreshHash(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; refreshHash: string },
): Promise<LedgerRow | null> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.select('id, connector_key_id, service, company_ref, provider, account_uids, status')
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('service', 'skatteverket')
.eq('refresh_hash', params.refreshHash)
.eq('status', 'active')
.maybeSingle()
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger refresh lookup failed: ${error.message}`)
return (data as LedgerRow | null) ?? null
}
/** Activate a pending connection (found by its signed pending_state) with the live handle + accounts. */
export async function activateByPendingState(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; pendingState: string; handle: string; accountUids?: string[] },
): Promise<LedgerRow | null> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.update({
status: 'active',
handle_hash: hashHandle(params.handle),
account_uids: params.accountUids ?? [],
pending_state: null,
activated_at: new Date().toISOString(),
last_used_at: new Date().toISOString(),
})
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('pending_state', params.pendingState)
.eq('status', 'pending')
.select('id, connector_key_id, service, company_ref, provider, account_uids, status')
.maybeSingle()
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger activate failed: ${error.message}`)
return (data as LedgerRow | null) ?? null
}
/** The active ledger row that owns a given handle under a key. Ownership check for reads/writes. */
export async function findByHandle(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; service: ConnectorService; handle: string },
): Promise<LedgerRow | null> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.select('id, connector_key_id, service, company_ref, provider, account_uids, status')
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('service', params.service)
.eq('handle_hash', hashHandle(params.handle))
.eq('status', 'active')
.maybeSingle()
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger lookup failed: ${error.message}`)
return (data as LedgerRow | null) ?? null
}
/** The active ledger row that owns a bank account uid under a key. */
export async function findByAccountUid(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; accountUid: string },
): Promise<LedgerRow | null> {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.select('id, connector_key_id, service, company_ref, provider, account_uids, status')
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('service', 'bank')
.eq('status', 'active')
.contains('account_uids', [params.accountUid])
.limit(1)
.maybeSingle()
if (error) throw new Error(`ledger account lookup failed: ${error.message}`)
return (data as LedgerRow | null) ?? null
}
export async function touchConnection(supabase: SupabaseClient, id: string): Promise<void> {
await supabase.from('connector_connections').update({ last_used_at: new Date().toISOString() }).eq('id', id)
}
/** Revoke by handle (DELETE /sessions). Idempotent. */
export async function revokeByHandle(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
params: { keyId: string; service: ConnectorService; handle: string },
): Promise<void> {
await supabase
.from('connector_connections')
.update({ status: 'revoked', revoked_at: new Date().toISOString() })
.eq('connector_key_id', params.keyId)
.eq('service', params.service)
.eq('handle_hash', hashHandle(params.handle))
.eq('status', 'active')
}