aabddb592f
* feat(billing): multi-user seat gate: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy Multiple people in one company becomes a paid capability (multi_user, the eighth PAID key). Derived at access time from capability_grants, no status column, no enforcement cron: - entitled: active grant (trial/stripe/team/manual/comp), everyone works - grace: newest grant expired < 20 days ago; countdown banner for everyone in companies with > 1 user; invites still allowed - frozen: only role=owner resolves; other memberships go dormant (rows untouched, paying reactivates instantly); invites 403 with paid-plan upsell Enforcement: new resolve_active_company_gated RPC (zero-arg RPC and RLS twin untouched: they also run on self-hosts, where the gate never bites), gated query fallback for service-role/API-key paths, setActiveCompany guard, MCP company-access check, invite route. Middleware routes all-frozen users to a new /paused page; the switcher greys locked companies. Migration 20260901081417 (applied to staging): trial trigger seeds multi_user, backfills for mid-trial companies, active Stripe subs, team agreements, and a grandfather grant (expires now, i.e. grace = deploy + 20 days) for existing unpaid multi-member companies. Daily cron mails owners at grace start and last day. Strings in sv+en; pg-real + unit tests included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): multi-user seat gate hardening from skeptic review - Stripe cancel now EXPIRES the multi_user stripe grant instead of deleting it: the 20-day grace window hangs on an expired row, so a deleted one froze churned payers' staff instantly with no banner and no mail. Other stripe grants keep the freeze-and-retain delete. - New SECURITY DEFINER company_multi_user_state() RPC (migration 20260901083726, applied to staging) and RPC-first getMultiUserState: capability_grants RLS hides team-scoped rows from non-team users, so user-client reads misread byra-covered companies as frozen (switch refusal, wrong switcher locks). - Byra-kind teams get a standing team-scoped multi_user grant (backfill + teams trigger): byra client companies have no company-scoped trial by design, so a grantless byra team would freeze every consultant and client user. - Comped/manual companies with active PAID-key grants extend to multi_user (a comped company must not read as paying while locking out user two). - /api/v1 gets the same dormancy gate as MCP (frozen non-owner -> 403). - PGRST202 on resolution fails OPEN (pre-migration DB has zero multi_user rows; the gated fallback would have frozen every non-owner mid-deploy). - Grace cron: covers team-scoped lapses (byra agreement ending) and skips the start mail for the hand-mailed grandfather cohort. - Tests updated/added across all touched surfaces; pg tests for the new RPC and byra trigger; trial-suppression pg test extended to 8 keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): decouple seat-gate env check and fail open on gate read throws CI round 1 on #2099: - isMultiUserEnforced no longer imports has-capability: several route test suites partially mock that module and the vitest mock guard threw from inside the v1 seat gate, turning expected 4xx responses into 500s. multi_user is never a connector capability, so the bypass reduces to the same env reads, now inlined. - getMultiUserState wraps its resolution in a fail-open try/catch: a client without .rpc or a thrown network error must never lock users out. - no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 -> 393 with reasons: the seat gate's .or() scope filter (server-resolved UUIDs) and the Stripe cancel expiry update's timestamp .or(); all columns in both strings are literals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): membership-guard the multi-user entitlement RPCs (Superagent P3) company_multi_user_ok and company_multi_user_state are SECURITY DEFINER and were granted to authenticated with a caller-supplied company UUID: any logged-in user could probe an arbitrary company's billing state and grace deadline across tenants. Migration 20260901091752 (applied to staging) requires an auth.uid() membership in the target company when a JWT is present, keeps service-role/definer contexts unrestricted, and clamps the grace window to [0, 20] days. pg tests: stranger gets false/NULL, member reads normally, oversized p_grace_days cannot widen the probe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
83 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
83 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Read-side payload guards for the member rosters
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* (CompanyMembersSection.tsx, TeamPanel.tsx).
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*
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* A 200 whose body does not carry the expected lists is a failed read, not an
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* empty roster: returning null forces the caller into its error state instead
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* of rendering an apparently member-less company or team. A consultant who
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* sees an empty list re-invites people who are already members, so "cannot
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* read the roster" must never render as "no members".
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*
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* The element types are the caller's own row interfaces; these guards verify
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* the envelope shape (lists are lists, flags are booleans), not the fields of
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* each row.
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*/
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export interface CompanyMembersPayload<M, I> {
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members: M[]
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invitations: I[]
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canInvite: boolean
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/** Multi-user seat gate: swap the invite form for the paid-plan upsell. */
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inviteRequiresUpgrade: boolean
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}
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export function parseCompanyMembersPayload<M, I>(body: unknown): CompanyMembersPayload<M, I> | null {
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if (typeof body !== 'object' || body === null) return null
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const data = (body as { data?: unknown }).data
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if (typeof data !== 'object' || data === null) return null
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const d = data as {
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members?: unknown
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invitations?: unknown
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canInvite?: unknown
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inviteRequiresUpgrade?: unknown
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}
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if (!Array.isArray(d.members) || !Array.isArray(d.invitations)) return null
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return {
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members: d.members as M[],
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invitations: d.invitations as I[],
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// Only an explicit boolean true unlocks the invite form.
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canInvite: d.canInvite === true,
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// Only an explicit true swaps the form for the upsell: an older server
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// without the field keeps the form, and the POST's own 403 still guards.
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inviteRequiresUpgrade: d.inviteRequiresUpgrade === true,
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}
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}
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export interface TeamMembersPayload<M, I> {
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members: M[]
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invitations: I[]
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teamName: string | null
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teamId: string | null
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teamKind: string | null
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isOwner: boolean
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canInvite: boolean
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}
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export function parseTeamMembersPayload<M, I>(body: unknown): TeamMembersPayload<M, I> | null {
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if (typeof body !== 'object' || body === null) return null
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const data = (body as { data?: unknown }).data
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if (typeof data !== 'object' || data === null) return null
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const d = data as {
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members?: unknown
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invitations?: unknown
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teamName?: unknown
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teamId?: unknown
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teamKind?: unknown
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isOwner?: unknown
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canInvite?: unknown
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}
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if (!Array.isArray(d.members)) return null
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return {
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members: d.members as M[],
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// Management-only extra, not roster state: a missing list means "none",
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// not a failed read (the strictness above protects the member roster).
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invitations: Array.isArray(d.invitations) ? (d.invitations as I[]) : [],
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teamName: typeof d.teamName === 'string' && d.teamName.length > 0 ? d.teamName : null,
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teamId: typeof d.teamId === 'string' && d.teamId.length > 0 ? d.teamId : null,
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teamKind: typeof d.teamKind === 'string' && d.teamKind.length > 0 ? d.teamKind : null,
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// Only explicit boolean true unlocks management affordances.
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isOwner: d.isOwner === true,
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canInvite: d.canInvite === true,
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}
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}
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