Files
accounted/app/api/connect/bank/[...path]/route.ts
T
Jakob Wennberg 37e50c272d feat(connect): Skatteverket broker + data proxy for self-hosted instances (tokens stay on the instance) (#1757)
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector'

Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted.

- lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync,
  skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a
  self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability().
  Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on
  purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant.
- lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key).
  Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins,
  else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on
  (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector
  capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the
  grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows.
  getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector
  keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the
  hosted trial copy).
- Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains
  'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline
  and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly).
  pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the
  (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows.
- Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector
  gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector
  keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests
  that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated
  to the new one.

Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green
against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint
ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector
extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can
be issued).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query

One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the
no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is
unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly

Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the
entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the
plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key.

Hosted side:
- Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix,
  org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids,
  current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count,
  last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering,
  separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted
  companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC
  validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR
  UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row)
  and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role.
  pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate
  limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade.
- lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts
  (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping),
  with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per
  request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET +
  POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report,
  never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless
  --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines).

Instance side:
- lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL
  default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count
  and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope,
  expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status
  deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone.
  /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key.
- Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json,
  with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with
  the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates),
  DECISIONS.

Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes
and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests
run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied.
no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget

Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A
self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect
a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all
transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision:
tokens on the instance, proxy stateless).

- Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger:
  sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only),
  `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global
  budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and
  `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs
  REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real
  covers all of it.
- EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core
  must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests
  unchanged.
- lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed
  connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR
  registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance
  redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch.
- app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions,
  accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST
  /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state;
  reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the
  global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted).
- issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of
  v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval.
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS.

Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against
supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt
relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean.
Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): Skatteverket broker + data proxy for self-hosted instances (tokens stay on the instance)

Sovereign plan WS3 PR5b, stacked on the bank proxy (#1751). A self-hosted
instance with a `skatteverket`-scoped connector key can now run the BankID
consent, file VAT/AGI and sync skattekonto through Arcim's registered
Skatteverket client; the SKV tokens are returned to the instance and stored
(encrypted) there.

- lib/connect/upstreams/skatteverket-oauth.ts: core-side SKV OAuth + data
  helpers (authorize URL, code/refresh exchange with Arcim's client secret,
  the four backing-API base URLs, the API-gateway Client_Id/Client_Secret
  headers). Core can't import @/extensions/, so this duplicates the
  extension's endpoints/scope set (one integrator = Arcim), mirroring the EB
  JWT relocation.
- app/api/connect/skv/oauth/authorize-url: builds the authorize URL against
  OUR registered redirect_uri + a signed connector state, per-company SKV
  connection quota, pending ledger row.
- app/api/connect/skv/oauth/token: exchanges/refreshes and RETURNS the tokens
  to the instance; the ledger keeps only sha256(access_token) +
  sha256(refresh_token).
- app/api/connect/skv/api/[...path]: allowlist over moms / skattekonto /
  agd-inlamning / agd-period. The instance sends the user's SKV Bearer (as
  X-Connector-Upstream-Authorization) + X-Connector-Key; the proxy checks the
  token hash against the ledger, adds Arcim's gateway credentials (never
  exposed to the instance), forwards. Same per-key + global budget as bank.
- The Skatteverket extension /callback gains the connector branch
  (isConnectorState -> 302 back to the instance; code never exchanged there).
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: SKV connector live) + DECISIONS.

Tests: SKV oauth lib, authorize-url, token, data proxy, callback connector
branch (all green; 74 connect + 425 connect/SKV). tsc, guards, lint clean;
no-phantom-columns held at 380 (literal update branches). Not in this PR:
instance-side wiring (PR6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(connect): SKV broker review+skeptic batch: state-bound exchange, owned-only refresh, identity-number redaction, quota reservation, https-only bases, docs dedupe

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* docs(self-host): restore the instance-wiring qualifier in the connector section

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): PR #1757 review batch 2: redirect 'error' on credential fetches, mandatory ledger writes before token return, MD037

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): reject encoded path separators in SKV data-proxy segments (traversal guard)

The WHATWG parser normalizes raw dot segments before the route runs;
what survives is an encoded separator inside a segment (a%2Fb, ..%2Fx,
a%5Cb), which would escape the allowlisted service base once the
upstream fetch re-normalizes. splitPath now decodes each segment and
rejects dot segments and separator-bearing values.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
2026-08-31 22:40:55 +02:00

349 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import { withConnectorAuth, type ConnectorContext } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/with-connector-auth'
import { getAuthorizationHeader } from '@/lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt'
import { reserveUpstream } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/upstream-budget'
import {
activateByPendingState,
countHeldConnections,
createPendingConnection,
deletePendingConnectionById,
findByAccountUid,
findByHandle,
findPendingByState,
revokeByHandle,
touchConnection,
} from '@/lib/connect/hosted/ledger'
import { signConnectorState, verifyConnectorState } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/state'
/**
* Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances (WS3 PR5).
*
* The instance calls this with its connector key; the proxy adds Arcim's EB
* JWT and forwards to Enable Banking. The instance never holds the EB
* credential; the bank session id it gets back rests on the instance. This
* route is what makes that split safe: a strict path allowlist (never an open
* passthrough), per-key + global rate budget on every upstream call, a
* per-company connection quota checked at authorize time, and an ownership
* ledger so an instance can only use sessions/accounts it obtained through its
* own key.
*
* Consent handoff: POST /auth's redirect_url is rewritten to OUR hosted EB
* callback (already registered with EB), and the upstream `state` is replaced
* by a signed connector state carrying the instance's own return URL. The
* hosted EB callback (app/api/extensions/enable-banking/callback) detects that
* signed state and 302s the browser back to the instance with the code, so no
* new redirect URI has to be registered at Enable Banking per instance.
*/
/**
* The EB base URL must be https (http only for loopback dev): forwardToEb
* sends Arcim's EB JWT in Authorization, so a plaintext override would ship
* the credential unencrypted. Resolved lazily so a bad env fails the request
* (500 via the wrapper), never the build.
*/
function ebBaseUrl(): string {
const raw = (
process.env.ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL_PRODUCTION ||
process.env.ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL ||
'https://api.enablebanking.com'
).replace(/\/+$/, '')
const url = new URL(raw)
const loopback = url.hostname === 'localhost' || url.hostname === '127.0.0.1'
if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !(url.protocol === 'http:' && loopback)) {
throw new Error('ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL must be https: the EB JWT is sent in Authorization')
}
return raw
}
const COMPANY_HEADER = 'x-connector-company'
const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000
function requireScope(ctx: ConnectorContext): NextResponse | null {
if (ctx.key.scopes.includes('bank_sync')) return null
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'This connector key does not include bank sync', code: 'CONNECTOR_SCOPE_MISSING' },
{ status: 403 },
)
}
function companyRef(request: Request): string | null {
return request.headers.get(COMPANY_HEADER)?.trim() || null
}
async function budgetOr429(ctx: ConnectorContext): Promise<NextResponse | null> {
const budget = await reserveUpstream(ctx.supabase, 'bank')
if (budget.ok) return null
ctx.log.warn('bank connector budget exhausted', { scope: budget.scope })
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Bank connector is busy, try again shortly', code: 'CONNECTOR_RATE_LIMITED', scope: budget.scope },
{ status: 429, headers: { 'Retry-After': String(budget.retryAfterSec) } },
)
}
// Statuses that must carry no body (RFC 9110). new Response(text, {status:204})
// throws in undici, so pass a null body through for these.
const NULL_BODY_STATUS = new Set([204, 205, 304])
interface EbResult {
status: number
ok: boolean
/** null for the RFC 9110 bodyless statuses. */
text: string | null
contentType: string | null
}
/**
* Forward a request to Enable Banking with Arcim's JWT and read the body
* INSIDE the timeout window: clearing the timer at headers-received left an
* upstream that stalls mid-body holding the request open forever.
*/
async function forwardToEb(method: string, path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<EbResult> {
const controller = new AbortController()
const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS)
try {
const res = await fetch(`${ebBaseUrl()}${path}`, {
method,
signal: controller.signal,
// A followed redirect would resend the EB JWT to the redirect target.
redirect: 'error',
headers: {
Authorization: getAuthorizationHeader(),
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
Accept: 'application/json',
},
...(body !== undefined ? { body: JSON.stringify(body) } : {}),
})
const text = NULL_BODY_STATUS.has(res.status) ? null : await res.text()
return { status: res.status, ok: res.ok, text, contentType: res.headers.get('content-type') }
} finally {
clearTimeout(timeout)
}
}
function passthrough(res: EbResult): NextResponse {
if (res.text === null) {
return new NextResponse(null, { status: res.status })
}
return new NextResponse(res.text, {
status: res.status,
headers: { 'Content-Type': res.contentType ?? 'application/json' },
})
}
function pathOf(request: Request): string {
const idx = request.url.indexOf('/api/connect/bank')
const rest = idx === -1 ? '' : request.url.slice(idx + '/api/connect/bank'.length)
return rest.split('?')[0].replace(/\/+$/, '') || '/'
}
function queryOf(request: Request): string {
const q = request.url.indexOf('?')
return q === -1 ? '' : request.url.slice(q)
}
const HOSTED_EB_CALLBACK = () =>
`${(process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL || 'http://localhost:3000').replace(/\/+$/, '')}/api/extensions/enable-banking/callback`
export const GET = withConnectorAuth('connect.bank', async (request, ctx) => {
const scopeError = requireScope(ctx)
if (scopeError) return scopeError
const path = pathOf(request)
// GET /aspsps — bank list. Rate-budgeted, no ownership.
if (path === '/aspsps') {
const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
if (blocked) return blocked
return passthrough(await forwardToEb('GET', `/aspsps${queryOf(request)}`))
}
// GET /sessions/{id} — must own the session.
const sessionMatch = /^\/sessions\/([^/]+)$/.exec(path)
if (sessionMatch) {
const sessionId = decodeURIComponent(sessionMatch[1])
const owned = await findByHandle(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, service: 'bank', handle: sessionId })
if (!owned) return notOwned()
const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
if (blocked) return blocked
await touchConnection(ctx.supabase, owned.id)
return passthrough(await forwardToEb('GET', `/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}`))
}
// GET /accounts/{uid}/balances|transactions — must own the account.
const acctMatch = /^\/accounts\/([^/]+)\/(balances|transactions)$/.exec(path)
if (acctMatch) {
const uid = decodeURIComponent(acctMatch[1])
const owned = await findByAccountUid(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, accountUid: uid })
if (!owned) return notOwned()
const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
if (blocked) return blocked
await touchConnection(ctx.supabase, owned.id)
return passthrough(await forwardToEb('GET', `/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(uid)}/${acctMatch[2]}${queryOf(request)}`))
}
return notAllowed()
})
export const POST = withConnectorAuth('connect.bank', async (request, ctx) => {
const scopeError = requireScope(ctx)
if (scopeError) return scopeError
const path = pathOf(request)
const cref = companyRef(request)
// POST /auth — start a bank authorization for one company.
if (path === '/auth') {
if (!cref) return missingCompany()
let payload: Record<string, unknown>
try {
payload = (await request.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
} catch {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid JSON', code: 'BAD_REQUEST' }, { status: 400 })
}
const instanceReturn = typeof payload.redirect_url === 'string' ? payload.redirect_url : null
if (!instanceReturn || !isOnInstance(instanceReturn, ctx.key.instanceUrl)) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'redirect_url must be on the connector key\'s instance', code: 'CONNECTOR_REDIRECT_INVALID' },
{ status: 400 },
)
}
// Per-company connection quota (the sold package). Counting alone is a
// TOCTOU race under concurrent /auth calls, so the pending row doubles as
// a reservation: fast-reject on the pre-count, insert, then RE-count and
// roll the own row back when over the limit. Fresh pending rows reserve
// quota for the 15-minute consent window (see countHeldConnections).
const quotaExceeded = () =>
NextResponse.json(
{
error: 'Bank connection quota reached for this company',
code: 'CONNECTOR_QUOTA_EXCEEDED',
limit: ctx.key.limits.bank_connections_per_company,
},
{ status: 403 },
)
const held = await countHeldConnections(ctx.supabase, ctx.key.id, 'bank', cref)
if (held >= ctx.key.limits.bank_connections_per_company) return quotaExceeded()
const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
if (blocked) return blocked
const instanceState = typeof payload.state === 'string' ? payload.state : ''
const signedState = signConnectorState({ kid: ctx.key.id, svc: 'bank', ret: instanceReturn, st: instanceState, cref })
const provider = typeof (payload.aspsp as { name?: string } | undefined)?.name === 'string'
? String((payload.aspsp as { name: string }).name)
: null
const pendingId = await createPendingConnection(ctx.supabase, {
keyId: ctx.key.id,
service: 'bank',
companyRef: cref,
provider,
pendingState: signedState,
})
const heldAfter = await countHeldConnections(ctx.supabase, ctx.key.id, 'bank', cref)
if (heldAfter > ctx.key.limits.bank_connections_per_company) {
await deletePendingConnectionById(ctx.supabase, pendingId)
return quotaExceeded()
}
// Rewrite the redirect to OUR registered callback and swap in the signed state.
const ebBody = { ...payload, redirect_url: HOSTED_EB_CALLBACK(), state: signedState }
return passthrough(await forwardToEb('POST', '/auth', ebBody))
}
// POST /sessions — finalize after consent, record the session in the ledger.
if (path === '/sessions') {
let payload: Record<string, unknown>
try {
payload = (await request.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
} catch {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid JSON', code: 'BAD_REQUEST' }, { status: 400 })
}
// The instance sends back the signed connector state it received. The
// code is only exchanged AGAINST that state's own pending row: verified
// signature, this key, bank service, and the row still pending. Without
// the binding, a code could be exchanged under a foreign or consumed
// state, minting an upstream session the ledger never records.
const pendingState = typeof payload.connector_state === 'string' ? payload.connector_state : null
if (!pendingState) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Missing connector_state', code: 'BAD_REQUEST' }, { status: 400 })
}
const verified = verifyConnectorState(pendingState)
if (!verified.ok) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid connector state', code: 'CONNECTOR_STATE_INVALID' }, { status: 400 })
}
if (verified.payload.kid !== ctx.key.id || verified.payload.svc !== 'bank') {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'State does not belong to this key', code: 'CONNECTOR_STATE_INVALID' }, { status: 403 })
}
const pendingRow = await findPendingByState(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, pendingState })
if (!pendingRow) return notOwned()
const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
if (blocked) return blocked
const ebRes = await forwardToEb('POST', '/sessions', { code: payload.code })
if (ebRes.ok && ebRes.text !== null) {
try {
const session = JSON.parse(ebRes.text) as { session_id?: string; accounts?: Array<{ uid?: string }> }
if (session.session_id) {
const accountUids = (session.accounts ?? [])
.map((a) => a.uid)
.filter((u): u is string => typeof u === 'string')
const activated = await activateByPendingState(ctx.supabase, {
keyId: ctx.key.id,
pendingState,
handle: session.session_id,
accountUids,
})
if (!activated) {
// The pending row was consumed between the precheck and now (a
// concurrent replay of the same state). An unrecorded upstream
// session must not be handed out: close it and refuse.
await forwardToEb('DELETE', `/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(session.session_id)}`)
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Connector state already consumed', code: 'CONNECTOR_STATE_CONSUMED' },
{ status: 409 },
)
}
}
} catch (err) {
ctx.log.warn('could not record session in ledger', { err: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) })
}
}
return passthrough(ebRes)
}
return notAllowed()
})
export const DELETE = withConnectorAuth('connect.bank', async (request, ctx) => {
const scopeError = requireScope(ctx)
if (scopeError) return scopeError
const path = pathOf(request)
const sessionMatch = /^\/sessions\/([^/]+)$/.exec(path)
if (!sessionMatch) return notAllowed()
const sessionId = decodeURIComponent(sessionMatch[1])
const owned = await findByHandle(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, service: 'bank', handle: sessionId })
if (!owned) return notOwned()
const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
if (blocked) return blocked
const res = await forwardToEb('DELETE', `/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}`)
// Revoke the ledger row only when the upstream delete actually took (or the
// session is already gone upstream): revoking on a transient EB error would
// leave the remote session alive but permanently unreachable via the proxy.
if (res.ok || res.status === 404) {
await revokeByHandle(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, service: 'bank', handle: sessionId })
}
return passthrough(res)
})
function isOnInstance(url: string, instanceUrl: string | null): boolean {
if (!instanceUrl) return false
try {
return new URL(url).origin === new URL(instanceUrl).origin
} catch {
return false
}
}
function notAllowed(): NextResponse {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Not allowed', code: 'CONNECTOR_PATH_NOT_ALLOWED' }, { status: 403 })
}
function notOwned(): NextResponse {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unknown connection for this key', code: 'CONNECTOR_NOT_OWNED' }, { status: 404 })
}
function missingCompany(): NextResponse {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Missing X-Connector-Company header', code: 'CONNECTOR_COMPANY_MISSING' }, { status: 400 })
}