37e50c272d
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted. - lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync, skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability(). Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant. - lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key). Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins, else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows. getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the hosted trial copy). - Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains 'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly). pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows. - Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated to the new one. Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can be issued). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key. Hosted side: - Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix, org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids, current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count, last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering, separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row) and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role. pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade. - lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping), with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET + POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report, never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines). Instance side: - lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope, expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone. /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key. - Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json, with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates), DECISIONS. Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied. no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision: tokens on the instance, proxy stateless). - Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger: sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only), `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real covers all of it. - EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests unchanged. - lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch. - app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions, accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state; reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted). - issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval. - Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS. Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean. Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): Skatteverket broker + data proxy for self-hosted instances (tokens stay on the instance) Sovereign plan WS3 PR5b, stacked on the bank proxy (#1751). A self-hosted instance with a `skatteverket`-scoped connector key can now run the BankID consent, file VAT/AGI and sync skattekonto through Arcim's registered Skatteverket client; the SKV tokens are returned to the instance and stored (encrypted) there. - lib/connect/upstreams/skatteverket-oauth.ts: core-side SKV OAuth + data helpers (authorize URL, code/refresh exchange with Arcim's client secret, the four backing-API base URLs, the API-gateway Client_Id/Client_Secret headers). Core can't import @/extensions/, so this duplicates the extension's endpoints/scope set (one integrator = Arcim), mirroring the EB JWT relocation. - app/api/connect/skv/oauth/authorize-url: builds the authorize URL against OUR registered redirect_uri + a signed connector state, per-company SKV connection quota, pending ledger row. - app/api/connect/skv/oauth/token: exchanges/refreshes and RETURNS the tokens to the instance; the ledger keeps only sha256(access_token) + sha256(refresh_token). - app/api/connect/skv/api/[...path]: allowlist over moms / skattekonto / agd-inlamning / agd-period. The instance sends the user's SKV Bearer (as X-Connector-Upstream-Authorization) + X-Connector-Key; the proxy checks the token hash against the ledger, adds Arcim's gateway credentials (never exposed to the instance), forwards. Same per-key + global budget as bank. - The Skatteverket extension /callback gains the connector branch (isConnectorState -> 302 back to the instance; code never exchanged there). - Docs (SELF-HOSTING: SKV connector live) + DECISIONS. Tests: SKV oauth lib, authorize-url, token, data proxy, callback connector branch (all green; 74 connect + 425 connect/SKV). tsc, guards, lint clean; no-phantom-columns held at 380 (literal update branches). Not in this PR: instance-side wiring (PR6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(connect): SKV broker review+skeptic batch: state-bound exchange, owned-only refresh, identity-number redaction, quota reservation, https-only bases, docs dedupe Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * docs(self-host): restore the instance-wiring qualifier in the connector section Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): PR #1757 review batch 2: redirect 'error' on credential fetches, mandatory ledger writes before token return, MD037 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): reject encoded path separators in SKV data-proxy segments (traversal guard) The WHATWG parser normalizes raw dot segments before the route runs; what survives is an encoded separator inside a segment (a%2Fb, ..%2Fx, a%5Cb), which would escape the allowlisted service base once the upstream fetch re-normalizes. splitPath now decodes each segment and rejects dot segments and separator-bearing values. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
349 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
349 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { withConnectorAuth, type ConnectorContext } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/with-connector-auth'
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import { getAuthorizationHeader } from '@/lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt'
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import { reserveUpstream } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/upstream-budget'
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import {
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activateByPendingState,
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countHeldConnections,
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createPendingConnection,
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deletePendingConnectionById,
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findByAccountUid,
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findByHandle,
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findPendingByState,
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revokeByHandle,
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touchConnection,
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} from '@/lib/connect/hosted/ledger'
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import { signConnectorState, verifyConnectorState } from '@/lib/connect/hosted/state'
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/**
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* Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances (WS3 PR5).
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*
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* The instance calls this with its connector key; the proxy adds Arcim's EB
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* JWT and forwards to Enable Banking. The instance never holds the EB
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* credential; the bank session id it gets back rests on the instance. This
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* route is what makes that split safe: a strict path allowlist (never an open
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* passthrough), per-key + global rate budget on every upstream call, a
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* per-company connection quota checked at authorize time, and an ownership
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* ledger so an instance can only use sessions/accounts it obtained through its
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* own key.
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*
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* Consent handoff: POST /auth's redirect_url is rewritten to OUR hosted EB
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* callback (already registered with EB), and the upstream `state` is replaced
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* by a signed connector state carrying the instance's own return URL. The
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* hosted EB callback (app/api/extensions/enable-banking/callback) detects that
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* signed state and 302s the browser back to the instance with the code, so no
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* new redirect URI has to be registered at Enable Banking per instance.
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*/
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/**
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* The EB base URL must be https (http only for loopback dev): forwardToEb
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* sends Arcim's EB JWT in Authorization, so a plaintext override would ship
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* the credential unencrypted. Resolved lazily so a bad env fails the request
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* (500 via the wrapper), never the build.
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*/
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function ebBaseUrl(): string {
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const raw = (
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process.env.ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL_PRODUCTION ||
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process.env.ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL ||
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'https://api.enablebanking.com'
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).replace(/\/+$/, '')
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const url = new URL(raw)
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const loopback = url.hostname === 'localhost' || url.hostname === '127.0.0.1'
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if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !(url.protocol === 'http:' && loopback)) {
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throw new Error('ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL must be https: the EB JWT is sent in Authorization')
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}
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return raw
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}
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const COMPANY_HEADER = 'x-connector-company'
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const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000
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function requireScope(ctx: ConnectorContext): NextResponse | null {
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if (ctx.key.scopes.includes('bank_sync')) return null
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'This connector key does not include bank sync', code: 'CONNECTOR_SCOPE_MISSING' },
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{ status: 403 },
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)
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}
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function companyRef(request: Request): string | null {
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return request.headers.get(COMPANY_HEADER)?.trim() || null
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}
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async function budgetOr429(ctx: ConnectorContext): Promise<NextResponse | null> {
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const budget = await reserveUpstream(ctx.supabase, 'bank')
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if (budget.ok) return null
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ctx.log.warn('bank connector budget exhausted', { scope: budget.scope })
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'Bank connector is busy, try again shortly', code: 'CONNECTOR_RATE_LIMITED', scope: budget.scope },
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{ status: 429, headers: { 'Retry-After': String(budget.retryAfterSec) } },
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)
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}
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// Statuses that must carry no body (RFC 9110). new Response(text, {status:204})
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// throws in undici, so pass a null body through for these.
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const NULL_BODY_STATUS = new Set([204, 205, 304])
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interface EbResult {
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status: number
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ok: boolean
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/** null for the RFC 9110 bodyless statuses. */
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text: string | null
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contentType: string | null
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}
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/**
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* Forward a request to Enable Banking with Arcim's JWT and read the body
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* INSIDE the timeout window: clearing the timer at headers-received left an
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* upstream that stalls mid-body holding the request open forever.
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*/
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async function forwardToEb(method: string, path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<EbResult> {
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const controller = new AbortController()
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const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS)
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try {
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const res = await fetch(`${ebBaseUrl()}${path}`, {
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method,
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signal: controller.signal,
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// A followed redirect would resend the EB JWT to the redirect target.
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redirect: 'error',
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headers: {
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Authorization: getAuthorizationHeader(),
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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Accept: 'application/json',
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},
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...(body !== undefined ? { body: JSON.stringify(body) } : {}),
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})
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const text = NULL_BODY_STATUS.has(res.status) ? null : await res.text()
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return { status: res.status, ok: res.ok, text, contentType: res.headers.get('content-type') }
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} finally {
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clearTimeout(timeout)
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}
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}
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function passthrough(res: EbResult): NextResponse {
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if (res.text === null) {
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return new NextResponse(null, { status: res.status })
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}
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return new NextResponse(res.text, {
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status: res.status,
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headers: { 'Content-Type': res.contentType ?? 'application/json' },
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})
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}
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function pathOf(request: Request): string {
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const idx = request.url.indexOf('/api/connect/bank')
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const rest = idx === -1 ? '' : request.url.slice(idx + '/api/connect/bank'.length)
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return rest.split('?')[0].replace(/\/+$/, '') || '/'
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}
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function queryOf(request: Request): string {
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const q = request.url.indexOf('?')
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return q === -1 ? '' : request.url.slice(q)
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}
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const HOSTED_EB_CALLBACK = () =>
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`${(process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL || 'http://localhost:3000').replace(/\/+$/, '')}/api/extensions/enable-banking/callback`
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export const GET = withConnectorAuth('connect.bank', async (request, ctx) => {
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const scopeError = requireScope(ctx)
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if (scopeError) return scopeError
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const path = pathOf(request)
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// GET /aspsps — bank list. Rate-budgeted, no ownership.
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if (path === '/aspsps') {
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const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
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if (blocked) return blocked
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return passthrough(await forwardToEb('GET', `/aspsps${queryOf(request)}`))
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}
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// GET /sessions/{id} — must own the session.
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const sessionMatch = /^\/sessions\/([^/]+)$/.exec(path)
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if (sessionMatch) {
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const sessionId = decodeURIComponent(sessionMatch[1])
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const owned = await findByHandle(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, service: 'bank', handle: sessionId })
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if (!owned) return notOwned()
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const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
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if (blocked) return blocked
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await touchConnection(ctx.supabase, owned.id)
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return passthrough(await forwardToEb('GET', `/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}`))
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}
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// GET /accounts/{uid}/balances|transactions — must own the account.
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const acctMatch = /^\/accounts\/([^/]+)\/(balances|transactions)$/.exec(path)
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if (acctMatch) {
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const uid = decodeURIComponent(acctMatch[1])
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const owned = await findByAccountUid(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, accountUid: uid })
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if (!owned) return notOwned()
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const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
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if (blocked) return blocked
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await touchConnection(ctx.supabase, owned.id)
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return passthrough(await forwardToEb('GET', `/accounts/${encodeURIComponent(uid)}/${acctMatch[2]}${queryOf(request)}`))
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}
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return notAllowed()
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})
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export const POST = withConnectorAuth('connect.bank', async (request, ctx) => {
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const scopeError = requireScope(ctx)
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if (scopeError) return scopeError
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const path = pathOf(request)
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const cref = companyRef(request)
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// POST /auth — start a bank authorization for one company.
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if (path === '/auth') {
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if (!cref) return missingCompany()
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let payload: Record<string, unknown>
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try {
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payload = (await request.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
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} catch {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid JSON', code: 'BAD_REQUEST' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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const instanceReturn = typeof payload.redirect_url === 'string' ? payload.redirect_url : null
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if (!instanceReturn || !isOnInstance(instanceReturn, ctx.key.instanceUrl)) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'redirect_url must be on the connector key\'s instance', code: 'CONNECTOR_REDIRECT_INVALID' },
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{ status: 400 },
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)
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}
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// Per-company connection quota (the sold package). Counting alone is a
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// TOCTOU race under concurrent /auth calls, so the pending row doubles as
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// a reservation: fast-reject on the pre-count, insert, then RE-count and
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// roll the own row back when over the limit. Fresh pending rows reserve
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// quota for the 15-minute consent window (see countHeldConnections).
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const quotaExceeded = () =>
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NextResponse.json(
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{
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error: 'Bank connection quota reached for this company',
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code: 'CONNECTOR_QUOTA_EXCEEDED',
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limit: ctx.key.limits.bank_connections_per_company,
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},
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{ status: 403 },
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)
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const held = await countHeldConnections(ctx.supabase, ctx.key.id, 'bank', cref)
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if (held >= ctx.key.limits.bank_connections_per_company) return quotaExceeded()
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const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
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if (blocked) return blocked
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const instanceState = typeof payload.state === 'string' ? payload.state : ''
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const signedState = signConnectorState({ kid: ctx.key.id, svc: 'bank', ret: instanceReturn, st: instanceState, cref })
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const provider = typeof (payload.aspsp as { name?: string } | undefined)?.name === 'string'
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? String((payload.aspsp as { name: string }).name)
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: null
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const pendingId = await createPendingConnection(ctx.supabase, {
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keyId: ctx.key.id,
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service: 'bank',
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companyRef: cref,
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provider,
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pendingState: signedState,
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})
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const heldAfter = await countHeldConnections(ctx.supabase, ctx.key.id, 'bank', cref)
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if (heldAfter > ctx.key.limits.bank_connections_per_company) {
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await deletePendingConnectionById(ctx.supabase, pendingId)
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return quotaExceeded()
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}
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// Rewrite the redirect to OUR registered callback and swap in the signed state.
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const ebBody = { ...payload, redirect_url: HOSTED_EB_CALLBACK(), state: signedState }
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return passthrough(await forwardToEb('POST', '/auth', ebBody))
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}
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// POST /sessions — finalize after consent, record the session in the ledger.
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if (path === '/sessions') {
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let payload: Record<string, unknown>
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try {
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payload = (await request.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
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} catch {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid JSON', code: 'BAD_REQUEST' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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// The instance sends back the signed connector state it received. The
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// code is only exchanged AGAINST that state's own pending row: verified
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// signature, this key, bank service, and the row still pending. Without
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// the binding, a code could be exchanged under a foreign or consumed
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// state, minting an upstream session the ledger never records.
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const pendingState = typeof payload.connector_state === 'string' ? payload.connector_state : null
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if (!pendingState) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Missing connector_state', code: 'BAD_REQUEST' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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const verified = verifyConnectorState(pendingState)
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if (!verified.ok) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid connector state', code: 'CONNECTOR_STATE_INVALID' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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if (verified.payload.kid !== ctx.key.id || verified.payload.svc !== 'bank') {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'State does not belong to this key', code: 'CONNECTOR_STATE_INVALID' }, { status: 403 })
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}
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const pendingRow = await findPendingByState(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, pendingState })
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if (!pendingRow) return notOwned()
|
|
const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
|
|
if (blocked) return blocked
|
|
const ebRes = await forwardToEb('POST', '/sessions', { code: payload.code })
|
|
if (ebRes.ok && ebRes.text !== null) {
|
|
try {
|
|
const session = JSON.parse(ebRes.text) as { session_id?: string; accounts?: Array<{ uid?: string }> }
|
|
if (session.session_id) {
|
|
const accountUids = (session.accounts ?? [])
|
|
.map((a) => a.uid)
|
|
.filter((u): u is string => typeof u === 'string')
|
|
const activated = await activateByPendingState(ctx.supabase, {
|
|
keyId: ctx.key.id,
|
|
pendingState,
|
|
handle: session.session_id,
|
|
accountUids,
|
|
})
|
|
if (!activated) {
|
|
// The pending row was consumed between the precheck and now (a
|
|
// concurrent replay of the same state). An unrecorded upstream
|
|
// session must not be handed out: close it and refuse.
|
|
await forwardToEb('DELETE', `/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(session.session_id)}`)
|
|
return NextResponse.json(
|
|
{ error: 'Connector state already consumed', code: 'CONNECTOR_STATE_CONSUMED' },
|
|
{ status: 409 },
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
ctx.log.warn('could not record session in ledger', { err: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) })
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return passthrough(ebRes)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return notAllowed()
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
export const DELETE = withConnectorAuth('connect.bank', async (request, ctx) => {
|
|
const scopeError = requireScope(ctx)
|
|
if (scopeError) return scopeError
|
|
const path = pathOf(request)
|
|
const sessionMatch = /^\/sessions\/([^/]+)$/.exec(path)
|
|
if (!sessionMatch) return notAllowed()
|
|
const sessionId = decodeURIComponent(sessionMatch[1])
|
|
const owned = await findByHandle(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, service: 'bank', handle: sessionId })
|
|
if (!owned) return notOwned()
|
|
const blocked = await budgetOr429(ctx)
|
|
if (blocked) return blocked
|
|
const res = await forwardToEb('DELETE', `/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}`)
|
|
// Revoke the ledger row only when the upstream delete actually took (or the
|
|
// session is already gone upstream): revoking on a transient EB error would
|
|
// leave the remote session alive but permanently unreachable via the proxy.
|
|
if (res.ok || res.status === 404) {
|
|
await revokeByHandle(ctx.supabase, { keyId: ctx.key.id, service: 'bank', handle: sessionId })
|
|
}
|
|
return passthrough(res)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
function isOnInstance(url: string, instanceUrl: string | null): boolean {
|
|
if (!instanceUrl) return false
|
|
try {
|
|
return new URL(url).origin === new URL(instanceUrl).origin
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
function notAllowed(): NextResponse {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Not allowed', code: 'CONNECTOR_PATH_NOT_ALLOWED' }, { status: 403 })
|
|
}
|
|
function notOwned(): NextResponse {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unknown connection for this key', code: 'CONNECTOR_NOT_OWNED' }, { status: 404 })
|
|
}
|
|
function missingCompany(): NextResponse {
|
|
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Missing X-Connector-Company header', code: 'CONNECTOR_COMPANY_MISSING' }, { status: 400 })
|
|
}
|