3a3c4adbc6
* revert(agent): restore plain AWS_* Bedrock credential handling
Undoes the credential-name change from #937 (ae489cfd) in both Bedrock
clients (lib/agent/composer/client.ts and the invoice-inbox extractor).
The BEDROCK_AWS_* rename assumed Vercel/Lambda shadows AWS_*, but the
plain AWS_* client ran on prod for six weeks (since #584), so it was
never shadowed. The current assistant outage predates #937 and is
environmental (prod AWS credentials / Bedrock access), not this code.
Leaves the unrelated JournalEntryForm.tsx change from #937 intact.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(agent): log real Bedrock failure + credential-load diagnostics
When someone uses the agent, surface why it fails on prod instead of the
opaque "request ended without sending any chunks":
- client.ts getAnthropic(): on cold start, log the resolved region and
whether the AWS key/secret loaded from env (error-level if missing),
plus the 4-char access-key-id prefix (AKIA = our IAM key, ASIA = a
platform/STS credential) and whether a session token is present. No
secret is logged.
- run-turn.ts: on a stream failure, extract err.status / err.code /
err.cause / err.stack explicitly. The logger keeps only name+message
from an Error and drops the stack in production, so the true failure
(auth 403 vs bad region/model 400 vs throttle 429 vs transport cut)
was invisible until now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
86 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
86 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
import AnthropicBedrock from '@anthropic-ai/bedrock-sdk'
|
|
import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
|
|
|
|
const log = createLogger('agent-bedrock-client')
|
|
|
|
let cached: AnthropicBedrock | null = null
|
|
|
|
// Single AnthropicBedrock client for the agent composer + chat loop. Matches
|
|
// the credential surface the rest of the codebase already uses (see
|
|
// extensions/general/invoice-inbox/lib/extract-invoice-fields.ts) so:
|
|
//
|
|
// 1. There's no separate ANTHROPIC_API_KEY to provision and rotate.
|
|
// 2. All Claude traffic stays in eu-north-1: important for Swedish
|
|
// accounting data under BFL retention.
|
|
// 3. Failures and quotas show up in one AWS surface, not two.
|
|
//
|
|
// Trade-off vs. the direct Anthropic API: Bedrock's prompt-cache TTL is
|
|
// 5 minutes (default) rather than the 1h the plan §10 specifies. We still
|
|
// pass `cache_control: { type: 'ephemeral', ttl: '1h' }` in the system
|
|
// prompt assembly: Bedrock currently ignores the explicit TTL and uses 5m.
|
|
// Cache effectiveness drops on multi-minute gaps but the loop still works.
|
|
// Revisit if/when Bedrock exposes longer TTLs or if cost forces the direct
|
|
// API.
|
|
export function getAnthropic(): AnthropicBedrock {
|
|
if (cached) return cached
|
|
const awsRegion = process.env.AWS_REGION || 'eu-north-1'
|
|
const awsAccessKey = process.env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID
|
|
const awsSecretKey = process.env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY
|
|
|
|
// Startup diagnostic: make a hosted misconfiguration visible in the logs
|
|
// instead of it surfacing only as an opaque "request ended without sending
|
|
// any chunks" at stream time. Runs once per cold start (the client is cached).
|
|
// Never logs a secret: only the region, presence booleans, and the 4-char
|
|
// access-key-id PREFIX (AKIA = long-term IAM user key; ASIA = STS/temporary
|
|
// role credential, i.e. a platform-injected one rather than ours).
|
|
if (!awsAccessKey || !awsSecretKey) {
|
|
log.error('agent Bedrock credentials not loaded from env', undefined, {
|
|
region: awsRegion,
|
|
hasAccessKeyId: !!awsAccessKey,
|
|
hasSecretAccessKey: !!awsSecretKey,
|
|
regionFromEnv: !!process.env.AWS_REGION,
|
|
})
|
|
} else {
|
|
log.info('agent Bedrock client init', {
|
|
region: awsRegion,
|
|
keyPrefix: awsAccessKey.slice(0, 4),
|
|
hasSessionToken: !!process.env.AWS_SESSION_TOKEN,
|
|
regionFromEnv: !!process.env.AWS_REGION,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// When both static keys are present, pass them. Otherwise omit them so the
|
|
// SDK falls back to the AWS credential provider chain (instance profile,
|
|
// IRSA, EKS pod identity, ...). The two-overload SDK refuses a mix.
|
|
cached =
|
|
awsAccessKey && awsSecretKey
|
|
? new AnthropicBedrock({ awsRegion, awsAccessKey, awsSecretKey })
|
|
: new AnthropicBedrock({ awsRegion })
|
|
return cached
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Bedrock model IDs. Region prefix `eu.` keeps inference inside eu-north-1.
|
|
// Both are env-overridable so ops can swap models without a code deploy.
|
|
//
|
|
// Per plan §14 the composer's atom-selection call should run on Opus 4.7 for
|
|
// the higher-stakes selection reasoning. Opus 4.7 is not yet enabled on this
|
|
// AWS Bedrock account (403 "not available for this account": request access
|
|
// on the AWS console under Bedrock → Model access). For now we point OPUS at
|
|
// Sonnet 4.6 so the composer still works; atom selection on Sonnet is still
|
|
// good: it's a structured-output call via tool_use forcing, not deep
|
|
// reasoning. Flip BEDROCK_OPUS_MODEL_ID back to eu.anthropic.claude-opus-4-7
|
|
// once Opus access lands.
|
|
export const OPUS_MODEL = process.env.BEDROCK_OPUS_MODEL_ID || 'eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6'
|
|
export const SONNET_MODEL = process.env.BEDROCK_SONNET_MODEL_ID || 'eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6'
|
|
|
|
// Extended-thinking budgets (budget_tokens) for the chat intents. These are
|
|
// ceilings, not floors: the model spends only what a turn needs, so a generous
|
|
// cap improves hard turns (multi-source VAT synthesis, anomaly detection)
|
|
// without taxing simple ones. run-turn derives max_tokens = budget + 4096, so
|
|
// raising these is safe: no manual max_tokens bookkeeping. Tiered to match the
|
|
// model split: DEEP for the Opus / heavy-reasoning intents, STANDARD for the
|
|
// rest. Early-stage default favours reasoning quality over token cost; dial
|
|
// down here in one place if latency/cost ever bites.
|
|
export const THINKING_BUDGET_STANDARD = 6000
|
|
export const THINKING_BUDGET_DEEP = 12000
|