Files
accounted/lib/auth/api-keys.ts
T
Jakob Wennberg 0bc81d4c88 feat(auth): SoD acknowledge on stage+approve keys + agent:write scope for memory tools (P0-3) (#681)
* feat(auth): SoD acknowledge on stage+approve keys + agent:write scope for memory tools

Segregation of duties on API keys is now warn + explicit acknowledgement
(not block): minting a key with any staging write scope AND
pending_operations:approve returns 409 API_KEY_SOD_CONFLICT unless the
caller re-POSTs with acknowledge_sod: true. The acknowledgement is recorded
(sod_acknowledged_at / sod_acknowledged_by) for an auditable risk acceptance
(ISO 27001:2022 A.5.3 / BFNAR 2013:2). The create UI surfaces an inline
warning and an explicit confirm dialog before submitting the ack — the
default "all scopes ticked" create routes through that path.

Also introduces the agent:write scope and maps the previously-UNMAPPED memory
tools gnubok_remember_fact / gnubok_forget_fact to it. Because unmapped tools
were callable by any key, the migration grandfathers agent:write onto every
existing non-revoked key with an explicit scope list so nothing regresses;
new keys must opt in. agent:write is deliberately excluded from the default
grants and is NOT a staging scope (no SoD conflict with approve).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(db): enforce both-or-neither on the SoD acknowledgement pair

Review finding (Greptile P2): sod_acknowledged_at/sod_acknowledged_by were
independently nullable, so a partial write could silently pass and undermine
the auditable risk acceptance (ISO 27001 A.5.3 / SOC 2 CC6.1). Adds a
paired-NULL CHECK constraint + pg-real coverage for both partial-write
directions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(auth)+feat(auth): compliance-review round — self-attestation documented, ack logged, SoD boundary assumption captured

- Migration header now states explicitly that the SoD acknowledgement is a
  SELF-attestation by deliberate design (enskild firma has no second person;
  the claude.ai approval flow needs stage+approve on one credential) — the
  control objective is informed consent + audit record, not dual control.
- The acknowledge_sod=true path now emits a structured log.warn
  (api_key.sod_acknowledged with key id/prefix, conflicting scope, scopes,
  acknowledger, company) so the acceptance lands in the logging pipeline in
  addition to the sod_acknowledged_* columns (ASVS V16.1.1).
- STAGING_SCOPES carries the documented system control (BFNAR 2013:2
  systemdokumentation) for why agent:write is not a staging scope: memory
  tools write advisory agent context and cannot stage räkenskapsinformation.

Dismissed as by-design/verified: hard-block and second-approver remediations
(user decision: warn + acknowledge); scope-update gap (the [id] route only
supports DELETE — scopes are immutable post-creation); session-auth concern
(withRouteContext is cookie+MFA only; API-key auth exists only on /api/v1
and MCP).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: re-trigger CI (Supabase Preview 502 infra hiccup)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-06 11:13:35 +02:00

382 lines
19 KiB
TypeScript

import crypto from 'crypto'
import { createClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
const KEY_PREFIX = 'gnubok_sk_'
const REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX = 'gnubok_rt_'
// ── API Key Scopes ──────────────────────────────────────────
export const API_KEY_SCOPES = {
'transactions:read': { label: 'Transaktioner — läs', description: 'Lista transaktioner, mallförslag, kategoriförslag (3 verktyg)' },
'transactions:write': { label: 'Transaktioner — skriv', description: 'Kategorisera, av-kategorisera, kvittomatchning, koppling mot faktura (4 verktyg)' },
'customers:read': { label: 'Kunder — läs', description: 'Lista kunder (1 verktyg)' },
'customers:write': { label: 'Kunder — skriv', description: 'Skapa kunder (1 verktyg)' },
'invoices:read': { label: 'Fakturor — läs', description: 'Lista fakturor (1 verktyg)' },
'invoices:write': { label: 'Fakturor — skriv', description: 'Skapa, skicka, markera betald/skickad (4 verktyg)' },
'suppliers:read': { label: 'Leverantörer — läs', description: 'Lista leverantörer och leverantörsfakturor, hitta verifikat-kandidater (3 verktyg)' },
'suppliers:write': { label: 'Leverantörer — skriv', description: 'Skapa leverantörer; godkänn, kreditera, betal-länka och hantera leverantörsfakturor (6 verktyg)' },
'reports:read': { label: 'Rapporter — läs', description: 'Kontoplan, huvudbok, balansräkning, resultaträkning, moms, KPI, reskontra, perioder, bankavstämning, SIE-export (12 verktyg)' },
'bookkeeping:write': { label: 'Bokföring — skriv', description: 'Stänga/låsa perioder, ingående balans, bokslut, SIE-import, voucher-gap-förklaringar' },
'payroll:read': { label: 'Löner — läs', description: 'Lista anställda, lönekörningar, lönejournal (3 verktyg)' },
'payroll:write': { label: 'Löner — skriv', description: 'Skapa lönekörning, beräkna, generera AGI (3 verktyg)' },
// v1 REST API — added Phase 1
'companies:read': { label: 'Företag — läs', description: 'Lista och visa företagsprofiler som API-nyckeln har tillgång till' },
'events:read': { label: 'Händelser — läs', description: 'Polla händelseloggen (event_log) som webhook-fallback' },
'webhooks:manage': { label: 'Webhooks — hantera', description: 'Skapa, lista, uppdatera och radera webhook-prenumerationer' },
'operations:read': { label: 'Operationer — läs', description: 'Hämta status för långkörande operationer (importer, bokslut, omvärdering)' },
'documents:read': { label: 'Dokument — läs', description: 'Lista och hämta dokumentbilagor' },
'documents:write': { label: 'Dokument — skriv', description: 'Ladda upp och koppla dokument till verifikationer' },
'compliance:read': { label: 'Compliance — läs', description: 'Pre-flight-kontroller: momsstängning, bokslutsberedskap, voucher-gap, IB/UB-kontinuitet' },
'agent:read': { label: 'Agent — läs', description: 'Specialiserad bokföringsassistent: profil, laddade specialister/atomer, minnen (briefing + skill-katalog)' },
'agent:write': { label: 'Agent — skriv', description: 'Spara och ta bort agentens minnen om företaget (remember_fact, forget_fact)' },
'pending_operations:read': { label: 'Stagade operationer — läs', description: 'Lista pending_operations (staged writes awaiting approval)' },
'pending_operations:approve': { label: 'Stagade operationer — godkänn', description: 'Godkänn eller avvisa stagade operationer via API/MCP — agenten ersätter web-UI:s granskning' },
} as const
export type ApiKeyScope = keyof typeof API_KEY_SCOPES
export const ALL_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = Object.keys(API_KEY_SCOPES) as ApiKeyScope[]
/** The read-only scopes assigned to keys with no explicit scopes (legacy/null). */
export const DEFAULT_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [
'transactions:read',
'customers:read',
'invoices:read',
'suppliers:read',
'reports:read',
]
/**
* Default scope grant for OAuth-issued keys when the client did not pass an
* explicit `scope` parameter at /authorize. Read-only by design — every
* write or approval scope must be requested explicitly by the client AND
* affirmatively ticked by the user on the consent screen.
*
* Rationale (do not weaken without a documented security decision):
* - GDPR Art. 25(2) data-protection-by-default: the minimum-necessary
* access set must be the silent baseline.
* - ISO 27001:2022 A.5.18 / A.8.2 / SOC 2 CC6.3: privileged capabilities
* (write, approve) must not be bundled into a default grant.
* - Segregation of Duties (findStageApproveConflict below): granting any
* STAGING_SCOPES member together with `pending_operations:approve` on a
* single key lets an automated agent both stage AND commit financial
* postings without a human-in-the-loop review. Keeping the default
* read-only prevents this combination from being silently issued.
* - BFL 5 kap 5§ / BFNAR 2013:2 behandlingshistorik: write paths that
* create or modify verifikationer must be opt-in at the authorization
* layer; conversational acknowledgement at the agent layer is not an
* auditable substitute.
*/
export const DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [
'transactions:read',
'customers:read',
'invoices:read',
'suppliers:read',
'reports:read',
'companies:read',
'events:read',
'operations:read',
'documents:read',
'compliance:read',
'payroll:read',
'pending_operations:read',
]
/**
* Scopes advertised in the RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata document
* (/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server). Restricted to the same set that
* /authorize will grant by default — destructive scopes still work when
* requested explicitly, they just aren't enumerated for unauthenticated
* callers (defense-in-depth against scope-escalation reconnaissance).
*/
export const PUBLIC_OAUTH_METADATA_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [...DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES]
/**
* Scopes that allow staging a pending_operation. Used to detect a
* segregation-of-duties conflict when paired with `pending_operations:approve`
* on the same API key (ISO 27001:2022 A.5.3, SOC 2 CC6.1).
*
* Documented system control (BFNAR 2013:2 systemdokumentation): `agent:write`
* is deliberately NOT a staging scope. The memory tools it gates
* (gnubok_remember_fact/forget_fact) write advisory agent context — they
* cannot create, mutate, or stage räkenskapsinformation, so memory-write +
* approve on one key does not let an agent both stage and commit bookkeeping.
* If a future memory surface ever feeds DIRECTLY into voucher generation
* (rather than via a separately staged-and-approved operation), revisit this
* classification.
*/
export const STAGING_SCOPES: ApiKeyScope[] = [
'transactions:write',
'customers:write',
'invoices:write',
'suppliers:write',
'bookkeeping:write',
'payroll:write',
'documents:write',
]
/**
* Detect a segregation-of-duties conflict between staging and approval scopes
* on the same key. Returns the offending staging scope, or null when the
* combination is clean. Callers may choose to block, warn, or record an
* acknowledged risk acceptance.
*
* Granting both stage+approve to the same actor lets an automated agent both
* stage AND commit financial postings without a human-in-the-loop review,
* which is the explicit control surface for BFNAR 2013:2 (behandlingshistorik)
* and BFL 5 kap 5§ traceability requirements.
*/
export function findStageApproveConflict(scopes: ApiKeyScope[]): ApiKeyScope | null {
if (!scopes.includes('pending_operations:approve')) return null
return scopes.find((s) => STAGING_SCOPES.includes(s)) ?? null
}
/** Scope domain groups for UI rendering */
export const SCOPE_GROUPS = [
{ domain: 'transactions', label: 'Transaktioner', read: 'transactions:read' as const, write: 'transactions:write' as const },
{ domain: 'customers', label: 'Kunder', read: 'customers:read' as const, write: 'customers:write' as const },
{ domain: 'invoices', label: 'Fakturor', read: 'invoices:read' as const, write: 'invoices:write' as const },
{ domain: 'suppliers', label: 'Leverantörer', read: 'suppliers:read' as const, write: 'suppliers:write' as const },
{ domain: 'reports', label: 'Rapporter', read: 'reports:read' as const, write: null },
{ domain: 'bookkeeping', label: 'Bokföring', read: null, write: 'bookkeeping:write' as const },
{ domain: 'payroll', label: 'Löner', read: 'payroll:read' as const, write: 'payroll:write' as const },
{ domain: 'pending_operations', label: 'Stagade operationer', read: 'pending_operations:read' as const, write: 'pending_operations:approve' as const },
{ domain: 'agent', label: 'Agent', read: 'agent:read' as const, write: 'agent:write' as const },
] as const
/** Map MCP tool name → required scope. Tools omitted from this map are available to any authenticated key (e.g. discovery/search/skill loading). */
export const TOOL_SCOPE_MAP: Record<string, ApiKeyScope> = {
// Transactions
gnubok_list_uncategorized_transactions: 'transactions:read',
gnubok_list_transactions_without_documents: 'transactions:read',
gnubok_create_transactions: 'transactions:write',
gnubok_categorize_transaction: 'transactions:write',
gnubok_receipt_matcher: 'transactions:write',
gnubok_get_counterparty_templates: 'transactions:read',
gnubok_suggest_categories: 'transactions:read',
gnubok_match_transaction_to_invoice: 'transactions:write',
gnubok_link_transaction_to_journal_entry: 'transactions:write',
gnubok_match_batch_allocate: 'transactions:write',
gnubok_bulk_book_transactions: 'transactions:write',
gnubok_auto_match_period: 'transactions:write',
// Customers
gnubok_list_customers: 'customers:read',
gnubok_create_customer: 'customers:write',
// Invoices
gnubok_list_invoices: 'invoices:read',
gnubok_create_invoice: 'invoices:write',
gnubok_send_invoice: 'invoices:write',
gnubok_mark_invoice_as_paid: 'invoices:write',
gnubok_mark_invoice_as_sent: 'invoices:write',
// Suppliers
gnubok_list_suppliers: 'suppliers:read',
gnubok_list_supplier_invoices: 'suppliers:read',
// Reports
gnubok_get_trial_balance: 'reports:read',
gnubok_get_vat_report: 'reports:read',
gnubok_vat_review_widget: 'reports:read',
gnubok_vat_close_check: 'reports:read',
gnubok_get_kpi_report: 'reports:read',
gnubok_get_income_statement: 'reports:read',
gnubok_list_accounts: 'reports:read',
gnubok_get_balance_sheet: 'reports:read',
gnubok_get_general_ledger: 'reports:read',
gnubok_query_journal: 'reports:read',
gnubok_get_ar_ledger: 'reports:read',
gnubok_get_supplier_ledger: 'reports:read',
gnubok_list_fiscal_periods: 'reports:read',
gnubok_get_reconciliation_status: 'reports:read',
// Document inbox
gnubok_upload_document: 'transactions:write',
gnubok_list_inbox_items: 'transactions:read',
gnubok_get_inbox_item: 'transactions:read',
gnubok_list_unmatched_documents: 'transactions:read',
gnubok_get_document_content: 'transactions:read',
gnubok_attach_document_to_transaction: 'transactions:write',
// Payroll
gnubok_list_employees: 'payroll:read',
gnubok_get_salary_run: 'payroll:read',
gnubok_get_salary_journal: 'payroll:read',
gnubok_create_salary_run: 'payroll:write',
gnubok_calculate_salary_run: 'payroll:write',
gnubok_generate_agi: 'payroll:write',
// Bookkeeping write (Stream 1 Phase 1) — high-risk, always staged
gnubok_close_period: 'bookkeeping:write',
gnubok_lock_period: 'bookkeeping:write',
gnubok_unlock_period: 'bookkeeping:write',
gnubok_run_year_end: 'bookkeeping:write',
gnubok_year_end_readiness: 'reports:read',
gnubok_set_opening_balances: 'bookkeeping:write',
gnubok_run_currency_revaluation: 'bookkeeping:write',
gnubok_explain_voucher_gap: 'bookkeeping:write',
gnubok_list_voucher_gaps: 'reports:read',
// Transaction reversal (medium-risk)
gnubok_uncategorize_transaction: 'transactions:write',
// SIE export (read-only) + import (write)
gnubok_export_sie: 'reports:read',
gnubok_audit_package: 'reports:read',
gnubok_import_sie: 'bookkeeping:write',
// Supplier CRUD
gnubok_create_supplier: 'suppliers:write',
// Supplier invoice lifecycle
gnubok_approve_supplier_invoice: 'suppliers:write',
gnubok_credit_supplier_invoice: 'suppliers:write',
gnubok_create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox: 'suppliers:write',
gnubok_set_inbox_extracted_data: 'suppliers:write',
// Supplier invoice payment via existing verifikat (no new bokföring)
gnubok_find_voucher_candidates_for_supplier_invoice: 'suppliers:read',
gnubok_link_supplier_invoice_to_voucher: 'suppliers:write',
// Invoice conversion + crediting
gnubok_convert_invoice: 'invoices:write',
gnubok_credit_invoice: 'invoices:write',
// Phase 4: arbitrary-line bookkeeping primitives (high-risk, always staged)
gnubok_create_voucher: 'bookkeeping:write',
gnubok_correct_entry: 'bookkeeping:write',
gnubok_reverse_journal_entry: 'bookkeeping:write',
// Agent surface (Phase 6 MCP parity): briefing tool exposes company-specific
// profile + memory so it's scoped; gnubok_list_skills / gnubok_load_skill
// stay unscoped (discovery + static Markdown bodies + globally-readable atom
// registry — no per-company data).
gnubok_get_agent_briefing: 'agent:read',
// Agent memory write (previously UNMAPPED → callable by any key). Mapping to
// agent:write; existing non-revoked keys are grandfathered in the
// 20260619140000 migration so this does not regress them.
gnubok_remember_fact: 'agent:write',
gnubok_forget_fact: 'agent:write',
// Pending operations approval (mirrors the /pending web UI)
gnubok_list_pending_operations: 'pending_operations:read',
gnubok_approve_pending_operation: 'pending_operations:approve',
gnubok_reject_pending_operation: 'pending_operations:approve',
}
export function validateScopes(scopes: unknown): ApiKeyScope[] | null {
if (scopes === null || scopes === undefined) return null
if (!Array.isArray(scopes)) return null
const valid = scopes.filter((s): s is ApiKeyScope => s in API_KEY_SCOPES)
return valid.length > 0 ? valid : null
}
/**
* Create a Supabase service client that doesn't require cookies.
* Used for API key validation (MCP, webhooks) where there's no browser session.
*/
export function createServiceClientNoCookies() {
return createClient(
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY!
)
}
export function generateApiKey(): { key: string; hash: string; prefix: string } {
const random = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
const key = `${KEY_PREFIX}${random}`
const hash = hashApiKey(key)
const prefix = key.slice(0, KEY_PREFIX.length + 8)
return { key, hash, prefix }
}
export function hashApiKey(key: string): string {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(key).digest('hex')
}
export function generateRefreshToken(): { token: string; hash: string } {
const random = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
const token = `${REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX}${random}`
const hash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex')
return { token, hash }
}
export function hashRefreshToken(token: string): string {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex')
}
export function isRefreshToken(token: string): boolean {
return token.startsWith(REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX)
}
export function extractBearerToken(request: Request): string | null {
const authHeader = request.headers.get('authorization')
if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) return null
return authHeader.slice(7)
}
/**
* Validate an API key and enforce rate limiting.
* Uses the DB RPC for atomic check + increment.
* Returns the user_id, company_id, api_key_id, name, and effective scopes on
* success, or an error with HTTP status.
* null scopes in DB → DEFAULT_SCOPES (read-only).
*
* api_key_id and api_key_name are returned so callers (e.g. the MCP server)
* can record actor attribution on pending_operations and audit_log.
* They may be undefined when the deployed DB hasn't yet run the migration
* that adds them to the RPC return shape.
*/
/**
* Operating mode of the API key. 'live' keys see real company data; 'test' keys
* are bound to deterministic sandbox companies. Keys created before the Phase 1
* migration default to 'live' for backwards compatibility.
*/
export type ApiKeyMode = 'live' | 'test'
export async function validateApiKey(
key: string
): Promise<
| {
userId: string
companyId: string
apiKeyId?: string
apiKeyName?: string
scopes: ApiKeyScope[]
mode: ApiKeyMode
}
| { error: string; status: number }
> {
if (isRefreshToken(key)) {
return {
error: 'Refresh token cannot be used as access token; exchange it at /api/mcp-oauth/token',
status: 401,
}
}
if (!key.startsWith(KEY_PREFIX)) {
return { error: 'Invalid API key format', status: 401 }
}
const hash = hashApiKey(key)
const supabase = createServiceClientNoCookies()
const { data, error } = await supabase.rpc('validate_and_increment_api_key', {
p_key_hash: hash,
})
if (error || !data || data.length === 0) {
return { error: 'Invalid API key', status: 401 }
}
const row = data[0]
if (row.rate_limited) {
return { error: 'Rate limit exceeded', status: 429 }
}
return {
userId: row.user_id,
companyId: row.company_id,
apiKeyId: row.api_key_id,
apiKeyName: row.api_key_name,
scopes: validateScopes(row.scopes) ?? DEFAULT_SCOPES,
// `mode` may be undefined when the deployed DB hasn't yet run the Phase 1
// migration that adds it to the RPC return. Default to 'live' so existing
// keys behave unchanged.
mode: (row.mode === 'test' ? 'test' : 'live') as ApiKeyMode,
}
}
/**
* Check if a given scope is allowed by the key's scopes.
*/
export function hasScope(keyScopes: ApiKeyScope[], required: ApiKeyScope): boolean {
return keyScopes.includes(required)
}