b6332e9ff4
* feat(salary): one-click AGI submission with filing state machine and success feedback The AGI panel required users to know that "Ladda ner AGI-fil" was the generate step, then click submit, signing link, and kvittens manually. A nollkorning filing stalled on "AGI-XML saknas" pointing at a UI path that does not exist. - New primary button "Lamna in till Skatteverket" chains the existing endpoints client-side: generate XML if missing, POST underlag, poll kontrollresultat, create signing link, open Mina Sidor in a tab opened synchronously at click (popup-blocker safe). Inline stepper shows each step; the four old buttons become collapsed advanced/recovery actions, auto-expanded in stale-draft and rejected states. XML download stays visible and free for manual filing. - deriveAgiFilingState() + useAgiSubmission() lift the per-period submission record to the run page: the progress rail and salary hero now render the real state machine (generated, underlag inskickat, vantar pa BankID-signatur, inlamnad med kvittensnummer) instead of telling users to "lamna in" an already-submitted declaration. - Success card with kvittensnummer and signature metadata once signed, plus a toast when a poll flips the state while the page is open. - AGI kvittens cron every 15 min instead of every 2 h so filings signed on another device get stamped and emailed promptly. - Advanced submit also auto-generates, and the stale "Lon -> AGI -> Generera" error text now points at the real buttons. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(enable-banking): instant OAuth callback feedback and dead-attempt cleanup The bank redirect landed on a blank page for the several seconds the callback spent exchanging the PSD2 session and mirroring accounts, and every failed connect attempt left a status='error' row that rendered forever as an "Atgard kravs" card next to a successful retry, showing duplicate connections to the same bank. - Stream a branded "Slutfor bankanslutningen" progress page from the callback: the shell flushes before the session exchange starts and a script/meta redirect follows when the work completes, with a 30s slow-work escape hatch. Fast outcomes (denial, bad params, unknown state) keep their plain redirects. - Delete never-activated connection rows (no session_id, no accounts_data) on denial or exchange failure, and sweep leftovers for the same bank on the next connect. Established connections keep their "Atgard krävs" card via the accounts_data guard; FKs are ON DELETE SET NULL so deletion has no dependents. - Show "Banken ar ansluten: hamtar dina konton" while the settings panel loads after the callback instead of an anonymous spinner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): reject re-send of issued invoices and gate bookkeeping on the sent flip A direct POST to /api/invoices/[id]/send against an already-issued invoice re-emailed the customer and posted a second revenue verifikat (createInvoiceJournalEntry has no dedup), overwriting journal_entry_id and orphaning the first entry. Only the UI hid the button; the v1 route and the MCP commit executor already rejected non-drafts. - Non-draft invoices now return 409 INVOICE_ALREADY_SENT. - The draft to sent status flip is an optimistic lock (status guard plus row-count check); journal entry, accrual schedules, PDF archival and the invoice.sent event only run for the request that won the flip. - On a flip failure the journal entry is deferred: the row stays draft and a retry re-runs the pipeline, ending with exactly one verifikat. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): payment links, failure visibility and sandbox guard for recurring auto-send - sendInvoiceFromSchedule now auto-creates an online payment link via applyPaymentLinkToInvoice before rendering and passes the payment link QR to the PDF: parity with the dashboard and v1 send routes, which recurring invoices silently lacked. - The recurring cron persists last_run_warning both when a claimed run throws (hourly retries stay visible on the schedule) and when a stale schedule is rolled forward, so a deterministic failure can no longer skip a month silently. - Auto-send is blocked for sandbox companies at the email chokepoint (freeze-and-retain: the invoice is still generated as a draft), covering both the cron and the run-now route with one guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(salary): close the Fortnox payroll API gaps (phases 1-4) Payroll now runs end-to-end through the open API, including onboarding a client from another payroll system, with every write staged for approval. - v1: per-employee payslips (list/detail/PDF), payslip line writes, run roster attach/remove, absence ranges (per-day storage), jamkning fields, cutover opening balances (single + atomic bulk PUT), vacation balance + vacation-year-close. PUT added to the wrapper's idempotency/ test-key set (test keys could otherwise write through PUT). - MCP: 10 new tools (get_employee/get_payslip/list_absence/ get_vacation_balance reads + staged update_payslip_line, register_absence, create_employee, update_employee, set_employee_opening_balances, close_vacation_year), executors, risk tiers, op-type CHECK expansions. create_employee encrypts personnummer at staging: pending_operations never holds plaintext. - Scope-map audit retrofit: 11 formerly unmapped tools now scoped; BREAKING for keys that relied on the 4 default-allow writes. - Cutover: employee_opening_balances (derived lock trigger, self-unlocks on run correction), engine YTD/karens/liability integration, Ingaende saldon section in the employee editor. - Arbetsschema-lite: employees.hours_per_week/workdays_per_week drive the hourly/daily divisors; legacy 173/21 preserved exactly at defaults so existing pay math is byte-identical. - Vacation ledger + semesterberedning/arsavslut: recomputed per-year day balances (synced on book/correct, non-fatal), year-close with the min-20 floor, 5-year sparade-dagar expiry to forced payout, and a 2920/2940 drift adjustment via the bookkeeping engine; Semester dashboard card with preview-then-confirm dialog. - Fix: Zod 4 defaults leak through .partial(), which made every sparse employee PATCH fail validation and reset defaulted columns. Migrations 20260713100000/101000/110000/121000/122000 (applied to staging with version rows; prod via merge). vacation_ledger renamed from 20260713120000 to avoid colliding with vat_declaration_totals_rpc. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: cut dashboard page-load latency (region, round trips, caching, VAT RPC) The dominant cost was infrastructure: Vercel functions ran in iad1 (Washington D.C.) while Supabase (DB + auth) lives in eu-north-1 (Stockholm), so every request paid 4-5 transatlantic round trips of auth + company resolution before doing any real work (measured 530-1900ms for single-query GETs in prod logs). Pin functions to arn1 and cut the redundant work on top: - vercel.json: functions to arn1, same city as the database - getActiveCompanyId: preference + first-membership queries run in parallel; the fallback result doubles as validation in the common single-company case (one round trip instead of two sequential) - withRouteContext: Server-Timing header and authMs/companyMs/handlerMs in the op-completed log, so latency is attributable per phase - dashboard layout: nav badge counts off the critical path; DashboardNav loads them client-side via the new use-worklist-badges SWR hook with debounced realtime revalidation - swr (new dependency, approved): global provider; useCompanySettings shares one cache entry across consumers and renders from cache on back-navigation instead of re-showing skeletons - /pending: realtime refetch debounced; bulk operations previously fired 4 requests per row-change event - VAT declaration: new get_vat_declaration_totals RPC returns per-account totals, settlement-shape detection (#984) and source_type counts in ONE round trip instead of paging every entry+line through PostgREST. Account lists stay TS-side parameters so ACCOUNT_RUTA remains the single source of truth. Shape-exclusion coverage moved to tests/pg/vat-declaration-totals-rpc.pg.test.ts; DDL already applied to staging. - bundle: CommandPalette lazy-mounts on first Ctrl/Cmd+K, AgentChat dynamic-imports the markdown parser, @vercel/speed-insights (new dependency, approved) added for real-user timings The /salary fetch-waterfall fix from the same effort already landed inside 2084a756. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): settle öre-rounded payments from the mark-paid flow An invoice with öresavrundning shows a rounded "Att betala" on the PDF; the customer pays that amount (up to 50 öre off the stored öre total) and the invoice-page mark-paid flow rejected it with MATCH_AMOUNT_EXCEEDS_REMAINING: a dead end, while the bank-transaction match flow already absorbed the residual to 3740. - PaymentBookingDialog now proposes the rounded bank leg plus the 3740 residual line (credit when rounded up, debit when rounded down), resolved via getDisplayTotal from the per-invoice override and company_settings.ore_rounding. - settleInvoicePayment and the v1 mark-paid route absorb the sub-krona residual, gated by planInvoicePaymentForLines: absorption applies ONLY when the caller lines carry the exact residual on 3740; otherwise the strict plan applies (sub-krona partials stay partial, no-3740 overshoots keep the 400), so the GL can never diverge from the AR sub-ledger. - planInvoicePayment absorb-band boundary tightened to >= 1 kr: an exactly-1-kr overshoot used to slip past both the guard and the absorb branch and silently over-record paid_amount (pre-existing on the bank-match path). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): resolve all 7 PR compliance findings - ASVS V3.3: per-request CSP nonce on the enable-banking finalize page (mirrors the mcp-oauth consent page); inline scripts are nonce-bound - ASVS V16: decouple callback finalize work from the response stream (eager promise + next/server after()) so a client disconnect cannot drop session persistence or the consent_granted audit emit - ISO 27001 A.8.15: failed audit-event emits log through the structured logger with a stable message for log-based alerting - ASVS V2.3: recurring-invoice cron and run-now routes resolve isSandboxCompany themselves and pass an explicit suppressAutoSend flag (defence in depth around the email chokepoint, freeze-and-retain kept) - ISO 27001 A.8.11: stagePendingOperation rejects plaintext personnummer-bearing keys in params/preview_data (key-based guard; EF org numbers make value-matching unsafe) - ASVS V4.5: employee PATCH body is truly sparse; cleared number fields are omitted instead of resetting DB values to hardcoded fallbacks - ASVS V8.2.1: route-level tests pin the v1 cross-company deny (404 by convention, not 403) on the payslip PDF endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: implement vacation-year basis change validation and error handling - Added tests to block vacation-year basis changes when open balances exist. - Implemented error handling for open-balances guard query failures in the settings route. - Enhanced absence route to reject reversed date ranges with a validation error. - Updated absence handling to use atomic upserts instead of delete+insert for better performance and reliability. - Refactored salary calculation logic to correctly handle age-based avgifter rates according to Skatteverket's rules. - Improved error messaging for vacation year closure adjustments. - Adjusted employee opening balances handling to preserve audit information during upserts. * feat(settings): add validation to block vacation-year basis change with open balances feat(absence): reject reversed date ranges in absence queries fix(absence): update absence handling to use atomic upserts instead of delete+insert fix(employee): improve validation for jamkning dates in employee updates fix(opening-balances): ensure created_by field is preserved during upserts test(absence): enhance tests for absence range and date validations test(calculation): add tests for age-based avgifter rates and edge cases test(semesterberedning): validate vacation year closure adjustments and error handling test(employee-opening-balances): update tests to reflect changes in salary_run_employees schema * fix(migrations): implement NOT VALID constraints for pending_operations and add validation migration --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
505 lines
21 KiB
TypeScript
505 lines
21 KiB
TypeScript
import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
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import { createServiceClient } from '@/lib/supabase/server'
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import { NextResponse, after } from 'next/server'
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import { ensureInitialized } from '@/lib/init'
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import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
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import { createSession, type AccountInfo } from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/api-client'
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import type { StoredAccount } from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/types'
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import { eventBus } from '@/lib/events/bus'
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import {
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upsertFromPsd2,
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allocatePsd2LedgerAccount,
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defaultLedgerForCurrency,
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} from '@/lib/cash-accounts/service'
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import { renderFinalizeShell, renderFinalizeRedirect } from './finalize-page'
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// This route emits bank_connection.consent_granted / .cash_account_mirror_failed
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// (ASVS V16 / GDPR Art.30 audit events). ensureInitialized() must run at module
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// load so registerEventLogHandler() has subscribed before the first emit();
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// otherwise the audit row is silently dropped on a cold instance where this
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// redirect route is the first event-emitting code path to execute.
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ensureInitialized()
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// Structured logger for audit-trail failures (ISO 27001 A.8.15): a failed
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// audit-event emission must be visible to log-based alerting, not just a raw
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// console line. The stable message below is what monitoring keys on.
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const log = createLogger('enable-banking/callback')
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const AUDIT_EMIT_FAILED = 'audit event emit failed'
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type ServiceClient = Awaited<ReturnType<typeof createServiceClient>>
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interface PendingConnection {
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id: string
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user_id: string
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company_id: string
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bank_name: string | null
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status: string
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}
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// Shown in the settings banner when the session exchange/finalize fails.
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// User-facing, so Swedish (the raw upstream error is in the server log).
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const FINALIZE_FAILED_MESSAGE =
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'Anslutningen kunde inte slutföras. Försök igen om en stund.'
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/**
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* GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/callback
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*
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* OAuth callback for Enable Banking PSD2 authorization.
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* Must be a real Next.js route (not extension handler) because
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* banks redirect to this URL directly.
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*
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* Fast outcomes (bank denial, bad params, unknown state) respond with a
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* classic 307. The success path instead streams an interim "Slutför
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* bankanslutningen" page while the slow work runs (session exchange with
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* Enable Banking, cash-account mirroring), then streams a client-side
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* redirect: without this the user stares at a blank tab for several seconds,
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* which reads as a failed connection and provokes duplicate retries.
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*/
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export async function GET(request: Request) {
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const { searchParams } = new URL(request.url)
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const code = searchParams.get('code')
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const state = searchParams.get('state') // Cryptographic oauth_state token
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const error = searchParams.get('error')
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const errorDescription = searchParams.get('error_description')
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const baseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'
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if (error) {
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const errorMessage = errorDescription || error
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// access_denied is the user cancelling at the bank — an expected outcome,
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// not a runtime error. Only bank-side failures stay at error level.
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const isUserCancel =
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error === 'access_denied' || /cancelled by user/i.test(errorDescription ?? '')
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const logDenied = isUserCancel ? console.warn : console.error
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logDenied('[enable-banking] Bank authorization denied', {
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error,
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error_description: errorDescription,
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has_state: !!state,
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})
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// Clean up the pending bank_connections row so it doesn't accumulate
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if (state) {
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try {
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const supabase = await createServiceClient()
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// Fetch connection details for logging before updating. Match by
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// oauth_state across pending/expired/error so an in-place reconnect
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// (which stays 'expired' during the round-trip) is also handled.
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const { data: pendingConn } = await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.select('id, user_id, bank_name, psu_type, status')
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.eq('oauth_state', state)
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.in('status', ['pending', 'expired', 'error'])
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.single()
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if (pendingConn) {
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logDenied('[enable-banking] Authorization denied details', {
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connection_id: pendingConn.id,
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user_id: pendingConn.user_id,
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bank_name: pendingConn.bank_name,
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error_code: error,
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error_description: errorDescription,
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})
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if (pendingConn.status === 'pending') {
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// Fresh connect that never became a connection: delete the row
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// instead of parking it in 'error'. A parked row renders forever
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// as an "Åtgärd krävs" card, so a failed attempt followed by a
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// successful retry showed up as two connections to the same bank.
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// The ?bank_error banner below is the actual failure feedback.
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await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.delete()
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.eq('id', pendingConn.id)
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.eq('status', 'pending')
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} else {
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// Reconnect of an established connection: keep the row (it holds
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// accounts/transactions history) and surface the failure on it.
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// If the bank reports a session-expiry during authorization
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// itself, mark it 'expired' (not generic 'error') so the settings
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// panel surfaces the reconnect button rather than a dead-end
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// error state.
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const isSessionExpiry = /session.?expired|expired.?session|closed.?session|session.?closed|invalid.?session|session.?not.?found/i.test(
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`${error} ${errorDescription ?? ''}`
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)
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await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.update({ status: isSessionExpiry ? 'expired' : 'error', error_message: errorMessage, oauth_state: null })
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.eq('id', pendingConn.id)
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}
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// Include bank name, error code, and psu_type in the redirect so the
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// UI can render targeted guidance (e.g. PSU-type retry on
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// access_denied, or the Handelsbanken corporate fullmakt steps on
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// server_error for a business connect).
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const params = new URLSearchParams({
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bank_error: errorMessage,
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...(pendingConn.bank_name ? { bank_name: pendingConn.bank_name } : {}),
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bank_error_code: error,
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...(pendingConn.psu_type ? { psu_type: pendingConn.psu_type } : {}),
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})
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return NextResponse.redirect(`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?${params.toString()}`)
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}
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} catch (cleanupError) {
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console.error('[enable-banking] Failed to clean up pending bank connection:', cleanupError)
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}
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}
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return NextResponse.redirect(
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`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=${encodeURIComponent(errorMessage)}`
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)
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}
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if (!code || !state) {
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return NextResponse.redirect(`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=missing_parameters`)
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}
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// Validate authorization code format
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const codePattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9._~+\/-]{8,2048}$/
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if (!codePattern.test(code)) {
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return NextResponse.redirect(`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=invalid_code_format`)
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}
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const supabase = await createServiceClient()
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// Look up the connection awaiting this callback by oauth_state (CSRF-safe).
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// oauth_state is a single-use random token cleared after use, so it uniquely
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// identifies the row regardless of status. Accept 'expired'/'error' too: an
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// in-place reconnect keeps the row in 'expired' during the round-trip (so
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// the nightly stale-'pending' cleanup can't delete an established row).
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// This lookup is fast, so it runs BEFORE the streamed response: an unknown
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// state stays a plain redirect.
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const { data: pendingConnection, error: findError } = await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.select('id, user_id, company_id, bank_name, status')
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.eq('oauth_state', state)
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.in('status', ['pending', 'expired', 'error'])
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.single()
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if (findError || !pendingConnection) {
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console.error('[enable-banking] No pending connection for oauth_state', {
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findError: findError ? { message: findError.message, code: findError.code, details: findError.details } : null,
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state,
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hasCode: !!code,
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})
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return NextResponse.redirect(
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`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=${encodeURIComponent('invalid_state')}`
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)
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}
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// Kick the finalize work off eagerly, decoupled from the response stream:
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// if the user closes the tab mid-stream, the stream is cancelled but this
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// promise keeps running, so the session persistence, cash-account mirror
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// and consent_granted audit emit are not lost (ASVS V16). Never rejects:
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// failures resolve to the cleanup redirect target.
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const finalizePromise = (async (): Promise<string> => {
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try {
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return await finalizeConnection(supabase, pendingConnection, code)
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} catch (finalizeError) {
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console.error('[enable-banking] Callback error', {
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message: finalizeError instanceof Error ? finalizeError.message : String(finalizeError),
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stack: finalizeError instanceof Error ? finalizeError.stack : undefined,
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name: finalizeError instanceof Error ? finalizeError.name : undefined,
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state,
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connectionId: pendingConnection.id,
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})
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return cleanupFailedFinalize(supabase, pendingConnection)
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}
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})()
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// Keep the serverless function alive until the finalize work settles even
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// if the client disconnects and the platform considers the response done.
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try {
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after(() => finalizePromise.then(() => undefined))
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} catch {
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// Outside a request scope (unit tests, plain node server): the stream's
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// own await below still drives the promise to completion.
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}
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// Per-request CSP nonce for the two inline scripts on the finalize page
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// (ASVS V3.3): mirrors the mcp-oauth consent page. The global next.config
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// CSP also applies; the intersection means inline scripts on THIS response
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// must carry the nonce.
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const cspNonce = randomBytes(16).toString('base64')
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const csp = [
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"default-src 'none'",
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`script-src 'nonce-${cspNonce}'`,
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"style-src 'unsafe-inline'",
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"base-uri 'none'",
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"form-action 'self'",
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"frame-ancestors 'none'",
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].join('; ')
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// Stream: flush the branded "Slutför bankanslutningen" shell immediately,
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// await the finalize work, then stream a client-side redirect to the
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// outcome URL. The user sees progress from the first byte instead of a
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// blank tab.
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const encoder = new TextEncoder()
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const stream = new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({
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async start(controller) {
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controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(renderFinalizeShell(pendingConnection.bank_name, cspNonce)))
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const targetPath = await finalizePromise
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try {
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controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(renderFinalizeRedirect(`${baseUrl}${targetPath}`, cspNonce)))
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controller.close()
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} catch {
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// Stream already cancelled (client closed the tab). The finalize
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// work above completed regardless; there is just no one to redirect.
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}
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},
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})
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return new Response(stream, {
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headers: {
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'Content-Type': 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
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'Content-Security-Policy': csp,
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// The body carries a one-time OAuth outcome: never cache, never buffer
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// (X-Accel-Buffering opts out of proxy buffering so the shell chunk
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// actually reaches the browser before the work finishes).
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'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
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'X-Accel-Buffering': 'no',
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},
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})
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}
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/**
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* The slow part of the callback: exchange the authorization code for a PSD2
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* session, persist the account metadata, mirror accounts into cash_accounts,
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* and emit the audit event. Returns the app-relative redirect target.
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* Extracted so the route can run it behind the streamed progress page.
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*/
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async function finalizeConnection(
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supabase: ServiceClient,
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pendingConnection: PendingConnection,
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code: string,
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): Promise<string> {
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const userId = pendingConnection.user_id
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console.log('[enable-banking] Exchanging code for session', {
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connectionId: pendingConnection.id,
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userId,
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codeLength: code.length,
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})
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|
|
|
const sessionData = await createSession(code)
|
|
const { session_id, accounts, access } = sessionData
|
|
const consentExpiresAt = access.valid_until
|
|
|
|
console.log('[enable-banking] Session created successfully', {
|
|
connectionId: pendingConnection.id,
|
|
sessionId: '[REDACTED]',
|
|
accountCount: accounts.length,
|
|
consentExpiresAt,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// GDPR Art.5(1)(c) / Art.25(1): data minimization. We only store the
|
|
// metadata the user needs to pick which accounts to sync (uid, name, IBAN,
|
|
// currency). Balances are bank account financial data: we don't fetch
|
|
// them here. The first sync (after the user enables specific accounts)
|
|
// populates balance + balance_updated_at via lib/sync.ts. Accounts the
|
|
// user deselects never have their balance pulled.
|
|
const accountsMetadata: StoredAccount[] = accounts.map((account: AccountInfo) => ({
|
|
uid: account.uid,
|
|
iban: account.account_id?.iban,
|
|
name: account.name || account.product,
|
|
currency: account.currency,
|
|
// Default to enabled. The user is presented with a picker
|
|
// immediately after this callback to uncheck unwanted accounts
|
|
// before any transactions are fetched.
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
// Stay in 'pending_selection' until the user confirms which accounts to sync.
|
|
// The cron and manual sync routes both skip this status, so no transactions
|
|
// can be pulled before the user has had a chance to deselect accounts.
|
|
// Do not set last_synced_at here either: no transactions have been fetched
|
|
// yet, and setting it would cause the cron's first-sync 90-day backfill
|
|
// path to be skipped. The first successful sync sets it.
|
|
const { data: updatedConnection, error: updateError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({
|
|
session_id,
|
|
status: 'pending_selection',
|
|
accounts_data: accountsMetadata,
|
|
consent_expires: consentExpiresAt,
|
|
oauth_state: null, // Clear to prevent replay
|
|
})
|
|
.eq('id', pendingConnection.id)
|
|
.select('id, bank_name, company_id, user_id')
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
if (updateError) {
|
|
console.error('[enable-banking] Failed to update connection after session creation', {
|
|
connectionId: pendingConnection.id,
|
|
updateError: { message: updateError.message, code: updateError.code, details: updateError.details },
|
|
sessionId: '[REDACTED]',
|
|
})
|
|
throw new Error(`Failed to update connection: ${updateError.message}`)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Mirror each PSD2 account into cash_accounts so routing decisions read
|
|
// from the canonical entity table. Accounts already mirrored (reconnect)
|
|
// keep their ledger_account — re-deriving it here would clobber the
|
|
// user's remaps. New accounts each get a free BAS class-19 slot: a bank
|
|
// returning N same-currency accounts must not collide on the UNIQUE
|
|
// (company_id, ledger_account) constraint by all defaulting to 1930.
|
|
const { data: mirroredRows } = await supabase
|
|
.from('cash_accounts')
|
|
.select('external_uid, ledger_account')
|
|
.eq('company_id', updatedConnection.company_id)
|
|
.eq('bank_connection_id', updatedConnection.id)
|
|
const existingLedgerByUid = new Map(
|
|
((mirroredRows ?? []) as Array<{ external_uid: string; ledger_account: string }>).map(
|
|
(r) => [r.external_uid, r.ledger_account],
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
const assignedLedgers = new Set<string>(existingLedgerByUid.values())
|
|
let accountsDataDirty = false
|
|
|
|
for (const account of accountsMetadata) {
|
|
let targetLedger = existingLedgerByUid.get(account.uid)
|
|
if (!targetLedger) {
|
|
targetLedger =
|
|
(await allocatePsd2LedgerAccount(supabase, updatedConnection.company_id, updatedConnection.user_id, {
|
|
currency: account.currency,
|
|
accountName: account.name,
|
|
exclude: assignedLedgers,
|
|
})) ?? defaultLedgerForCurrency(account.currency)
|
|
}
|
|
assignedLedgers.add(targetLedger)
|
|
if (account.ledger_account !== targetLedger) {
|
|
account.ledger_account = targetLedger
|
|
accountsDataDirty = true
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
await upsertFromPsd2(supabase, updatedConnection.company_id, {
|
|
bank_connection_id: updatedConnection.id,
|
|
external_uid: account.uid,
|
|
currency: account.currency,
|
|
ledger_account: targetLedger,
|
|
iban: account.iban ?? null,
|
|
name: account.name ?? null,
|
|
enabled: account.enabled ?? true,
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (cashErr) {
|
|
const reason = cashErr instanceof Error ? cashErr.message : String(cashErr)
|
|
console.error('[enable-banking] Failed to mirror cash_account on callback', {
|
|
connectionId: updatedConnection.id,
|
|
uid: account.uid,
|
|
error: reason,
|
|
})
|
|
// Persist the failure to event_log so a security review can see that
|
|
// a PSD2 account returned by the bank was not mirrored into our
|
|
// routing table; otherwise this is only visible in console output
|
|
// (ASVS V16 / ISO 27001 A.8.15 / SOC 2 CC7.2).
|
|
try {
|
|
await eventBus.emit({
|
|
type: 'bank_connection.cash_account_mirror_failed',
|
|
payload: {
|
|
connectionId: updatedConnection.id,
|
|
bankName: updatedConnection.bank_name ?? null,
|
|
accountUid: account.uid,
|
|
ledgerAccount: targetLedger,
|
|
currency: account.currency,
|
|
reason,
|
|
userId: updatedConnection.user_id,
|
|
companyId: updatedConnection.company_id,
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (emitError) {
|
|
// A.8.15: structured error (not bare console) so log-based alerting
|
|
// catches a dropped security event instead of it vanishing silently.
|
|
log.error(AUDIT_EMIT_FAILED, emitError as Error, {
|
|
eventType: 'bank_connection.cash_account_mirror_failed',
|
|
connectionId: updatedConnection.id,
|
|
accountUid: account.uid,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Persist the allocated ledgers into accounts_data so the AccountPicker
|
|
// pre-fills the actual assignments instead of colliding currency
|
|
// defaults. Non-fatal: cash_accounts is the routing source of truth.
|
|
if (accountsDataDirty) {
|
|
const { error: accountsDataError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({ accounts_data: accountsMetadata })
|
|
.eq('id', updatedConnection.id)
|
|
if (accountsDataError) {
|
|
console.warn('[enable-banking] Failed to persist allocated ledgers to accounts_data', {
|
|
connectionId: updatedConnection.id,
|
|
error: accountsDataError.message,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Audit trail: PSD2 consent has been exchanged and account metadata stored.
|
|
// ASVS V16 requires this transition to be logged as a security event; emit
|
|
// here so the event_log handler persists it (30-day TTL).
|
|
try {
|
|
await eventBus.emit({
|
|
type: 'bank_connection.consent_granted',
|
|
payload: {
|
|
connectionId: updatedConnection.id,
|
|
bankName: updatedConnection.bank_name ?? null,
|
|
accountCount: accounts.length,
|
|
consentExpiresAt: consentExpiresAt ?? null,
|
|
userId: updatedConnection.user_id,
|
|
companyId: updatedConnection.company_id,
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (emitError) {
|
|
// Non-fatal: redirect the user even if the audit event fails. The
|
|
// structured error record is the alerting channel (A.8.15): production
|
|
// log monitoring keys on the stable message. The underlying DB write
|
|
// (the source of truth for the connection state) has already succeeded.
|
|
log.error(AUDIT_EMIT_FAILED, emitError as Error, {
|
|
eventType: 'bank_connection.consent_granted',
|
|
connectionId: updatedConnection.id,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return `/settings/banking?select_accounts=${updatedConnection.id}`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Failure cleanup after finalizeConnection threw. A fresh connect (prior
|
|
* status 'pending') never became a connection: delete the row so it can't
|
|
* linger as a zombie "Åtgärd krävs" card next to a successful retry. A
|
|
* reconnect row (established connection) is kept and marked 'error' so the
|
|
* user retains the renew affordance. Returns the error redirect target.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function cleanupFailedFinalize(
|
|
supabase: ServiceClient,
|
|
pendingConnection: PendingConnection,
|
|
): Promise<string> {
|
|
try {
|
|
if (pendingConnection.status === 'pending') {
|
|
await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.delete()
|
|
.eq('id', pendingConnection.id)
|
|
.eq('status', 'pending')
|
|
} else {
|
|
await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({ status: 'error', error_message: FINALIZE_FAILED_MESSAGE, oauth_state: null })
|
|
.eq('id', pendingConnection.id)
|
|
.in('status', ['pending', 'expired', 'error'])
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (cleanupError) {
|
|
console.error('[enable-banking] Callback cleanup failed', {
|
|
cleanupError: cleanupError instanceof Error ? cleanupError.message : String(cleanupError),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const params = new URLSearchParams({
|
|
bank_error: FINALIZE_FAILED_MESSAGE,
|
|
...(pendingConnection.bank_name ? { bank_name: pendingConnection.bank_name } : {}),
|
|
})
|
|
return `/settings/banking?${params.toString()}`
|
|
}
|