Follow-up to the PII-redaction fix, addressing the compliance-swarm findings on this unauthenticated client telemetry sink:
- Per-/24 rate limit (30/min) via checkRateLimit — bounds log-flooding (CC6.1). Fails open when no limiter is configured; the whole handler is wrapped so a transient limiter error degrades to { ok:false } rather than a 500.
- Cap message length (2000) and serialized extra size (8 KB) — bounds client input (V2.2). Shape is coerced rather than strictly schema-rejected, so a malformed report still logs (this endpoint exists to capture client errors).
- No auth added: the endpoint is intentionally called pre-auth during onboarding.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Jakob Wennberg
b91f0bdbf8