Files
accounted/supabase/migrations/20260311120000_sandbox_support.sql
T
Mattsson 109f860e22 Sandbox (#8)
* feat: add sandbox infrastructure — migration, types, and middleware

Add database migration for sandbox support:
- Add `is_sandbox` boolean column to company_settings
- Update 4 enforcement trigger functions (journal entry immutability,
  journal entry line immutability, retention enforcement, document
  deletion blocking) to bypass checks for sandbox users
- Add `cleanup_sandbox_user()` SECURITY DEFINER function that handles
  FK-safe deletion order (document_attachments → journal_entry_lines →
  journal_entries → supplier_invoices → auth.users cascade)
- Add `cleanup_expired_sandbox_users()` function that loops over
  sandbox users older than N hours with per-user error handling

Update TypeScript types:
- Add `is_sandbox: boolean` to CompanySettings interface
- Add `is_sandbox: false` to makeCompanySettings() test factory

Update middleware:
- Add `/sandbox` to public routes so the landing page is accessible
  without authentication

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add sandbox landing page, seed API, cleanup cron, and banner

Sandbox landing page (app/sandbox/page.tsx):
- Client component matching the existing auth page aesthetic
- Auth check: if logged in as real user, shows message to use incognito
- Otherwise shows feature overview (invoices, transactions, bookkeeping,
  reports) with "Starta sandbox" button
- On click: signInAnonymously() → POST /api/sandbox/seed → redirect
- Uses window.location.href for full page load (ensures middleware
  picks up new session cookies)

Seed API (app/api/sandbox/seed/route.ts):
- POST handler gated to anonymous users only (403 for real users)
- Idempotent: returns { seeded: false } if company_settings exists
- Seeds ~40 rows: profile, company_settings (is_sandbox: true,
  onboarding_complete: true), chart of accounts (via RPC),
  fiscal period, 3 customers (Swedish business, EU business,
  individual), 4 invoices (paid/sent/overdue/draft), 4 invoice
  items, 2 posted journal entries with 5 lines, 8 transactions
  (3 categorized, 2 income, 3 uncategorized), 2 deadlines
- Journal entries inserted directly (not via engine) to avoid
  event emission, using next_voucher_number() RPC

Cleanup cron (app/api/sandbox/cleanup/cron/route.ts):
- GET handler with CRON_SECRET Bearer token auth
- Creates service role Supabase client
- Calls cleanup_expired_sandbox_users RPC (24h default)

Sandbox banner (components/dashboard/SandboxBanner.tsx):
- Amber bar with dismiss button (client state, reappears on reload)
- Text: "Sandlådemiljö — dina data raderas automatiskt efter 24 timmar"
- "Skapa konto" link to /register

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: integrate sandbox into dashboard — banner, nav, settings safeguards

Dashboard layout (app/(dashboard)/layout.tsx):
- Fetch is_sandbox from company_settings
- Render SandboxBanner at top of page for sandbox users
- Pass isSandbox prop to DashboardNav
- Hide RecaptIdentify analytics for sandbox users

Root page (app/page.tsx):
- Same sandbox banner and isSandbox prop treatment as dashboard layout
  (root page has its own layout, not wrapped by (dashboard)/layout)

DashboardNav (components/dashboard/DashboardNav.tsx):
- Add optional isSandbox prop
- Change logout button text to "Avsluta sandbox" when isSandbox
- Redirect to /sandbox instead of /login on logout for sandbox users
- Applied to both desktop sidebar and mobile drawer logout buttons

Settings page (app/(dashboard)/settings/page.tsx):
- Hide "Bank (PSD2)" tab entirely for sandbox users — prevents
  connecting real bank accounts from a temporary anonymous session
- Hide "Radera konto" card for sandbox users — account auto-deletes
  via cron, and the delete flow requires email confirmation

Vercel config (vercel.json):
- Add sandbox cleanup cron at 04:00 UTC daily
  (/api/sandbox/cleanup/cron)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remove audit trigger for non-existent tax_codes table

Migration 018 referenced public.tax_codes which was never created
(migration 012 is a placeholder). This caused failures when running
migrations from scratch on a fresh database.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remove ALTER FUNCTION for 3 non-existent functions

Removed search_path pinning for create_invoice_with_items,
seed_asset_categories, and update_reconciliation_session_counts —
none of these functions were ever created in any migration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remove ALTER for generate_invoice_number (created in later migration)

The function is created in migration 20260306 with search_path already
set, but migration 20260304 tried to ALTER it before it existed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fixed redirect issue

* Update app/api/sandbox/seed/route.ts

Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update app/api/sandbox/seed/route.ts

Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update app/sandbox/page.tsx

Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Fixed catch block issue

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-11 14:54:53 +01:00

290 lines
8.9 KiB
PL/PgSQL

-- Sandbox support: is_sandbox column, enforcement trigger bypasses, cleanup functions
-- =============================================================================
-- 1a. Add is_sandbox column to company_settings
-- =============================================================================
ALTER TABLE public.company_settings
ADD COLUMN is_sandbox boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT false;
CREATE INDEX idx_company_settings_sandbox
ON public.company_settings (is_sandbox)
WHERE is_sandbox = true;
-- =============================================================================
-- 1b. Update enforcement triggers to skip for sandbox users
-- =============================================================================
-- enforce_journal_entry_immutability — add sandbox bypass
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.enforce_journal_entry_immutability()
RETURNS trigger
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SET search_path = public
AS $$
BEGIN
-- Skip enforcement for sandbox users
IF EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM public.company_settings
WHERE user_id = COALESCE(OLD.user_id, NEW.user_id) AND is_sandbox = true
) THEN
IF TG_OP = 'DELETE' THEN
RETURN OLD;
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
IF TG_OP = 'DELETE' THEN
-- Allow deleting drafts
IF OLD.status = 'draft' THEN
RETURN OLD;
END IF;
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Cannot delete a % journal entry (id: %)', OLD.status, OLD.id;
END IF;
-- TG_OP = 'UPDATE'
-- Allow: draft → draft (editing a draft)
IF OLD.status = 'draft' AND NEW.status = 'draft' THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
-- Allow: draft → posted (committing)
IF OLD.status = 'draft' AND NEW.status = 'posted' THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
-- Allow: posted → reversed (storno reversal)
IF OLD.status = 'posted' AND NEW.status = 'reversed' THEN
-- Only allow setting reversed_by_id during this transition
IF NEW.description != OLD.description
OR NEW.entry_date != OLD.entry_date
OR NEW.fiscal_period_id != OLD.fiscal_period_id
OR NEW.voucher_number != OLD.voucher_number THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Cannot modify fields of a posted entry during reversal (id: %)', OLD.id;
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
-- Block all other transitions
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Cannot modify a % journal entry (id: %). Committed entries are immutable per Bokföringslagen.',
OLD.status, OLD.id;
END;
$$;
-- enforce_journal_entry_line_immutability — add sandbox bypass
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.enforce_journal_entry_line_immutability()
RETURNS trigger
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SET search_path = public
AS $$
DECLARE
v_status text;
v_user_id uuid;
BEGIN
-- Get the parent entry status and user_id
SELECT status, user_id INTO v_status, v_user_id
FROM public.journal_entries
WHERE id = COALESCE(OLD.journal_entry_id, NEW.journal_entry_id);
-- Skip enforcement for sandbox users
IF EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM public.company_settings
WHERE user_id = v_user_id AND is_sandbox = true
) THEN
IF TG_OP = 'DELETE' THEN
RETURN OLD;
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
-- Allow modifications to lines of draft entries
IF v_status = 'draft' THEN
IF TG_OP = 'DELETE' THEN
RETURN OLD;
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
-- Block modifications to lines of posted/reversed entries
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Cannot % lines of a % journal entry. Committed entries are immutable per Bokföringslagen.',
TG_OP, v_status;
END;
$$;
-- enforce_retention_journal_entries — add sandbox bypass (SECURITY DEFINER)
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.enforce_retention_journal_entries()
RETURNS trigger
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = public
AS $$
DECLARE
v_retention_expires date;
BEGIN
-- Skip enforcement for sandbox users
IF EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM public.company_settings
WHERE user_id = OLD.user_id AND is_sandbox = true
) THEN
RETURN OLD;
END IF;
SELECT fp.retention_expires_at INTO v_retention_expires
FROM public.fiscal_periods fp
WHERE fp.id = OLD.fiscal_period_id;
IF v_retention_expires IS NOT NULL AND v_retention_expires > CURRENT_DATE THEN
INSERT INTO public.audit_log (user_id, action, table_name, record_id, description)
VALUES (OLD.user_id, 'RETENTION_BLOCK', 'journal_entries', OLD.id,
'Attempted deletion within retention period (expires ' || v_retention_expires || ')');
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Cannot delete journal entry within 7-year retention period (expires %)',
v_retention_expires;
END IF;
RETURN OLD;
END;
$$;
-- block_document_deletion — add sandbox bypass (SECURITY DEFINER)
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.block_document_deletion()
RETURNS trigger
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = public
AS $$
DECLARE
v_entry_status text;
v_retention_expires date;
BEGIN
-- Skip enforcement for sandbox users
IF EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM public.company_settings
WHERE user_id = OLD.user_id AND is_sandbox = true
) THEN
RETURN OLD;
END IF;
-- Check if linked to a committed journal entry
IF OLD.journal_entry_id IS NOT NULL THEN
SELECT je.status INTO v_entry_status
FROM public.journal_entries je
WHERE je.id = OLD.journal_entry_id;
IF v_entry_status IN ('posted', 'reversed') THEN
-- Log the blocked attempt
INSERT INTO public.audit_log (user_id, action, table_name, record_id, description)
VALUES (OLD.user_id, 'DOCUMENT_DELETE_BLOCKED', 'document_attachments', OLD.id,
'Attempted deletion of document linked to ' || v_entry_status || ' journal entry ' || OLD.journal_entry_id);
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Cannot delete document linked to a % journal entry (Bokföringslagen)',
v_entry_status;
END IF;
END IF;
-- Check retention window
IF OLD.journal_entry_id IS NOT NULL THEN
SELECT fp.retention_expires_at INTO v_retention_expires
FROM public.journal_entries je
JOIN public.fiscal_periods fp ON fp.id = je.fiscal_period_id
WHERE je.id = OLD.journal_entry_id;
IF v_retention_expires IS NOT NULL AND v_retention_expires > CURRENT_DATE THEN
INSERT INTO public.audit_log (user_id, action, table_name, record_id, description)
VALUES (OLD.user_id, 'RETENTION_BLOCK', 'document_attachments', OLD.id,
'Attempted deletion within retention period (expires ' || v_retention_expires || ')');
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Cannot delete document within 7-year retention period (expires %)',
v_retention_expires;
END IF;
END IF;
RETURN OLD;
END;
$$;
-- =============================================================================
-- 1c. cleanup_sandbox_user(p_user_id uuid)
-- =============================================================================
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.cleanup_sandbox_user(p_user_id uuid)
RETURNS integer
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = public
AS $$
DECLARE
v_is_sandbox boolean;
v_deleted integer := 0;
BEGIN
-- Verify this is a sandbox user
SELECT is_sandbox INTO v_is_sandbox
FROM public.company_settings
WHERE user_id = p_user_id;
IF v_is_sandbox IS NOT TRUE THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'User % is not a sandbox user', p_user_id;
END IF;
-- Clear RESTRICT FKs on document_attachments
UPDATE public.document_attachments
SET journal_entry_id = NULL, journal_entry_line_id = NULL
WHERE user_id = p_user_id;
DELETE FROM public.document_attachments WHERE user_id = p_user_id;
-- Delete journal entry lines (child of journal_entries)
DELETE FROM public.journal_entry_lines
WHERE journal_entry_id IN (
SELECT id FROM public.journal_entries WHERE user_id = p_user_id
);
-- Delete journal entries (triggers bypass for sandbox)
DELETE FROM public.journal_entries WHERE user_id = p_user_id;
-- Delete supplier invoices before suppliers cascade
DELETE FROM public.supplier_invoices WHERE user_id = p_user_id;
-- Delete from auth.users — cascades everything else
DELETE FROM auth.users WHERE id = p_user_id;
GET DIAGNOSTICS v_deleted = ROW_COUNT;
RETURN v_deleted;
END;
$$;
-- =============================================================================
-- 1d. cleanup_expired_sandbox_users(p_max_age_hours int)
-- =============================================================================
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.cleanup_expired_sandbox_users(p_max_age_hours int DEFAULT 24)
RETURNS integer
LANGUAGE plpgsql
SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = public
AS $$
DECLARE
v_user_id uuid;
v_total integer := 0;
BEGIN
FOR v_user_id IN
SELECT cs.user_id
FROM public.company_settings cs
WHERE cs.is_sandbox = true
AND cs.created_at < now() - interval '1 hour' * p_max_age_hours
LOOP
BEGIN
PERFORM public.cleanup_sandbox_user(v_user_id);
v_total := v_total + 1;
EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN
RAISE WARNING 'Failed to clean up sandbox user %: %', v_user_id, SQLERRM;
END;
END LOOP;
RETURN v_total;
END;
$$;
-- Grant execute to service_role
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.cleanup_sandbox_user(uuid) TO service_role;
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.cleanup_expired_sandbox_users(int) TO service_role;