accounted/.env.example

# Local development environment variables.
# Copy to .env and fill in the values: cp .env.example .env

# ── Required ──────────────────────────────────────────────
# Supabase project credentials (Dashboard -> Settings -> API)
NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL=https://your-project.supabase.co
NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY=your-anon-or-publishable-key
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY=your-service-role-or-secret-key

# App base URL (local dev)
NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL=http://localhost:3000

# Shared hosted white-label deployments only: exact comma-separated hostnames
# that are registered on this deployment. No wildcards. Invite and auth links
# use a listed request/browser host; every other host falls back to
# NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL. Also add each listed host's /auth/callback and /invite/*
# URLs to the Supabase Auth redirect allowlist before deploying it.
# NEXT_PUBLIC_WHITELABEL_DOMAINS=portal.brand-one.example,books.brand-two.example

# Secret for authenticating cron/scheduled requests.
# Any non-empty random string for local dev: openssl rand -hex 16
CRON_SECRET=generate-a-random-secret

# Receipt hunt (nightly matcher, 05:30 UTC): comma-separated company ids the
# hunt may stage proposals for. Unset means it runs for nobody, so enabling it
# is always a deliberate act rather than a side effect of deploying.
# Model used to resolve bank descriptors to merchants and to decide which mail
# is the receipt for which purchase. Falls back to BEDROCK_MODEL_ID.
RECEIPT_HUNT_MODEL_ID=
# Floor for accepting the model's pairing. Every proposal is human-reviewed, so
# this trades recall against review effort, not against correctness.
RECEIPT_HUNT_MIN_CONFIDENCE=
RECEIPT_HUNT_COMPANY_IDS=

# Session timeouts are opt-in per user (user_preferences.auto_logout, toggled
# in Settings > Security): users who have not opted in stay signed in for the
# full Supabase session lifetime. The variables below set the limits that
# apply to opted-in users: 30 minutes idle, 12 hours absolute, warning 2
# minutes before expiry. Set a timeout to 0 to disable that limit entirely.
# Self-hosted deployments default both limits to 0 unless overridden.
# NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_TIMEOUT_FORCE_ALL=true enforces the timeouts for every
# user regardless of their preference (emergency lever / strict deployments).
# The signing key falls back to SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY; set a dedicated
# random secret if session signing should rotate independently.
# NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS=1800000
# NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS=43200000
# NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS=120000
# NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_TIMEOUT_FORCE_ALL=false
# SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET=

# Self-hosted only: set to true when public signup is turned off in your
# GoTrue/Supabase auth config (GOTRUE_DISABLE_SIGNUP / "Allow new users to
# sign up" off). GoTrue offers no clean server-side read of that setting, so
# this flag mirrors it. When true, inviting a teammate who has no account
# provisions the account server-side via the auth admin invite API (GoTrue
# must have SMTP configured to deliver that mail) instead of relying on
# public /register, which GoTrue would reject with "Signups not allowed".
# The GoTrue redirect URI allow-list (URI Allow List / GOTRUE_URI_ALLOW_LIST)
# must include /invite/* or the invite email's redirect silently falls back
# to SITE_URL.
# Hosted keeps this unset: public signup stays open there.
# AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED=false

# Sign in with Google. Requires the Google provider to be configured in
# Supabase/GoTrue first (Google Cloud OAuth client + redirect URI):
# https://supabase.com/docs/guides/auth/social-login/auth-google
# The button stays hidden until this is true.
# NEXT_PUBLIC_GOOGLE_AUTH_ENABLED=true

# Cloudflare Turnstile site key for Supabase Auth bot protection. This value is
# public and is embedded in the browser bundle. Leave it unset until a widget
# has been created for the deployment's exact hostnames. Deploy the site key
# before enabling Turnstile with the matching SECRET in Supabase Auth, so the
# existing login flow remains available throughout rollout.
# NEXT_PUBLIC_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY=

# ── Optional: extension features (core runs without these) ─
# AI features (document extraction + AI assistant). Three ways to provide a
# backend; set one of them. AI_PROVIDER (bedrock|anthropic|openai-compatible)
# forces the choice if several are present; otherwise Bedrock wins, then the
# direct Anthropic API, then an OpenAI-compatible endpoint.
#
# 1. Claude via AWS Bedrock. Needs an AWS account with Bedrock model access to
#    Claude. Keeps inference in eu-north-1, which is what hosted runs.
# AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
# AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
# AWS_REGION=eu-north-1
#
# 2. Claude via the direct Anthropic API. No AWS account needed. Note that it
#    has no EU-residency guarantee: use Bedrock if you need one.
# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=
#
# 3. Any OpenAI-compatible endpoint (chat-completions API), e.g. a Swedish
#    inference provider for a sovereign self-host. Document extraction and
#    single-call AI jobs run here; the in-app chat assistant does not yet.
#    A model id is required (no default exists for an arbitrary endpoint).
# AI_BASE_URL=https://api.example.se/v1
# AI_API_KEY=
# AI_MODEL=                       # default model for every tier
# AI_EXTRACTION_MODEL=            # per-tier overrides (also AI_ASSISTANT_MODEL, AI_HEAVY_MODEL);
#                                 # legacy BEDROCK_MODEL_ID / BEDROCK_SONNET_MODEL_ID /
#                                 # BEDROCK_OPUS_MODEL_ID keep working as the same overrides
# AI_VISION=true                  # openai-compatible only: set false for a text-only model
#                                 # (images/PDFs are then skipped honestly; HTML mail still extracts)
# AI_PDF_MODE=auto                # auto (Claude: native, others: rasterize with poppler) | native | rasterize
# AI_PDF_MAX_PAGES=4              # pages rasterized per PDF
# AI_PDF_RASTERIZER_BIN=pdftoppm   # poppler binary name/path (the self-host image installs poppler-utils)
# AI_STRICT_JSON=false            # openai-compatible only: response_format json_schema when the provider enforces it
# AI_EXTRACTION_MAX_TOKENS=8192   # output cap for document extraction (legacy BEDROCK_MAX_TOKENS)
# AI_PROVIDER=
# Self-hosted connector subscription (instance side). Leave unset on hosted.
# GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY=
# GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL=https://app.gnubok.se
# Outbound email (invoices, reminders). Pick one provider. Resend is what
# hosted runs; SMTP is for self-hosts that want mail on their own relay.
# EMAIL_PROVIDER=resend|smtp   # optional; RESEND_API_KEY wins, else SMTP_HOST
# RESEND_API_KEY=
# RESEND_FROM_EMAIL=
# SMTP_HOST=
# SMTP_PORT=587
# SMTP_SECURE=false            # true = implicit TLS on 465, false = STARTTLS required (set SMTP_REQUIRE_TLS=false only for a plaintext LAN relay)
# SMTP_USER=
# SMTP_PASS=
# SMTP_FROM_EMAIL=
# SMTP_REQUIRE_TLS=true        # false only for a plaintext relay on a trusted LAN
# SMTP_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=true
# Bank connections (Enable Banking)
# ENABLE_BANKING_APP_ID=
# ENABLE_BANKING_PRIVATE_KEY=
# Peppol e-invoicing via Qvalia (certified Access Point + SMP, partner model).
# The adapter registers itself when QVALIA_API_KEY, QVALIA_PARTNER_REG_NO and
# QVALIA_BASE_URL are all set; PEPPOL_TRANSPORT_PROVIDER=qvalia switches it on
# for users. Sandbox https://api-test.qvalia.com, production https://api.qvalia.com,
# separate keys per environment. QVALIA_ACCOUNT_REG_NO defaults to the partner
# number (consolidated setup). QVALIA_WEBHOOK_SECRET is the value Qvalia echoes
# in the QVALIA_WEBHOOK_HEADER on every delivery event (configure it with
# POST /partner/{p}/webhook/{id}/auth, type api_key). The key is sent bare in
# the Authorization header (what the sandbox accepts); QVALIA_AUTH_SCHEME=apikey
# switches to the "ApiKey <key>" form from the newest docs.
# PEPPOL_TRANSPORT_PROVIDER=qvalia
# Cap on companies that may publish a receiving identifier through the
# provider account (the Qvalia partner contract is priced per tenant, 10 to
# start). Unset = no cap.
# PEPPOL_RECEIVING_MAX_REGISTRATIONS=10
# QVALIA_API_KEY=
# QVALIA_PARTNER_REG_NO=
# QVALIA_ACCOUNT_REG_NO=
# QVALIA_BASE_URL=https://api-test.qvalia.com
# QVALIA_WEBHOOK_SECRET=
# QVALIA_WEBHOOK_HEADER=x-accounted-webhook-key
# QVALIA_AUTH_SCHEME=raw

# Accounting integrations
# FORTNOX_CLIENT_ID=
# FORTNOX_CLIENT_SECRET=
# FORTNOX_REDIRECT_URI=
# Self-hosted only: which scopes YOUR Fortnox app registration carries in the
# Fortnox Developer Portal. Unset means the hosted deployment's defaults
# (documents true, assets false), which describe the hosted app, not yours.
# Set to the registration's actual state: claiming an unapproved scope makes
# Fortnox reject authorize with invalid_scope before login, and denying an
# approved one just leaves that import feature off.
# FORTNOX_DOCUMENT_SCOPES_APPROVED=true    # Arkivplats + Koppla filer (underlag import)
# FORTNOX_ASSET_SCOPES_APPROVED=false      # Anlaggningsregister (asset register import)
# Björn Lundén app credentials (OAuth2 client credentials; per-company
# User-Key is entered by the user in the migration wizard)
# BJORN_LUNDEN_CLIENT_ID=
# BJORN_LUNDEN_CLIENT_SECRET=
# WhatsApp receipt intake (whatsapp-inbox extension, Meta Cloud API).
# ACCESS_TOKEN: system-user permanent token with whatsapp_business_messaging
# scope only. PHONE_NUMBER_ID: the Graph object id of the sending number.
# APP_SECRET verifies X-Hub-Signature-256 on the webhook; VERIFY_TOKEN is the
# GET-handshake shared secret you also enter in the Meta app dashboard.
# PHONE_HASH_KEY: random pepper for phone lookup hashes (openssl rand -hex 32).
# PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: 32-byte hex AES-256-GCM key (openssl rand -hex 32).
# WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN=
# WHATSAPP_PHONE_NUMBER_ID=
# WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET=
# WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN=
# WHATSAPP_PHONE_HASH_KEY=
# WHATSAPP_PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
# Optional: the public number as E.164 digits (e.g. 46766867041) for the
# wa.me deep link in settings. Unset = resolved from the Graph API instead.
# WHATSAPP_PUBLIC_NUMBER=
# Bolagsverket: digital inlämning av årsredovisning (bolagsverket extension).
# BOLAGSVERKET_ENV is test | accept | prod (default test) and also caps which
# environment a company may select in settings (test < accept < prod).
# Certificate material is read from env ONLY (PEM or base64-wrapped PEM):
# never from extension settings or the database.
#
# SECRET CUSTODY (prod): never keep the real mTLS private key in a plaintext
# .env file. Inject these at runtime from a secrets manager (Vercel encrypted
# env vars, AWS Secrets Manager, Vault, Doppler, …), restrict read access to
# the deploy pipeline, and rotate the client certificate/key on the cadence
# agreed with Bolagsverket (and immediately on suspected exposure). Outbound
# hosts are pinned per environment in extensions/general/bolagsverket/lib/
# client.ts (HOSTS): the endpoint is not configurable via env.
# BOLAGSVERKET_ENV=
# BOLAGSVERKET_CLIENT_CERT=
# BOLAGSVERKET_CLIENT_KEY=
# BOLAGSVERKET_CA=
# Safety gate: enable only after agreement, certificate, test-bank fixtures,
# acceptance testing, and production runbook approval are complete.
# BOLAGSVERKET_FILING_ENABLED=false
# NEXT_PUBLIC_BOLAGSVERKET_FILING_ENABLED=false
# BOLAGSVERKET_ARELLE_VALIDATOR_URL=
# BOLAGSVERKET_ARELLE_VALIDATOR_TOKEN=

# ── Optional: product analytics + error tracking (PostHog) ─
# Hosted only. Self-hosted deployments never load PostHog: isAnalyticsEnabled()
# (lib/analytics/enabled.ts) short-circuits on NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED=true, and
# no __NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_*__ sentinel is baked into the Docker image, so an
# operator cannot accidentally ship their users' behaviour to our project.
#
# The token is the PUBLIC project token (phc_...). It is embedded in the client
# bundle by design and is not a secret. Leave unset to run with analytics off.
# Browser traffic goes through the same-origin /rl rewrite in next.config.ts;
# NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_HOST is only used by the server-side SDK.
# NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_PROJECT_TOKEN=
# NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_HOST=https://eu.i.posthog.com
#
# PostHog Support identity verification. A REAL SECRET (it also authenticates
# external API requests), so no NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix: it must never reach the
# client bundle. Only the derived per-user HMAC crosses to the browser
# (lib/analytics/identity-hash.ts). Unset means support tickets are scoped to
# one browser session and users recover them by email link, which is the
# normal state for local dev, CI and self-hosted.
# POSTHOG_SECRET_API_KEY=

# ── Optional: error tracking / observability ──────────────
# The app routes every error-level log line, and anything flagged
# `alert: true`, to a provider-agnostic sink (lib/observability). When the
# PostHog token above is set, lib/init.ts registers the PostHog adapter
# (lib/analytics/posthog-observability.ts) as that sink; otherwise the sink
# stays a NO-OP, the PostHog client is never constructed and nothing is ever
# sent. (The SDK is still bundled in those builds, since the imports are
# static; it simply never initialises.) The variables below are for a
# DIFFERENT vendor adapter and still change nothing on their own.
#
# Names are generic placeholders. When a provider is picked, either keep these
# and read them in the adapter, or replace them with the vendor's own names.
# OBSERVABILITY_DSN=            # server-side ingest endpoint / key
# NEXT_PUBLIC_OBSERVABILITY_DSN=  # browser ingest endpoint / key, if used
# Any adapter reading these MUST forward only post-redaction payloads
# (lib/observability/redact.ts): see docs/security/logging-and-observability.md
# Optional overrides. Both have sensible defaults: the environment falls back
# to VERCEL_ENV then NODE_ENV, and the release falls back to
# NEXT_PUBLIC_BUILD_ID (the commit sha next.config.ts inlines at build time)
# then VERCEL_GIT_COMMIT_SHA. Set them only when tagging must differ.
# OBSERVABILITY_ENVIRONMENT=
# OBSERVABILITY_RELEASE=