Mattsson
11995b1b0c
* feat(auth): make automatic logout an opt-in per-user setting Session timeouts (30 min idle / 12 h absolute on hosted) now apply only to users who enable "Automatic logout" in Settings > Security. Default is off: sessions live for the full Supabase refresh-token lifetime, the behavior from before the 2026-07 session hardening. - user_preferences.auto_logout (migration, default false), toggled via the extended /api/user/preferences route - The opt-in is snapshotted into the signed timeout cookie at mint, so enforcement stays DB-read-free per request; the preferences route clears the cookie on change so a toggle takes effect immediately - Pre-toggle cookies are authentic-but-stale: re-minted preserving their timers, never routed down the tamper path, so the rollout does not log anyone out - NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_TIMEOUT_FORCE_ALL=true enforces timeouts for every user regardless of preference (emergency lever, also plumbed through the Docker image); self-hosted stays disabled by default Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): resolve PR #1536 review findings - Replace the spread upsert in /api/user/preferences with one literal payload per field: the phantom-column schema guard cannot resolve spread payloads (Unit tests 3/4 ceiling failure) - Map the preferences 500 through getErrorMessage so the user-facing text is Swedish (CodeRabbit) - fetchAutoLogoutPreference now returns null on a FAILED read instead of a fail-open false: callers skip minting so an unknown preference is never persisted into the year-long signed cookie, and the next request retries; failures log at error level, distinct from the normal opt-out path (compliance swarm GDPR Art.32(1)(b) / ISO A.8.5) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): write multi-field preference updates as one atomic upsert A request carrying both hide_assistant_fab and auto_logout previously issued two sequential writes, so a failure of the second returned 500 after half the request had persisted (CodeRabbit, PR #1536). One literal upsert per accepted field combination keeps the write atomic and stays resolvable for the phantom-column schema guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
108 lines
5.1 KiB
Docker
108 lines
5.1 KiB
Docker
# ── Stage 1: Base ──
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FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:968df39aedcea65eeb078fb336ed7191baf48f972b4479711397108be0966920 AS base
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# `apk upgrade` patches OS packages (e.g. libssl3/libcrypto3) that have fixes
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# published after the pinned base digest was built, so the Trivy image scan in
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# CI doesn't fail on fixable Alpine CVEs. The digest stays pinned for a
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# reproducible starting point; only security patches float on top.
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RUN apk upgrade --no-cache && apk add --no-cache libc6-compat
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# ── Stage 2: Dependencies ──
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FROM base AS deps
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WORKDIR /app
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COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
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RUN npm ci
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# ── Stage 3: Builder ──
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FROM base AS builder
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WORKDIR /app
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ARG EXTENSIONS_PRESET=self-hosted
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COPY --from=deps /app/node_modules ./node_modules
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COPY . .
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# Apply extension preset (must happen before build: prebuild hook
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# runs setup:extensions which reads extensions.config.json)
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COPY docker/extensions.${EXTENSIONS_PRESET}.json ./extensions.config.json
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# Build with placeholder sentinel values for NEXT_PUBLIC_* vars.
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# These get replaced at runtime by docker-entrypoint.sh so the image
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# is generic and reusable across different Supabase projects.
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL__
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# Realtime WebSocket origin for the CSP. Must be its own sentinel: the CSP is
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# baked into the build output, so the entrypoint cannot derive wss:// from the
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# already-substituted https URL after the fact (issue #893).
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_WS_URL=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_WS_URL__
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY__
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL=__NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL__
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY=__NEXT_PUBLIC_VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY__
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED__
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA=__NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA__
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS__
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS__
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS__
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_TIMEOUT_FORCE_ALL=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_TIMEOUT_FORCE_ALL__
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# Keep the branding placeholder intact through prebuild's inject script so
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# docker-entrypoint.sh can substitute the runtime value into public/sw.js.
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ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_BRANDING_APP_NAME=__NEXT_PUBLIC_BRANDING_APP_NAME__
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ENV NEXT_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1
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RUN npm run build
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# ── Stage 4: Runner ──
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FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:968df39aedcea65eeb078fb336ed7191baf48f972b4479711397108be0966920 AS runner
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WORKDIR /app
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# Patch OS packages (libssl3/libcrypto3, …) with fixes published after the
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# pinned base digest, so CI's Trivy scan doesn't flag fixable Alpine CVEs. No
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# su-exec or curl needed: the entrypoint runs unprivileged as nextjs and the
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# healthcheck uses BusyBox wget. The runtime runs `node server.js` and never
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# invokes npm, so we delete the base image's bundled npm CLI: its vendored deps
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# (picomatch, tar, brace-expansion, ip-address) are the packages Trivy flags on
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# this image: removing npm clears them at the source and shrinks the attack
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# surface.
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RUN apk upgrade --no-cache && \
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rm -rf /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm /usr/local/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npx
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ENV NODE_ENV=production
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ENV NEXT_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1
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RUN addgroup --system --gid 1001 nodejs && \
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adduser --system --uid 1001 -G nodejs nextjs
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# /app at runtime is split across the read-only image layer and tmpfs mounts:
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# /app/server.js, /app/node_modules/, /app/package.json : image (read-only)
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# /app/.next/ : tmpfs (writable)
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# /app/public/ : tmpfs (writable)
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# The entrypoint runs UNPRIVILEGED as nextjs: it copies the templates from
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# /opt/gnubok-template/ into the nextjs-owned tmpfs mounts, substitutes the
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# NEXT_PUBLIC_* placeholders, then drops the write bits. Because it never needs
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# to chown or setuid, the container runs under docker-compose's `cap_drop: ALL`
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# + `read_only: true` with no added capabilities.
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COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone/server.js ./server.js
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COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone/node_modules ./node_modules
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COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone/package.json ./package.json
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# Baked-in templates for runtime population of the tmpfs mounts.
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COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone/.next /opt/gnubok-template/.next
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COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/static /opt/gnubok-template/.next/static
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COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/public /opt/gnubok-template/public
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# Pre-create the tmpfs mount points (empty in the image layer; the entrypoint
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# fills them at startup). Owned by nextjs so the unprivileged entrypoint can
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# write into the tmpfs mounted over them.
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RUN mkdir -p /app/.next/cache /app/public && \
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chown nextjs:nodejs /app /app/.next /app/.next/cache /app/public
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COPY --chmod=755 --chown=nextjs:nodejs docker-entrypoint.sh ./docker-entrypoint.sh
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USER nextjs
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EXPOSE 3000
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ENV PORT=3000
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ENV HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0
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ENTRYPOINT ["./docker-entrypoint.sh"]
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CMD ["node", "server.js"]
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