Files
accounted/tests/pg/connector-proxy-ledger.pg.test.ts
f31eeaa603 feat(connect): Peppol through the connector (hosted proxy, instance transport, ownership ledger) (#2177)
* feat(connect): peppol connector foundation: capability, ledger/budget service, quota

Adds the storage + package shape for brokering Peppol through the connector with
the same one-address + rate-budget model as bank/skatteverket: a peppol
capability (connector-gated, free on hosted), peppol as a ledger + upstream
service, a conservative rate budget, and a migration extending the ledger
service CHECK and the per-key limits (peppol_connections_per_company). Proxy
route + instance-side Qvalia reroute follow. Switch-on gated on the Qvalia
brokering-terms check.

(cherry picked from commit 3cc0da6a3, migration renumbered 20260902190000)

Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat

* feat(connect): Peppol through the connector: hosted proxy, instance transport, ownership ledger

Completes the Peppol upstream for self-hosted instances on the connector
(WS3): an instance with a connector key carrying the peppol scope and no
Qvalia keys of its own sends and receives e-invoices through Arcim's
contracted access point, the same way bank and Skatteverket already route.

Hosted: app/api/connect/peppol/[...path] speaks the PeppolTransport
operations (lookup, submit, status, evidence, recipient PUT/DELETE, inbound
list/xml) rather than proxying Qvalia paths, because the Qvalia account is
shared by every hosted company and every instance: reads must be scoped to
what the caller owns, and the inbound read endpoint is destructive for the
whole account. Ownership: a receiving registration is a ledger row (service
peppol, participant id in account_uids, sha256 in handle_hash so one key
holds a participant at a time); outbound submissions land in the new
connector_peppol_submissions table and gate status/evidence; inbound
documents are served from the hosted archive filtered by the participants
the key holds. Per-company quota (peppol_connections_per_company), the
shared PEPPOL_RECEIVING_MAX_REGISTRATIONS cap, and the global peppol rate
budget apply. Provider failures cross as CONNECTOR_UPSTREAM_ERROR with the
adapter's retryable flag (422 or 502).

Instance: lib/invoices/transports/connector.ts implements PeppolTransport
over that API and registers itself in connector mode (key present, no
QVALIA_* keys); getPeppolTransportAvailability() defaults to it when no
provider is selected, so an instance needs no PEPPOL_TRANSPORT_PROVIDER.
Webhooks are not brokered; the existing outbound status poll covers it.
Hosted is byte-identical: it has its own keys, so connector mode is never on.

Docs: SELF-HOSTING.md, SOVEREIGN.md, .env.example. Switch-on for third-party
instances stays gated on the Qvalia brokering-terms check; without the scope
every operation answers 403.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(connect): authorize Peppol participants per key, harden the proxy after review

Review follow-ups on #2177. Authorization: a key may only register (and send
as) participant identifiers Arcim recorded on the key at issuance
(connector_keys.peppol_participants, migration 20260902191000) or the
licensee's own org number, and a document may only be submitted as a sender
the key has registered; X-Connector-Company stays an opaque per-company ref.
Cap: the shared access-point cap now counts fresh pending reservations and is
re-checked after this request's own reservation, so concurrent registrations
cannot both pass. Inbound: both halves of the participant id are filtered in
the archive query (over-fetched, then exact-pair checked), so foreign rows
sharing an identifier cannot consume the limit. Delete: deregistration is a
required transport capability, checked before the ledger row is revoked, and
registration refuses an access point that cannot deregister. Instance
transport: the hosted URL must be https (loopback http only, same rule as
getConnectorConfig), and the response body is read inside the timeout window
with body-read failures mapped to retryable transport errors.
issue-connector-key.ts gains --peppol-participants and
--peppol-connections-per-company. Declined: NOT VALID on the ledger CHECK
(the table is empty until keys are issued; the validated scan is instant).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(connect): bind Peppol ownership to the instance company, query exact participant pairs

Second review round on #2177. Ownership is now (key, company_ref), not key
alone: a sender must be registered under the same company header, status and
evidence reads look the submission up under the header company, DELETE and
re-registration refuse a participant the key holds for another company, so
one company on a multi-company instance cannot act on another company's
registration through the shared key. The instance transport resolves the
owning company from its own peppol_deliveries / peppol_registrations rows
before status, evidence and deregistration calls (deps.companyFor,
deps.companyForParticipant, wired in transports/index.ts). Inbound listing
stays key-wide (the instance routes documents to its own companies by its
own registrations). The archive query now runs one exact-pair query per
scheme (scheme fixed, that scheme's identifiers), so neither foreign nor
cross-pair rows can consume the limit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io>
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 20:57:57 +02:00

146 lines
7.2 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
import { getPool, withUserContext } from './setup'
import { insertAuthUser } from './fixtures'
// pg-real for migration 20260831200000: the connection ledger, the global
// upstream budget RPC, and validate v2 returning limits. Service-role-only
// exposure is asserted the same way as the base connector-keys test.
function hash(s: string): string {
return createHash('sha256').update(s).digest('hex')
}
async function insertKey(limits?: Record<string, number>): Promise<{ id: string; hash: string }> {
const key = `gnubok_ck_${randomBytes(16).toString('base64url')}`
const h = hash(key)
const { rows } = await getPool().query<{ id: string }>(
`INSERT INTO public.connector_keys (key_hash, key_prefix, org_number, scopes, status${limits ? ', limits' : ''})
VALUES ($1, $2, '5561234567', ARRAY['bank_sync','skatteverket'], 'active'${limits ? ', $3' : ''})
RETURNING id`,
limits ? [h, key.slice(0, 18), JSON.stringify(limits)] : [h, key.slice(0, 18)],
)
return { id: rows[0].id, hash: h }
}
describe('validate_and_increment_connector_key v2', () => {
it('returns the key limits (default when unset)', async () => {
const { hash: h } = await insertKey()
const { rows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT * FROM public.validate_and_increment_connector_key($1)`, [h])
expect(rows[0].limits).toEqual({ bank_connections_per_company: 1, skv_connections_per_company: 1, peppol_connections_per_company: 1, sync_min_interval_s: 0 })
})
it('returns custom limits verbatim', async () => {
const { hash: h } = await insertKey({ bank_connections_per_company: 3, skv_connections_per_company: 2, sync_min_interval_s: 1800 })
const { rows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT * FROM public.validate_and_increment_connector_key($1)`, [h])
expect(rows[0].limits).toEqual({ bank_connections_per_company: 3, skv_connections_per_company: 2, sync_min_interval_s: 1800 })
})
})
describe('connector_reserve_upstream', () => {
it('reserves under the ceiling and rejects over it, service-scoped', async () => {
const svc = `bank-${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`
const call = async () => {
const { rows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT public.connector_reserve_upstream($1, 2, 100) AS r`, [svc])
return rows[0].r as { ok: boolean; scope?: string }
}
expect((await call()).ok).toBe(true)
expect((await call()).ok).toBe(true)
const third = await call()
expect(third.ok).toBe(false)
expect(third.scope).toBe('minute')
// A different service has its own budget.
const { rows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT public.connector_reserve_upstream($1, 2, 100) AS r`, [`skv-${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`])
expect((rows[0].r as { ok: boolean }).ok).toBe(true)
})
it('is executable by service_role only', async () => {
const { rows } = await getPool().query<{ role: string; ok: boolean }>(
`SELECT r.role, has_function_privilege(r.role, 'public.connector_reserve_upstream(text,integer,integer)', 'execute') AS ok
FROM (VALUES ('anon'), ('authenticated'), ('service_role')) AS r(role)`,
)
expect(Object.fromEntries(rows.map((r) => [r.role, r.ok]))).toEqual({ anon: false, authenticated: false, service_role: true })
})
})
describe('connector_connections ledger', () => {
it('accepts peppol as a ledger service (migration 20260902190000)', async () => {
const { id: keyId } = await insertKey()
const participant = `0007:${randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}`
const { rows } = await getPool().query<{ id: string }>(
`INSERT INTO public.connector_connections (connector_key_id, service, company_ref, handle_hash, account_uids, status)
VALUES ($1, 'peppol', 'c1', $2, ARRAY[$3::text], 'active') RETURNING id`,
[keyId, hash(participant), participant],
)
expect(rows[0].id).toBeTruthy()
await expect(
getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.connector_connections (connector_key_id, service, company_ref, status) VALUES ($1, 'kivra', 'c1', 'pending')`,
[keyId],
),
).rejects.toThrow(/connector_connections_service_check|check constraint/)
})
it('enforces the handle uniqueness per service and cascades with the key', async () => {
const { id: keyId } = await insertKey()
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.connector_connections (connector_key_id, service, company_ref, handle_hash, status)
VALUES ($1, 'bank', 'c1', $2, 'active')`,
[keyId, hash('sess-1')],
)
await expect(
getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.connector_connections (connector_key_id, service, company_ref, handle_hash, status)
VALUES ($1, 'bank', 'c2', $2, 'active')`,
[keyId, hash('sess-1')],
),
).rejects.toThrow(/idx_connector_connections_handle|duplicate key/)
await getPool().query(`DELETE FROM public.connector_keys WHERE id = $1`, [keyId])
const { rows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM public.connector_connections WHERE connector_key_id = $1`, [keyId])
expect(rows[0].n).toBe(0)
})
it('is invisible to an authenticated user (service-role only)', async () => {
const { id: keyId } = await insertKey()
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.connector_connections (connector_key_id, service, company_ref, status) VALUES ($1, 'bank', 'c1', 'pending')`,
[keyId],
)
const userId = await insertAuthUser()
await withUserContext(userId, async (client) => {
const r = await client.query(`SELECT id FROM public.connector_connections`)
expect(r.rowCount).toBe(0)
})
})
})
describe('connector_peppol_submissions (migration 20260902190000)', () => {
it('is unique per provider submission, cascades with the key, and is invisible to authenticated', async () => {
const { id: keyId } = await insertKey()
const submissionId = `int-${randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}`
await getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.connector_peppol_submissions (connector_key_id, company_ref, provider_submission_id, idempotency_key)
VALUES ($1, 'c1', $2, 'idem-1')`,
[keyId, submissionId],
)
await expect(
getPool().query(
`INSERT INTO public.connector_peppol_submissions (connector_key_id, company_ref, provider_submission_id) VALUES ($1, 'c2', $2)`,
[keyId, submissionId],
),
).rejects.toThrow(/connector_peppol_submissions_provider_submission_unique|duplicate key/)
const userId = await insertAuthUser()
await withUserContext(userId, async (client) => {
const r = await client.query(`SELECT id FROM public.connector_peppol_submissions`)
expect(r.rows).toEqual([])
})
// The participant allowlist (20260902191000) defaults to empty: a fresh key may
// publish nothing beyond its own org number until Arcim records participants.
const { rows: keyRows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT peppol_participants FROM public.connector_keys WHERE id = $1`, [keyId])
expect(keyRows[0].peppol_participants).toEqual([])
await getPool().query(`DELETE FROM public.connector_keys WHERE id = $1`, [keyId])
const { rows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM public.connector_peppol_submissions WHERE connector_key_id = $1`, [keyId])
expect(rows[0].n).toBe(0)
})
})