Files
accounted/tests/pg/check-email-exists.pg.test.ts
Jakob Wennberg 2296c0cd59 fix(auth): provision invitees server-side when signups are disabled (#1404)
* fix(auth): provision invitees server-side when signups are disabled

Self-hosted installations with GoTrue disable_signup broke the invite
flow silently: invitees without an account were routed to /register,
where supabase.auth.signUp fails with "Signups not allowed for this
instance", surfaced only as a generic toast.

New server-only env flag AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED (documented in
.env.example) mirrors the GoTrue setting. When true, POST
/api/company/members/invite checks check_email_exists and, for invitees
without an account, provisions one via auth.admin.inviteUserByEmail
with a redirect back to /invite/<token>, before the Resend email and
before the invitation row is written so a provisioning failure leaves
nothing half-created and the admin can retry. The response now carries
user_provisioned alongside email_sent, and a provisioning failure
returns 502 with a Swedish message mapped through getErrorMessage
instead of a silently-successful invite.

/auth/callback now routes type=invite verifications to /reset-password
(the existing set-password surface) instead of dropping the
passwordless user on the dashboard, and preserves the invite token from
next=/invite/<token> as the pre-auth invite cookie so the existing
reset-password invite handoff accepts the membership right after the
password is saved.

getErrorMessage learns two GoTrue patterns: "Signups not allowed"
(account creation closed on this installation, contact your inviter or
administrator) so the /register dead end is explained even for flows
that bypass provisioning, and "Error sending ... email" (GoTrue SMTP
not configured) so the 502 above is actionable.

Hosted is untouched: the flag is unset there and every new code path is
gated on it.

Fixes #1335

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): restore check_email_exists RPC and harden self-host invite config

Adversarial review of #1404 found that the check_email_exists function the
invite flow depends on does not exist anywhere: it shipped in PR #229 and
was lost in the #244 migration consolidation before ever reaching prod
(verified missing on the hosted production database directly). Today
app/api/team/accept destructures only { data } from the RPC call, so
alreadyHasAccount is silently null on every deployment and the invite page
routes even existing-account invitees toward /register.

- New migration 20260804140000 restores the function exactly as originally
  shipped: SECURITY DEFINER over auth.users, EXECUTE revoked from PUBLIC,
  anon and authenticated, granted to service_role only (prevents email
  enumeration). Fixes hosted prod behavior too once applied.
- New tests/pg/check-email-exists.pg.test.ts locks in existence,
  case-insensitive matching, false-for-unknown, and the role grants.
- .env.docker.example gains the AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED block self-hosters
  actually use; both env templates now note that the GoTrue redirect URI
  allow-list must include /invite/* or the invite email redirect silently
  falls back to SITE_URL.
- Invite route test for the existsError branch: RPC failure logs a warning
  and provisioning proceeds anyway (GoTrue is authoritative).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): mask invitee email in provisioning-failure log (#1335)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 19:34:54 +02:00

92 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll } from 'vitest'
import { getPool, getClient, runAsServiceRole } from './setup'
import { insertAuthUser } from './fixtures'
/**
* Migration 20260804140000_restore_check_email_exists_rpc.sql restores
* public.check_email_exists, which shipped in PR #229 and was lost in the
* #244 migration consolidation before it ever reached prod. The invite flow
* (app/api/team/accept and app/api/company/members/invite) calls it via the
* service client to decide whether an invitee already has an account. It
* reads auth.users under SECURITY DEFINER, so execution must stay
* service-role only: exposing it to anon or authenticated would be an email
* enumeration oracle. These tests lock both the semantics and the grants in.
*/
describe('check_email_exists RPC (pg)', () => {
let seededUserId: string
let seededEmail: string
beforeAll(async () => {
seededUserId = await insertAuthUser()
// insertAuthUser stores the email as pg-real-<uuid>@test.invalid.
seededEmail = `pg-real-${seededUserId}@test.invalid`
})
it('exists in the schema (regression: lost in the #244 consolidation)', async () => {
const res = await getPool().query<{ n: number }>(
`SELECT count(*)::int AS n
FROM pg_proc p
JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace
WHERE n.nspname = 'public' AND p.proname = 'check_email_exists'`,
)
expect(res.rows[0]!.n).toBe(1)
})
it('returns true for an existing auth user', async () => {
const res = await getPool().query<{ found: boolean }>(
`SELECT public.check_email_exists($1) AS found`,
[seededEmail],
)
expect(res.rows[0]!.found).toBe(true)
})
it('matches case-insensitively on both sides', async () => {
const res = await getPool().query<{ found: boolean }>(
`SELECT public.check_email_exists($1) AS found`,
[seededEmail.toUpperCase()],
)
expect(res.rows[0]!.found).toBe(true)
})
it('returns false for an unknown email', async () => {
const res = await getPool().query<{ found: boolean }>(
`SELECT public.check_email_exists($1) AS found`,
['nobody-here@test.invalid'],
)
expect(res.rows[0]!.found).toBe(false)
})
async function expectExecutionDenied(role: 'anon' | 'authenticated') {
const client = await getClient()
try {
await client.query('BEGIN')
await client.query(`SET LOCAL ROLE ${role}`)
await expect(
client.query(`SELECT public.check_email_exists('probe@test.invalid')`),
).rejects.toThrow(/permission denied/i)
} finally {
await client.query('ROLLBACK').catch(() => {})
client.release()
}
}
it('denies execution to the anon role', async () => {
await expectExecutionDenied('anon')
})
it('denies execution to the authenticated role', async () => {
await expectExecutionDenied('authenticated')
})
it('allows execution to the service_role role', async () => {
const found = await runAsServiceRole(async (client) => {
const res = await client.query<{ found: boolean }>(
`SELECT public.check_email_exists($1) AS found`,
[seededEmail],
)
return res.rows[0]!.found
})
expect(found).toBe(true)
})
})