2296c0cd59
* fix(auth): provision invitees server-side when signups are disabled Self-hosted installations with GoTrue disable_signup broke the invite flow silently: invitees without an account were routed to /register, where supabase.auth.signUp fails with "Signups not allowed for this instance", surfaced only as a generic toast. New server-only env flag AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED (documented in .env.example) mirrors the GoTrue setting. When true, POST /api/company/members/invite checks check_email_exists and, for invitees without an account, provisions one via auth.admin.inviteUserByEmail with a redirect back to /invite/<token>, before the Resend email and before the invitation row is written so a provisioning failure leaves nothing half-created and the admin can retry. The response now carries user_provisioned alongside email_sent, and a provisioning failure returns 502 with a Swedish message mapped through getErrorMessage instead of a silently-successful invite. /auth/callback now routes type=invite verifications to /reset-password (the existing set-password surface) instead of dropping the passwordless user on the dashboard, and preserves the invite token from next=/invite/<token> as the pre-auth invite cookie so the existing reset-password invite handoff accepts the membership right after the password is saved. getErrorMessage learns two GoTrue patterns: "Signups not allowed" (account creation closed on this installation, contact your inviter or administrator) so the /register dead end is explained even for flows that bypass provisioning, and "Error sending ... email" (GoTrue SMTP not configured) so the 502 above is actionable. Hosted is untouched: the flag is unset there and every new code path is gated on it. Fixes #1335 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): restore check_email_exists RPC and harden self-host invite config Adversarial review of #1404 found that the check_email_exists function the invite flow depends on does not exist anywhere: it shipped in PR #229 and was lost in the #244 migration consolidation before ever reaching prod (verified missing on the hosted production database directly). Today app/api/team/accept destructures only { data } from the RPC call, so alreadyHasAccount is silently null on every deployment and the invite page routes even existing-account invitees toward /register. - New migration 20260804140000 restores the function exactly as originally shipped: SECURITY DEFINER over auth.users, EXECUTE revoked from PUBLIC, anon and authenticated, granted to service_role only (prevents email enumeration). Fixes hosted prod behavior too once applied. - New tests/pg/check-email-exists.pg.test.ts locks in existence, case-insensitive matching, false-for-unknown, and the role grants. - .env.docker.example gains the AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED block self-hosters actually use; both env templates now note that the GoTrue redirect URI allow-list must include /invite/* or the invite email redirect silently falls back to SITE_URL. - Invite route test for the existsError branch: RPC failure logs a warning and provisioning proceeds anyway (GoTrue is authoritative). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): mask invitee email in provisioning-failure log (#1335) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
92 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
92 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll } from 'vitest'
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import { getPool, getClient, runAsServiceRole } from './setup'
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import { insertAuthUser } from './fixtures'
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/**
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* Migration 20260804140000_restore_check_email_exists_rpc.sql restores
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* public.check_email_exists, which shipped in PR #229 and was lost in the
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* #244 migration consolidation before it ever reached prod. The invite flow
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* (app/api/team/accept and app/api/company/members/invite) calls it via the
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* service client to decide whether an invitee already has an account. It
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* reads auth.users under SECURITY DEFINER, so execution must stay
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* service-role only: exposing it to anon or authenticated would be an email
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* enumeration oracle. These tests lock both the semantics and the grants in.
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*/
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describe('check_email_exists RPC (pg)', () => {
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let seededUserId: string
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let seededEmail: string
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beforeAll(async () => {
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seededUserId = await insertAuthUser()
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// insertAuthUser stores the email as pg-real-<uuid>@test.invalid.
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seededEmail = `pg-real-${seededUserId}@test.invalid`
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})
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it('exists in the schema (regression: lost in the #244 consolidation)', async () => {
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const res = await getPool().query<{ n: number }>(
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`SELECT count(*)::int AS n
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FROM pg_proc p
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JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace
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WHERE n.nspname = 'public' AND p.proname = 'check_email_exists'`,
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)
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expect(res.rows[0]!.n).toBe(1)
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})
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it('returns true for an existing auth user', async () => {
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const res = await getPool().query<{ found: boolean }>(
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`SELECT public.check_email_exists($1) AS found`,
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[seededEmail],
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)
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expect(res.rows[0]!.found).toBe(true)
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})
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it('matches case-insensitively on both sides', async () => {
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const res = await getPool().query<{ found: boolean }>(
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`SELECT public.check_email_exists($1) AS found`,
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[seededEmail.toUpperCase()],
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)
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expect(res.rows[0]!.found).toBe(true)
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})
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it('returns false for an unknown email', async () => {
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const res = await getPool().query<{ found: boolean }>(
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`SELECT public.check_email_exists($1) AS found`,
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['nobody-here@test.invalid'],
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)
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expect(res.rows[0]!.found).toBe(false)
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})
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async function expectExecutionDenied(role: 'anon' | 'authenticated') {
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const client = await getClient()
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try {
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await client.query('BEGIN')
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await client.query(`SET LOCAL ROLE ${role}`)
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await expect(
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client.query(`SELECT public.check_email_exists('probe@test.invalid')`),
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).rejects.toThrow(/permission denied/i)
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} finally {
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await client.query('ROLLBACK').catch(() => {})
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client.release()
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}
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}
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it('denies execution to the anon role', async () => {
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await expectExecutionDenied('anon')
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})
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it('denies execution to the authenticated role', async () => {
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await expectExecutionDenied('authenticated')
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})
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it('allows execution to the service_role role', async () => {
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const found = await runAsServiceRole(async (client) => {
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const res = await client.query<{ found: boolean }>(
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`SELECT public.check_email_exists($1) AS found`,
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[seededEmail],
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)
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return res.rows[0]!.found
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})
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expect(found).toBe(true)
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})
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})
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