358c25094d
* fix(security): tenant guard on the GL-line read RPCs (PR #624 follow-up) get_unlinked_gl_lines and get_account_gl_lines_for_matching are SECURITY DEFINER and EXECUTE-able by anon/authenticated, so any authenticated (or anonymous) caller could invoke them directly over /rest/v1/rpc with another company's id and read its general-ledger lines — a cross-tenant read that bypasses the API routes' requireCompanyId() guard. Confirmed against the DB: anon and authenticated both hold EXECUTE, and SECURITY DEFINER sidesteps RLS. Add an in-function guard constraining anon/authenticated callers to their own companies (the same boundary user_company_ids()/RLS enforces). Trusted callers are untouched — service_role (the enable-banking reconciliation cron) and direct / superuser access (migrations, the pg-real harness) are not anon/authenticated, so the predicate is a no-op and behaviour is unchanged. A foreign company id now yields zero rows, not data. Scope: hardens the two READ RPCs that expose ledger data. The remaining company-scoped SECURITY DEFINER RPCs are writes / sequence generators with their own internal authorization; a broader audit of that set is tracked separately. pg-real coverage: a company-B member probing company A gets zero rows from both RPCs, while a company-A member and direct/superuser access still see the data. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): revoke EXECUTE from PUBLIC/anon on the GL-line read RPCs Defense-in-depth follow-up to the tenant guard. The guard already returns zero rows to an anon/authenticated caller probing another company; this additionally strips the EXECUTE privilege so an unauthenticated (anon) caller cannot invoke the financial-ledger RPCs at all. Supabase grants EXECUTE to PUBLIC as well as to anon, and anon is a member of PUBLIC — revoking only anon is insufficient, so revoke both, then keep the two legitimate callers: authenticated (the API routes call via the user's session; the in-function guard scopes them to their own companies) and service_role (the enable-banking reconciliation cron). Verified on the DB: anon EXECUTE = false, authenticated/service_role = true. Adds an anon-role pg test asserting the call is rejected at the privilege layer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): read JWT role from claims object in the GL-line RPC guard The 20260611120000 guard used auth.role() to detect the caller's role, but auth.role() reads the individual request.jwt.claim.role GUC first and only some installs fall back to the claims object. PostgREST sets the claims OBJECT (the individual claim.* GUCs are deprecated), and the pg-real harness sets request.jwt.claims (+ claim.sub for auth.uid()) but NOT claim.role — so on an auth.role() without the object fallback it returns NULL and the guard's NOT IN ('anon','authenticated') branch was TRUE, skipping the membership check. A pg-real test caught it: an authenticated non-member could still read another company's GL lines (the guard failed open in that environment). Read the role straight from request.jwt.claims (exactly what auth.role() itself falls back to), so the guard enforces in every environment regardless of which JWT-claim GUCs are populated. Verified on the DB: an authenticated non-member evaluates both guard branches false → row excluded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
154 lines
5.4 KiB
PL/PgSQL
154 lines
5.4 KiB
PL/PgSQL
-- Migration: make the GL-line read-RPC tenant guard read the role from the JWT
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-- claims object directly, instead of via auth.role().
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--
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-- 20260611120000 used `auth.role()` to detect the caller's role. auth.role()
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-- reads the individual `request.jwt.claim.role` GUC first and only falls back to
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-- the `request.jwt.claims` object on installs whose auth.role() carries that
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-- fallback. PostgREST sets the claims OBJECT (the individual claim.* GUCs are
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-- deprecated), and the pg-real test harness sets `request.jwt.claims` (+ an
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-- individual `request.jwt.claim.sub` for auth.uid()) but NOT `request.jwt.claim.role`.
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-- On an auth.role() without the object fallback that yields NULL, so the guard's
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-- `NOT IN ('anon','authenticated')` branch was TRUE and the membership check was
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-- skipped — i.e. the guard failed OPEN (caught by a pg-real test: an
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-- authenticated non-member could still read another company's lines).
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--
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-- Reading `current_setting('request.jwt.claims', true)::jsonb ->> 'role'`
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-- directly is what auth.role() itself falls back to, and depends only on the
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-- claims object that both PostgREST and the harness reliably set — so the guard
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-- enforces correctly in every environment. Behaviour is otherwise identical:
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-- service_role and direct/superuser (no claims → NULL → '') still bypass; anon
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-- and authenticated are constrained to their own companies.
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.get_unlinked_gl_lines(
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p_company_id UUID,
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p_account_number TEXT DEFAULT '1930',
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p_date_from DATE DEFAULT NULL,
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p_date_to DATE DEFAULT NULL
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)
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RETURNS TABLE (
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line_id UUID,
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journal_entry_id UUID,
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debit_amount NUMERIC,
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credit_amount NUMERIC,
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line_description TEXT,
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entry_date DATE,
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voucher_number INT,
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voucher_series TEXT,
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entry_description TEXT,
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source_type TEXT
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)
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LANGUAGE sql
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STABLE
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SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = public
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AS $$
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SELECT
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jel.id AS line_id,
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je.id AS journal_entry_id,
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jel.debit_amount,
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jel.credit_amount,
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jel.line_description,
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je.entry_date,
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je.voucher_number,
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je.voucher_series,
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je.description AS entry_description,
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je.source_type
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FROM public.journal_entry_lines jel
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JOIN public.journal_entries je ON je.id = jel.journal_entry_id
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WHERE jel.account_number = p_account_number
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AND je.company_id = p_company_id
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AND je.status = 'posted'
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AND je.source_type IS DISTINCT FROM 'opening_balance'
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AND je.source_type IS DISTINCT FROM 'storno'
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AND je.source_type IS DISTINCT FROM 'correction'
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AND (p_date_from IS NULL OR je.entry_date >= p_date_from)
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AND (p_date_to IS NULL OR je.entry_date <= p_date_to)
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AND NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1
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FROM public.transactions t
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WHERE t.journal_entry_id = je.id
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AND t.company_id = p_company_id
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)
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-- Tenant guard: anon/authenticated may only read their own companies;
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-- service_role and direct/superuser access (no JWT role) bypass.
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AND (
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coalesce(nullif(current_setting('request.jwt.claims', true), '')::jsonb ->> 'role', '')
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NOT IN ('anon', 'authenticated')
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OR je.company_id IN (SELECT public.user_company_ids())
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)
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ORDER BY je.entry_date, je.voucher_number;
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$$;
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.get_account_gl_lines_for_matching(
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p_company_id UUID,
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p_account_number TEXT DEFAULT '1930',
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p_date_from DATE DEFAULT NULL,
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p_date_to DATE DEFAULT NULL,
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p_include_matched BOOLEAN DEFAULT false
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)
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RETURNS TABLE (
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line_id UUID,
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journal_entry_id UUID,
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debit_amount NUMERIC,
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credit_amount NUMERIC,
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line_description TEXT,
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entry_date DATE,
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voucher_number INT,
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voucher_series TEXT,
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entry_description TEXT,
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source_type TEXT,
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linked_transaction_count INT
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)
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LANGUAGE sql
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STABLE
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SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = public
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AS $$
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SELECT
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jel.id AS line_id,
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je.id AS journal_entry_id,
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jel.debit_amount,
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jel.credit_amount,
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jel.line_description,
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je.entry_date,
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je.voucher_number,
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je.voucher_series,
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je.description AS entry_description,
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je.source_type,
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(
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SELECT count(*)
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FROM public.transactions t
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WHERE t.journal_entry_id = je.id
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AND t.company_id = p_company_id
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)::int AS linked_transaction_count
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FROM public.journal_entry_lines jel
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JOIN public.journal_entries je ON je.id = jel.journal_entry_id
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WHERE jel.account_number = p_account_number
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AND je.company_id = p_company_id
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AND je.status = 'posted'
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AND je.source_type IS DISTINCT FROM 'opening_balance'
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AND je.source_type IS DISTINCT FROM 'storno'
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AND je.source_type IS DISTINCT FROM 'correction'
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AND (p_date_from IS NULL OR je.entry_date >= p_date_from)
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AND (p_date_to IS NULL OR je.entry_date <= p_date_to)
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AND (
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p_include_matched
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OR NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1
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FROM public.transactions t
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WHERE t.journal_entry_id = je.id
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AND t.company_id = p_company_id
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)
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)
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-- Tenant guard: anon/authenticated may only read their own companies;
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-- service_role and direct/superuser access (no JWT role) bypass.
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AND (
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coalesce(nullif(current_setting('request.jwt.claims', true), '')::jsonb ->> 'role', '')
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NOT IN ('anon', 'authenticated')
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OR je.company_id IN (SELECT public.user_company_ids())
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)
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ORDER BY je.entry_date, je.voucher_number;
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$$;
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NOTIFY pgrst, 'reload schema';
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