Files
accounted/lib/auth/session-timeout.ts
Mattsson 11995b1b0c feat(auth): make automatic logout an opt-in per-user setting (#1536)
* feat(auth): make automatic logout an opt-in per-user setting

Session timeouts (30 min idle / 12 h absolute on hosted) now apply only
to users who enable "Automatic logout" in Settings > Security. Default
is off: sessions live for the full Supabase refresh-token lifetime, the
behavior from before the 2026-07 session hardening.

- user_preferences.auto_logout (migration, default false), toggled via
  the extended /api/user/preferences route
- The opt-in is snapshotted into the signed timeout cookie at mint, so
  enforcement stays DB-read-free per request; the preferences route
  clears the cookie on change so a toggle takes effect immediately
- Pre-toggle cookies are authentic-but-stale: re-minted preserving
  their timers, never routed down the tamper path, so the rollout does
  not log anyone out
- NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_TIMEOUT_FORCE_ALL=true enforces timeouts for
  every user regardless of preference (emergency lever, also plumbed
  through the Docker image); self-hosted stays disabled by default

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): resolve PR #1536 review findings

- Replace the spread upsert in /api/user/preferences with one literal
  payload per field: the phantom-column schema guard cannot resolve
  spread payloads (Unit tests 3/4 ceiling failure)
- Map the preferences 500 through getErrorMessage so the user-facing
  text is Swedish (CodeRabbit)
- fetchAutoLogoutPreference now returns null on a FAILED read instead
  of a fail-open false: callers skip minting so an unknown preference
  is never persisted into the year-long signed cookie, and the next
  request retries; failures log at error level, distinct from the
  normal opt-out path (compliance swarm GDPR Art.32(1)(b) / ISO A.8.5)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): write multi-field preference updates as one atomic upsert

A request carrying both hide_assistant_fab and auto_logout previously
issued two sequential writes, so a failure of the second returned 500
after half the request had persisted (CodeRabbit, PR #1536). One
literal upsert per accepted field combination keeps the write atomic
and stays resolvable for the phantom-column schema guard.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 16:45:41 +02:00

405 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript

import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
import {
SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE,
type SessionAuthMethod,
type SessionTimeoutClientState,
type SessionTimeoutReason,
} from './session-timeout-shared'
const DEFAULT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000
const DEFAULT_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS = 12 * 60 * 60 * 1000
const DEFAULT_WARNING_MS = 2 * 60 * 1000
const COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60
const SIGNING_CONTEXT = 'accounted-session-timeout-v1:'
export interface SessionTimeoutConfig {
enabled: boolean
idleTimeoutMs: number
absoluteTimeoutMs: number
warningMs: number
// Ignore the per-user auto_logout opt-in and enforce timeouts for every
// cookie session (emergency lever / strict self-hosted deployments).
enforceForAll: boolean
}
export interface SessionTimeoutState {
version: 1
userId: string
sessionId: string | null
startedAt: number
lastActivityAt: number
method: SessionAuthMethod
// Snapshot of user_preferences.auto_logout taken when the state was minted.
// Absent on cookies minted before the opt-in toggle existed: those must be
// re-minted (reading the preference), never treated as tampered.
autoLogout?: boolean
}
type Environment = Record<string, string | undefined>
function parseDuration(value: string | undefined, fallback: number): number {
if (value === undefined || value.trim() === '') return fallback
const parsed = Number(value)
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) || parsed < 0) return fallback
return parsed
}
export function getSessionTimeoutConfig(
env: Environment = process.env,
): SessionTimeoutConfig {
const defaultTimeout = env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED === 'true' ? 0 : undefined
const idleTimeoutMs = parseDuration(
env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS,
defaultTimeout ?? DEFAULT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
const absoluteTimeoutMs = parseDuration(
env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS,
defaultTimeout ?? DEFAULT_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
const configuredWarningMs = parseDuration(
env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS,
DEFAULT_WARNING_MS,
)
const enabledTimeouts = [idleTimeoutMs, absoluteTimeoutMs]
.filter((timeout) => timeout > 0)
const warningMs = enabledTimeouts.length > 0
? Math.min(configuredWarningMs, ...enabledTimeouts)
: 0
return {
enabled: idleTimeoutMs > 0 || absoluteTimeoutMs > 0,
idleTimeoutMs,
absoluteTimeoutMs,
warningMs,
enforceForAll: env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_TIMEOUT_FORCE_ALL === 'true',
}
}
export function createSessionTimeoutState(args: {
userId: string
sessionId: string | null
method: SessionAuthMethod
autoLogout: boolean
now?: number
}): SessionTimeoutState {
const now = args.now ?? Date.now()
return {
version: 1,
userId: args.userId,
sessionId: args.sessionId,
startedAt: now,
lastActivityAt: now,
method: args.method,
autoLogout: args.autoLogout,
}
}
/**
* Whether timeouts actually apply to this session. Auto logout is opt-in
* per user (founder decision 2026-08-12): without the opt-in snapshot, or
* the global force-all override, a session lives as long as the Supabase
* refresh token.
*/
export function sessionTimeoutEnforced(
state: SessionTimeoutState,
config: SessionTimeoutConfig,
): boolean {
return config.enabled && (state.autoLogout === true || config.enforceForAll)
}
/**
* Read the user's auto_logout opt-in. A missing row is a definitive false
* (never opted in); a FAILED read returns null, deliberately distinct from
* the opt-out path: callers must not persist a snapshot for an unknown
* preference (which would silently disable the control for an opted-in
* user for the cookie's lifetime) and instead skip minting so the next
* request retries the read. Sessions that already carry a snapshot are
* unaffected: enforcement keeps running off the signed cookie.
*/
export async function fetchAutoLogoutPreference(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
userId: string,
): Promise<boolean | null> {
try {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('user_preferences')
.select('auto_logout')
.eq('user_id', userId)
.maybeSingle()
if (error) {
console.error(
'[session-timeout] auto_logout preference read FAILED; enforcement undetermined for this request',
error,
)
return null
}
return data?.auto_logout === true
} catch (error) {
console.error(
'[session-timeout] auto_logout preference read FAILED; enforcement undetermined for this request',
error,
)
return null
}
}
export function evaluateSessionTimeout(
state: SessionTimeoutState,
config: SessionTimeoutConfig,
now = Date.now(),
): SessionTimeoutReason | null {
if (!sessionTimeoutEnforced(state, config)) return null
if (
config.absoluteTimeoutMs > 0 &&
now - state.startedAt >= config.absoluteTimeoutMs
) {
return 'absolute'
}
if (
config.idleTimeoutMs > 0 &&
now - state.lastActivityAt >= config.idleTimeoutMs
) {
return 'idle'
}
return null
}
function getSigningSecret(env: Environment): string {
const dedicated = env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET?.trim()
if (dedicated) return dedicated
const serviceRole = env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY?.trim()
if (serviceRole) return serviceRole
throw new Error(
'Session timeout enforcement requires SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET or SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY',
)
}
function bytesToBase64Url(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
let binary = ''
for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte)
return btoa(binary)
.replaceAll('+', '-')
.replaceAll('/', '_')
.replace(/=+$/u, '')
}
function base64UrlToBytes(value: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> | null {
try {
const base64 = value.replaceAll('-', '+').replaceAll('_', '/')
const padded = base64.padEnd(Math.ceil(base64.length / 4) * 4, '=')
const binary = atob(padded)
const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length)
for (let index = 0; index < binary.length; index += 1) {
bytes[index] = binary.charCodeAt(index)
}
return bytes
} catch {
return null
}
}
function encodePayload(state: SessionTimeoutState): string {
return bytesToBase64Url(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(state)))
}
function decodePayload(payload: string): unknown {
const bytes = base64UrlToBytes(payload)
if (!bytes) return null
try {
return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(bytes))
} catch {
return null
}
}
function isValidState(value: unknown): value is SessionTimeoutState {
if (!value || typeof value !== 'object') return false
const state = value as Partial<SessionTimeoutState>
return (
state.version === 1 &&
typeof state.userId === 'string' &&
state.userId.length > 0 &&
(state.sessionId === null || typeof state.sessionId === 'string') &&
Number.isSafeInteger(state.startedAt) &&
Number.isSafeInteger(state.lastActivityAt) &&
(state.method === 'password' || state.method === 'bankid') &&
// Absent on pre-toggle cookies: valid, but callers re-mint (see
// sessionStateNeedsRemint) instead of treating the cookie as forged.
(state.autoLogout === undefined || typeof state.autoLogout === 'boolean') &&
(state.startedAt as number) > 0 &&
(state.lastActivityAt as number) >= (state.startedAt as number)
)
}
async function importSigningKey(secret: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {
// The signing key is HKDF-derived with a purpose-bound info string, never
// the raw secret: the SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY fallback must not use the
// privileged credential itself as an HMAC key.
const baseKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw',
new TextEncoder().encode(secret),
'HKDF',
false,
['deriveKey'],
)
return crypto.subtle.deriveKey(
{
name: 'HKDF',
hash: 'SHA-256',
salt: new Uint8Array(32),
info: new TextEncoder().encode(SIGNING_CONTEXT),
},
baseKey,
{ name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256', length: 256 },
false,
['sign', 'verify'],
)
}
export async function signSessionTimeoutState(
state: SessionTimeoutState,
env: Environment = process.env,
): Promise<string | null> {
// A missing signing secret must degrade the timeout feature, never crash
// authenticated requests: verifySessionTimeoutState already returns null in
// the same misconfiguration, so returning null here keeps both halves of
// the feature consistently disabled.
try {
const payload = encodePayload(state)
const key = await importSigningKey(getSigningSecret(env))
const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign(
'HMAC',
key,
new TextEncoder().encode(`${SIGNING_CONTEXT}${payload}`),
)
return `${payload}.${bytesToBase64Url(new Uint8Array(signature))}`
} catch (error) {
console.error(
'[session-timeout] signing failed; timeout state not persisted',
error,
)
return null
}
}
export async function verifySessionTimeoutState(
value: string | undefined,
env: Environment = process.env,
): Promise<SessionTimeoutState | null> {
if (!value) return null
const [payload, signature, extra] = value.split('.')
if (!payload || !signature || extra !== undefined) return null
const signatureBytes = base64UrlToBytes(signature)
if (!signatureBytes) return null
try {
const key = await importSigningKey(getSigningSecret(env))
const valid = await crypto.subtle.verify(
'HMAC',
key,
signatureBytes,
new TextEncoder().encode(`${SIGNING_CONTEXT}${payload}`),
)
if (!valid) return null
} catch {
return null
}
const state = decodePayload(payload)
return isValidState(state) ? state : null
}
interface SessionTimeoutCookieOptions {
path: '/'
httpOnly: true
secure: boolean
sameSite: 'lax'
maxAge: number
}
export function sessionTimeoutCookieOptions(): SessionTimeoutCookieOptions {
return {
path: '/',
httpOnly: true,
secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
sameSite: 'lax',
maxAge: COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
}
}
export function sessionTimeoutClearCookieOptions(): SessionTimeoutCookieOptions {
return {
...sessionTimeoutCookieOptions(),
maxAge: 0,
}
}
export function toSessionTimeoutClientState(
state: SessionTimeoutState,
config: SessionTimeoutConfig,
serverNow = Date.now(),
): SessionTimeoutClientState {
return {
enabled: sessionTimeoutEnforced(state, config),
idleTimeoutMs: config.idleTimeoutMs,
absoluteTimeoutMs: config.absoluteTimeoutMs,
warningMs: config.warningMs,
serverNow,
startedAt: state.startedAt,
lastActivityAt: state.lastActivityAt,
method: state.method,
}
}
export function sessionStateMatchesUser(
state: SessionTimeoutState,
userId: string,
sessionId: string | null,
): boolean {
if (state.userId !== userId) return false
if (state.sessionId === null) return true
// The state is bound to a specific Supabase session. If the current session
// id cannot be resolved it is unknown, not a wildcard: report a mismatch so
// the caller mints a fresh state instead of accepting another session's.
if (sessionId === null) return false
return state.sessionId === sessionId
}
/**
* Pre-toggle cookies carry no auto_logout snapshot. They are authentic, so
* they must not hit the tampering path; callers re-mint them, reading the
* preference, so every live cookie converges on the v-with-snapshot shape.
*/
export function sessionStateNeedsRemint(state: SessionTimeoutState): boolean {
return state.autoLogout === undefined
}
export function apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout(
pathname: string,
hasAuthorizationHeader: boolean,
): boolean {
if (
pathname === '/api/health' ||
pathname === '/api/log' ||
pathname.startsWith('/api/mcp-oauth/')
) {
return true
}
return hasAuthorizationHeader && (
pathname.startsWith('/api/v1/') ||
pathname.startsWith('/api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp')
)
}
export { SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE }