c0ecf2fa3bebd46bdfd0169efd73b89653d1dfed
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Jakob Wennberg
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749f90fe62 |
feat(inbox): direct-to-storage upload for files over the hosted body limit (#1551) (#2030)
Hosted uploads larger than the 4 MB multipart ceiling (Vercel's 4.5 MB request-body cap) now go POST /upload/create (signed PUT URL, rate-limited) -> PUT to the raw Storage URL -> POST /upload/complete (server-side magic-byte and size validation, sha256, WORM move, idempotent), reusing the #1378 pending-upload primitives. uploadAndExtract is split into uploadDocument + processArchivedDocument so both paths share the inbox pipeline. Dokumentinkorgen and the supplier-invoice form use the new path only above the threshold; files that fit keep the multipart route. Cap stays at 10 MB (the issue asks for 20 MB: founder call). Refs #1551 |
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bjornbergenheim
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f101bde6a8 |
fix(selfhost): stop NEXT_PUBLIC_* flags being constant-folded out of the Docker build (#1656)
The image is built once with sentinel values
(ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED__) that
docker-entrypoint.sh seds into .next at container start. Comparing a flag in
place defeats that: the bundler inlines the sentinel, the minifier folds
"__NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED__" === 'true' to false and eliminates the branch, so
both the variable name and the sentinel disappear and sed has nothing left to
replace. The flag is then permanently false whatever the operator configures.
Diagnosed against a running self-hosted instance: the compiled gate read
function r(){return"true"!==process.env.FORCE_PAYWALL
&&"true"===process.env.DISABLE_PAYWALL}
with the isSelfHosted() branch gone. The un-prefixed FORCE_PAYWALL /
DISABLE_PAYWALL survived precisely because they are never inlined, and
NODE_ENV === 'development' was folded away by the same mechanism. The one
place the flag still worked, getSessionTimeoutConfig(env = process.env), reads
it off a parameter the bundler cannot fold.
Consequence: every Docker self-host ran with the entitlement paywall live, so
ai, bank_sync, skatteverket and email_send went dark 30 days after company
creation when the seeded trial grants expired. Nothing surfaced it, because
dev and the Vercel build both have real env values and never reproduce it.
Analytics, forced MFA, BankID and the hosted upload ceiling read the same flag
and were wrong in the same direction.
Flags are now read as values through lib/env/public-flags, which keeps the
sentinel in the output as a live string literal and defers the comparison to
runtime. flagEnabled uses a Set lookup rather than ===, which a minifier could
fold if it ever inlined the helper.
Guarded twice, because the source fix alone would not have caught this:
- check:guards folded-public-flag fails any in-place NEXT_PUBLIC_* comparison
(AST, no baseline, verified to fire on a probe file);
- docker-publish asserts the sentinels survive the built image, which is the
only artifact where the failure is observable.
npm test 14999 passed, npm run lint 0 errors, npm run check:guards clean.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Bergenheim <29535152+bjornbergenheim@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
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Jakob Wennberg
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38a890c8d1 |
fix(underlag): carry the phone photo that is too big to send, and say why when we cannot (#1550)
* fix(whatsapp-inbox): register the channel question event types Every follow-up question the WhatsApp intake asks has been failing its processing_history append in production: ChannelQuestionAsked, ChannelQuestionAnswered and ChannelQuestionExpired were never added to the processing_event_types catalog the event_type FK points at. appendQuestionHistory() catches and logs that failure by design, so the reply to the sender still goes out and nothing looked broken from the outside. What was lost is the durable record of the exchange, which is part of how the underlag was obtained (BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8). Catalog rows only: aggregate_type 'System' already passes the CHECK. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(underlag): say why an upload failed, and get out of an expired session A user reported that none of the three ways to add a receipt from a phone worked, all of them answering "Uppladdning misslyckades. Nagot gick fel, forsok igen" immediately. Production told us nothing: every upload request that reached the route in the same 24 hours returned 200. Both halves of that are the same bug. The workspace read failures as `throw new Error(json.error)`, which loses a body that is not JSON (the res.json() call throws first) and stringifies the structured envelope to "[object Object]", so anything the route did not answer with a plain string arrived as the generic fallback. The middleware 401 for an expired cookie session is exactly that envelope shape, and a phone tab left open is exactly where the session expires unnoticed: the controller's timers are throttled in the background, so the request the user just made is what finds out. Now the response is resolved where it fails, through the house helper that already knows the status map, and an expired session is announced on the session-timeout BroadcastChannel so the controller signs out and routes to /login the same way it does for an expired heartbeat. Failed uploads also post metadata (status, size, mime type, resolved reason) to /api/log, the one API path exempt from the timeout gate, so a request answered before the route runs stops being invisible. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(underlag): carry the phone photo that is too big to send The reported failure was not the account and not the session: hosted rejects any request body over 4.5 MB itself, before the function runs. Measured against production, 4.4 MB reaches the route and 4.6 MB comes back as a plain-text FUNCTION_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE. Nothing invokes the function, so nothing lands in the logs, which is why one user's failing uploads were invisible while every upload that arrived returned 200. An iPhone photo in "Most Compatible" mode is 4-12 MB, so whether it worked depended on whose phone took the picture. Meanwhile the route advertises a 10 MB limit it can never be handed. Photos are now re-encoded in the browser when they exceed what the platform will carry: 2400px on the long edge at JPEG q0.85, stepping the quality down only if that is not enough. That keeps the small print on a receipt legible, which is what BFL 7 kap asks of an archived underlag ("varaktigt läsbart skick", a faithful reproduction), and a refusal is not. What cannot be shrunk (a PDF, or HEIC where the browser will not decode it) is refused before the upload starts, naming its actual size and the limit rather than failing in transit. 413 joins the HTTP status map so a rejection we cannot pre-empt still says what happened: the platform's body is plain text, so the status is the only thing there is to translate. Self-hosted Docker has no proxy in front of the app, so none of this applies there and the route's own MAX_FILE_SIZE keeps governing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |