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Author SHA1 Message Date
Jakob Wennberg 18cbc4c30a fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155) 
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables

Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items.

- api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could
  forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they
  belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the
  identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs.
- rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become
  service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash
  readable by co-members was a bearer credential.
- validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no
  longer a member of the key's company.
- provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed
  to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent
  team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role
  only, matching every existing code path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database

Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer.

- One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the
  read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through
  the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role
  claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and
  trigger cascades.
- company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions;
  invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition
  guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and
  archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership.
- Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert
  posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with
  a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the
  definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes
  still pass.
- create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths;
  validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE;
  match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance
  RPCs become service_role only; the production-only
  seed_asset_categories is dropped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time

prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker
and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the
registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths

The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership
but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer
holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the
API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY
for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin

Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy
served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy
forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender,
could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se.

- inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images)
  served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP.
- storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB
  mime for the key is on the allow-list.
- document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type.
- logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG

Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a
scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there.
The upload pickers stop advertising SVG.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user

The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a
victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank
account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company.
requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who
started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL
preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter

WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with
plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the
invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All
three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard,
https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the
stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted
but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and
exports isRateLimiterConfigured().

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie

getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel
from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token
cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look
like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in
requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or
listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed
on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user

The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever
consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the
flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed
their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the
initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that
session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org
number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket
callbacks enforce the same initiator check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity

Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address
the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could
pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the
account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed,
the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000),
bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and
BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation
re-sent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes

A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page
named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link
handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered
URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a
company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host;
non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped
by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log

- register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID
  signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp.
- BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation.
- WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy.
- Logo help text no longer advertises SVG.
- DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts

Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down
by the one legacy error the change removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 11:38:30 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 4ac7b45c8a perf(layout): dashboard layout in two waves, nav flags as one RPC, local JWT verification (#1946) 
The dashboard layout runs on every hard load, hard refresh, company switch
and the 16 router.refresh() sites, and loading.tsx cannot paint until it
resolves. It cost ~20 network calls in 4 sequential waves: a third
getUser() round trip to Supabase Auth (after the proxy's and the route
guard's), the company resolution, then 16 reads including four limit-1
probes whose only job is to decide whether to render the Webshop and
Körjournal nav rows, and an entitlements read that itself ran two waves.

- lib/auth/claims.ts: claimsPinned/userFromClaims extracted from
  require-auth.ts (unchanged) so the dashboard request context shares the
  exact pinning + mapping. getDashboardAuthContext verifies the JWT locally
  and falls back to getUser() only when claims are missing, unpinned or
  unverifiable: the proxy already performed the per-request revocation
  check before the layout runs (same semantics approved for routes on
  2026-07-23).
- Wave 1 (user-keyed, parallel with the company resolution): team
  membership, profile, user preferences and the memberships join, which
  now also supplies the active company's row and role, so the separate
  companies and company_members reads are gone.
- Wave 2 (company-keyed): settings, agent profile, the switcher's settings
  names, entitlements in ONE wave (getCompanyEntitlements takes the
  team_id the join already carries and runs the grants read alongside
  config + subscription), and get_dashboard_nav_flags().
- supabase/migrations/20260826120000_get_dashboard_nav_flags.sql:
  SECURITY INVOKER, STABLE, EXECUTE for authenticated only; RLS applies
  inside. lib/dashboard/nav-flags.ts wraps it with the pre-RPC four-probe
  fallback on PGRST202/42883/42501 (self-hosted not yet migrated, deploy
  ordering) and degrades to hidden rows on any other error.
- tests/pg/dashboard-nav-flags-rpc.pg.test.ts (6): fresh company, active vs
  pending WooCommerce, active Shopify, mileage trips, RLS for a member of
  another company, EXECUTE grants. Unit tests for the wrapper (RPC row,
  single-object payload, each fallback code, other errors) and for the
  entitlements teamId option.

~20 calls / 4 waves -> ~12 calls / 2 waves, 0 auth network calls.

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-26 15:14:49 +02:00
Mattsson 288915c152 Fix/fdb fr usrs (#1125) 
* fix(invoices): return attachment filename in delivery history summaries

The 20260723003000 hardening dropped attachment_filename from
list_invoice_delivery_summaries, so the delivery history UI always fell
back to the generic "faktura.pdf" label. Recreate the RPC with the
filename included: it is derived from company name, customer name,
invoice number, and date, all already visible to every company member,
so the minimization boundary is unchanged. Addresses stay masked and
message content, BCC, and checksums stay server-side.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(reconciliation): surface own-account transfer legs in match-to-voucher by default

The second (incoming) leg of a transfer between two of the company's own
bank accounts was hidden in the 'Matcha mot befintlig verifikation' dialog
because the voucher counted as 'already matched' once its outgoing leg was
linked, even though the incoming account's line had no settling transaction.
Users read the empty default list as 'the app won't let me link this'.

get_account_gl_lines_for_matching now counts links per settlement account:
a transaction provably on another cash account no longer marks the voucher
as matched for the requested account, so the unsettled transfer leg surfaces
by default (and auto-selects on an exact match). Same-account N:1 stays
behind the 'Visa aven matchade verifikationer' opt-in, and transactions
without a resolvable cash account conservatively keep counting everywhere.
get_unlinked_gl_lines is deliberately untouched (feeds auto-reconcile).

Companion guard: mark_entry_as_opening_balance now refuses entries with
linked bank transactions, since half-settled transfer vouchers became
reachable in the reconciliation view's unmatched table where 'Mark som IB'
renders; re-tagging one would strand its transaction against a movement-
excluded entry. getReconciliationStatus counts unmatched GL lines with the
account-scoped RPC so the status card agrees with the table.

Fixes #1026

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(api): cut prod p95 latency via local JWT auth, single-RT company resolution, and report aggregate RPCs

Baseline 2026-07-23 (487 prod samples): p50 160ms, p95 480ms, 13% of
requests over 300ms. Target: p95 under 300ms.

- requireAuth: verify JWTs locally via getClaims (ES256/JWKS) instead of
  a second network getUser per request; getUser fallback keeps HS256
  self-hosted and existing test mocks working; middleware still
  revocation-checks every /api request
- resolve_active_company RPC (20260723161000): one round trip replaces
  2-3 queries in getActiveCompanyId and middleware; PGRST202/42501 fall
  back to the legacy query path
- arsredovisning build-data: ~33 sequential round trips down to ~7,
  output byte-identical (snapshot-proven)
- currency rate route: stop bypassing the exchange_rates cache (missing
  supabase arg caused an external Riksbanken call on every request)
- document.get: parallelize row fetch, signed URL and audit event
- list_company_accounts RPC (20260723170000): accounts list in one round
  trip instead of paging past PostgREST's 1000-row cap
- vat-declaration route: drop a dead sequential company_settings query
- get_kpi_report_aggregates RPC (20260723180000): KPI report's three
  full-period line scans collapsed into one aggregate call; dimension-
  filtered path unchanged
- lint: fix 9 baseline errors, downgrade 4 react-hooks compiler rules to
  warn, zero the eslint baseline ratchet

All four gates green: lint 0 errors, 9163 tests, check:guards, build.
Migrations applied idempotently to staging only; prod receives them via
Supabase branching on merge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): resolve PR review findings across auth, VAT declaration, and IB retag

- requireAuth getClaims fast path: pin iss (project URL) and aud
  ('authenticated'), log every fallback to getUser (ASVS V9.1 finding)
- remove the ignored accountingMethod parameter from calculateVatDeclaration
  and the dead company_settings.accounting_method reads in xlsx/pdf/eskd
  routes; v1 API keeps accepting the query param but documents it as a no-op
- close the mark_entry_as_opening_balance TOCTOU race with a transactions
  trigger (20260723190000, FOR KEY SHARE on journal_entries) + pg tests;
  applied to staging and smoke-verified both directions
- re-add the 42501 tenant guard to branch-local migration 20260723160000
  (function body had silently reverted to the pre-20260619130100 definition)
- document the buildK3Noter tbFullRows full-TB contract (uppskjuten skatt
  opening balance per BFNAR 2012:1 ch.29)
- add KPI VAT-liability test covering reduced-rate output accounts 2621/2631

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(db): use NULL-safe caller_is_company_member in opening-balance retag guard

The re-added tenant guard carried the pre-20260703180000 raw
NOT IN (SELECT user_company_ids()) pattern, which the
null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet blocks. Staging re-synced.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-23 16:16:55 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 6d75b9a1bf feat: BankID authentication via TIC Identity API (#192) 
* feat: add BankID authentication via TIC Identity API

Integrate BankID as a login/signup method using the TIC Identity API.
Users can authenticate with BankID QR codes (desktop) or deep links (mobile),
link BankID to existing accounts, and skip TOTP MFA when BankID is linked.
Removes Step 0 (role choice) from onboarding for all users. Adds enrichment
data support for pre-filling company details from Bolagsverket during signup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address PR review — server-side rate limit, unlink clears MFA bypass

- Add per-IP rate limit (5s cooldown) on /bankid/start to prevent
  unbounded billable TIC sessions from unauthenticated callers
- Add /bankid/unlink endpoint that deletes bankid_identities AND clears
  app_metadata.bankid_linked so MFA enforcement resumes after unlink
- Update BankIdSettings to call server-side unlink instead of client-side delete

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: move rate limiter to module scope, add BankID logo and year-end skill

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-08 13:44:14 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 928a145f9a feat: upgrade auth to email+password with optional TOTP MFA 
- Replace magic-link-only login with email+password (primary) and magic link (toggle)
- Add registration page with strong password validation
- Add MFA enrollment (/mfa/enroll) with QR code and manual secret
- Add MFA verification (/mfa/verify) with 6-digit TOTP input
- Add password reset flow (/reset-password)
- Add middleware MFA enforcement gated by NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA env var
- Self-hosted deployments (NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED=true) skip MFA entirely
- Add Security tab in Settings for password change and MFA management
- Add requireAuth() API route helper with MFA check
- Update CLAUDE.md with Authentication section and env var docs
- Update Dockerfile and docker-entrypoint.sh for new env var placeholders

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-03-08 10:17:49 +01:00