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Jakob Wennberg fc04578818 feat(parties): suggestion pipeline from ledger keys and linked documents (#2172) 
* feat(parties): phase 1 substrate, one party per counterpart

Adds the identity layer above customers and suppliers, which keep their
tables and every foreign key and gain a nullable party_id.

- parties: company-scoped identity with status (suggested | confirmed),
  kind, alias keys, origin and merged_into. One live party per org number
  and company, enforced by a partial unique index; merged losers leave the
  index so a merge can be undone. This is the unique key the
  duplicate-invoice guard has lacked, since suppliers never had one.
- party_facts: statements with a source, a rank (preferred | normal |
  deprecated) and two time axes, never overwritten.
- party_identities: bankgiro, plusgiro, IBAN and friends per party, with
  seen and paid counts and a known | unverified status.
- party_decisions: every human action on a party as a labelled example.
- normalize_org_number(text): SQL mirror of lib/invariants/org-number.ts
  (strip separators, drop the century on 12 digits, Luhn check, 10 digits).
- ensure_party(): find by org number inside the company, else create.
  Name-only rows never merge at insert time; a name merge is a recorded
  human decision.
- Backfill: one party per existing supplier and customer, merged on org
  number, suppliers first so both roles land on one party.
- Archive contract: the four tables are master data in the full archive.

Observed parties (keys derived from voucher and bank text) are not stored;
they stay computed by the ledger-context RPC. No posted entry is touched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(parties): observed parties from voucher text, ledger_key and its mirror

Migrants arrive with vouchers, not bank transactions, so the bank-keyed
ledger context is empty for them. This adds the description-keyed twin.

- public.ledger_key(text): legibility key on top of the frozen
  normalize_counterparty_key mirror: strips AP-register prefixes (levfakt,
  leverantörsfaktura från N, levbet, faktura, kvitto, utgift), the supplier
  number that follows them, and trailing 1-3 digit runs, never "inköp".
  Mirrored by lib/parties/ledger-key.ts; the pair is pinned by a shared
  fixture list in the pg test.
- public.get_observed_parties(company, from_date, limit): posted vouchers
  grouped by ledger_key(description) with occurrences, variants, expense
  and revenue SEK from the lines, first/last seen, median cadence and the
  Laplace-smoothed dominant result account. Excludes storno, opening
  balance, year-end and VAT settlement, and vouchers that carry a bank
  merchant name (those stay with get_ledger_deep_context). SECURITY
  INVOKER, so RLS scopes it. Never stored.
- lib/parties/classify.ts: the deterministic pre-classifier moved out of
  the evaluation script so product and evaluation share one implementation
  (0.965 agreement with the founder labels, party recall 0.99).
- lib/parties/observed.ts: RPC wrapper that classifies each row and
  derives a display rhythm from the cadence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(parties): tenant-safe composite foreign keys on every party link

Facts, identities, decisions, customers.party_id, suppliers.party_id and
parties.merged_into now reference parties(id, company_id), so a row can
only point at a party in its own company. ON DELETE SET NULL names
party_id so role rows keep their company_id. Adds a pg-real test that
rejects every cross-company link and checks company_id survives a party
delete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(parties): suggestion pipeline from ledger keys and linked documents

Phase 1c of the parties plan. Fills a migrant's register with suggested
parties from what the ledger already knows, never as facts:

- get_ledger_key_evidence(company): hard keys per ledger_key from the
  documents linked to posted vouchers (org number via normalize_org_number,
  VAT, bankgiro, plusgiro, printed name). Documents whose supplier org is
  the company's own are the company's sales invoices and only count in
  self_docs.
- apply_party_suggestions(company, user, items): upserts suggestions.
  Attaches by explicit party_id, org number or an exact alias key; never
  by name. Identities become known at two sightings. Idempotent.
- decide_parties(company, user, ids, kind, note): bulk confirm or dismiss
  with one party_decisions row each.
- parties.suggested_reason: the evidence summary the queue shows per row.
- lib/parties/suggest.ts: buildSuggestions (pure) and
  suggestPartiesForCompany. Keys that mix two org numbers keep neither the
  hard key nor identities; same-core live parties are reported as
  similar_to for a person to decide. coreKey() moves into ledger-key.ts.

55 unit tests and 14 pg-real tests pass locally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(parties): decide_parties dismisses suggested parties only

Dismiss is the queue's answer to a suggestion; a confirmed party is never
archived through it. Superagent P2 on #2172.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(parties): type the rpc mock with its args so the ratchet stays clean

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 18:18:12 +02:00
Mattsson c0818bb2d2 feat(sales-orders): kundorder with partial delivery and partial invoicing (#2166) 
* feat(sales-orders): kundorder with partial delivery and partial invoicing

Adds sales orders (kundorder) as their own non-ledger document between
agreement and invoice, for companies that deliver or invoice in parts.

Schema (20260902130000): sales_orders + sales_order_items with RLS via
user_company_ids(), OR-<n> numbering RPC (membership-gated, no anon
execute), company_settings.sales_orders_enabled UI gate, and back-links
invoices.sales_order_id / invoice_items.sales_order_item_id. The invoiced
quantity per order line is DERIVED from the linked invoice lines on
non-cancelled, non-credited invoices and enforced by a BEFORE trigger, so
no counter can drift and a credited invoice frees its quantity. Header
status is draft / confirmed / completed / cancelled; completion is kept
by DB triggers from the same derived quantity. Delivery and invoicing
progress are derived per line, never stored as status.

Service + API: lib/sales-orders (create/update with id-preserving line
replace, transitions with compare-and-set, cumulative delivery
registration, invoice-from-order through buildInvoiceWriteData so
booking stays in the engine, proforma -> order conversion), routes under
/api/sales-orders and /api/invoices/[id]/convert-to-order, structured
SALES_ORDER_* error codes, archive classification of the new tables.
The invoice editor round-trips sales_order_item_id so a draft edit
cannot drop the link; GET /api/invoices gains ?sales_order_id=.

UI: /sales-orders list, create/edit form reusing the invoice line
conventions, detail with deliver and create-invoice dialogs and linked
invoices; nav row behind the settings toggle; the webshop row is
relabelled webshop_orders; "Skapa order" on proformas.

MCP (20260902141000/141001): list/get reads plus four staged writes
(create, transition, register delivery, create invoice from order) whose
executors call the lib services; op types added to the pending
operations CHECK.

Tests: route tests for every route (401/400/404/happy), service unit
tests, executor and tool tests, and tests/pg/sales-orders.pg.test.ts
(16 cases, green on staging) covering RLS, numbering guards, the
over-invoice trigger incl. release on cancel/credit and cross-company
refusal, the quantity floor, and completion maintenance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RQW7mXvbAPgjUHq7dSEamr

* fix(sales-orders): harden kundorder after skeptic and security review

Resolves every finding from the PR #2166 review pass in one batch.

Order link integrity: replaceInvoiceItems now refuses a line set that
drops an existing sales_order_item_id (INVOICE_UPDATE_DROPS_ORDER_LINK),
closing the MCP update_invoice header-only edit and the v1 PATCH path
that severed the link and freed the quantity for double invoicing. The
update_invoice re-fetch, gnubok_get_invoice and the v1 item projection
now carry sales_order_item_id so well-behaved clients round-trip it.

Quantity math: derived remaining/invoiced quantities are rounded to six
decimals and compared with an epsilon (roundQty, qtyGreater) so a float
remainder such as 0.5999999999999996 can neither refuse the final partial
invoice nor land as an invoice quantity; duplicate explicit picks are
summed before validation.

Leveransdatum: per-line last_delivery_date (migration 20260902160000);
an invoice takes the latest date over the lines it covers and only when
the covered quantity was delivered, never the header date and never for
an advance invoice (ML 17 kap 24 p.7, FX anchor per ML 8 kap 21-23).

VAT drift: the order stores the customer type and VAT-validation flag its
lines were priced under; invoicing refuses with
SALES_ORDER_CUSTOMER_VAT_CHANGED when they differ, and re-saving the
order re-validates the lines. Customer and currency are frozen once
invoices exist.

Tenant and role gates: composite FK (sales_order_id, company_id) ties a
line to its parent's company (Superagent P2); aa_enforce_company_writer_role
on both tables so a viewer cannot write through the browser client.

Proforma -> order refuses proformas with ROT/RUT, periodisering or
negative-quantity lines instead of dropping those fields. RESTRICT FK
errors on delete map to SALES_ORDER_LINE_LOCKED / SALES_ORDER_HAS_INVOICES.

Also: schema-guard literal payloads in lib/sales-orders (ceiling +2 with
reason), regenerated skills/accounted-api (sales_order_item_id on invoice
items), pg tests for the composite FK, the viewer gate and the new
columns, unit tests for every changed path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XzFmmH82hCJNmZbPqycDiW

* fix(sales-orders): resolve CodeRabbit round on PR #2166

Quick wins from the review, all in one pass:

- replaceInvoiceItems fails closed when the invoice_items snapshot cannot
  be read (it is both the restore source and the input to the kundorder
  link guard); the guard branch is explicit in both PATCH routes.
- Cumulative delivery registration carries an optimistic predicate on the
  quantity it read, so two concurrent registrations cannot regress each
  other; DELETE of an order keeps its allowed status in the predicate and
  answers a conflict when zero rows match.
- Business dates (order date, delivery date, invoice date) default to the
  Europe/Stockholm calendar day (todayIsoStockholm), never UTC: the
  delivery date is also the Riksbanken rate anchor.
- The invoice-from-order executor treats an event emit failure as
  non-blocking: the draft already exists.
- sales_order_items are archived through their parent with the order
  currency denormalised, like invoice_items.
- Proforma "Skapa order" tolerates a 2xx without a parsable body; the
  settings toggle refreshes the server-rendered nav.
- List route doc states that q matches the order number (customer names
  are matched client-side).

Declined (out of scope for this PR): moving header + line writes and the
delivery loop into transactional RPCs (same PostgREST pattern as the
invoice PATCH path, tracked as a follow-up), the MCP approval handler's
error message shape (pre-existing code outside this change), and the
docstring-coverage warning (no repo convention).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XzFmmH82hCJNmZbPqycDiW

* fix(sales-orders): move hardening migration off a colliding version; archive contract; ceiling

- 20260902160000_sales_orders_hardening.sql collided with main's
  20260902160000_parties_substrate.sql after the third sync; renamed to
  20260902180000 and made idempotent (DROP ... IF EXISTS before each
  ADD CONSTRAINT) so a preview branch that applied it under the old
  version replays it cleanly. Staging's schema_migrations row renamed.
- sales_order_items goes back to a direct archive dump: the coverage
  contract (tests/pg/full-archive-coverage.pg.test.ts) requires it for a
  table with its own company_id; the currency lives on the parent order
  one file over, joined by sales_order_id.
- Scanner ceiling re-baselined after merging main (parties phase 1): 397.
- v1 PATCH test queues a real empty invoice_items snapshot now that
  replaceInvoiceItems fails closed on an unreadable one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XzFmmH82hCJNmZbPqycDiW

* fix(sales-orders): drop the composite FK before its unique index on replay

The idempotent guard in 20260902180000_sales_orders_hardening.sql dropped
the unique (id, company_id) before the FK that depends on its index, so
the preview branch replay (which had applied the file under its former
version) failed with SQLSTATE 2BP01. Order swapped; replay verified on
staging.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XzFmmH82hCJNmZbPqycDiW

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 18:14:49 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg daeab67dca feat(parties): phase 1 substrate, one party per counterpart (#2162) 
* feat(parties): phase 1 substrate, one party per counterpart

Adds the identity layer above customers and suppliers, which keep their
tables and every foreign key and gain a nullable party_id.

- parties: company-scoped identity with status (suggested | confirmed),
  kind, alias keys, origin and merged_into. One live party per org number
  and company, enforced by a partial unique index; merged losers leave the
  index so a merge can be undone. This is the unique key the
  duplicate-invoice guard has lacked, since suppliers never had one.
- party_facts: statements with a source, a rank (preferred | normal |
  deprecated) and two time axes, never overwritten.
- party_identities: bankgiro, plusgiro, IBAN and friends per party, with
  seen and paid counts and a known | unverified status.
- party_decisions: every human action on a party as a labelled example.
- normalize_org_number(text): SQL mirror of lib/invariants/org-number.ts
  (strip separators, drop the century on 12 digits, Luhn check, 10 digits).
- ensure_party(): find by org number inside the company, else create.
  Name-only rows never merge at insert time; a name merge is a recorded
  human decision.
- Backfill: one party per existing supplier and customer, merged on org
  number, suppliers first so both roles land on one party.
- Archive contract: the four tables are master data in the full archive.

Observed parties (keys derived from voucher and bank text) are not stored;
they stay computed by the ledger-context RPC. No posted entry is touched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(parties): tenant-safe composite foreign keys on every party link

Facts, identities, decisions, customers.party_id, suppliers.party_id and
parties.merged_into now reference parties(id, company_id), so a row can
only point at a party in its own company. ON DELETE SET NULL names
party_id so role rows keep their company_id. Adds a pg-real test that
rejects every cross-company link and checks company_id survives a party
delete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 17:43:06 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 5291806c37 feat(parties): observed parties from voucher text, ledger_key and its mirror (#2168) 
Migrants arrive with vouchers, not bank transactions, so the bank-keyed
ledger context is empty for them. This adds the description-keyed twin.

- public.ledger_key(text): legibility key on top of the frozen
  normalize_counterparty_key mirror: strips AP-register prefixes (levfakt,
  leverantörsfaktura från N, levbet, faktura, kvitto, utgift), the supplier
  number that follows them, and trailing 1-3 digit runs, never "inköp".
  Mirrored by lib/parties/ledger-key.ts; the pair is pinned by a shared
  fixture list in the pg test.
- public.get_observed_parties(company, from_date, limit): posted vouchers
  grouped by ledger_key(description) with occurrences, variants, expense
  and revenue SEK from the lines, first/last seen, median cadence and the
  Laplace-smoothed dominant result account. Excludes storno, opening
  balance, year-end and VAT settlement, and vouchers that carry a bank
  merchant name (those stay with get_ledger_deep_context). SECURITY
  INVOKER, so RLS scopes it. Never stored.
- lib/parties/classify.ts: the deterministic pre-classifier moved out of
  the evaluation script so product and evaluation share one implementation
  (0.965 agreement with the founder labels, party recall 0.99).
- lib/parties/observed.ts: RPC wrapper that classifies each row and
  derives a display rhythm from the cadence.

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 17:33:30 +02:00
Mattsson b68c082ef5 feat(bank-sync): close the F2 report: gap backfill, consent and paused chip states, agent-triggered sync (#2165) 
* fix(bank-sync): cron backfills the gap since the last successful sync

The daily incremental sync always asked the bank for the last 7 days. Any
pause longer than that (a lapsed subscription paid again, a consent renewed
after expiry, an outage) silently lost the days in between: the connection
came back, looked healthy, and the missing transactions never arrived.

The lookback now widens to cover the gap since last_synced_at plus one day
of overlap, capped at the 90-day PSD2 limit, and a gap of a month or more
asks for strategy=longest like the manual sync route does. Dedup via
external_id makes the overlap harmless. First syncs keep their 90-day path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* feat(bank-sync): chip warns seven days before a bank consent expires

The transactions-page chip only reacted once a connection was already dead
(expired/error) or had gone stale. A consent that is about to end looked
healthy until the morning it stopped syncing. New "expiring" state when a
live connection's consent_expires is within seven days, the same threshold
as the consent-expiry email in the sync cron. Precedence: attention,
expiring, stale, healthy.

getChipState moves to lib/transactions/bank-sync-chip-state.ts so the
precedence is unit-tested; the component keeps the rendering only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* feat(bank-sync): chip says paused when the subscription lapsed

The daily cron filters connections by the bank_sync capability, so a
company whose trial or subscription ended keeps status=active rows with a
frozen last_synced_at. The chip read that as "stale, check the connection",
which sends the user to re-authorise a connection that is perfectly alive.
56 of 191 active connections on prod were in this state on 2026-09-01.

New "paused" state, ranked above everything else, when the company lacks
bank_sync: hosted points at billing, self-host at the connector key, the
same split BankSyncNowButton already makes. getChipState takes an options
object so the clock stays out of render (react-hooks/purity).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* feat(api): agent-triggerable bank sync in v1 and MCP

Closes the first wish in the F2 report: an integration could read bank
data but never refresh it. New POST /api/v1/companies/{id}/bank-connections/
{connectionId}/sync and MCP gnubok_sync_bank, both on a shared runner
(extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/trigger-sync.ts).

Cost is bounded structurally, not by policy: the window is never
caller-controlled (the cron's gap-aware 7 to 90 day lookback), a connection
synced within 15 minutes answers BANK_SYNC_COOLDOWN with next_allowed_at
(429 + Retry-After on v1; synced=false in-band on MCP so the agent reads on
instead of retrying), and a failing connection is throttled per process by
attempt time. A dead session is flipped to expired with a remediation that
hands the user the connect link: no API call revives a consent.

Gated on bank_sync like gnubok_connect_bank; scope transactions:write.
Registry, scope map, load-routes, spec snapshot and the generated
accounted-api skill updated; five BANK_SYNC_* / BANK_SESSION_EXPIRED codes
added to the structured-error registry. The web Synka-nu route is left as
is (see DECISIONS.md).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* test(bank-sync): use the options object in the remaining chip-state calls

Four multi-line calls still passed the clock positionally after
getChipState moved to an options object; tsc flagged them (vitest did not,
the extra argument was ignored at runtime).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* fix(api): address skeptic findings on the agent-triggered bank sync

Three refutations from the pre-publish skeptic pass:

1. Core imported the extension. The v1 sync route pulled the runner
   straight from @/extensions, which the core-build gate rejects and which
   left a live bank endpoint on zero-extension builds. The route now
   resolves it through the registry's services channel against a contract
   in lib/bank-sync/trigger-sync-contract.ts (same pattern as the
   Skatteverket read service) and answers EXTENSION_DISABLED when the
   extension is absent.

2. The idempotency cache stored the handler-level 429. A same-key retry
   after Retry-After, which is the documented retry, replayed the stale
   cooldown as a 400 for the cache's 24-hour TTL. withApiV1 no longer
   caches 429 responses; regression test added. The endpoint's pitfall no
   longer claims Idempotency-Key is mandatory (it was never enforced).

3. Two cron tests read the clock twice and failed whenever a millisecond
   passed between the reads. They now pin the clock with fake timers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* fix(bank-sync): durable cooldown lease and review wording

Resolves the PR #2165 review findings in one pass.

Superagent P1: the attempt throttle was a process-local Map, so two agent
calls on different serverless instances (or a retry after a cold start on
a failing connection) could each bill an Enable Banking call, contradicting
the one-sync-per-15-minutes promise. New bank_connections.sync_lease_until
(migration 20260902150000), claimed with one conditional UPDATE before the
bank is called; Postgres row locking makes exactly one claimer win, the
rest answer BANK_SYNC_COOLDOWN. The lease stays for the full window on
success and failure. Tests cover the claim order, a failed attempt seen
from a second instance, a lost race, and an expired lease.

CodeRabbit: the =1 plural branch now reads "in 1 day" / "om 1 dag"
(daysUntilConsentExpiry rounds a partial day up, so "tomorrow" could be
today); the cooldown pitfall on the v1 endpoint, the MCP description and
the in-band cooldown instruction now say a cooldown can follow a failed
attempt and tell the agent to compare last_synced_at before deciding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub

* fix(bank-sync): lease claim as a literal filter for the schema guard

CI's no-phantom-columns guard counts runtime-built query expressions and
its ceiling is exact; the templated `.or('sync_lease_until.is.null,...')`
claim added one. The column now defaults to epoch (NOT NULL), so "never
claimed" is just "expired long ago" and the atomic claim is a single
literal `.lte('sync_lease_until', now)` the guard can check. Migration is
unshipped (same PR), so it is edited in place.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub

* fix(bank-sync): runner verifies company membership before the lease

Superagent (round 3): the MCP path reached the shared runner without a
membership check of its own. Both callers do enforce it upstream
(withApiV1's company resolution and resolveMcpCompanyContext in the MCP
dispatcher), but the runner writes transactions and bills a bank call, so
it now checks company_members itself, before the cooldown and the lease
claim, and answers NOT_FOUND for a non-member. The viewer check that was
buried inside the sync block moves up with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 17:17:41 +02:00
Mattsson a80ce54b78 fix(mcp): eager-auth flag on the Grok connector links so Grok starts OAuth (#2167) 
* fix(mcp): eager-auth flag on the Grok connector links so Grok starts OAuth

Live test after #2158: pasting the Grok URL into grok.com's custom
connector dialog listed all 150+ tools and never opened the sign-in. Grok
probes the URL without credentials, like claude.ai, and reads the lazy
200 on initialize as an authless server; only the 401 challenge starts
OAuth (#2159 fixed the same thing for the claude.ai link).

- lib/onboarding/checklist.ts: mcpServerUrl() builds the server URL with
  an optional eagerAuth flag; sideDoorServerUrl() gives the Grok side door
  auth=required and keeps ChatGPT lazy; claudeConnectorLink() reuses it.
  SIDE_DOORS / SideDoor move here from the component. Tests for all three.
- NewUserChecklist copies the door-specific URL (now with a client marker).
- ApiKeysPanel's Grok row copies the flagged URL, mirroring the Claude one.
- auth-mode.ts comment records the second consumer; registry entry's Grok
  step carries the flag; DECISIONS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LhTJcwgzmN3TsLR8tVHwdi
Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>

* docs(mcp): registry Claude.ai step carries auth=required too

Review pass on #2167: the registry entry flagged the Grok install URL
but left the Claude.ai step on the bare URL, which pre-fills "None" in
claude.ai's dialog (#2159). Same file, same flag, now consistent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LhTJcwgzmN3TsLR8tVHwdi
Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 16:55:23 +02:00
Mattsson f1230282a9 feat(bookkeeping): verifikationsserie per bankkonto for bank-transaction bookings (#2160) 
* feat(bookkeeping): verifikationsserie per bankkonto for bank-transaction bookings

A company running several bank accounts (main bank on A, company card on M,
both imported via CSV) could not route each account's bookings into its own
series: every bank_transaction booking took the single company-wide default
from default_voucher_series_per_source_type.

- cash_accounts.voucher_series (nullable, single letter): per-account override,
  editable under Inställningar → Bokföring → Verifikationsserier per bankkonto
  (new PATCH /api/cash-accounts/[id]).
- resolveCashAccountVoucherSeries(): step 2 of the resolution order
  (explicit pick → account override → per-type map → A). Wired into the book
  route and createTransactionJournalEntry, which covers categorize, the agent,
  pending operations and the v1 API.
- Booking dialog gets the series picker, seeded from the server via
  /voucher-sequences/next?source_type&cash_account_id so dialog and route can
  never disagree. An unresolved embedded picker omits voucher_series so a
  stray 'A' never overrides the account's series.

Scope: bank_transaction bookings only. Invoice settlements matched from the
bank keep their payment series; bulk-book resolves inside its RPC (see
DECISIONS.md).

Migration applied to staging as 20260902121420.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JWSLbQc3jgpfqnxWe6nteh

* fix(bookkeeping): audit and document the per-bankkonto series, tighten preview and PATCH

Consolidated pass over the PR #2160 findings (skeptics, CodeRabbit, Swedish
compliance review):

- Behandlingshistorik (BFNAR 2013:2 p. 9.16): changing cash_accounts.voucher_series
  is a behandlingsregel that outranks the audited per-type map. New trigger
  audit_cash_accounts_voucher_series (UPDATE only, WHEN the series changes, so
  bank-sync churn never logs), cash_accounts added to AUDITED_TABLES and the
  audit_log filter, "Bankkonto ... Verifikationsserie: (tomt) -> M" events in
  the report, pg-real test. Applied to staging as 20260902124513.
- Systemdokumentation (p. 9.2-9.15): revision/systemdokumentation.json gains a
  verifikationsserier_regler block with the resolution order and the two
  exceptions (invoice settlements, samlingsverifikat); the per-account mapping
  itself is in data/cash_accounts.json.
- Settings picker uses the same closed list as the manual verifikat form
  (presets plus letters already in use) instead of all 26 letters; strings
  moved to messages/sv.json and messages/en.json.
- /voucher-sequences/next applies the account override only for
  source_type=bank_transaction (CodeRabbit), so a manual-entry preview cannot
  show a series the entry will not get.
- Book route resolves the series from the account the row ends up on after a
  stranded-row repoint, not the stale one.
- PATCH /api/cash-accounts/[id] answers 404 for a non-UUID id instead of a
  Postgres cast 500; the series lookup logs a warning when it fails open.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JWSLbQc3jgpfqnxWe6nteh

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 15:25:34 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 678acfe7ef fix(mcp): eager-auth flag so claude.ai's connector dialog detects OAuth, not "None" (#2159) 
claude.ai's two-step "Add custom connector" dialog probes the server URL
without credentials and pre-fills the Authentication choice from the
answer. Our lazy-auth endpoint (issue #1814) answers 200 on an anonymous
initialize, which the dialog reads as an authless server: it suggests
"None", and a connector added with that default never opens the sign-in
when the challenge arrives later. Per Anthropic's connector docs a 401 is
the only answer it reads as OAuth ("Claude does not honor a
WWW-Authenticate header on a 200 response").

- `auth=required` on the endpoint URL (extensions/general/mcp-server/
  auth-mode.ts) turns lazy auth off for that URL: every tokenless
  request, initialize included, answers the 401 + WWW-Authenticate
  challenge. Callers with a token are unaffected; the bare URL keeps
  lazy auth for Claude Code, the plugin, Cursor and ChatGPT, and existing
  connector records are untouched.
- The links we control carry the flag: Settings -> API & MCP (install
  link and copy block), the onboarding checklist, both docs pages and
  claude-plugin/CONNECTORS.md (plugin 1.2.3). The docs' Path A now
  describes the eager flow (sign-in opens on Add) instead of telling
  users to override the dialog's "None".
- Tests: eager-auth.test.ts (401 on initialize/tools/list/public tools,
  namespaced metadata pointer, token no-op, exact-flag only); checklist
  link shape updated.

Companion: gnubok-website PR (Kom igång connector link + regenerated
connect-claude / anslut-claude pages).


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013yw62FMXGSzo6icFDiBwP3

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 14:51:32 +02:00
Mattsson 6a85efb00a feat(mcp): allowlist Grok's connector callback and document the Grok path (#2158) 
* feat(mcp): allowlist Grok's connector callback and document the Grok path

Grok custom connectors self-register through /api/mcp-oauth/register with
redirect_uri https://grok.com/connectors-oauth-exchange-code/, which the
built-in allowlist rejected with invalid_redirect_uri before consent. Add
the callback as an exact-path BUILT_IN_PATTERNS entry (trailing slash
optional, no prefix) with provider 'grok', named "Grok (xAI)" on the
consent page. Tests: accept, foreign-host and other-path rejection,
provider mapping, and a register route test for the Grok DCR shape.

Surface Grok next to ChatGPT: a "Using Grok?" side door on the onboarding
Claude step (one side door open at a time, telemetry step grok), a Grok row
under "Other clients" in the API & MCP settings tab using ?client=grok, and
sv/en strings for both. Docs: mcp-server rule, ARCHITECTURE, README,
registry entry (install section), DECISIONS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EGbspj3hiNqvqTWZqdwysa
Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>

* fix(mcp): cite X Corp's published Grok callback, test the consent label

Review pass on #2158: the allowlist comment and DECISIONS entry claimed
xAI publishes no callback and the value came from a live observation; X
Corp lists https://grok.com/connectors-oauth-exchange-code/ as the "Grok
(web)" redirect URL at docs.x.com/x-ads-api/mcp, and grok.com serves the
path itself (slash form 308s to no-slash on the same origin). Reworded
both to cite that. Adds the consent-page test for "Grok (xAI)" next to
the ChatGPT one and a JSDoc on the onboarding side-door toggle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EGbspj3hiNqvqTWZqdwysa
Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 14:42:39 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 61a76b1669 feat(parties): phase 0 prerequisites, pg_trgm and golden-set draw (#2157) 
* feat(parties): phase 0 prerequisites, pg_trgm and golden-set draw

Phase 0 of the Kontakter plan: make the counterparty resolver measurable
before building it.

- Migration 20260902120000 enables pg_trgm (trigram blocking of
  counterparty keys) and drops the two context-graph tables from
  20260706193007 whose feature code was never merged and which prod no
  longer has, so fresh replays agree with prod.
- tests/pg/parties-phase0.pg.test.ts pins the extension, a sanity check on
  trigram ranking, and the absence of the graph tables.
- scripts/parties/draw-golden-set.sql is the reproducible, read-only draw
  of the 200-key labelling sample (three strata, md5-ordered) and the
  payee-identity base rate. The drawn rows contain customer voucher text
  and are kept in gitignored dev_docs, never in this public repo.
- scripts/parties/README.md records the label vocabulary and the numbers
  measured on prod on 2026-09-02.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(archive): drop the two context-graph tables from the archive contract

The migration in this PR removes graph_counterparties and
graph_transaction_counterparties, so the full-archive contract must stop
classifying them: tests/schema/no-phantom-columns.test.ts asserts that
every classified table exists in the migration replay, and the live-DB
twin in tests/pg/full-archive-coverage.pg.test.ts asserts the same against
information_schema.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 14:33:45 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg f266c386f3 chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers (#2150) 
* chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers

Remove 33 dead files, ~270 unreferenced exports/types, 13 dead i18n
namespaces and 4 unused dependencies; fold byte-identical helper copies
into one canonical home each (lib/utils chunk/sleep/utcDateStamp,
lib/dates/iso, lib/invariants/uuid, lib/xml/escape, lib/reports/sru/format,
lib/pdf/number-text, lib/browser/panel-request, lib/api/v1/body +
v1ValidationError rolled out to ~55 v1 routes, booking-template schemas).

No behaviour change: v1 bodies and status codes, MCP tool schemas, DB
writes and money math are untouched. Naive ore rounding was deliberately
not swapped for roundOre; see DECISIONS.md 2026-09-02 for the full list
of things left alone on purpose.

tsc, lint, 19588 unit tests and check:guards green; antipattern baseline
ratcheted (naive-ore-round 622 -> 620, hand-rolled-invariant 115 -> 113).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(transactions): import RawTransaction from @/types after the ingest re-export removal

CI's type ratchet (check:types, full tsconfig) caught the one test file
that still imported the type through lib/transactions/ingest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 11:51:16 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 18cbc4c30a fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155) 
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables

Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items.

- api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could
  forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they
  belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the
  identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs.
- rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become
  service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash
  readable by co-members was a bearer credential.
- validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no
  longer a member of the key's company.
- provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed
  to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent
  team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role
  only, matching every existing code path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database

Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer.

- One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the
  read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through
  the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role
  claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and
  trigger cascades.
- company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions;
  invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition
  guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and
  archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership.
- Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert
  posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with
  a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the
  definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes
  still pass.
- create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths;
  validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE;
  match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance
  RPCs become service_role only; the production-only
  seed_asset_categories is dropped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time

prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker
and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the
registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths

The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership
but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer
holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the
API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY
for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin

Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy
served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy
forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender,
could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se.

- inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images)
  served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP.
- storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB
  mime for the key is on the allow-list.
- document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type.
- logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG

Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a
scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there.
The upload pickers stop advertising SVG.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user

The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a
victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank
account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company.
requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who
started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL
preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter

WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with
plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the
invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All
three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard,
https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the
stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted
but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and
exports isRateLimiterConfigured().

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie

getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel
from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token
cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look
like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in
requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or
listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed
on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user

The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever
consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the
flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed
their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the
initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that
session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org
number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket
callbacks enforce the same initiator check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity

Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address
the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could
pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the
account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed,
the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000),
bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and
BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation
re-sent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes

A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page
named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link
handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered
URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a
company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host;
non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped
by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log

- register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID
  signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp.
- BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation.
- WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy.
- Logo help text no longer advertises SVG.
- DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts

Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down
by the one legacy error the change removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 11:38:30 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 6e8d76a9cb fix(skattekonto): remove the drift email, its event and the unused drift route (#2149) 
The nightly skattekonto sync emailed "Skattekontot stämmer inte med
bokföringen" whenever Skatteverket's saldo differed from BAS 1630 by more
than 1 kr, every 24 hours while it lasted. On 2026-09-02 it fired on a
35 842 kr gap that the reconciliation explained to the last krona with 14
unbooked rows, while the Hem notice and the reconciliation page (both
gated on unexplained_difference) said nothing was wrong.

The check shipped in May 2026 (#525) before any in-app skattekonto view
existed; the dashboard tile its comments promise was never built and the
drift API route had no consumer. Since 2026-08-25 the reconciliation page
and the Hem notice are the surface, with one definition of "stämmer inte".

Removed: skattekonto-drift.ts, skattekonto-drift-email.ts, their tests,
the skattekonto.drift_detected event type, the handler registration, the
cron's drift hook, GET /api/extensions/skatteverket/skattekonto/drift, and
the ROPA activity for the mail. The route is dropped from the ungated
extension route allowlist to lock the ratchet. skattekonto_drift_tolerance
stays: the Hem notice reads it. Stale skattekonto_drift_last_alert_at rows
in extension_data are inert.

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 11:28:55 +02:00
Mattsson 867767a22f feat(inbox): document-type badge and filter, +lev/+ver plus-addressing (#2129) (#2148) 
* feat(inbox): document-type badge and filter, +lev/+ver plus-addressing (#2129)

Phase 1: every inbox row shows its document kind (Kvitto, Leverantorsfaktura, Myndighetsbrev, Ovrigt) from the existing AI documentKind, and a second menu next to the status filter narrows the list to leverantorsfakturor or underlag. Pure predicate in lib/documents/inbox-kind.ts with tests.

Phase 2: the shared inbox address accepts RFC 5233 plus-addressing. The webhook splits the local part at the first + and looks up the base, so <local>+anything@ now reaches the company instead of 404ing. +lev and +ver land in the new nullable invoice_inbox_items.kind_hint column (CHECK supplier_invoice | receipt), threaded through EmailMeta into both inbox inserts and returned by GET /items. kind_hint wins over documentKind for the badge and the filter and survives re-extraction because it is a column. The sources panel shows both tagged addresses with a one-line hint (sv + en).

Tests: filter predicate per kind and null; parser and tag mapping; webhook routes +LEV and an unknown tag; pg test pins the CHECK and NULL default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hzv2Z2eCq8iJAAe8XC1hNr

* fix(inbox): honest empty state under a type filter, detail pane shares the row's kind resolution

Skeptic findings on #2148: with a type filter narrowing 'Att göra' to zero the empty state claimed 'allt är bearbetat' while the status trigger still counted pending rows; it now says no items of that type are here (sv + en). The fields rail printed the AI documentKind only, so a +lev hint could disagree with the row badge; it now uses resolveInboxKind like the list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hzv2Z2eCq8iJAAe8XC1hNr

* fix(inbox): keep the type-filter empty state off purchase lists, carry kind_hint onto rejected attachment rows

CodeRabbit on #2148: the purchase lists (Saknar underlag, Hämta från portal) ignore the type menu, so a leftover kind filter must not pick their empty-state copy. A rejected attachment (unsupported MIME, too large) now keeps the sender's +lev / +ver hint on its error row like every other inbox insert; the allowlist test covers it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hzv2Z2eCq8iJAAe8XC1hNr

* fix(inbox): set the +lev/+ver kind hint only when the shared address resolved the company

CodeRabbit on #2148: the hint was computed before recipient resolution, so a tag on an unknown or retired shared address could ride along onto a custom-domain match. It is now assigned inside the active shared-inbox branch only; regression test covers the multi-recipient case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Hzv2Z2eCq8iJAAe8XC1hNr

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 08:50:42 +02:00
Mattsson 4f33184a9a fix(mcp): explain the Claude-side steps after "Anslut till Claude" and tick the checklist on a real connection (#2133) (#2147) 
* fix(mcp): explain the Claude-side steps after "Anslut till Claude" and tick the checklist on a real connection (#2133)

Lazy auth is by design: Claude lists the tools before any sign-in and the
first company-scoped call answers 401, which opens the Accounted sign-in.
Nothing told the user, so a "connected" status with an unanswered first
question read as a broken connection (Axel, Discord).

- Settings -> API & MCP: one sentence of expectation under the button, and
  the step-by-step guide link moved from under two disclosures to directly
  under the button.
- Docs (connect-claude / anslut-claude): new "What happens after you click"
  section for Path A covering the connector dialog, the tools appearing
  before sign-in, the first-call login + consent screen, "ask again", and
  the "Required when the server asks" auth setting that only the manual
  path mentioned.
- Hem checklist step "Anslut till Claude": deep link now carries
  client=claude-connector like the settings button (claudeConnectorLink),
  the footnote carries the same expectation line plus the guide link, and
  the done-signal is an unrevoked api_keys row minted by the MCP OAuth
  token route (OAUTH_MCP_KEY_NAME) instead of the in-app AI-profile flag,
  which never meant "connected to Claude".
- Tests: claudeStepDone with/without a key row, deep-link snapshot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W7iJQwKiRTDWSMnRm4WM4L

* fix(mcp): correct consent-page claims, stop the completion PATCH loop, count OAuth keys past RLS (#2133)

Three skeptic refutations on PR #2147, fixed in one pass:

- Docs (EN + SV): the consent page shows the company active in the app and
  pre-selects every scope for Claude's connector (founder decision
  2026-08-26); it has no company picker and nothing to tick. Steps 3-4 of
  the new section, the "Read-only by default" paragraph above it, the
  sandbox note and the 10-minute test now describe Endast läs under
  Behörigheter instead.
- Checklist completion: users with initial_setup_path NULL (skipped the
  books question, then imported) hit the route's "Välj först hur du vill
  komma igång" 400 and, with saving as an effect dependency, retried it
  forever with a toast. completionPatchBody() records path=migration when
  none was chosen, and a rejected PATCH is not retried within the session.
- hasMcpKey: api_keys' SELECT policy is company-scoped, so the user client
  could not see companyless (NULL company_id) or archived-company keys and
  the step stayed open for the user who had just connected. The head count
  now runs through the service client with an explicit user_id filter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W7iJQwKiRTDWSMnRm4WM4L

* fix(mcp): surface a failed OAuth-key count and reserve the marker name (#2133)

CodeRabbit round on PR #2147:

- app/(dashboard)/page.tsx: a failed api_keys count answered count null,
  which claudeStepDone read as "never connected". Throw to the error
  boundary like the settings fetch does instead of guessing.
- app/api/settings/api-keys: reject a hand-minted key named
  MCP-klient (OAuth) (400 VALIDATION_ERROR): that name is the marker the
  Hem checklist reads as "connected to Claude", so a manual key with it
  would tick the step without any connection. Test added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W7iJQwKiRTDWSMnRm4WM4L

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 00:04:31 +02:00
Mattsson 8b09b06e14 feat(skatteverket): ombudsregister grant verification, honest session expiry, daily ombud sync (#2130) 
* feat(skatteverket): ombudsregister grant verification, honest session expiry, daily ombud sync

Users reported the Skatteverket connection "just disappearing" with no
banner, needing BankID again every time. Two causes, both fixed here:

1. SKV's per-flow refresh token lives 65 minutes. /status and the
   skv_disconnected notice called any stored refresh token "refreshable",
   so a days-dead session reported healthy and the reconnect banner never
   fired until a submission failed live. lib/skatteverket/session-lifetime
   now decides refreshability (expires_at + 5 min, refresh cap) for both
   surfaces; the settings panel states the one-hour session lifetime.

2. The durable fix is the ombud (system certificate) path, dormant since
   July behind SKATTEVERKET_SYSTEM_AUTH_MODE. Skatteverket added scope
   `obr` (Ombudshantering v2) to our application id on 2026-09-01, so grant
   verification can now ask the ombudsregister instead of classifying 403s
   from the read services:
   - lib/ombud-client.ts: GET /ombud/autentisieratOmbud, GET /roller,
     POST .../djuplank/utseombud, on the system identity, per the public
     tjanstebeskrivning v2.0 (mirrored in dev_docs/skatteverket/ombudshantering).
     Role codes are env-pinned (SKATTEVERKET_OMBUD_ROLL_LASOMBUD/_MOMS) or
     matched on rollbeskrivning text; a deep link never mints with a
     guessed code.
   - grant-probe.ts: register first, read-service probes only as fallback.
   - New daily cron /api/extensions/skatteverket/ombud/sync/cron (30 3 * * *):
     one register call discovers every company that granted us, creates or
     downgrades connection rows by org number, runs from shadow mode on,
     and never mass-revokes on an empty register.
   - POST /system-connection/deeplink + "Utse {app} som ombud" button:
     the company lands in SKV's e-service with roles pre-selected.
   - Default system scopes include `obr`; skvRequestWithAuth gains an
     `accept` option (Ombudshantering requires the Accept header).

Still inert in prod until the org certificate and avtal land; the cron and
verify routes no-op while system auth is off or unconfigured.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkLnhWnxt5wWB9j3vfMmxu

* fix(skatteverket): skeptic round on ombud sync, register 404 fallback, opt-in-only rows, mass-downgrade guard

Cron touches only existing connection rows (a tenant's own Verifiera or
deep-link opt-in; the deeplink route now records a pending row), so an
org-number twin never gets auto-verified, and rows the tenant revoked
locally stay revoked. A register 404 throws by default (spec: wrong URI)
and is empty only for the cron, which guards it. Decisions are planned
before any upsert; a run that would fully deny >= 3 rows and > 50% of the
granted ones applies no downgrade. Grants that classify as neither
behörighet are 'error', not 'denied'. Literal select in listConnections for
the phantom-column scanner. window.open without 'noopener' so the
pre-opened tab exists; opener nulled by hand. Deeplink route test added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkLnhWnxt5wWB9j3vfMmxu

* fix(skatteverket): CodeRabbit round: exact role labels, paginate connections, deny never-listed rows, fail deeplink without opt-in row

Role descriptions match the whole label so 'Momsdeklaration,
deklarationsombud' is never read as the narrow moms role. listConnections
pages through fetchAllRows on (created_at, id). A pending row the register
never lists is written once as denied instead of staying 'Inte verifierad'.
The deeplink route returns 500 when the opt-in row cannot be stored, and the
panel navigates in-tab when the pre-opened tab was blocked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkLnhWnxt5wWB9j3vfMmxu

* fix(skatteverket): fence ombud grants on contested org numbers; cron honours unrecognised role codes

An org number claimed by more than one live company is contested: verify
and deep link answer 409 ORG_NUMBER_CONTESTED and the nightly sync changes
nothing on it, so a tenant that typed a victim's public org number cannot
inherit the victim's grant. The sync also skips huvudmän whose register
roles classify as neither behörighet (pinning problem, never a denial),
mirroring probeViaOmbudsregister.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkLnhWnxt5wWB9j3vfMmxu

* fix(skatteverket): validate the ombud deep link host; withdraw grants on contested org numbers

The register's djuplank must be an https skatteverket.se URL before it is
returned or navigated to (the settings page follows it). The nightly sync
now withdraws a grant already recorded on an org number that more than one
live company claims, instead of only refusing new ones.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkLnhWnxt5wWB9j3vfMmxu

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 23:42:23 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg ea45e9dc2f fix(invoices): say what payment detail is missing, per currency (#2126) (#2139) 
"Fakturan saknar ett betalningskonto för vald valuta" read as a
foreign-currency account when the invoice was in SEK and the gap was
simply the company's bankgiro; the remediation line also asked for an
IBAN, which SEK does not need. A Visma-migrated user marking invoices
as sent hit this and went looking for a valutakonto.

- describeMissingInvoicePaymentAccount(currency) in
  lib/invoices/payment-accounts.ts: SEK names bankgiro, plusgiro, Swish
  or bank account; other currencies ask for an IBAN account in that
  currency (USD/GBP also offer routing number / sort code + BIC). Both
  point at Inställningar → Fakturering.
- getErrorMessage branches on INVOICE_SEND_PAYMENT_ACCOUNT_MISSING +
  details.currency (every dashboard route already sends it), before the
  English registry shortcut so both locales get the specific text.
- Registry entry rewritten currency-neutral for consumers without
  details (API, MCP): bankgiro/plusgiro/Swish/bankkonto for SEK, IBAN
  otherwise; remediation no longer says IBAN for everything.
- Staged-operation commit path uses the helper directly.

Tests: helper per currency, client mapping sv/en and the no-details
fallback.

Closes #2126


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WFhSQWzu5SyXB6kG5ActZc

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 22:38:01 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg dd84d6c1bb fix(mcp): tag unmapped tool failures with their cause vocabulary (#2051) (#2135) 
Closes #2051. errorCauseTag() shipped in #2027 written and tested but
wired to nothing. This connects it: the two execution catch paths (sync
call and task) now pass errorCause into mcp.tool_called, carrying the
SQLSTATE or coded-error code, else the error's class name, capped at 64
chars.

The rows this exists for are the UNKNOWN_ERROR residue, whose
errorMessage is the constant "Något gick fel. Försök igen." and whose
errorDetail is the English constant: 465 such rows in the last 30 days
(create_voucher 58 of its 60 failures, query_journal 122) with nothing
to cluster on. A five-character SQLSTATE is protocol vocabulary; a raw
driver message can quote row values from a constraint violation and
belongs in the server log, never in event_log, so the raw message is
deliberately not captured.

A plain `new Error(...)` tags null rather than 'Error': tagging
everything is the same as tagging nothing. Pre-execution denials (scope,
capability, validation, unknown tool) pass nothing because their
errorCode already is the cause.

Self-tested by unwiring one call site and watching the new test name it.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3P2hr19PhQuCoTSGoegcY

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 22:07:46 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 191fb2cfce fix(audit): alias learning is not a rule change, stop logging it (BFNAR noise) (#2134) 
Production falsified 20260901103000's exclusion list within 30 minutes
of deploy: 15 of the first 16 UPDATE audit rows on
categorization_templates changed only the learning columns plus
counterparty_aliases, because the learning path
(lib/bookkeeping/counterparty-templates.ts) merges new aliases in the
same write that bumps occurrence_count. Projected ~800 noise rows/day
against ~50/day of real rule changes, each one rendered into the
legally-facing behandlingshistorik as "Konteringsmall aendrad: Alias".

counterparty_aliases joins the trigger's strip list. The trade-off is
explicit: a human editing ONLY aliases is no longer logged. Accepted
because alias growth is overwhelmingly automatic, and a change that also
touches accounts, VAT, pattern or the active flag still logs: the first
real such row (2026-09-01 19:02:17Z, debit/credit/vat accounts changed
by the learning loop, BFN's automatkontering case exactly) was captured
correctly and stays captured under the new WHEN clause.

The pre-fix noise rows stay in audit_log (append-only). The read model
stops labelling the column, so alias-only diffs, historical ones
included, render as no-ops rather than rule changes; a diff that also
carries a real change shows only the real change.

pg-test extended: alias+learning update writes no audit row,
alias+account update still does. Read-model test pins the pre-fix noise
row shape to null.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3P2hr19PhQuCoTSGoegcY

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 21:58:02 +02:00
Mattsson b56da5d6c5 feat(api): expose bank-connection freshness in MCP and v1 REST (#2124) 
* feat(api): expose bank-connection freshness in MCP and v1 REST

gnubok_connect_bank now returns last_synced_at, consent_expires and
error_message per connection, and its instructions tell the agent to
flag stale or expiring connections. New read-only endpoint
GET /api/v1/companies/{companyId}/bank-connections exposes the same
fields to API-key integrations (scope companies:read).

Background: a user's PSD2 feed died silently in July; bookkeeping
looked complete while three weeks stale, and nothing on the API/MCP
surface could reveal it. Sync stays cron-driven; an agent-triggerable
sync was considered and deferred (see DECISIONS.md).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01USJHnxsindrs9X6zqQDLix

* fix(api): address skeptic findings on bank-connection freshness

- Map the bank-connections group into skills/accounted-api (apiskill:check
  crashed on the unmapped group; regenerated skill files included).
- Gate the v1 route on the bank_sync capability, mirroring the MCP twin:
  a lapsed entitlement now answers with a capability error instead of
  status=active with a frozen last_synced_at.
- Reword MCP instructions + v1 pitfalls: null last_synced_at right after
  connecting is normal, staleness threshold aligned to the UI's 36 hours,
  and re-authorisation is only advised for expired/error/consent-out, not
  for stale-but-active connections (lapsed subscription or deselected
  accounts are the usual causes there).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01USJHnxsindrs9X6zqQDLix

* fix(mcp): keep gnubok_connect_bank schema under the tools/list token ceiling

The enriched outputSchema plus the worked examples that landed on main
(#2100) pushed the projected tools/list payload 20 tokens over the
61.6K context-budget ceiling. Drop the per-property descriptions from
the new freshness fields; the instructions string (runtime output, not
catalog payload) already explains them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01USJHnxsindrs9X6zqQDLix

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 20:54:55 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg a08bf51ced feat(reports): log behandlingsregler changes and program versions (BFNAR 2013:2 p. 9.16) (#2097) 
* feat(reports): log behandlingsregler changes and program versions (BFNAR 2013:2 p. 9.16)

Part 3 of the behandlingshistorik series (#1787 report, #1790 PDF). BFNAR
2013:2 punkt 9.16 second paragraph requires the behandlingshistorik to record
"forandringar i bokforingssystemet som paverkar bokforingsposternas behandling
samt nar dessa forandringar infordes", and BFN's commentary names
behandlingsregler (automatkonteringar, fasta procentsatser) and new program
versions as the examples. Until now both changed without a trace.

Audit triggers on the behandlingsregler tables and the import logs:
mapping_rules, booking_template_library, categorization_templates,
salary_payroll_config, sie_imports, bank_file_imports. categorization_templates
learns on every booking (occurrence_count, confidence, last_seen_date), so
those telemetry-only updates are excluded by a WHEN clause the same way the
api_keys request counters are (20260721115701): only real rule changes are
logged. Measured against prod that is roughly 3 800 new audit rows a month
against an audit_log already taking 371 688, so about +1 %.

app_releases is an append-only log of program versions seen in production,
written by the runtime the first time a build answers a request. Vercel exposes
no build hook we can trust to write the row, so /api/version records it inside
after(): the handler returns synchronously and a floating promise could be
frozen before the insert lands, which is how a version log ends up silently
empty. The service client is constructed lazily so the constantly polled public
probe pays nothing once the module guard is set.

Program versions are rolled up per Swedish calendar day in the report. main
takes ~570 merges a month, so one event per version would be on the order of
7 000 a fiscal year: enough to trip the PDF's own 4 000-event guard and bury the
~400 events a real company's year contains. The statutory unit is the date, and
the same sentence qualifies the requirement to changes that affect processing,
which a deploy list cannot distinguish anyway. app_releases keeps the
per-version truth for anyone who needs to go deeper.

AuditLogEntry.user_id becomes string | null. The column is nullable and
write_audit_log() falls back to auth.uid(), which is NULL for a service-role or
global write; the company-less salary_payroll_config rows are the first that
routinely hit it, and the read model already coded for it.

Also restores the point citations the 2026-07-27 pass removed while the chapter
was unverified: it is kapitel 9, not kapitel 8 (which is arkivering), verified
against BFN's consolidated text.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3P2hr19PhQuCoTSGoegcY

* test(pg): fix two fixture bugs in the behandlingshistorik trigger tests

pg-real caught both, and neither is in the migration: the inserts fail
before the trigger is reached.

mapping_rules.rule_type is constrained to mcc_code / merchant_name /
description_pattern / amount_threshold / combined; the test used
'merchant'.

booking_template_library's btl_insert policy requires
current_user_can_write() and company_id = current_active_company_id(),
so the authenticated insert needs a company_members row and a
user_preferences.active_company_id, the same setup
booking-template-hidden.pg.test.ts uses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3P2hr19PhQuCoTSGoegcY

* test(pg): assert the booking-template audit row inside the user transaction

withUserContext always rolls back, so the audit row the trigger writes
is gone before an outside connection can see it. The trigger fires in
the same transaction as the write, so the assertion belongs there too.
The other cases in this file write on the pool (autocommit) and are
unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3P2hr19PhQuCoTSGoegcY

* fix(reports): name every build id in the per-day program-version entry

Raised by the compliance review on #2097: the roll-up listed five ids
and a count, which leaves an auditor unable to reconstruct which
versions ran that day. app_releases keeps the full record, but the
report is the surface anyone actually reads. A day is bounded by the
deploy rate (~19), so the full list stays one readable cell.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L3P2hr19PhQuCoTSGoegcY

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 20:31:10 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg e5fba9471e feat(bookkeeping): verifikationsserie dropdown, wider Ny verifikat modal, balancing amount on focus (#2120) 
Three fixes to the Ny verifikation modal.

1. Verifikationsserie is a closed dropdown, not a one-letter free-text
   field. Ships Fortnox's table verbatim from their Systemdokumentation
   (A Redovisning, B Kundfakturor, C Inbetalningar från kunder,
   D Leverantörsfakturor, E Utbetalningar till leverantörer, F Kassa,
   G Avskrivning, H Periodisering, I Bokslut, J Revisor, K Lön,
   L Kontantfaktura, M Momsrapport). A is deliberately Redovisning, not
   Kundfakturor: it is the general series manual entries land in, and
   migration 20260526120700 ships every source_type defaulting to 'A', so
   every existing company's A series already holds everything. Any letter
   the company already configured is appended so no existing value can
   fall out of the picker.

2. The modal goes from sm:max-w-3xl to sm:max-w-5xl lg:max-w-6xl.

3. Tabbing or clicking into an untouched amount proposes the outstanding
   difference, pre-selected so typing replaces it. Only fires when the row
   has an account, both amounts are empty, and the difference belongs on
   that side.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DnoyZCbfm2geRbwtUpi6XN
 2026-09-01 20:05:36 +02:00
Mattsson 0406e628e1 fix(settings): scope cross-field VAT validations to saves that touch them (#2121) 
* fix(settings): scope cross-field VAT validations to saves that touch them

The settings PUT validated the whole effective record on every partial
update, so companies stored as vat_registered without a vat_number were
blocked from saving anything through the endpoint, including the invoice
bank-details dialog, which has no VAT fields (reported by a user stuck on
"Momsregistreringsnummer kravs...").

Each cross-field check (VAT completeness, 40m-monthly, periodisk
sammanstallning) now runs only when the request body touches a field in
its group, so the invariant still holds whenever VAT config is edited.
Explicit null now counts as clearing a value during validation instead of
falling back to the stored one, closing a latent hole where
{ vat_number: null } passed validation but wrote null.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016fjJLUucErb1ZHyQ57fe1u

* fix(invoices): gate issuance on the seller VAT number (skeptic finding)

The settings scoping in the previous commit removed what was accidentally
the only enforcement of "momsregistrerad implies momsregnr on file": with
bank details saveable again, a registered company without a stored VAT
number could issue a faktura charging moms with no seller VAT number in
the footer (mandatory element, ML (2023:200) 17 kap. 24 §).

Issuance is now gated the same way the payment account is, at all four
independent issuance points (issueAndBookInvoice, dashboard send, v1 send,
v1 mark-sent), with a structured error pointing at Installningar -> Skatt.
Credit notes, proformas, and delivery notes are exempt like the payment
gate exempts them.

Also, per the Swedish review and the secondary skeptic finding:
- PS/EU-trade edits join the VAT-completeness touch group, so enabling
  periodisk sammanstallning on an incomplete registration keeps failing.
- The stale ML 11 kap. 8 citation is updated to ML 17 kap. 24.

The makeCompanySettings fixture now models a coherent registered company
(vat_number set); the missing-number tests override it explicitly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016fjJLUucErb1ZHyQ57fe1u

* fix(invoices): extend the seller-VAT-number gate to the headless issuance paths

Skeptic round 2 found three more issuance points beside the four gated in
the previous commit: the recurring auto-send service (cron, no human in
the loop), and the MCP staged-operation executors send_invoice and
mark_invoice_sent. Each carried the payment-account gate but not the VAT
gate; mark_invoice_sent additionally had a narrow settings select that
would have made a naive gate silently pass, now widened.

Recurring auto-send fails soft, matching its other guards: the invoice
stays a numbered draft with the standard schedule warning. The executors
return the structured Swedish message. Peppol send was verified
self-gating (BIS preflight requires the supplier VAT number).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016fjJLUucErb1ZHyQ57fe1u

* test(email): refresh brand-mail snapshots for the coherent VAT fixture

The makeCompanySettings fixture now carries a VAT number, so the invoice
and reminder mail footers correctly render the VAT line; the snapshots
predate that. Also cites ML 17 kap. 22-23 (andringsfaktura content list)
in the seller-vat-number docstring per the Swedish review suggestion,
documenting why credit notes are exempt. No behavior change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016fjJLUucErb1ZHyQ57fe1u

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 19:30:25 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg b5da51ea0a feat(settings): API & MCP tab: correct connector URL namespace, plugin path, Swedish guide (#2105) 
* feat(settings): API & MCP tab: correct connector URL namespace, plugin path, Swedish guide

The in-product MCP URLs omitted `tool_namespace=accounted`, and
resolveMcpToolNamespace() falls back to the legacy `gnubok_` prefix when the
param is absent. Every connection made from Settings therefore got `gnubok_*`
tool names while the docs, the accounted-api skill, and
claude-plugin/.mcp.json all reference `accounted_*`.

- Add `tool_namespace=accounted` to the Claude.ai, Claude Code, and
  Claude Desktop snippets.
- Move the Claude Desktop bridge from `npx gnubok-mcp` / `GNUBOK_API_KEY` to
  `npx -y accounted-mcp` / `ACCOUNTED_API_KEY`, and emit `ACCOUNTED_URL` so
  self-hosted and white-label instances get a config pointing at their own
  host. The `gnubok_sk_` key prefix is unchanged: it is wire format.
- Surface the Claude Code plugin, the only path that configures the
  connection and the seven workflow commands in one step.
- Rename the settings tab "API" to "API & MCP" and rewrite its intro: the
  MCP connection is what most users come here for, not API keys.
- Link the step-by-step guide from the panel, locale-aware.

Docs: add a Swedish /docs/api/anslut-claude alongside the English page (the
docs site has no locale routing, so each language is its own URL), give both
the Claude Code plugin path, and teach the export and freshness scripts about
the new page so cross-repo drift is caught.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HfZgiZmNN6qGEfgvXqxAeg

* fix(settings,docs): Cursor is not Claude Code; use the accounted_ tool name

Review follow-up on #2105.

`claude mcp add` is a Claude Code command. Cursor does not read it, so the
"Claude Code / Cursor" row and the docs sentence pointing Cursor users at that
command were both wrong (the row predates this PR; the docs sentence did not).
Cursor now gets its own row and its own `~/.cursor/mcp.json` snippet with the
`url` field, in the panel and in both docs pages.

Also `vat_close_check` -> `accounted_vat_close_check` in the reviewer test on
both pages, matching the identifier used in the prompts section above it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HfZgiZmNN6qGEfgvXqxAeg

* feat(settings,docs): one-click Connect to Claude, and cut the panel to one action

Anthropic documents an install link for custom connectors:
https://claude.ai/customize/connectors?modal=add-custom-connector&connectorName=NAME&connectorUrl=ENCODED
(claude.com/docs/connectors/building/directory-vs-custom). It opens claude.ai
with the connector name and URL prefilled; the user still reviews and confirms,
and it grants nothing on its own. We were telling people to copy a URL and go
paste it somewhere else instead.

Settings panel, rendered and reviewed:
- "Connect to Claude" button is now the only thing above the fold. Everything
  that needs a config file or a terminal (claude.ai manual paste, Claude Code,
  the plugin, Cursor) moved into one "Other clients" disclosure, and the
  API-key methods keep theirs. Four code blocks -> one button, 1057px -> 719px.
- The connect group renders above the API-keys group. Connecting is why users
  open this tab; the tab's own intro says so.
- Each entry inside the disclosures shows its instruction as visible text.
  They were `?` HelpPopovers, so the panel read as opaque code blobs with no
  instructions on screen.
- Prose interpolates the brand's real casing, not the lowercased config key.

Docs, both languages: Path A leads with the install link and drops from five
manual steps to a link plus three short paragraphs, with the manual paste kept
under a subheading. No raw HTML: the docs renderer has no rehype-raw, so
<details> would have been silently dropped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HfZgiZmNN6qGEfgvXqxAeg

* fix(settings,docs): correct claude mcp add syntax and the SSR install link

Review follow-up. Both findings verified before acting on them.

`claude mcp add --help` gives `claude mcp add [options] <name> <commandOrUrl>`:
the URL is positional and there is no `--url` flag, so the API-key snippet
would have failed on a missing argument. Both commands now put
`--transport http` before the name and pass the URL positionally, in the panel
and in both docs pages.

The panel is server-rendered before it hydrates and window.location has no
server equivalent, so the install link was built from a relative mcpBase in the
first paint. A click in that window would hand claude.ai a connectorUrl it
cannot resolve. The origin now resolves after mount and the anchor carries no
href until it is known, which also makes it unclickable rather than wrong.
Verified: the SSR HTML contains no claude.ai href and no relative connectorUrl,
post-hydration the href is absolute, and there are no hydration warnings.

DECISIONS.md: code-span the `gnubok_*`/`accounted_*` wildcards so they stop
rendering as emphasis, and drop the "no one-click deeplink" claim from the
earlier entry rather than leave a false statement standing two lines above its
own correction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HfZgiZmNN6qGEfgvXqxAeg

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 16:56:19 +02:00
Mattsson cd40127f0e feat(bank): expose bank-reported balance (booked + available) in UI, reconciliation, MCP and v1 API (#2118) 
* feat(bank): expose bank-reported balance (booked + available) in UI, reconciliation, MCP and v1 API

The PSD2 sync has fetched the bank's reported balance for years but the
data was stranded (F7): the Bank-page source picker read a cash_accounts
column no sync ever updated (frozen at connect time), reconciliation
hard-coded external_balance to null for bank accounts, and neither MCP
nor the v1 API exposed any balance at all, so the only path to a current
bank balance was logging into the bank.

- getAccountBalance now returns booked + available from the same
  quota-limited BALANCES response (previously all but one type discarded)
- every sync (manual + cron) mirrors balance, available_balance and
  balance_updated_at into cash_accounts, fixing the stale picker
- new cash_accounts.available_balance column (additive migration)
- reconciliation bank kind: external_balance = bank-reported balance,
  plus bank_reported_* fields and fetch timestamp in the bank block;
  difference math stays movement-based and untouched
- reconciliation view shows "Saldo enligt banken ... hamtat {date}"
- MCP gnubok_list_cash_accounts returns the three balance fields; the
  cash_today prompt now reports the bank's figure instead of teaching
  agents to answer with the bookkept 19xx balance
- new GET /api/v1/companies/{companyId}/cash-accounts endpoint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm

* fix(bank): keep external_balance null for bank sign-offs; never fabricate a zero balance; guard the mirror against stale writers

Post-review fixes from the skeptic pass + CodeRabbit on PR #2118:

- external_balance stays null for the bank reconciliation kind: sign-off
  persists it into account_reconciliations and bokslutsbilagor computes
  closing - external from that row, so a today-balance stored on a
  balansdag sign-off printed a phantom warning-red differens in the
  year-end appendix. The bank-reported figure lives only in the
  timestamped bank_reported_* pair in the bank block, and only when its
  fetch timestamp exists (a balance of unknown age is suppressed).
- AccountOverview no longer falls back to today's date when the balance
  timestamp is missing; the line is omitted instead.
- getAccountBalance returns null on an empty BALANCES response instead
  of fabricating amount 0 with a fresh timestamp; sync keeps the
  previous stored value.
- updateBalancesFromSync only writes over an older-or-missing
  balance_updated_at, so an older sync run finishing later cannot move
  the mirrored balance backwards.
- The inline initial backfill (picker save) now mirrors fetched
  balances into cash_accounts too (accounts_data is deliberately not
  re-written there).
- cash_today MCP prompt mentions the gnubok_call_tool bridge for hosts
  that only see the default catalog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm

* fix(bank): express the stale-writer guard as two literal predicates for the schema guard

The .or() with a template literal pushed the no-phantom-columns
unresolvable-expression count over its ceiling. Same semantics, two
updates: one for rows with an older timestamp, one for rows with none.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm

* fix(bank): rank interimBooked (ITBD) as a booked balance type before the generic fallback

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ewu46quXgh9LSr9UwYusxm

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 16:16:29 +02:00
Mattsson a57a8d968b fix(webshop-orders): stop syncing failed WooCommerce orders, remove stale unpaid rows (#2119) 
* fix(webshop-orders): stop importing failed WooCommerce orders, remove stale rows on failed transition

Failed checkouts carry no money event but imported as permanently
unbookable 'Ej betald' rows (user report). orderImports() now excludes
'failed' alongside 'trash', and a re-polled order that transitioned to
failed deletes its existing row via removeWebshopOrders(), which enforces
the freeze boundary app-side: frozen rows are never deleted, and a parent
with a frozen refund child is spared because parent_order_id cascades.
Removal failures hold the sync cursor like upsert failures do.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014hQZLCdT56j8nAyoQtAs2C

* fix(webshop-orders): make failed-order removal race-safe per skeptic findings

Repeat every guard on the DELETE statement itself, not only the candidate
select: a row booked/marked/invoiced between the two round trips must
survive (TOCTOU refutation). Never remove paid rows (orderRemoves gated on
!orderIsPaid plus is_paid=false on both statements): money moved at some
point, and paid parents are the only rows that can carry refund children,
which also closes the cascade race without a DB trigger. Spare
cross-marked rows (legacy_transaction_id): the order may be booked via the
retired transactions feed without any freeze column set.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014hQZLCdT56j8nAyoQtAs2C

* fix(webshop-orders): audit-log successful failed-order removals

Compliance swarm finding (ISO A.8.10): the hard delete logged only its
failure path. Every successful removal batch now logs companyId, deleted
row ids and the requested external_ids, the only deletion record for
pre-bokforing rows that carry no behandlingshistorik.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014hQZLCdT56j8nAyoQtAs2C

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 15:55:36 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg b1f7116231 fix(observability): clear the dead session on the first bounce, stop filing client disconnects as exceptions, scope the Hem probe (#2114) 
Three small defects found underneath error clusters that are themselves benign.

bounceToAuth returned a bare NextResponse.redirect and never copied the cookies
off supabaseResponse, so the Set-Cookie headers that clear a dead session were
thrown away on the first bounce and the browser replayed the dead refresh token
once more on /login. That doubled both the GoTrue 400s and the log volume. The
AuthApiError itself is left alone: it is correct session-expiry handling that
auth-js logs from inside node_modules, and getUser() returns it as a value.

"The destination stream closed early." is a client disconnecting mid-stream,
produced inside React's Flight server. Next's own isAbortError filter does not
recognise React's cancel error, so instrumentation.ts reported it to PostHog
Error Tracking as a real exception against real users' session replays and paid
an awaited flush on an otherwise-healthy request. A narrow predicate now
early-returns before PostHog is touched. This cannot remove the line from
Vercel's runtime-error table, which is fed by Next's stderr.

other-account-hint.ts issued an unfiltered journal_entries probe on the
blocking Hem render path, inside a render Promise.all: roughly 1 in 20 Hem
loads waited an extra 2.5 s for an advisory nudge. An unfiltered probe on a
multi-tenant table is also a correctness smell. It is now company-scoped and
off the blocking path.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 15:03:23 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg f1d76deaba fix(providers): stop dead-ending on a resource 403, and stop dropping every migrated kreditfaktura (#2113) 
* fix(providers): stop dead-ending on a resource 403, and stop dropping every migrated kreditfaktura

Two independent defects in the provider migration, both customer-visible.

A per-resource 403 was classified as a dead grant. classifyProviderError mapped
any 401 or 403 to PROVIDER_AUTH_EXPIRED, which is fatal, so a Fortnox account
without leverantorsregister permission aborted the whole migration at the
suppliers step with "Anslutningen har gatt ut. Ateranslut" even though the same
token had just succeeded on the previous step. Reconnecting can never fix that,
and steps 4 and later never ran. The provider's own reason ("Saknar behorighet
for leverantorsregister.") never reached the user. A 403 is now non-fatal once
the same token has already succeeded in the run, the migration continues, and
the provider's reason is surfaced. A 401, or a 403 on the first call, keeps the
auth-expired path.

fetchCompanyInfoDirect swallowed every error and returned null, which made the
existing PROVIDER_API_MODULE_INACTIVE remediation unreachable: a Visma customer
whose api_standard module is off got a silent 200 with an empty company card
instead of the precise Swedish explanation that was already written.

Kreditfakturor were dropped entirely. entity-mapper wrote document_type
'credit_note', but invoices_document_type_check allows only invoice, proforma
and delivery_note, and credit notes are modelled by credited_invoice_id. Every
migrated kreditfaktura was rejected and counted as skipped. One customer
imported 255 sales invoices and 0 credit notes on 2026-08-31; AR and revenue
are overstated by the credited amounts, and kreditfakturor are
rakenskapsinformation. They now import as invoice rows with reversed amounts
and status 'credited', following the in-app credit convention. They import
unlinked: no provider DTO carries a reference to the invoice being credited, so
there is nothing to match on and guessing would corrupt the AR ledger. The
wizard says so instead of burying them in skipped.

Also makes the OAuth callback non-replayable from browser history (no-store
plus history replacement), which is what the "state rejected" events were: a
replay of a callback that had already succeeded seconds earlier. No
already-connected page, so consumed-vs-unknown state stays unobservable to an
unauthenticated caller. Expected PSD2 session expiry drops from error to warn.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc

* fix(arcim): entity line needs the failed flag

The unlinked-credit-note row omitted `failed`, which the entityLines element
type requires. Caught by the zero-extensions build, not by vitest: the unit
suite does not typecheck.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc

* fix(arcim): write the missing-reference disclosure onto the credit note itself

Review finding (swedish-compliance-review-bot): ML 17 kap 22-23 § wants a
kreditfaktura to reference the invoice it credits, and BFL 5 kap 6-7 § wants a
verifikation to reference its underlag. No provider DTO carries that reference,
so the pairing cannot be resolved at import and guessing it would corrupt the
AR ledger. Reporting the count in the migration wizard is not enough: a result
screen is not rakenskapsinformation, and the gap has to be legible on the
record itself years later.

The disclosure now goes into invoices.notes and supplier_invoices.notes,
preserving whatever note the provider sent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 14:57:48 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 4ec2ff4b4d fix(documents): name the journal_entries/fiscal_periods relationship so supplier-invoice underlag can anchor (#2109) 
Prod has three foreign keys between journal_entries and fiscal_periods, so
PostgREST answers PGRST201 to any embed of that pair that does not name the
relationship. pickAnchorEntry() destructured only data, so the error was
dropped and the helper returned null on every call since it shipped on
2026-07-27: supplier-invoice underlag has never once anchored in production.
Users see "Underlag saknas" on a verifikat that plainly shows the invoice PDF.

Names the constraint, matching the already-merged sibling fix in
lib/transactions/inbox-underlag.ts (6a40b3c0e), and handles the error instead
of dropping it.

Adds scripts/checks/ambiguous-embed.mjs to the ratchet guard, because neither
test layer can see this class: a mocked Supabase client never resolves a
relationship, and pg-real bypasses PostgREST entirely. The check derives the
ambiguous table pairs by parsing supabase/migrations, so a migration adding a
second foreign key between two tables arms the guard on the same commit; the
derived list reproduces prod's pg_constraint output exactly. It accepts both
PostgREST hint forms (constraint name and FK column name, both in use here) and
parses aliased embeds, which is the shape the real bug took.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 14:44:54 +02:00
Mattsson 43341aa55c feat(ui): shift-click range selection on list row checkboxes (#2117) 
* feat(ui): shift-click range selection on list row checkboxes

Click one checkbox, shift-click another, and every row between them
takes the clicked row's new state, the way mail clients work. Turns a
20-row bulk selection into two clicks.

New useRangeSelect hook (lib/hooks/use-range-select.ts) keeps the anchor
and applies the range over the rows as currently rendered, so it follows
filtering, sorting and paging rather than the underlying data order. A
shift-click with no valid anchor (first click, or the anchor filtered
away) degrades to a plain toggle. Select-all and clear reset the anchor.

Wired into the 8 selection surfaces: transaction inbox and skattekonto
inbox (separate ranges, since the two row types book through different
endpoints), journal entry list, invoices, supplier invoices, orders,
pending operations, invoice inbox workspace.

Radix' onCheckedChange carries no mouse event, so each row records
shiftKey from the click that precedes it; the checkbox cells get
select-none so shift-clicking does not smear a text selection.

The pure range rule is unit tested (10 cases: both directions, range
unselect, anchor invalidation, rendered-order independence).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015n8vUx9Nukr8mHC7CVNF7y

* fix(ui): void the range anchor on an empty selection, keep placeholders out

Review findings from CodeRabbit and the skeptic pass, all in the new
range-selection feature:

- Clearing a selection left the anchor behind, so the next shift-click
  extended from a row the user could no longer see selected (click a row,
  press "Rensa markering", shift-click 30 rows down, get 30 rows). The
  explicit resetAnchor() calls only covered the clear paths that were
  wired by hand; several others (period change, filter change, post-bulk
  success, "Avmarkera") were not. An empty selection now counts as having
  no anchor, which covers every clear path including ones added later.
- The invoice inbox passed optimistic upload placeholders into visibleIds
  even though they render no checkbox. Safe today only because
  placeholders are always prepended; filtering them out makes the
  invariant local instead of depending on insert order elsewhere.
- pending: "Godkänn alla" pre-selects a non-empty set, so it resets the
  anchor explicitly.

Two existing tests used a fixture the UI cannot reach (an anchor with an
empty selection); they now start from the state a real anchor implies.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015n8vUx9Nukr8mHC7CVNF7y

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 14:37:25 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 77becf3d65 fix(documents): record archive integrity checks in their own ledger so the nightly control advances again (#2108) 
The 03:00 WORM verification cron stamped last_integrity_check_at on
document_attachments. enforce_period_lock_documents() fires on any UPDATE of a
row whose journal entry sits in a closed or locked period, without checking
whether the entry link actually changed, so a read-only integrity stamp was
rejected. The queue orders last_integrity_check_at ASC NULLS FIRST, so the
rejected rows re-sorted to the head every night and the batch became
permanently 200/200 blocked. Both call sites discarded the update error, so
nothing logged and nothing alerted.

Prod state: 34 557 current-version documents, 24 083 never checked, last
successful stamp 2026-08-31 03:00, nightly successes already decayed to
single digits.

Migration 017's enforcement triggers are legally required and never-touch, so
this does not narrow the trigger. The verification outcome moves to its own
document_integrity_checks table and the cron stops writing document_attachments
altogether, which takes the trigger off the write path. The legacy column stays
in place. Failures are now counted, logged and reported in the route's summary:
the silence is why this went unnoticed for weeks.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 14:23:05 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 088754d61a fix(processing-history): register the missing event types, and strip the PII two of them carry (#2111) 
* fix(processing-history): register the missing event types, and strip the PII two of them carry

Ten event types are emitted by code but absent from processing_event_types, so
every append fails the foreign key. Appends are best-effort try/catch, so no
user request fails, but the internal audit trail is empty for ten kinds of
legally motivated act, including the BFL 5 kap 5 § rattelse record when a user
swaps a transaction's underlag (TransactionDocumentReplaced) and the SOC 2
revocation record (OAuthClientRevoked).

Order matters and is deliberate. Two invoice-inbox events, RateLimitedDropped
and AttachmentsTruncated, put the raw sender address and mail subject in their
payload. Registering those types first would start persisting that PII into an
append-only table whose UPDATE is trigger-blocked and which the archive's
erasure path excludes. The strip therefore ships in this same commit, ahead of
the migration.

Only the invoice-inbox emitter was edited. whatsapp-inbox shares the
RateLimitedDropped type name with a payload that carries no phone number.

Closes the class rather than the two logged instances: a TypeScript union makes
an unregistered literal a compile error, and the pg test asserts the database
catalog is a superset of the code's list, generated from the union.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc

* fix(processing-history): strip the inbound-mail PII in the database, not by deploy ordering

Review finding (superagent-security, P2): shipping the emitter fix and the
catalog migration in one commit is not the same as one instant. Migrations
apply on merge while the replacement build takes minutes, so an old instance
can still write a sender address and mail subject in that window, and such a
row is permanent: processing_history takes no UPDATE and no DELETE, and the
archive export excludes it from the erasure path.

Adds a BEFORE INSERT trigger stripping `from` and `subject` from the
RateLimitedDropped and AttachmentsTruncated payloads, and keeps it afterwards
so the invariant belongs to the table rather than to one emitter's good
behaviour. The jsonb object check is load bearing: `payload - 'key'` raises on
a jsonb array and payload's shape is not constrained.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 14:14:09 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 21e6e2d314 fix(proxy): assert the production Supabase project for customer hosts instead of allowlisting them (#2107) 
The white-label guard only fired for hostnames hand-listed in
CUSTOMER_PRODUCTION_WHITE_LABEL_HOSTS. improveone.accounted.se was never added,
so when the .accounted.se domains were pinned to a feature-branch preview the
guard let it through: a customer-branded login page served from a build that
inlines the staging Supabase project, on the open internet, with no alert. The
26 August willem.accounted.se 503s were the same misrouting caught correctly,
because willem was on the list.

Inverts the model. Any customer-facing production hostname (not a *.vercel.app
preview, not localhost) must be served by the production Supabase project or
the guard trips. Adding a new white-label host no longer requires editing a
list in order to be protected.

Also closes two fail-open holes found alongside it. parseBackendHostname
returned null for an undefined NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL, so a missing project
read as "not staging" and fell through; it now trips the guard. And proxy.ts
gains an explicit env guard: today lib/supabase/middleware.ts asserts the URL
and key non-null and @supabase/ssr throws synchronously as the first statement
of updateSessionInner, which takes down every path including /login and
/robots.txt with an opaque crash rather than a deliberate 503.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 14:07:34 +02:00
Mattsson 08b1119c7d feat(connect): wire the SKV extension through the connector broker + data proxy (PR6b-2) (#2103) 
* feat(connect): wire the SKV extension through the connector broker + data proxy (PR6b-2)

In connector mode (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY set, no own SKV credentials) the
Skatteverket extension now routes through the hosted connector stack
(#1757) instead of calling Skatteverket directly:

- skvRequestWithAuth routes to the data proxy: base URL maps to a service
  segment (moms/skattekonto/agd-inlamning/agd-period), the user's SKV
  Bearer moves to X-Connector-Upstream-Authorization, the connector key
  authenticates the proxy, and the gateway Client_Id/Client_Secret are
  omitted (the proxy adds Arcim's). Connector-layer 4xx bodies (code
  CONNECTOR_*) are classified before the SKV-shaped 401/403 sniffing so a
  broker refusal surfaces operator guidance (check GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY),
  never APIGW/BankID guidance for knobs the instance does not have.
- OAuth: /authorize starts the consent via the broker's authorize-url
  (persisting its redirect_uri + connector_state), the hosted SKV callback
  bounces the code back to the instance, and exchangeCodeForTokens /
  refreshAccessToken exchange through the broker's /oauth/token,
  unwrapping its { data } envelope. Tokens still rest encrypted on the
  instance; client_id/client_secret never exist there.
- Broker refresh 404 CONNECTOR_NOT_OWNED maps to SESSION_EXPIRED
  (terminal; reconnect fixes); broker 502 stays a raw error so a transient
  SKV outage never re-arms the reconnect banner (#1155).
- getSkatteverketEnvironment() reports 'prod' in connector mode: the
  upstream env is hosted's, and the instance's unset defaults would show a
  false Testmiljo badge on real filings.
- System (CCG/ombud) auth is deliberately not brokered: hosted-only,
  stays direct.

Hosted and own-credentials self-hosts are byte-identical: every branch
gates on skatteverketConnectorMode(), which is null whenever own SKV
credentials exist or no connector key is set. Direct-path tests pin that.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KRfamAKDqvRNwbjr5XD2VS

* fix(connect): classify SKV dead-refresh-token dialects broker-side; forward diagnostic headers; connector-aware gateway guidance

Skeptic refutation on PR #2103 (found independently by the correctness and
compliance skeptics): the broker's /oauth/token catch-all collapsed SKV's
terminal dead-refresh-token dialects (404 id_not_found, 400 invalid_grant,
"Refresh Token status is expired": the dominant refresh outcome, per-flow
tokens live 65 minutes) into the generic 502 CONNECTOR_SKV_TOKEN_FAILED, so
a connector instance could never classify ordinary session expiry: raw
English 500s instead of the reconnect flow, staged filing operations
consumed as non-recoverable, crons retrying raw forever.

- Broker /oauth/token: re-codes those dialects as 401
  CONNECTOR_SKV_REFRESH_DEAD, refresh grant only (invalid_grant on the code
  exchange means an expired one-shot code and keeps the generic 502). The
  classifier (isSkvDeadRefreshTokenError) uses the same regex set the
  extension's direct path classifies with.
- Instance dead-token classifier maps CONNECTOR_SKV_REFRESH_DEAD to
  SESSION_EXPIRED alongside 404 CONNECTOR_NOT_OWNED; the generic 502 stays
  a raw error so a transient SKV outage never re-arms the reconnect banner.
- Data proxy: forwards WWW-Authenticate and x-skv-*/x-amzn-*/x-api-*
  response headers (the instance's MISSING_SCOPE classification reads them;
  body-less gateway rejections carry no other signal).
- Instance gateway-refusal guidance is connector-aware: a self-host has no
  SKATTEVERKET_APIGW_CLIENT_ID and no Utvecklarportalen access, so connector
  mode points at /api/connector/status and support instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KRfamAKDqvRNwbjr5XD2VS

* fix(connect): reject redirects on the instance's broker OAuth requests

CodeRabbit inline finding (CWE-200): the connector-mode authorize-url and
token requests followed redirects by default, so a 307/308 would resend the
connector key (and code/refresh token) to the redirect target. redirect
'error', matching the broker's own postToken rule; the token response must
only ever come from the broker endpoint itself.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KRfamAKDqvRNwbjr5XD2VS

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 12:11:34 +02:00
Mattsson ee22c9c7b7 feat(connect): connector status + Synka nu row in Settings -> Abonnemang (PR6b-3) (#2104) 
* feat(connect): connector status + Synka nu row in Settings -> Abonnemang (PR6b-3)

Self-host only: shows per-upstream connector mode, key prefix, and the
active company's granted capabilities from GET /api/connector/status,
plus a manual run of the entitlement sync via the new authed
POST /api/connector/sync (requireWrite, 60s cooldown) instead of
waiting for the hourly cron. Hidden on hosted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KAUKbGUGtAmRhpDKfn84F5

* fix(connect): handle sync fetch rejection, count capabilities not rows, not_configured toast

Skeptic findings on the Synka nu flow: a rejected fetch (instance
restarting) was a silent no-op with an unhandled rejection; the success
toast printed grant rows (companies x scopes) as capabilities; a
not_configured outcome claimed the hosted service was unreachable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KAUKbGUGtAmRhpDKfn84F5

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 11:44:33 +02:00
Mattsson aabddb592f feat(billing): multi-user paywall: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy (#2099) 
* feat(billing): multi-user seat gate: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy

Multiple people in one company becomes a paid capability (multi_user, the
eighth PAID key). Derived at access time from capability_grants, no status
column, no enforcement cron:

- entitled: active grant (trial/stripe/team/manual/comp), everyone works
- grace: newest grant expired < 20 days ago; countdown banner for everyone
  in companies with > 1 user; invites still allowed
- frozen: only role=owner resolves; other memberships go dormant (rows
  untouched, paying reactivates instantly); invites 403 with paid-plan upsell

Enforcement: new resolve_active_company_gated RPC (zero-arg RPC and RLS twin
untouched: they also run on self-hosts, where the gate never bites), gated
query fallback for service-role/API-key paths, setActiveCompany guard, MCP
company-access check, invite route. Middleware routes all-frozen users to a
new /paused page; the switcher greys locked companies.

Migration 20260901081417 (applied to staging): trial trigger seeds
multi_user, backfills for mid-trial companies, active Stripe subs, team
agreements, and a grandfather grant (expires now, i.e. grace = deploy + 20
days) for existing unpaid multi-member companies. Daily cron mails owners at
grace start and last day. Strings in sv+en; pg-real + unit tests included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP

* fix(billing): multi-user seat gate hardening from skeptic review

- Stripe cancel now EXPIRES the multi_user stripe grant instead of deleting
  it: the 20-day grace window hangs on an expired row, so a deleted one
  froze churned payers' staff instantly with no banner and no mail. Other
  stripe grants keep the freeze-and-retain delete.
- New SECURITY DEFINER company_multi_user_state() RPC (migration
  20260901083726, applied to staging) and RPC-first getMultiUserState:
  capability_grants RLS hides team-scoped rows from non-team users, so
  user-client reads misread byra-covered companies as frozen (switch
  refusal, wrong switcher locks).
- Byra-kind teams get a standing team-scoped multi_user grant (backfill +
  teams trigger): byra client companies have no company-scoped trial by
  design, so a grantless byra team would freeze every consultant and
  client user.
- Comped/manual companies with active PAID-key grants extend to multi_user
  (a comped company must not read as paying while locking out user two).
- /api/v1 gets the same dormancy gate as MCP (frozen non-owner -> 403).
- PGRST202 on resolution fails OPEN (pre-migration DB has zero multi_user
  rows; the gated fallback would have frozen every non-owner mid-deploy).
- Grace cron: covers team-scoped lapses (byra agreement ending) and skips
  the start mail for the hand-mailed grandfather cohort.
- Tests updated/added across all touched surfaces; pg tests for the new
  RPC and byra trigger; trial-suppression pg test extended to 8 keys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP

* fix(billing): decouple seat-gate env check and fail open on gate read throws

CI round 1 on #2099:
- isMultiUserEnforced no longer imports has-capability: several route test
  suites partially mock that module and the vitest mock guard threw from
  inside the v1 seat gate, turning expected 4xx responses into 500s.
  multi_user is never a connector capability, so the bypass reduces to the
  same env reads, now inlined.
- getMultiUserState wraps its resolution in a fail-open try/catch: a client
  without .rpc or a thrown network error must never lock users out.
- no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 -> 393 with reasons: the seat gate's .or()
  scope filter (server-resolved UUIDs) and the Stripe cancel expiry update's
  timestamp .or(); all columns in both strings are literals.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP

* fix(billing): membership-guard the multi-user entitlement RPCs (Superagent P3)

company_multi_user_ok and company_multi_user_state are SECURITY DEFINER and
were granted to authenticated with a caller-supplied company UUID: any
logged-in user could probe an arbitrary company's billing state and grace
deadline across tenants. Migration 20260901091752 (applied to staging)
requires an auth.uid() membership in the target company when a JWT is
present, keeps service-role/definer contexts unrestricted, and clamps the
grace window to [0, 20] days. pg tests: stranger gets false/NULL, member
reads normally, oversized p_grace_days cannot widen the probe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 11:29:12 +02:00
Mattsson ca12b1855e fix(connect): PR #1758 CodeRabbit follow-up: connector status hardening, i18n strings, doc alignment (#2098) 
* fix(connect): PR #1758 CodeRabbit follow-up: harden connector status, i18n the connector-mode strings, align docs

- getConnectorConfig() rebuilds baseUrl as origin + path: userinfo, query
  and fragment are stripped (warn-logged without the raw value) so nothing
  secret-shaped pasted into GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL survives into the
  /api/connector/status echo or the derived proxy URLs (CWE-200)
- /api/connector/status responds Cache-Control: no-store on both branches
  (key prefix + wiring layout out of shared browser caches, CWE-525)
- CWE-319 thread verified as no-change: both connector-mode helpers derive
  from getConnectorConfig(), which fails closed on non-https
- SkatteverketConnectPanel tooltips and BankSyncNowButton gate/upsell
  strings moved to messages/sv.json + messages/en.json keys
- DECISIONS.md: MD037 fix on line 1146 (backtick the glob), line 1147
  reworded to grants-written-wiring-pending, decision lines appended
  (incl. declining the UpgradeNote children-append suggestion)
- docs/SOVEREIGN.md availability wording aligned with SELF-HOSTING.md:
  infra merged, keys issued manually on request, client wiring pending

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKZUp1nePr8sVDoLkMSxbS

* docs(connect): skeptic follow-up: bank client wiring is merged (#2094), SKV pending, no keys issued until it lands

Skeptic refutation on PR #2098: SOVEREIGN.md claimed the services 'do not
carry traffic' while this branch already contains #2094 (EB client proxy
routing), and 'issued manually on request' contradicted the standing
no-key-before-full-PR6b rule while skatteverketConnectorMode() has no
client consumer yet. SOVEREIGN.md, SELF-HOSTING.md and DECISIONS.md line
1147 now all say: bank client wiring merged and carries traffic with a
key, Skatteverket client wiring ships in a following release, keys are
not issued until it lands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UKZUp1nePr8sVDoLkMSxbS

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 11:16:37 +02:00
Mattsson e113e9c099 fix(vat,documents): EU reverse-charge packs feed ruta 20/21; daily reanchor cron for floating supplier-invoice underlag (#2095) 
Two user reports (Anders, 2026-08-25 + 2026-08-29):

1. The seeded standardmallar "Inkop EU-varor/-tjanster, omvand moms 25%"
   booked the cost on 4010/6540, which no momsdeklaration ruta reads, so the
   fiktiv moms filled ruta 30/48 while ruta 20/21 (inkopsvarde) stayed 0;
   Skatteverket rejects that (FK004, ML 13 kap). The packs now book directly
   on the basis accounts 4515/4535 (ACCOUNT_RUTA -> ruta 20/21); the
   transaction-picker path already skips its own basis emission for basis
   debit accounts, so no double counting. Regression test pins every
   reverse-charge pack to a 44xx/45xx business debit. Prod rows update via
   the existing pack sync cron (upsert on pack_slug).

2. A kontantmetod payment verifikat stayed "Underlag saknas" although the
   invoice PDF was attached and eligible on every static condition: the
   inline anchorSupplierInvoiceDocument silently did nothing (prod case
   2026-08-28, verified in audit_log: no document_attachments update between
   the payment booking and the user's manual re-upload). The helper now
   verifies the guarded update actually matched a row instead of claiming
   success on zero rows, logs its silent bail branches, and a new daily cron
   (/api/documents/reanchor/cron) re-runs the anchor for any floating
   retained document with a posted verifikat, replacing the pattern of
   one-off repair migrations (20260727180000, 20260824150000). The sweep
   names the FK in its embed and is idempotent; locked/closed periods are
   skipped as before.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Jj6Rg1ViyFRej55gbxLVgj

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 10:16:07 +02:00
Mattsson a47d54f1d7 feat(supplier-invoices): sortable list columns matching the customer invoice list (#2091) 
Adds client-side sorting to /supplier-invoices: all seven columns get the
same accessible SortableHeader as /invoices, backed by a pure comparator
(Swedish collation, nulls last, displayed-value semantics, stable
invoice_date/id tie-break). The click cycle is tri-state (asc, desc, back
to the API default of due date ascending) per the verifikat-list
precedent, since this list has a meaningful default order to return to.
The detail-pager list context follows the sorted order.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DZSVsZqbx8vDnC2SXunNaR

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 09:23:31 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 50f13cf198 feat(connect): self-host connector enablement: EB/SKV in the preset, connector-mode seam, status endpoint (#1758) 
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector'

Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted.

- lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync,
  skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a
  self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability().
  Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on
  purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant.
- lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key).
  Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins,
  else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on
  (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector
  capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the
  grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows.
  getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector
  keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the
  hosted trial copy).
- Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains
  'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline
  and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly).
  pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the
  (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows.
- Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector
  gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector
  keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests
  that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated
  to the new one.

Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green
against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint
ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector
extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can
be issued).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query

One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the
no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is
unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly

Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the
entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the
plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key.

Hosted side:
- Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix,
  org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids,
  current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count,
  last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering,
  separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted
  companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC
  validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR
  UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row)
  and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role.
  pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate
  limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade.
- lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts
  (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping),
  with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per
  request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET +
  POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report,
  never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless
  --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines).

Instance side:
- lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL
  default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count
  and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope,
  expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status
  deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone.
  /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key.
- Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json,
  with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with
  the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates),
  DECISIONS.

Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes
and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests
run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied.
no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget

Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A
self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect
a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all
transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision:
tokens on the instance, proxy stateless).

- Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger:
  sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only),
  `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global
  budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and
  `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs
  REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real
  covers all of it.
- EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core
  must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests
  unchanged.
- lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed
  connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR
  registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance
  redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch.
- app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions,
  accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST
  /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state;
  reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the
  global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted).
- issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of
  v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval.
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS.

Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against
supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt
relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean.
Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): Skatteverket broker + data proxy for self-hosted instances (tokens stay on the instance)

Sovereign plan WS3 PR5b, stacked on the bank proxy (#1751). A self-hosted
instance with a `skatteverket`-scoped connector key can now run the BankID
consent, file VAT/AGI and sync skattekonto through Arcim's registered
Skatteverket client; the SKV tokens are returned to the instance and stored
(encrypted) there.

- lib/connect/upstreams/skatteverket-oauth.ts: core-side SKV OAuth + data
  helpers (authorize URL, code/refresh exchange with Arcim's client secret,
  the four backing-API base URLs, the API-gateway Client_Id/Client_Secret
  headers). Core can't import @/extensions/, so this duplicates the
  extension's endpoints/scope set (one integrator = Arcim), mirroring the EB
  JWT relocation.
- app/api/connect/skv/oauth/authorize-url: builds the authorize URL against
  OUR registered redirect_uri + a signed connector state, per-company SKV
  connection quota, pending ledger row.
- app/api/connect/skv/oauth/token: exchanges/refreshes and RETURNS the tokens
  to the instance; the ledger keeps only sha256(access_token) +
  sha256(refresh_token).
- app/api/connect/skv/api/[...path]: allowlist over moms / skattekonto /
  agd-inlamning / agd-period. The instance sends the user's SKV Bearer (as
  X-Connector-Upstream-Authorization) + X-Connector-Key; the proxy checks the
  token hash against the ledger, adds Arcim's gateway credentials (never
  exposed to the instance), forwards. Same per-key + global budget as bank.
- The Skatteverket extension /callback gains the connector branch
  (isConnectorState -> 302 back to the instance; code never exchanged there).
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: SKV connector live) + DECISIONS.

Tests: SKV oauth lib, authorize-url, token, data proxy, callback connector
branch (all green; 74 connect + 425 connect/SKV). tsc, guards, lint clean;
no-phantom-columns held at 380 (literal update branches). Not in this PR:
instance-side wiring (PR6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): self-host connector enablement: EB/SKV in the preset, connector-mode seam, status endpoint

Sovereign plan WS3 PR6 (enablement layer), stacked on the SKV broker (#1757).

- docker/extensions.self-hosted.json += enable-banking, skatteverket: a
  connector-key self-host now ships the bank + Skatteverket extensions; a key
  with the matching scope makes them work, without one they show the existing
  capability_blocked upsell (unconfigured extensions no-op).
- lib/connect/instance/upstreams.ts: the connector-mode seam. An upstream is
  in connector mode only when GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY is set AND the instance has
  no own credentials for it (hasOwnEnableBankingCredentials /
  hasOwnSkatteverketCredentials). Hosted always has own credentials, so hosted
  is provably never in connector mode: the guard is what keeps hosted
  byte-identical. Base URLs GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL/api/connect/{bank,skv}, headers
  X-Connector-Company / X-Connector-Upstream-Authorization.
- GET /api/connector/status: the operator's wiring view (self_hosted, per
  upstream own_credentials|connector|unconfigured, key prefix never the key,
  granted connector capabilities). Hosted returns self_hosted:false.
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: status endpoint + extensions ship in the image),
  DECISIONS.

Tests: connector-mode detection matrix (off without a key, off with own
creds incl. the _PRODUCTION EB variants, on via the proxy, CONNECT_URL
override) + status route (self-host vs hosted, unconfigured, per-upstream
mode, prefix-not-key). 83 connect/connector tests green; tsc, guards, lint.

DEFERRED to PR6b (needs a live connector key + a real bank/SKV to verify
end to end, touches the live consent path): wiring the EB api-client /
consent callback and the SKV oauth / api-client to call the proxy in
connector mode, and the "Synka nu" settings row (UI, needs visual sign-off).
The seam + preset + status route make PR6b a contained follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(connect): upstreams seam reuses lib/entitlements/own-credentials

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* test(connector): status route tests pass the Next params argument (post-merge withRouteContext signature)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* docs(self-host): collapse the re-duplicated connector section; correct the crontab generator's preset comment

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(self-host): UpgradeNote and SKV tooltip name the connector key, never the hosted subscription; SOVEREIGN.md updated to merged reality

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(self-host): BankSyncNowButton gate copy branches like UpgradeNote (connector key, not hosted billing)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
 2026-08-31 23:18:43 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 37e50c272d feat(connect): Skatteverket broker + data proxy for self-hosted instances (tokens stay on the instance) (#1757) 
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector'

Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted.

- lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync,
  skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a
  self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability().
  Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on
  purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant.
- lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key).
  Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins,
  else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on
  (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector
  capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the
  grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows.
  getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector
  keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the
  hosted trial copy).
- Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains
  'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline
  and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly).
  pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the
  (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows.
- Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector
  gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector
  keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests
  that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated
  to the new one.

Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green
against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint
ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector
extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can
be issued).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query

One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the
no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is
unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly

Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the
entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the
plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key.

Hosted side:
- Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix,
  org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids,
  current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count,
  last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering,
  separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted
  companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC
  validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR
  UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row)
  and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role.
  pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate
  limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade.
- lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts
  (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping),
  with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per
  request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET +
  POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report,
  never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless
  --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines).

Instance side:
- lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL
  default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count
  and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope,
  expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status
  deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone.
  /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key.
- Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json,
  with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with
  the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates),
  DECISIONS.

Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes
and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests
run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied.
no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget

Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A
self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect
a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all
transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision:
tokens on the instance, proxy stateless).

- Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger:
  sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only),
  `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global
  budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and
  `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs
  REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real
  covers all of it.
- EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core
  must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests
  unchanged.
- lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed
  connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR
  registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance
  redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch.
- app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions,
  accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST
  /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state;
  reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the
  global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted).
- issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of
  v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval.
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS.

Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against
supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt
relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean.
Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): Skatteverket broker + data proxy for self-hosted instances (tokens stay on the instance)

Sovereign plan WS3 PR5b, stacked on the bank proxy (#1751). A self-hosted
instance with a `skatteverket`-scoped connector key can now run the BankID
consent, file VAT/AGI and sync skattekonto through Arcim's registered
Skatteverket client; the SKV tokens are returned to the instance and stored
(encrypted) there.

- lib/connect/upstreams/skatteverket-oauth.ts: core-side SKV OAuth + data
  helpers (authorize URL, code/refresh exchange with Arcim's client secret,
  the four backing-API base URLs, the API-gateway Client_Id/Client_Secret
  headers). Core can't import @/extensions/, so this duplicates the
  extension's endpoints/scope set (one integrator = Arcim), mirroring the EB
  JWT relocation.
- app/api/connect/skv/oauth/authorize-url: builds the authorize URL against
  OUR registered redirect_uri + a signed connector state, per-company SKV
  connection quota, pending ledger row.
- app/api/connect/skv/oauth/token: exchanges/refreshes and RETURNS the tokens
  to the instance; the ledger keeps only sha256(access_token) +
  sha256(refresh_token).
- app/api/connect/skv/api/[...path]: allowlist over moms / skattekonto /
  agd-inlamning / agd-period. The instance sends the user's SKV Bearer (as
  X-Connector-Upstream-Authorization) + X-Connector-Key; the proxy checks the
  token hash against the ledger, adds Arcim's gateway credentials (never
  exposed to the instance), forwards. Same per-key + global budget as bank.
- The Skatteverket extension /callback gains the connector branch
  (isConnectorState -> 302 back to the instance; code never exchanged there).
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: SKV connector live) + DECISIONS.

Tests: SKV oauth lib, authorize-url, token, data proxy, callback connector
branch (all green; 74 connect + 425 connect/SKV). tsc, guards, lint clean;
no-phantom-columns held at 380 (literal update branches). Not in this PR:
instance-side wiring (PR6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(connect): SKV broker review+skeptic batch: state-bound exchange, owned-only refresh, identity-number redaction, quota reservation, https-only bases, docs dedupe

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* docs(self-host): restore the instance-wiring qualifier in the connector section

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): PR #1757 review batch 2: redirect 'error' on credential fetches, mandatory ledger writes before token return, MD037

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): reject encoded path separators in SKV data-proxy segments (traversal guard)

The WHATWG parser normalizes raw dot segments before the route runs;
what survives is an encoded separator inside a segment (a%2Fb, ..%2Fx,
a%5Cb), which would escape the allowlisted service base once the
upstream fetch re-normalizes. splitPath now decodes each segment and
rejects dot segments and separator-bearing values.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
 2026-08-31 22:40:55 +02:00
Mattsson 5131ee9085 fix(errors): point payment-account-missing message at Installningar -> Fakturering (#2088) 
A user importing invoices from Visma hit INVOICE_SEND_PAYMENT_ACCOUNT_MISSING
on mark-sent and could not find where to add the account: the message said
"under Fakturering" without saying it lives in settings. Spell out the full
path (Installningar -> Fakturering) in the Swedish and English messages and
the remediation line, matching the wording other structured errors already use.

Copy-only: error code, status, and behavior unchanged.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vh2e8MkbnTbTwRDDLV3tTo

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-31 22:26:14 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 10bbfb9d79 fix(mcp): make agent failures diagnosable from the log, not just from the source (#2087) 
* fix(mcp): make agent failures diagnosable from the log, not just from the source

Mining event_log for mcp.tool_called: VALIDATION_ERROR ran at about one a day
until 2026-08-25, then jumped to a hundred a day and stayed there. One
integration's gnubok_get_kpi_report has been refused 604 times over seven days
and is still failing.

The cause is the unknown-parameter guard from #1856, which is correct and
stays. The caller is even told precisely what is wrong: getStructuredError puts
"Unknown parameter "x" for <tool>. Valid parameters: ..." into message_en,
which the agent receives.

What was broken is what we recorded about it. Two things, both cheap:

- Telemetry logged only message_sv, which for VALIDATION_ERROR is the registry
  default "Förfrågan innehåller ogiltiga uppgifter." and names neither the
  parameter nor the tool. A seven-day outage was indistinguishable from a typo,
  and the cause was only findable by reading the dispatcher source. errorDetail
  now carries message_en, stored only when it differs from errorMessage, so the
  many domain failures whose message_sv is already the specific text cost
  nothing extra.
- errorKind said 'company_access_denied' for all 604, because the arg guard
  throws inside the company-routing try. That is an active misdirection: it
  sends triage looking for a tenancy bug that does not exist. Exactly two
  things in that block raise VALIDATION_ERROR, the unknown-parameter guard and
  a malformed company_id, and neither is a permissions failure, so they now log
  as 'invalid_arguments'.

Tests reproduce the production call shape and were verified to fail when either
fix is reverted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(mcp): derive the telemetry payload type from the event contract

Two review findings, both valid.

The local ToolCalledPayload interface was a hand-maintained duplicate that
omitted sessionId and half the errorKind union. That is not cosmetic: it is why
errorDetail could be added to the emitter and to lib/events/types.ts while the
test file type-checked against a stale shape. Deriving it from
EventPayload<'mcp.tool_called'> removes the drift.

The null-detail assertion was also conditional, so it would have passed on a
wrong-but-present value. Replaced with two determinate cases: a scope denial
carries both languages without duplicating either, and the unknown-tool exit,
which supplies no diagnostic, stores null.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(mcp): pin the scope name in the diagnostic assertion

'A different string' passes on any placeholder. The reason errorDetail is worth
storing is that it names what the caller lacks, so assert that.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-31 22:24:28 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 413a0978c0 fix(v1): attribute every REST write to the API key that made it (#2074) 
commitEntry() already reads getActor() and forwards it to
commit_journal_entry, which stamps journal_entries.committed_actor_* and the
audit_log COMMIT row. But runWithActor had exactly one production call site,
the pending-operations commit, so everything reaching the ledger by any other
route committed anonymously.

Setting the scope once in withApiV1 attributes every v1 write, including the
ones that get to the ledger several frames down through reverseEntry,
correctEntry and the supplier-invoice paths. No signature changes, no
migration.

The severity is not the headline aggregate. 184 873 of the 193 466
unattributed entries are source_type='import', bulk SIE migration with no
meaningful actor. Excluding those it is 8 593 of 11 009, and it concentrates
where it matters most: 99.8% of storno entries and 100% of correction entries
had no actor. Those are the two sanctioned rättelse paths under BFL 5 kap.
5 §, where "who did this, and when" is a legal question.

Only the authenticated branch is wrapped. The anonymous public path has no
attribution worth recording.

Verified by removing the wrapper and watching 3 of 4 tests fail; the fourth,
which checks AsyncLocalStorage does not leak between requests, correctly still
passed.

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-31 21:49:51 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 36123cef23 feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget (#1751) 
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector'

Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted.

- lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync,
  skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a
  self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability().
  Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on
  purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant.
- lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key).
  Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins,
  else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on
  (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector
  capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the
  grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows.
  getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector
  keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the
  hosted trial copy).
- Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains
  'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline
  and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly).
  pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the
  (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows.
- Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector
  gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector
  keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests
  that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated
  to the new one.

Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green
against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint
ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector
extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can
be issued).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query

One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the
no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is
unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly

Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the
entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the
plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key.

Hosted side:
- Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix,
  org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids,
  current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count,
  last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering,
  separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted
  companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC
  validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR
  UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row)
  and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role.
  pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate
  limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade.
- lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts
  (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping),
  with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per
  request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET +
  POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report,
  never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless
  --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines).

Instance side:
- lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL
  default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count
  and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope,
  expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status
  deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone.
  /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key.
- Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json,
  with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with
  the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates),
  DECISIONS.

Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes
and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests
run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied.
no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget

Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A
self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect
a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all
transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision:
tokens on the instance, proxy stateless).

- Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger:
  sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only),
  `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global
  budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and
  `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs
  REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real
  covers all of it.
- EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core
  must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests
  unchanged.
- lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed
  connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR
  registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance
  redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch.
- app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions,
  accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST
  /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state;
  reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the
  global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted).
- issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of
  v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval.
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS.

Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against
supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt
relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean.
Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(connect): update ledger pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831200000

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): redact opaque path segments before usage metering; correct stale RPC-source comment

GET/DELETE /sessions/{id} and /accounts/{uid}/... carry the raw EB
session id / account uid in the pathname; metering persisted it in
cleartext next to the ledger that stores only sha256(handle). Opaque
segments (UUID, long hex, long base64url) now become ':id' before the
connector_usage_events insert. Migration comment now cites the real
prior RPC source (20260831190000).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): percent-encoded path segments count as opaque in metering redaction

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): PR #1751 review batch: https-only EB URL, body-covering timeout, quota reservation, delete-after-success, doc fix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): bind the /sessions code exchange to its verified pending state; ceiling +1

Verified state signature, key/service match, and an existing pending
row now precede the EB exchange; a concurrently consumed state closes
the just-minted upstream session and 409s. no-phantom-columns ceiling
391 for countHeldConnections' computed .or() timestamp filter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
 2026-08-31 21:46:50 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 0ff1b05553 feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly (#1748) 
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector'

Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted.

- lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync,
  skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a
  self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability().
  Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on
  purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant.
- lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key).
  Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins,
  else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on
  (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector
  capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the
  grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows.
  getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector
  keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the
  hosted trial copy).
- Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains
  'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline
  and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly).
  pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the
  (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows.
- Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector
  gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector
  keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests
  that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated
  to the new one.

Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green
against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint
ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector
extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can
be issued).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query

One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the
no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is
unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly

Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the
entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the
plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key.

Hosted side:
- Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix,
  org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids,
  current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count,
  last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering,
  separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted
  companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC
  validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR
  UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row)
  and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role.
  pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate
  limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade.
- lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts
  (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping),
  with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per
  request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET +
  POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report,
  never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless
  --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines).

Instance side:
- lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL
  default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count
  and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope,
  expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status
  deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone.
  /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key.
- Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json,
  with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with
  the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates),
  DECISIONS.

Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes
and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests
run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied.
no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(connect): update pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831190000

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): RPC errors answer 503 not 401; X-Connector-Key wins over Authorization

A hosted DB error mapped to 401 made the instance sync treat a pooler
blip as key revocation and delete its entire connector grant cache,
zeroing the 72h offline grace. 503 lands in the sync's keep-grants
branch (already test-pinned). Bearer-first extraction hashed the
upstream token on dual-header proxied calls, 401ing the exact shape
X-Connector-Key exists for.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): sync deletes grants only on a body-proven connector rejection, never bare 401/403

A WAF challenge page, edge deployment protection, or an egress proxy
answers 401/403 without the hosted app ever running; trusting status
alone wiped the instance's 72h offline grant cache within the hour.
Deletion now requires the hosted route's own rejection code in the
JSON body; codeless 401/403 keeps grants (server_error branch).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): PR #1748 review batch: https-only connect URL, atomic pin, prefix-gated Bearer, deferred metering, entitlements validation, integer months

- GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL must be https (http only for loopback); invalid or
  plaintext URLs disable the connector instead of sending the key.
- instance_url pin update filters on IS NULL; a lost race re-reads and
  reports the winner's pin.
- extractConnectorKey: a Bearer is the connector credential only with
  the gnubok_ck_ prefix; upstream Bearer falls through to X-Connector-Key.
- Usage metering runs via after() off the response path (inline outside
  a request scope).
- Sync validates entitlements shape: unknown status or malformed
  current_period_end keeps grants (server_error), never deletes.
- issue-connector-key rejects fractional --months.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
 2026-08-31 20:51:17 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg cfce2de925 feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' (#1747) 
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector'

Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted.

- lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync,
  skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a
  self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability().
  Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on
  purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant.
- lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key).
  Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins,
  else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on
  (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector
  capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the
  grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows.
  getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector
  keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the
  hosted trial copy).
- Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains
  'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline
  and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly).
  pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the
  (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows.
- Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector
  gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector
  keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests
  that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated
  to the new one.

Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green
against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint
ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector
extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can
be issued).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query

One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the
no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is
unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(entitlements): self-host connector gate honors only source=connector grants

The trial-seed trigger (seed_trial_capability_grants) writes 30-day
source='trial' rows for bank_sync and skatteverket on every company
insert, self-hosts included. The partitioned self-host gate read every
active grant, so a fresh self-host company held every connector
capability for a month with no connector key (CodeRabbit finding on
#1747, verified against migration 20260818170000).

hasCapability and getCompanyIdsWithCapability now add
.eq('source', 'connector') on a self-host; getCompanyEntitlements skips
non-connector rows there. Hosted reads every source exactly as before
(covered by a test asserting no source filter is applied).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(entitlements): pin the early-grants wave on the self-host partition, fix stale docstrings

Address the review round on the readGrants() merge resolution:

- Add two recording-mock tests for getCompanyEntitlements with teamId
  (the dashboard layout path): on a self-host the early grants read must
  narrow to the connector keys and carry source = 'connector'; on hosted
  it reads every paid key with no source filter. The in-loop source check
  masked a lost narrowing, so this pins the query itself.
- Move the getCompanyEntitlements docstring back above the function and
  replace "Self-hosted holds everything" with the actual partition.
- keys.ts: say that lib/connect/instance arrives with stack PR #1748 so a
  reader on main does not chase a module that is not there yet.
- DECISIONS.md: describe the InvoiceInboxWorkspace.tsx merge resolution
  accurately (set to the #1753 blob origin/main carried at push time, not
  the merged parent's) and note that stack children must merge this
  branch forward.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NdxH4DGnggvqHBCmif6B16

* chore(connector): merge origin/main, re-version connector migration to 20260831170000

Migration 20260820122000 predates versions already applied to prod
(latest 20260831150000); renamed to keep Supabase branching history
monotonic. Test reference updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(entitlements): own-credentials seam so self-hosts running their own EB/SKV are never connector-gated

Forward-ports the connector-mode seam's own-credentials half from the
instance-wiring layer: a self-host with its own Enable Banking or
Skatteverket credentials holds that capability outright, exactly like
every other local capability. Without this, upgrading an own-credentials
self-host silently killed working bank sync and SKV integrations and
showed a hosted subscription upsell whose remedy does not exist for a
self-host. capability_blocked copy gains a self-host variant naming
GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY; stale all-on comments updated at the two gate
call sites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(entitlements): route the pending-op capability block through capabilityBlockedError for self-host copy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(entitlements): PR #1747 review batch: connector-grant expiry CHECK, test cleanup, DECISIONS correction

- Migration 20260831180000: CHECK (source <> 'connector' OR expires_at IS
  NOT NULL); connector grants are a short-lived offline cache, a NULL
  expiry would be a permanent unlock nothing revokes. pg test added.
- beforeEach vi.clearAllMocks() in the three entitlements test files.
- DECISIONS entry corrected: the trial seed DOES write trial rows for
  bank_sync/skatteverket; what it never writes is source='connector' or
  the connector-only keys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
 2026-08-31 17:55:29 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 9fe37b85b5 feat(agents): per-key approval authority, the amount an agent may post unattended (#2079) 
* feat(agents): per-key approval authority, the amount an agent may post unattended

An API key gets an optional ceiling in SEK. Above it the agent may still stage
the work, it just may not finish it alone: a human approves the same verifikat
in the app. Default is NULL, so every existing key keeps its behaviour and
turning this on is entirely opt-in.

Enforced at the two places an API key reaches the ledger, and at both the
refusal happens BEFORE the point of no return:

- MCP: in commitPendingOperation, before the atomic claim, so the operation
  stays 'pending'. Behind the claim it would be caught by the generic handler,
  marked terminal 'rejected', and the staged verifikat would be gone.
- REST: in journal-entries.commit, before commitEntry, so the draft stays a
  draft and the voucher sequence never advances (BFL 5 kap. 7 §). The dry run
  refuses too, rather than promising a voucher number the key cannot deliver.

Not enforced inside commit_journal_entry: a RAISE there is swallowed by
engine.ts into a retryable 500, and it would cost a DROP+CREATE on the function
that issues every voucher number.

Operations whose amount is only known during dispatch (batch allocation, bulk
booking, the settlement link paths) fail OPEN behind an explicit allowlist.
Pricing them ahead of dispatch would be a guess, and a wrong guess silently
breaks batch allocation the day someone sets a limit. The allowlist is derived
from what production actually stores: create_voucher carries total_debit on
1389 of 1389 rows, categorize_transaction carries amount on 2002 of 2003,
create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox carries total on 208 of 228.

This is a blast-radius cap, not a security boundary. A per-entry ceiling is
defeated by splitting one entry into several, and an LLM will find that, so
UNATTENDED_COMMIT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED forbids splitting first: one affärshändelse is
one verifikat (BFL 5 kap. 6 §). A cumulative rolling-window limit is the
primitive that actually bounds exposure and is left to a separate change.

The guard is written NULL-first everywhere. An absent, unparseable or
non-positive ceiling always means unlimited, never "block everything".

Agents read their own ceiling from gnubok_get_agent_briefing instead of
discovering it by burning a staged verifikat on a 403.

Changing a ceiling is auditable: it now renders in behandlingshistorik
(BFL 5 kap. 11 §). The audit trigger already fired on the column, but the
report dropped the event because the field was not in its diff map.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(skill): regenerate accounted-api skill for the new commit pitfall

apiskill:check is a ratchet: the generated reference must match the endpoint
registry. Never hand-edited.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(agents): pin the DB default itself, and declare the briefing field required

Two review findings, both real:

- the default test stored an explicit NULL, so it stayed green even if the
  column default changed to a positive ceiling: the one change that would
  silently start blocking every existing key. It now omits the column.
- gnubok_get_agent_briefing documents unattended_commit_limit as always
  present and emits it unconditionally, so it belongs in the output schema's
  required list.

Declined the NOT VALID constraint suggestion, with the reason recorded in the
migration: api_keys is 388 rows / 768 kB in production.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(agents): name the TOCTOU window in the REST ceiling check

A security scan flagged that the line sum is read before commitEntry, so a
concurrent write to the draft's lines can post over the ceiling. Real, and
accepted: closing it means enforcing inside commit_journal_entry, where a RAISE
becomes a retryable 500 and destroys the staged operation on the MCP path.

Recorded in the code rather than left implicit, so nobody later mistakes this
for a hard control. A per-entry ceiling is already defeated by splitting, which
needs no race; the cumulative rolling-window limit is the primitive that bounds
exposure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(agents): price the settlement and batch paths that were bypassing the ceiling

A security scan flagged that known money-posting operations fail open, and it
was right. The first cut priced only create_voucher, categorize_transaction and
create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox, on the belief that the batch and settlement
paths computed their totals only inside SQL at dispatch. Production says
otherwise: the staged preview already carries the amount, because it is the
number a human is shown when approving the operation.

Over the last 120 days each of these is present and numeric on 100% of that
type's staged rows:

  link_transaction_journal_entry  transaction_amount  1369 rows
  bulk_book_transactions          tx_sum               273 rows
  link_supplier_invoice_voucher   payment_amount        55 rows
  match_batch_allocate            total_allocated       24 rows
  mark_invoice_paid               total                  3 rows

So a key with a ceiling could post any amount through the four largest
settlement paths. Now priced, and the ceiling applies.

Only reconciliation_match stays unpriced: it carries pair_count, which is a
COUNT. Pricing off that would compare pairs against kronor, which is worse than
not enforcing. link_document_to_voucher and attach_document_to_transaction move
no money at all; the transaction_amount they carry is context, not a posting.

Genuinely unpriceable types still fail OPEN. This control can only ever narrow
what a key does, and a wrong guess at an amount blocks a legitimate commit, so
guessing high would leave an agent unable to work.

Adds a test that walks the whole allowlist, so a typo'd field name cannot
silently make a type unpriceable again: that is exactly the hole this closes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): drop the ceiling from the agent briefing, the payload budget has no room

The tools/list context-budget bench sits at 65 000 tokens and main now leaves
roughly 20 tokens of headroom. An always-present field on the briefing's output
schema costs about 85, so this addition alone pushed the bench red.

The bench's own note is explicit that the answer is to demote a tool rather than
raise the ceiling, so raising it here would be the wrong trade for a
nice-to-have.

Nothing is lost that matters: the operation is never destroyed when it is
refused, so discovering the ceiling from UNATTENDED_COMMIT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED costs
one round trip and no work. That error already carries both attempted and limit,
and GET /api/settings/api-keys returns the value. Re-exposing it on the briefing
is worth doing once there is budget to spend.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(api): spell affärshändelse correctly in the commit pitfall

Fixed in the route's registerEndpoint pitfalls, which is the source; the skill
reference is regenerated from it and never hand-edited.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-31 15:53:53 +01:00
Mattsson 2814d70cb4 feat(bookkeeping): Fortnox-style inline IB correction + cascade to later years (#2076) 
* feat(bookkeeping): cascade opening-balance corrections to later years

Fortnox/SIE migrations book one IB verifikat per imported year, so
correcting one year's ingaende balans left every later year's linked IB
carrying the stale figures (support case: a 2019 IB fixed in Fortnox
after export never reached Accounted, skewing all subsequent saldon).

- POST /api/import/opening-balance/correct accepts cascade: true and
  applies the correction's per-account delta to each subsequent year's
  IB via storno + rebook + relink (lib/import/opening-balance/cascade.ts).
  Locked/closed/lock-dated/bokslut years are skipped and reported, never
  forced; a failed year is compensated and the cascade continues.
- CorrectOpeningBalanceDialog offers the cascade as a default-checked
  checkbox when later years have their own IB verifikat, and when the
  current year is blocked it points at the earliest open year's IB
  verifikat instead of dead-ending.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jn6sxPE3zMfpM4CQ24jGY

* fix(bookkeeping): atomic cascade replacement + review findings for PR #2076

- Cascade now books each later year through replaceOpeningBalanceEntry
  (one RPC transaction: storno + corrected voucher + pointer swap, CAS
  on the expected old entry), removing the create/reverse/relink window
  that could leave a period linked to a reversed IB entry.
- Cascaded verifikat keep the original lines verbatim (descriptions and
  dimensions) and append labelled IB-rättelse adjustment lines per
  changed account instead of collapsing per-account nets.
- Year-end lookup fails closed: a query error skips the period instead
  of reading as 'no bokslut'.
- Dialog always sends the cascade flag (a cold reference cache no longer
  silently disables the default-on cascade), the success toast separates
  blocked years from failed years needing review, and the checkbox notes
  that a resultat correction may still need an omforing to 2091.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jn6sxPE3zMfpM4CQ24jGY

* feat(bookkeeping): Fortnox-style inline IB correction without storno

Founder decision 2026-08-31: IB edits in open unlocked years should feel
like Fortnox (change the number, no extra verifikat) instead of always
producing a storno + rebook pair in serie A.

- Migration 20260831150000 redefines correct_entry_lines_inline to admit
  source_type 'opening_balance' with three IB guards: only the period's
  current linked IB, no posted bokslut on the period, and replacement
  lines restricted to balance-sheet accounts (class 1-2). The entry id
  never changes, so fiscal_periods.opening_balance_entry_id stays valid
  and every report reads the corrected lines automatically. Storno,
  year_end and vat_settlement stay excluded; locked/closed/lock-dated
  periods are still refused (BFL 5 kap 5 par: storno is the only track
  there).
- New POST /api/import/opening-balance/correct-inline: diff-based strike
  and replace inside the same IB verifikat, same OB_* pre-flight codes
  as the storno route, RPC rule violations surfaced verbatim as 409
  OB_INLINE_REFUSED. With cascade: true the per-account delta is
  appended as labelled IB-rattelse lines inside each later open year's
  own IB verifikat (cascade mode 'inline'): a multi-year correction
  with zero new verifikat.
- CorrectOpeningBalanceDialog computes the row diff (untouched lines
  keep ids, descriptions and dimensions) and posts to the inline route;
  copy updated (no storno language), toast reports inline updates.
- In-app agent guidance (shared-rules) updated to describe the inline
  flow and the cascade checkbox.
- Tests: pg-real suite for the redefined RPC (IB accept, linked-IB
  guard, bokslut guard, P&L guard, structural types still refused,
  non-IB unaffected), route tests, cascade inline-mode unit tests.

The storno-based /correct route and engine paths are untouched: they
remain for the import replace flow and API compatibility.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jn6sxPE3zMfpM4CQ24jGY

* fix(agent): avoid the BFL 5 kap 5 par marker string in IB guidance

The verifikation-draft period-lock gate test uses the literal
'BFL 5 kap 5 §' as a marker for locked-period-only guidance; the new IB
bullet in shared-rules carried the same string in every prompt and broke
the open-period assertion. Reference Bokföringslagen generically instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jn6sxPE3zMfpM4CQ24jGY

* fix(bookkeeping): derive inline cascade delta from the rattelse log

Swedish-review finding on PR #2076: the cascade delta was computed from
a route-side line snapshot read before the RPC, which a concurrent edit
could theoretically desync from what the RPC actually committed. The
delta now comes from the RPC's own journal_entry_rattelse_log row
(struck_lines/added_lines snapshotted inside the RPC transaction), so
the cascade always matches the committed base correction. Also softened
the blocked-year guidance copy (declared-status is an assumption, not a
verified fact).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jn6sxPE3zMfpM4CQ24jGY

* fix(bookkeeping): visible cascade failure + dimensions-aware no-op check

CodeRabbit round-2 findings on PR #2076:
- A cascade that failed to run (log fetch error, unexpected throw) was
  returned as an empty successful summary, so the dialog reported
  nothing wrong while later years stayed unverified. Both routes now
  mark it failed: true and the dialog tells the user to check later
  years' opening balances.
- The RPC's no-op guard compared account/amount/description only, so a
  dimensions-only rattelse raised 'Rattelsen andrar ingenting'. The
  comparison keys now include canonical dimensions jsonb text (fixed in
  the unmerged 20260831150000 migration).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012Jn6sxPE3zMfpM4CQ24jGY

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-31 16:01:11 +02:00
Mattsson f216a60bf8 feat(invoices): per-line percentage discount and separate fakturamarkning (#2084) 
* feat(invoices): per-line percentage discount and separate fakturamarkning

User request: rabatt i procent per artikelrad, and a marking field
separate from Er referens.

- invoice_items.discount_percent (0-100, default 0): line_total and
  vat_amount are stored NET of the discount. Shared exact-ore math in
  lib/invoices/line-amounts.ts (gross, discount, net) used by the web
  builder, staged-operation commit, editor preview, PDF, and Peppol.
  Undiscounted lines keep the legacy unrounded qty*price byte-identical.
- ROT/RUT deduction computes on the discounted net line total.
- invoices.invoice_marking: printed on the PDF next to the references
  and mapped to Peppol BT-10 BuyerReference (marking wins over
  your_reference; either satisfies the BT-10 requirement).
- Peppol renders the discount as a BG-27 line AllowanceCharge
  (reason code 95, MultiplierFactorNumeric, Amount, BaseAmount).
- Editor: "Lagg till rabatt" in the row menu (same reveal pattern as
  ROT/RUT), Markning row next to Er referens, forval chip, review
  dialog shows discounts and marking.
- Plumbed through v1 REST projections, MCP create/get/update invoice
  tools, pending-operations update path, and copy-invoice (discount
  copied; marking deliberately not, it is recipient-specific).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JJAt9yM7tgZ69f1XnNnq52

* fix(invoices): carry discount_percent through every deduction, credit, convert and preview path

Skeptic + CI findings on the discount/marking feature, one pass:

- generateRotRutLines and propose-send-lines now pass discount_percent
  into computeDeduction: the send/credit/cash verifikat booked 1513 on
  the GROSS line while deduction_total, the PDF and the Skatteverket
  claim carried the net, stranding the difference on 1513 and pushing
  1510 negative once the customer paid. Test pins 1513=3000/1510=7000
  for a 20%-discounted 10 000 kr ROT line.
- preview-pdf route accepts discount_percent (net totals + net-based
  deduction) and invoice_marking; the editor now sends the marking, so
  the preview equals the invoice it becomes.
- Credit notes carry discount_percent (buildCreditNoteItem, v1 credit
  route select+insert, MCP credit executor) and invoice_marking, so the
  kreditfaktura face arithmetic multiplies out and shows the Rabatt
  column (ML 17 kap 24 §).
- Proforma->invoice convert copies discount_percent + invoice_marking:
  the converted invoice previously failed Peppol LINE_TOTAL_MISMATCH
  and lost the rebate on the next builder pass.
- Editor hides the discount menu in self-billed mode (the self-billed
  wire shape has no discount; previewed net would book gross).
- MCP staging and commitCreateInvoice reject a non-number
  discount_percent (a string coerced past the range check but was
  ignored by the totals math and still stored).
- Regenerated skills/accounted-api (apiskill:check CI failure).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JJAt9yM7tgZ69f1XnNnq52

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-31 15:34:06 +02:00