c0ecf2fa3bebd46bdfd0169efd73b89653d1dfed
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 MattssonandClaude Fable 5.1
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6a85efb00a |
feat(mcp): allowlist Grok's connector callback and document the Grok path (#2158)
* feat(mcp): allowlist Grok's connector callback and document the Grok path Grok custom connectors self-register through /api/mcp-oauth/register with redirect_uri https://grok.com/connectors-oauth-exchange-code/, which the built-in allowlist rejected with invalid_redirect_uri before consent. Add the callback as an exact-path BUILT_IN_PATTERNS entry (trailing slash optional, no prefix) with provider 'grok', named "Grok (xAI)" on the consent page. Tests: accept, foreign-host and other-path rejection, provider mapping, and a register route test for the Grok DCR shape. Surface Grok next to ChatGPT: a "Using Grok?" side door on the onboarding Claude step (one side door open at a time, telemetry step grok), a Grok row under "Other clients" in the API & MCP settings tab using ?client=grok, and sv/en strings for both. Docs: mcp-server rule, ARCHITECTURE, README, registry entry (install section), DECISIONS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EGbspj3hiNqvqTWZqdwysa Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> * fix(mcp): cite X Corp's published Grok callback, test the consent label Review pass on #2158: the allowlist comment and DECISIONS entry claimed xAI publishes no callback and the value came from a live observation; X Corp lists https://grok.com/connectors-oauth-exchange-code/ as the "Grok (web)" redirect URL at docs.x.com/x-ads-api/mcp, and grok.com serves the path itself (slash form 308s to no-slash on the same origin). Reworded both to cite that. Adds the consent-page test for "Grok (xAI)" next to the ChatGPT one and a JSDoc on the onboarding side-door toggle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EGbspj3hiNqvqTWZqdwysa Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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18cbc4c30a |
fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155)
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items. - api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs. - rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash readable by co-members was a bearer credential. - validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no longer a member of the key's company. - provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role only, matching every existing code path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer. - One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and trigger cascades. - company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions; invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership. - Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes still pass. - create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths; validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE; match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance RPCs become service_role only; the production-only seed_asset_categories is dropped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender, could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se. - inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images) served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP. - storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB mime for the key is on the allow-list. - document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type. - logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there. The upload pickers stop advertising SVG. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company. requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard, https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and exports isRateLimiterConfigured(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks enforce the same initiator check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed, the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000), bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation re-sent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host; non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log - register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp. - BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation. - WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy. - Logo help text no longer advertises SVG. - DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down by the one legacy error the change removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e7e4efbfbc |
feat(oauth): one-click consent: all scopes pre-selected, list collapsed, Allow above the fold (#1953)
The read-only default forced every agent-first user to scroll a scope
list and hand-tick write rows before the flow could work. Founder call
2026-08-26: pre-check ALL scopes when the client requests none (Claude's
connector case), collapse the scope list into an expandable details fold
('Alla förvalda, visa och justera'), and keep the Allow button visible
without scrolling.
Why this is defensible: every write is STAGED for explicit approval
before anything touches the ledger, each scope row stays individually
untickable inside the fold, the warn line states the staging rule right
above the button, and the grant is revocable under Inställningar >
API-nycklar. A client that requests explicit scopes still gets exactly
that set (RFC 6749 3.3 least-privilege unchanged), and the tampered/empty
POST fallback stays read-only.
CONNECTORS.md gains the share link (connectorName/connectorUrl params)
plus the starter prompt to pair with it.
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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31e0cd6e05 |
feat(onboarding): company setup from the conversation and POST /api/v1/companies (#1814 PR 3) (#1864)
* feat(onboarding): company setup from the conversation and POST /api/v1/companies Third PR of agent-first onboarding (#1814). Once connected, the agent can now set up a company end to end without the web wizard, and partner platforms can provision companies over REST. - create_company_for_user: service-role-only SECURITY DEFINER twin of create_company_with_owner taking the owner explicitly (service clients have no auth.uid()). pg-real test covers creation, role gating, unknown owner and foreign team. - lib/company/create-company.ts: the wizard's creation sequence (org number, TIC snapshot, BAS chart, settings, first fiscal period, tax deadlines, rollback) extracted into createCompanyCore; the Server Action delegates to it, behaviour unchanged. - lib/company/onboarding-input.ts: one Zod schema + planner for the agent/API paths; a VAT-registered company without moms_period is refused (a missing period silently yields zero VAT deadlines). - MCP: gnubok_create_company (two-phase: preview, then confirm=true; companies:write, company-independent), gnubok_connect_bank and gnubok_connect_skatteverket (status + the browser link, gated on bank_sync / skatteverket, search-only in the catalog), the "onboarding" skill, and initialize instructions pointing at it. - Consent page pre-ticks companies:write for an account with no company yet, so the setup does not dead-end on insufficient scope after signup. - POST /api/v1/companies (companies:write, dry-run aware) on the same core; scope map, registry, spec snapshot and the generated API skill updated. - tools/list payload ceiling raised 59.95K -> 60.4K for the one new default-catalog tool (documented in the guard). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 * fix(onboarding): explicit f_skatt, org number when VAT-registered, EF first year ends 31 Dec Review findings on #1864 (Swedish compliance review): - f_skatt is required, never defaulted to approved (SE-R-005 risk). - org_number is required when vat_registered: the invoice momsregistreringsnummer derives from it (ML 17 kap 24 §). - An enskild firma's first fiscal year must end on 31 December and its start month is forced to 1 even with first_fiscal_year set, mirroring the wizard's own rule text (BFL 3 kap. 1 §). - POST /api/v1/companies no longer claims Idempotency-Key support (the wrapper only honours it on company-scoped routes). - pg-real: createCompanyCore's chart seed runs under the real service_role, which the unit tests could not prove. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 * test(pg): starter chart has 41 accounts, assert non-empty The service_role chart-seed proof passed the part that mattered (no 42501 from seed_chart_of_accounts) and failed on a wrong row-count guess: the seeded chart is a curated starter set, not the full BAS list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 * fix(migrations): move create_company_for_user to 20260825120000 main gained 20260824170000_bulk_book_transactions_service_actor.sql with the same version while this branch was open; two files on one version abort every Supabase branch apply and the prod auto-apply. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 * chore(api): refresh spec snapshot and generated skill after rebasing onto main Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 * fix(mcp): flat create_company result, refuse localhost connect links, test hygiene CodeRabbit on #1864: the confirmed-create result was wrapped in the { data, next } envelope while its outputSchema promised top-level fields; it now returns the fields with next as a sibling. The two connect-link tools refuse to build a link when NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL is unset instead of handing a remote user a localhost URL. Tests clear mocks and the event bus in beforeEach. Not changed: the rollback already survives user_preferences.active_company_id (that FK is ON DELETE SET NULL since 20260331010000), and v1 error details stay in the surface's English developer convention. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a717f03898 |
feat(mcp-oauth): let an account with no company connect and sign up from the OAuth popup (#1814 PR 1) (#1855)
* feat(mcp-oauth): let an account with no company connect and sign up from the OAuth popup Identity unlock for agent-first onboarding (#1814, shape B+). A person with no Accounted account can now connect from an MCP client, create the account inside the Connect popup and finish the OAuth dance. - authorize/token no longer require a company: consent renders a companyless variant and the key is minted with company_id NULL. - validateApiKey returns companyId string|null and binds an unbound key to the user's first company on the first validation after it exists. - MCP server: company-dependent tools and data resources answer with a structured NO_COMPANY_YET error; the company-independent tools still run; telemetry skips when there is no company scope. - /api/events fails closed instead of throwing for an unbound key. - authorize forces TOTP enrollment (not just verification) for password accounts with no factor, since the middleware skips enrollment for zero-company users; BankID-linked accounts stay exempt. - /login forwards next to /register; register, GoogleAuthButton and /auth/callback carry it back to the consent page (callback honours only /api/mcp-oauth/authorize, via safeReturnTo); /mfa/enroll hard-navigates to /api/* destinations like /mfa/verify. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 * refactor(company): move getActiveCompanyId out of the next/headers module lib/auth/api-keys.ts needs the resolver for unbound-key binding, but lib/company/context.ts imports next/headers for the legacy company cookie and Turbopack refuses that import on some of api-keys' import paths (the preview build failed). The resolver and CompanyContextError now live in lib/company/active-company.ts; context.ts re-exports them so every caller and test mock is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 * fix(mcp-oauth): fail closed on a failed assurance lookup; enroll Back aborts instead of looping Review findings on #1855: requireAal2 let consent through at AAL1 when getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() returned nothing and a verified factor existed. Only a positive AAL2 answer passes now; a failed lookup and the inconsistent verified-factor-at-AAL1 case both step up to /mfa/verify. Back on /mfa/enroll with the consent page as returnTo went straight back into the redirect loop; it now aborts to the app. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018wCdzRTatKiDByKB8hCNT6 --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob WennbergandClaude Fable 5
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dc5aea4a35 |
feat(mcp): speak spec revision 2026-07-28 (stateless core) (#1277)
* feat(mcp): speak spec revision 2026-07-28 (stateless core) Adopt the 2026-07-28 MCP spec revision on the connector endpoint while keeping every handshake-era client (2025-06-18 and earlier) byte-identical: - Accept per-request _meta protocol negotiation (io.modelcontextprotocol/protocolVersion); unsupported versions return UnsupportedProtocolVersionError (-32022) with the supported list. - Implement server/discover (spec MUST): supported revisions, capabilities including the extensions field, identity, instructions, freshness hints. - Decorate results for stateless clients: required resultType, serverInfo in _meta, and CacheableResult ttlMs/cacheScope on tools/list, prompts/list, resources/list, resources/read. - Validate the standard Mcp-Method/Mcp-Name request headers when present (HeaderMismatchError -32020); absence stays accepted. - Declare the ratified MCP Apps extension (io.modelcontextprotocol/ui) in capabilities; the widgets already use the ratified mime type and _meta.ui.resourceUri shape, so no widget changes are needed. - OAuth: include the RFC 9207 iss parameter on every authorization response (success and error) and advertise authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported in RFC 8414 metadata. Resource-not-found already used -32602 and tools/list ordering was already deterministic; both are covered by the new test file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): Mcp-Name covers params.uri, base64 sentinel, version-header consistency Review follow-ups against the transport spec text: Mcp-Name mirrors params.name OR params.uri (resources/read), values arrive base64-wrapped in the =?base64?...?= sentinel and must be decoded before comparison, and an MCP-Protocol-Version header that disagrees with the _meta protocol version is a HeaderMismatch. Absence of any header stays accepted since this server supports handshake-era clients (spec-sanctioned leniency). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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7dde8cac82 |
fix(security): resolve the CodeQL backlog, three fixes and three documented false positives (#1225)
Triage of all 9 CodeQL alerts surfaced on main by #1223. None were introduced by that PR. Fixed: the compliance-review artifact now unpacks to runner.temp instead of over the trusted checkout (actions/artifact-poisoning, critical); MCP LIKE patterns escape backslash first, which was a real correctness bug returning wrong rows for any search containing a backslash (js/incomplete-sanitization, 2 sites); and the mcp-oauth consent form action is HTML-escaped (js/reflected-xss, not exploitable because WHATWG URL already percent-encodes " < >, but & is not in that encode set). Dismissed as false positives with reasoning recorded at each site and in DECISIONS.md: sie-export escapeQuotes, where doubling backslashes would violate SIE 4B, corrupt files in conformant readers and skew #KSUMMA under BFL 7-year retention; hashApiKey, where SHA-256 is correct for a 256-bit CSPRNG token and changing it would invalidate every live gnubok_sk_ key; and the DuplicateBookingDialog href, which is a DB UUID behind a literal path prefix. Regression tests cover both behavioural fixes, including the escape ordering. |
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MattssonandClaude Opus 4.8
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abe9ac9d8c |
Fix/attributes config (#926)
* fix(git): pin LF on generated extension registry and vitest snapshots setup:extensions and vitest write these files with LF; with core.autocrlf=true git expects CRLF and flags them as phantom modifications on every dev/build run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): enforce MFA on mcp-oauth consent and gate viewer storno route mcp-oauth/authorize renders an HTML consent page and issues 303 redirects that withRouteContext cannot express, so it kept raw getUser() and thereby skipped the AAL2 gate: a password-only (AAL1) session could approve consent that mints a long-lived, MFA-bypassing API key. Add a route-local requireAal2() step-up on GET and POST; AAL1 sessions redirect to /mfa/verify, BankID users are exempt. Separately, POST /api/reports/vat-declaration/rc-basis-gaps/fix calls correctEntry() (storno of a posted entry) but lacked requireWrite, so viewer-role members could trigger it. Add { requireWrite: true }. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): route transactions endpoints through withRouteContext Migrate the transactions routes off hand-rolled supabase.auth.getUser() onto the MFA-enforcing withRouteContext wrapper; add requireWrite on mutating handlers (book, uncategorize, attach-document, ignore, batch-match, create-from-document). Behavior and response shapes preserved; tests updated to the wrapper mock pattern. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): route SIE import and bank reconciliation through withRouteContext Migrate import/sie and reconciliation/bank routes onto the MFA-enforcing wrapper; requireWrite on mutations (import execute, create-accounts, mappings write verbs, link/unlink/run/mark-opening-balance). Reads (status, unmatched-entries) stay ungated. Response shapes preserved; tests added/updated to the wrapper mock pattern. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): route salary endpoints through withRouteContext Migrate salary employees and runs routes (plus ku, payroll-config, tax-tables) onto the MFA-enforcing wrapper; requireWrite on mutations. Personnummer masking/encryption untouched; file downloads (AGI XML, payslip PDF, payment files) keep their headers. Two payment-file GETs retain requireWrite because they stamp *_file_generated_at and previously gated viewers. Tests added/updated to the wrapper mock pattern. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): route report endpoints through withRouteContext Migrate the read-only report routes (trial balance, balansrapport, resultatrapport, income statement, ledgers, KPI, VAT declaration, salary journal, monthly breakdown, journal register, continuity check, full archive, etc.) onto the MFA-enforcing wrapper. All read-only, no requireWrite. JSON/XLSX/PDF/ZIP response bodies and headers preserved byte-for-byte; tests updated to the wrapper mock pattern. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): route invoices, skatteverket, agent and extension endpoints through withRouteContext Migrate invoices, supplier-invoices, skatteverket tax-payments, and dynamic extension routes onto the MFA-enforcing wrapper with requireWrite on mutations. The two NDJSON streaming agent routes (invoke, onboarding/stream) use requireAuth() directly (the wrapper can't wrap a streaming response) so MFA is still enforced. skatteverket payment-file GET keeps requireWrite (stamps a generated-at field). Response shapes and file headers preserved; tests added/updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): route documents, events, team and account endpoints through withRouteContext Migrate documents, events, kpi/preferences, vat/validate, support/contact onto the MFA-enforcing wrapper with requireWrite on mutations. account/password, team/accept and team/members use requireAuth() directly (user-level or pre-membership flows with no active company context) so MFA is still enforced. events keeps its dual API-key-or-session auth. Document retention guard untouched; tests added/updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): route settings and pending-operations endpoints through withRouteContext Migrate settings (api-keys, oauth-clients, booking-templates, counterparty-templates, logo, company settings) and pending-operations (commit, bulk-commit, reject, edit-before-approve) onto the MFA-enforcing wrapper with requireWrite on mutations. Credential-guarding routes keep their per-user ownership filters. Response shapes preserved; tests added/updated to the wrapper mock pattern. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(guards): ratchet raw-route-auth baseline 119->1 after A1 migration Lock in the withRouteContext migration so the count cannot regress. The single remaining entry, mcp-oauth/authorize, is a documented exception (HTML consent + redirects, MFA enforced via route-local step-up). Record the campaign and requireWrite decisions in DECISIONS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(vat): add eSKD momsdeklaration file export for "Deklarera via fil" Generate the Skatteverket eSKDUpload v6.0 XML file so users can file VAT by upload instead of typing every ruta into the form. Extract buildFiledAmounts() as the shared whole-krona source of truth (öre truncated per SFL 22 kap 1 §) so the XML file and the manual-filing PDF can never disagree. Adds the /eskd API route, an XML option in the report export menu, and the upload button on the manual-filing card. Strings in sv + en. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(vat): add 'vat_settlement' source type and update related components * fix(booking): adjust search input layout and enable autofocus * fix(vat): support 12-digit org numbers and adjust emission order for eSKD file * fix(migration): add 'vat_settlement' to journal_entries.source_type CHECK --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob WennbergandClaude Sonnet 5
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ec27228a8e |
style: remove em/en dashes repo-wide, add CLAUDE.md rule against them (#890)
Em dashes (—) and en dashes (–) had spread across comments, docs, tests, and a few UI strings, reading as AI-generated boilerplate rather than house style. Replaced each with punctuation matching its context: colon for explanatory clauses, comma for asides, plain hyphen for numeric/legal ranges (e.g. "21-23§"), "to"/"till" for date ranges, parentheses for paired-dash asides. messages/en.json and messages/sv.json were fixed by hand together to keep sv/en in sync. Left untouched where the dash is the functional subject rather than decorative punctuation: date-range-parser.ts's separator regex, charset-repair.ts's CP1252 byte-mapping table (and its test), the SIE encoding mojibake docs, generic-csv.ts's minus-sign normalizer, the agent system-prompt files that already instruct against em dashes, and a golden iXBRL test fixture compared byte-for-byte. Also fixes two bugs surfaced along the way: an off-by-one in ApiKeysPanel's scope-label split (a leftover from an earlier partial pass), and a charset-repair test that had lost the literal en-dash it exists to verify. Regenerated the agent atom seed migration (skills:generate) since 27 SKILL.md files changed. Added a CLAUDE.md rule against em/en dashes, with an explicit carve-out for the functional-dash cases above. Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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e4d4d8e4dc |
feat: enhance OAuth scopes and UI for agent-driven approval process (#544)
* feat: enhance OAuth scopes and UI for agent-driven approval process * refactor: update OAuth scopes to enforce explicit user consent for write and approval actions |
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Mattsson
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566ed72984 |
Bug/mcp connection issue (#541)
* feat(api): implement caching and logging in health check endpoint - Added in-memory caching for health check responses to reduce load on Postgres. - Introduced logging for error handling in health check. - Updated response structure to exclude error details from public responses. feat(api): enhance OAuth consent UI and scope handling - Improved consent UI to reflect exact requested scopes and added better user guidance. - Updated scope handling logic to ensure least-privilege access. - Enhanced styling for better user experience and accessibility. chore(docker): improve security and resource management in Docker setup - Updated Docker Compose configuration to enforce read-only file systems and resource limits. - Added health checks and logging options for better observability. - Introduced optional Caddy reverse proxy for TLS termination. fix(migrations): resolve ambiguity in create_company_with_owner function - Dropped orphaned 3-arg overload of create_company_with_owner function. - Recreated canonical 4-arg version with cash account seeding logic. - Ensured proper permissions for function execution in Postgres. * feat: enhance security checks for team membership in company creation * test: add CSP tests for OAuth authorization endpoint * feat: enhance error handling and reporting in bank file import process |