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Jakob Wennberg f266c386f3 chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers (#2150) 
* chore: repo-wide bloat sweep, remove dead code and fold duplicate helpers

Remove 33 dead files, ~270 unreferenced exports/types, 13 dead i18n
namespaces and 4 unused dependencies; fold byte-identical helper copies
into one canonical home each (lib/utils chunk/sleep/utcDateStamp,
lib/dates/iso, lib/invariants/uuid, lib/xml/escape, lib/reports/sru/format,
lib/pdf/number-text, lib/browser/panel-request, lib/api/v1/body +
v1ValidationError rolled out to ~55 v1 routes, booking-template schemas).

No behaviour change: v1 bodies and status codes, MCP tool schemas, DB
writes and money math are untouched. Naive ore rounding was deliberately
not swapped for roundOre; see DECISIONS.md 2026-09-02 for the full list
of things left alone on purpose.

tsc, lint, 19588 unit tests and check:guards green; antipattern baseline
ratcheted (naive-ore-round 622 -> 620, hand-rolled-invariant 115 -> 113).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(transactions): import RawTransaction from @/types after the ingest re-export removal

CI's type ratchet (check:types, full tsconfig) caught the one test file
that still imported the type through lib/transactions/ingest.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 11:51:16 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 18cbc4c30a fix(security): audit remediation 2026-09-01: api_keys identity, viewer gates, OAuth binding, XSS, MFA gate (#2155) 
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables

Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items.

- api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could
  forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they
  belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the
  identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs.
- rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become
  service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash
  readable by co-members was a bearer credential.
- validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no
  longer a member of the key's company.
- provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed
  to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent
  team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role
  only, matching every existing code path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database

Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer.

- One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the
  read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through
  the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role
  claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and
  trigger cascades.
- company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions;
  invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition
  guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and
  archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership.
- Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert
  posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with
  a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the
  definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes
  still pass.
- create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths;
  validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE;
  match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance
  RPCs become service_role only; the production-only
  seed_asset_categories is dropped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time

prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker
and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the
registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths

The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership
but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer
holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the
API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY
for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin

Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy
served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy
forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender,
could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se.

- inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images)
  served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP.
- storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB
  mime for the key is on the allow-list.
- document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type.
- logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG

Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a
scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there.
The upload pickers stop advertising SVG.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user

The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a
victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank
account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company.
requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who
started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL
preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter

WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with
plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the
invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All
three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard,
https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the
stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted
but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and
exports isRateLimiterConfigured().

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie

getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel
from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token
cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look
like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in
requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or
listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed
on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user

The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever
consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the
flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed
their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the
initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that
session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org
number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket
callbacks enforce the same initiator check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity

Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address
the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could
pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the
account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed,
the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000),
bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and
BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation
re-sent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes

A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page
named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link
handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered
URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a
company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host;
non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped
by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log

- register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID
  signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp.
- BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation.
- WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy.
- Logo help text no longer advertises SVG.
- DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts

Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down
by the one legacy error the change removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-02 11:38:30 +02:00
bjornbergenheim 43a71aec3c fix(supabase): stop server clients leaking a 30s refresh ticker per request (#1612) 
* fix(supabase): stop server clients leaking a 30s refresh ticker per request

`autoRefreshToken` defaults to true in supabase-js, and off-browser
@supabase/auth-js starts the refresh ticker unconditionally:

    // in non-browser environments the refresh token ticker runs always
    this.startAutoRefresh()

That is a setInterval firing every 30 s. It calls unref(), so the process
still exits, tests pass, and Vercel never notices because the process is
torn down long before the tickers accumulate. But unref() does not make a
timer collectable: it stays registered in the event loop and remains a GC
root for its callback, which closes over the GoTrueClient, the
SupabaseClient, and the whole request scope around it.

A long-running self-hosted instance therefore leaks one timer plus one
entire request graph (socket, IncomingMessage, ServerResponse, headers,
route context: ~100 kB) per client constructed. One died of "JavaScript
heap out of memory" after 42 h, the last 24 of them completely idle. The
heap snapshot showed 445 retained request graphs and ~1050 Timeouts in
the 30 000 ms bucket, retained via `autoRefreshTicker`, and the rate
matched the traffic exactly: the Docker healthcheck polls /api/health
every 30 s and the webhook dispatch cron runs every minute, so
3 clients/min x 148 min = 444.

- new lib/supabase/service-client.ts: createServiceRoleClient() applies
  SERVER_AUTH_OPTIONS, spread LAST so a caller passing its own auth block
  cannot re-enable the ticker
- 22 call sites migrated; only booking-templates/sync/cron had ever
  passed the options itself
- guard 9 in no-new-antipatterns.mjs fails CI on any new value import of
  supabase-js's createClient outside the wrapper; type-only imports are
  fine. Verified to fail on a deliberate regression and pass once fixed
- browser clients untouched: a signed-in tab genuinely needs the refresh,
  and lib/supabase/client.ts is built on createBrowserClient anyway

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(checks): catch namespace imports in the leaky-supabase-client guard

The guard only matched named imports, so

    import * as sb from '@supabase/supabase-js'
    sb.createClient(url, key)

reached createClient through member access without ever naming it, and
passed. Verified against the real script before and after: the shape is
flagged now, and `import type * as sb` still passes.

Namespace value imports are treated as leaky outright rather than tracking
member access, which keeps the check a regex over source text with no new
dependency.

Review also suggested excluding *.test.tsx alongside *.test.ts. Skipped: the
repo has no .test.tsx files, and all four sibling checks in this file use
`.test.ts`. Diverging in one of them would read as an accident; if such files
appear, all four should change together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-17 14:30:17 +02:00
Mattsson c35b2547fb feat(webshop-orders): Orders page with per-store, per-payment-method booking (#1525) 
* feat(webshop-orders): schema, types and error codes for the orders surface

webshop_orders (order/refund rows, financial-freeze trigger, member
select/update RLS, no DELETE) + webshop_store_settings (per-store payment
method -> account map), source_type 'webshop_order', multi-store index drop,
customer_country, and a one-time woo cursor reset so the switch-over
backfills and cross-marks existing feed rows. Tables classified in the
full-archive export; pg-real coverage for RLS, freeze and CHECK.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(webshop-orders): core service (ingest, booking lines)

upsertWebshopOrders: two-phase order/refund upsert with FX enrichment,
legacy-feed cross-marking, frozen-row protection and field-wise jsonb
comparisons (Postgres does not preserve object key order). Booking-line
builder: per-rate VAT split with SIGNED buckets (discounts book as revenue
reductions), refund mirroring, 3740 residual, per-store account prefill,
and advisory export/EU + OSS warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(webshop-orders): API routes for list, booking, invoicing and mapping

Booking is draft -> atomic claim -> commit (conditional link-back closes the
concurrent double-book race; a lost claim cancels the voucher-free draft).
Legacy-feed guard honors transactions.is_ignored on both the book and
create-invoice paths. Invoice conversion reuses buildInvoiceWriteData for an
unnumbered draft with dominant-rate fallback and drift-safe unit prices.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(webshop-orders): Orders page, booking/invoice dialogs and gated nav

/orders lists per-store orders with status tabs (server-side filters),
exception chips and one action per row. Booking dialog prefills from the
per-store payment-method mapping with an opt-in remember; invoice dialog
converts to a draft kundfaktura. The Order nav item renders only for
companies with an active WooCommerce connection or existing order rows
(Shopify deliberately excluded until its sync writes webshop_orders).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(woocommerce): switch the order sync to webshop_orders, multi-store

The sync maps rich wc/v3 payloads (billing, line/shipping/fee taxes, refund
allocations with parent-prorated VAT fallback) and upserts order rows
instead of transactions-inbox rows; already-imported feed rows stay
bookable and get cross-marked. Multi-store: several active connections per
company, per-store panel cards with the account-mapping editor.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(webshop-orders): decision log entries and ratchet baseline

Baseline moves DOWN only: naive-ore-round 638 -> 637 via roundOre adoption;
hand-rolled invariants stay at 115 (ACCOUNT_NUMBER_RE imported, not inlined).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(webshop-orders): resolve PR #1525 review findings and CI failures

Review batch (Superagent, CodeRabbit, Swedish compliance review):
- Mutual-exclusion claims: booking guards invoice_id, invoice link-back
  guards journal_entry_id AND treats zero matched rows as the conflict it
  is (409 + rollback), closing both TOCTOU races.
- Freeze v2 migration (20260812124858): the link columns themselves are
  protected: invoice links immutable, journal links clearable only while
  the entry is still a draft (the booking rollback path).
- Scraped orgnr no longer auto-written to customers.org_number; rate
  fallback applies only on single-VAT-bucket orders; refunds get their own
  WEBSHOP_ORDER_REFUND_NOT_CONVERTIBLE code; VAT advisories outrank the
  invoice-mode hint in the booking dialog.
- Ingest compares every synced field (billing corrections no longer drop
  as unchanged); sync guards absent refunds arrays; /sync aggregates
  per-store results; panel disables all cards while a request runs; orders
  page separates load failure from empty; account field explains itself.

CI: regenerated skills/accounted-api; pg tests restructured for
transaction-abort/rollback semantics + freeze-link coverage; unresolvable-
expression ceiling 375 -> 378 with documented reason (partial-update
payloads in ingest, shapes covered by unit tests).

Declined: CodeRabbit docstring-coverage advisory (house style: comments
only where the code cannot say it).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-12 15:08:13 +02:00
Mattsson 707d597b2e feat(woocommerce): store order/refund feed extension (#1442) 
* feat(woocommerce): store order/refund feed extension

Connect a WooCommerce store via the wc-auth key handshake (manual key
fallback) with per-store consumer key/secret AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest,
and import paid orders and refunds into the transactions inbox as a
bank-style feed on the 1680 cash account. Feed-only: nothing auto-books,
gateway fees/payouts are out of scope (core wc/v3 does not expose them).

Sync is cursor-paginated on modified_after (offset pages only inside
same-second date_modified ties), terminates on an empty page, holds the
cursor below failed refund fetches / ingest errors / deadline-skipped work,
checks the time budget between refund fetches, and drops rows dated on or
before bookkeeping_locked_through on every run. Nightly cron gated on the
extension registry + new paid capability woocommerce_sync (backfilled to
existing bank_sync grant holders).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(migrations): move woocommerce migrations past main's 20260806090000

origin/main gained 20260806090000_recurring_schedule_interval_months while
this branch was in flight; identical version timestamps abort the Supabase
apply, so the two new migrations move to 20260806170000/20260806170100.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(woocommerce): resolve CodeRabbit review findings

- callback 503s early when WOOCOMMERCE_CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY is
  unset: encryptCredential would otherwise throw after the probe and
  strand the pending row without error_message
- disconnect and upstream-revoke clear the encrypted consumer key/secret:
  nothing reads them after revoke and keeping decryptable dead
  credentials is unnecessary retention
- manual sync gets a 240s time budget and the panel reports a truncated
  run as 'partial, sync again' instead of a normal completion
- listOrderRefunds terminates on an empty batch (hosts may cap per_page),
  dedupes by id against hosts that ignore page, and caps total pages
- unparseable money strings count as errors and log instead of being
  silently identical to a zero total
- pg test uses per-run unique store URLs so committed rows cannot hit
  the store_url partial unique index across pg-real runs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(woocommerce): resolve CodeRabbit cycle-2 findings

- listOrderRefunds throws when the page cap is exhausted with data still
  flowing, instead of returning a silently partial list the sync cursor
  would advance past; the error routes into the existing held-cursor
  refund-retry path
- partial sync results keep the row-error count, and the partial toast
  string surfaces it (ICU plural, hidden at zero) in both locales

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: retrigger CI after dropped push event

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-06 23:30:00 +02:00