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Author SHA1 Message Date
Mattsson d8cf78330e docs(self-hosting): own-credentials section, stale connector lines, complete .env.example (#2146) 
* docs(self-hosting): own-credentials section, stale connector lines, complete .env.example (#2131)

SELF-HOSTING.md said the Skatteverket client wiring "ships in a following
release"; PR #2103 merged it, so both bank sync and Skatteverket now carry
traffic through the hosted proxy with a key. The two stale sentences are
replaced and SOVEREIGN.md line 48 says the same thing.

New "Own credentials (no connector key)" subsection documents the path an
operator takes without a key: Enable Banking app in restricted production
mode with the callback URL, the Skatteverket developer-portal application
with the redirect URI, every variable the code reads, the five production
base URLs (all defaults point at the test environment), the kill switch,
and the rule that any own credential switches that upstream out of
connector mode.

.env.example gains the Skatteverket block, the optional Enable Banking
variables, and RESEND_INBOUND_DOMAIN / RESEND_INBOUND_WEBHOOK_SECRET, which
the invoice-inbox manifest requires but the example never listed.
DOCKER.md no longer claims Enable Banking is excluded from the self-host
preset (docker/extensions.self-hosted.json ships it).

ENABLE_BANKING_SANDBOX is removed from the enable-banking manifest and the
index.ts header: declared as optional, never read anywhere; the sandbox is
selected by ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL. Logged in DECISIONS.md.

Closes #2131

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012C6M2ZoZc6QDRxU3m9WzgE
Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>

* docs(self-hosting): correct key format, AISP scope caveat, SKV scopes and rotation note (#2131)

Skeptic findings on PR #2146, one pass:
- ENABLE_BANKING_PRIVATE_KEY: the decoder base64-decodes first and wraps
  anything else as DER, so a raw PEM fails at JWT signing. The docs and
  .env.example no longer claim it is accepted.
- Enable Banking restricted mode covers the operator's own accounts only;
  an instance hosting client companies is doing licensed AIS and needs
  the connector key or its own AISP registration. Said so.
- Listed the OAuth scopes the app requests (both AGI scopes), noted that
  the kill switch gates API calls, not the BankID login, and that the
  token encryption key has no dual-key rotation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012C6M2ZoZc6QDRxU3m9WzgE
Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-09-01 23:08:47 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 0ff1b05553 feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly (#1748) 
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector'

Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted.

- lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync,
  skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a
  self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability().
  Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on
  purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant.
- lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key).
  Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins,
  else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on
  (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector
  capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the
  grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows.
  getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector
  keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the
  hosted trial copy).
- Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains
  'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline
  and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly).
  pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the
  (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows.
- Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector
  gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector
  keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests
  that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated
  to the new one.

Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green
against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint
ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector
extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can
be issued).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query

One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the
no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is
unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly

Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the
entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the
plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key.

Hosted side:
- Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix,
  org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids,
  current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count,
  last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering,
  separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted
  companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC
  validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR
  UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row)
  and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role.
  pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate
  limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade.
- lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts
  (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping),
  with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per
  request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET +
  POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report,
  never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless
  --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines).

Instance side:
- lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL
  default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count
  and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope,
  expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status
  deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone.
  /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key.
- Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json,
  with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with
  the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates),
  DECISIONS.

Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes
and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests
run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied.
no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(connect): update pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831190000

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): RPC errors answer 503 not 401; X-Connector-Key wins over Authorization

A hosted DB error mapped to 401 made the instance sync treat a pooler
blip as key revocation and delete its entire connector grant cache,
zeroing the 72h offline grace. 503 lands in the sync's keep-grants
branch (already test-pinned). Bearer-first extraction hashed the
upstream token on dual-header proxied calls, 401ing the exact shape
X-Connector-Key exists for.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): sync deletes grants only on a body-proven connector rejection, never bare 401/403

A WAF challenge page, edge deployment protection, or an egress proxy
answers 401/403 without the hosted app ever running; trusting status
alone wiped the instance's 72h offline grant cache within the hour.
Deletion now requires the hosted route's own rejection code in the
JSON body; codeless 401/403 keeps grants (server_error branch).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): PR #1748 review batch: https-only connect URL, atomic pin, prefix-gated Bearer, deferred metering, entitlements validation, integer months

- GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL must be https (http only for loopback); invalid or
  plaintext URLs disable the connector instead of sending the key.
- instance_url pin update filters on IS NULL; a lost race re-reads and
  reports the winner's pin.
- extractConnectorKey: a Bearer is the connector credential only with
  the gnubok_ck_ prefix; upstream Bearer falls through to X-Connector-Key.
- Usage metering runs via after() off the response path (inline outside
  a request scope).
- Sync validates entitlements shape: unknown status or malformed
  current_period_end keeps grants (server_error), never deletes.
- issue-connector-key rejects fractional --months.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
 2026-08-31 20:51:17 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 502905e093 feat(fortnox): make scope-approval flags overridable via env for self-hosted apps (#2069) 
FORTNOX_DOCUMENT_SCOPES_APPROVED and FORTNOX_ASSET_SCOPES_APPROVED read env vars of the same name with the hosted registration's values as defaults, so a self-hosted Fortnox app avoids invalid_scope at authorize and the impossible reconnect loop without patching source. Supersedes #2001.

Co-authored-by: Pierre Gronberg <pierre@hbgdesignlab.se>
 2026-08-31 09:27:31 +01:00
Goostaf 6ac9679fb5 feat(auth): base available login methods off GoTrue providers (#1869) 
* feat(auth): base login fields on GoTrue providers

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

# Conflicts:
#	app/(auth)/login/login-client.tsx
#	app/(auth)/register/page.tsx

* fix: address feedback

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* chore: remove hardcoded Google enabled checks

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

# Conflicts:
#	.env.example

* feat: show label when password login is disabled

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: use MicrosoftMark, correct comment

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: display custom providers

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: show when no methods are available

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: display custom provider labels

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: add SAML login path

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: show when no methods are available

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: display SAML button when enabled

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: preserve nextPath and broken key

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: redirect test to client

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: expose registerEnabled

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: provider allowlist and request timeout

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: restore compact labels

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* refactor: move withTimeout implementation to utils

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: include nextPath

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix: export function and test case

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* feat: only show SAML button if vars configured

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>

* fix(auth): map SAML sign-in error through getErrorMessage

The antipattern ratchet (check:guards, raw-user-error) rejects a raw
error.message reaching a user-visible sink. Route the signInWithSSO
error through getErrorMessage like the other auth error paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013BAzJjXQBa9F5L1U42wUMj
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): GitHub brand mark on the provider button; decision log

GitHub allows its invertocat in solid black/white, so currentColor is
correct; custom OIDC providers keep the generic key icon.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013BAzJjXQBa9F5L1U42wUMj
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Goostaf <gasplund2@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-31 09:13:39 +01:00
Jakob Wennberg 523fba0419 feat(email): SMTP mailer behind the EmailService seam (EMAIL_PROVIDER=smtp); Resend stays the hosted default (#1746) 
SmtpEmailService (nodemailer 9.0.5, exact-pinned) behind the existing EmailService seam. Provider resolution: EMAIL_PROVIDER wins, else RESEND_API_KEY selects Resend (hosted byte-identical), else SMTP_HOST selects SMTP. From header is built exactly like the Resend service after #1956 (no 'via <app>', fromAddress honored, platform-sender retry). STARTTLS is required by default (requireTLS) with SMTP_REQUIRE_TLS=false as an explicit opt-out for a plaintext LAN relay. Docs, env examples and the generated extension registry updated.
 2026-08-30 11:54:47 +02:00
Mattsson 328ccda10d fix: protect public Auth flows from automated abuse (#1904) 
* fix: add Turnstile to public auth flows

* test: isolate Turnstile auth tests
 2026-08-25 19:14:06 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 9ef7de861f feat(peppol): poll outbound delivery status + cap receiving registrations (#1793) 
* feat(peppol): poll outbound delivery status from the access point

Qvalia's webhook API answers 404 on its production host (the sandbox answers
204), so without this the prod lifecycle would stop at submission_accepted.
The transport gains pollDeliveryStatus(); the Qvalia adapter reads
/invoices/outgoing/status and maps the message-log status through the same
tolerant mapping as a document_delivery webhook, with the same dedupe key, so
a later webhook for the same transition is a harmless duplicate. A cron four
times an hour walks the open deliveries of the last 45 days, records the
answer through the append-only lifecycle RPC and fetches evidence once a
delivery reaches transport or a terminal state. Kept as the safety net for a
missed webhook once Qvalia ships them to prod.

Refs #546

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqFpxeWqbpR7bcwUJLRERQ

* feat(peppol): cap receiving registrations at the contracted tenant count

The Qvalia partner contract is priced per tenant (10 to start), so the
registration refuses the next company with PEPPOL_REGISTRATION_CAP_REACHED
once PEPPOL_RECEIVING_MAX_REGISTRATIONS live registrations exist, instead of
silently exceeding the contract. A company that already holds a live row is
never counted twice; unset means no cap (own provider account).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqFpxeWqbpR7bcwUJLRERQ

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-21 17:06:57 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 05c3c6ebd9 feat(peppol): Qvalia access-point adapter, send flow and delivery webhook (#1780) 
* feat(peppol): Qvalia access-point adapter, send flow and delivery webhook

Qvalia is the contracted Peppol Access Point (signed 2026-08-21). This fills
the provider-neutral PeppolTransport seam from #1595 with a real adapter and
turns the disabled "Skicka via Peppol" menu item into a working send flow.

Adapter (lib/invoices/transports/qvalia.ts): partner-scoped recipient lookup,
XML submission to /invoices/outgoing with integrationId correlation, 409
recovery only when the stored copy carries the same seller endpoint, tolerant
mapping of Qvalia's free-text webhook statuses onto the 11-state lifecycle,
constant-time shared-secret webhook verification (Qvalia does not sign
webhooks), and evidence retrieval of the message-log status plus Qvalia's
stored XML copy. Registered from the environment in lib/init.ts; switched on
per deployment with PEPPOL_TRANSPORT_PROVIDER=qvalia.

POST /api/invoices/[id]/peppol/send: stage the exact XML, look up the
recipient, record recipient_verified and submitting, submit, record
submission_accepted, then issue a draft with the mark-sent semantics
(issueAndBookInvoice) only after the network accepted it. A sync rejection is
a terminal failed event so the identical document is never re-sent; an
operational failure is retryable; an already-submitted XML replays
idempotently.

POST /api/webhooks/peppol/qvalia resolves the delivery by integrationId,
persists the verified event via the service-role RPC and stores evidence
best-effort; unknown submissions answer 200, our own persistence failures 500.

UI: the send item is availability-driven with a confirm dialog, the invoice
page shows the latest Peppol status, and drafts can be sent (the number is
assigned server-side). Probe script for the first sandbox contact under
scripts/peppol/qvalia-probe.ts.

Refs #546

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqFpxeWqbpR7bcwUJLRERQ

* fix(peppol): Qvalia sandbox facts from first live contact: bare-key auth, api-test host, SMP-URL document types

The onboarding mail and a live probe against the sandbox (partner
SE5595386219) corrected three assumptions from the public docs: the key is
accepted bare in the Authorization header (the ApiKey prefix answers 401), the
sandbox host is api-test.qvalia.com, and the recipient lookup returns document
types as SMP service URLs, so capabilities are now normalized to bare Peppol
document type ids before comparison.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqFpxeWqbpR7bcwUJLRERQ

* feat(peppol): probe commands to inspect and configure the Qvalia webhook subscription

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqFpxeWqbpR7bcwUJLRERQ

* fix(peppol): decode UBL entities in one pass (CodeQL js/double-escaping)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TqFpxeWqbpR7bcwUJLRERQ

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-21 12:45:11 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 4ecc888416 feat(ai): self-host enablement for BYO endpoints: poppler in the runner image, backend-agnostic smoke script, docs (#1743) 
Sovereign plan WS1 PR2, stacked on the extraction-first service (#1740).

- Dockerfile (runner stage): `apk add --no-cache poppler-utils`, the one
  system package beyond the base image (~4 MB plus shared libs, pdftoppm
  25.12 on node:22-alpine). pdftoppm renders the first pages of a PDF for
  AI backends with no native PDF input (an OpenAI-compatible Swedish
  endpoint); page images land in /tmp, which docker-compose.yml already
  mounts as tmpfs under the read-only root. Hosted (Bedrock) never calls
  it; the cron image is untouched.
- scripts/smoke-ai-provider.ts: the self-hoster's "is AI wired up"
  command. Prints provider, models per tier, PDF mode (+ whether
  pdftoppm is present), vision/strict-JSON; then one text generation per
  tier model, one schema-shaped answer and, given a file, the exact
  document-extraction path an upload takes. Skips are reported as
  failures with the fix. Reads .env.local then .env.
- docs/SELF-HOSTING.md: verifying section rewritten around the new
  script (smoke-ai.ts stays for the assistant's Anthropic-only parameter
  probes); rasterizer/tmpfs notes; .env.example gains
  AI_PDF_RASTERIZER_BIN; DECISIONS entry.

Verified: live against hosted Bedrock (text per tier, structured, PDF
extraction) and against a local OpenAI-compatible mock with
AI_PROVIDER=openai-compatible (the mock received Bearer auth, per-tier
model ids and one image_url part per rasterized page; extraction parsed
the fenced JSON answer). poppler-utils probed on node:22-alpine.

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-20 19:48:21 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg c7a75d069d feat(ai): job-shaped AI service with OpenAI-compatible backend, extraction-first; stop extracting every inbox document twice (#1740) 
* feat(ai): job-shaped AI service with OpenAI-compatible backend, extraction-first; stop extracting every inbox document twice

Sovereign plan WS1 PR1 (#1406 Tier 2, extraction-first, aligned with the
AI surface audit).

lib/ai grows a job-shaped service (generateText / generateStructured /
extractFromDocument; no streaming members yet, see plan rule R3):
- services/anthropic-family delegates to the existing createAiClient()
  and sends the exact request literals the inbox extractor sent before
  (request-shape tests deep-equal them), so hosted Bedrock stays
  byte-identical.
- services/openai-compatible talks to any chat-completions endpoint
  (BYO Swedish provider) via Vercel AI SDK 6.x, exact-pinned and
  guarded: images as parts, PDFs rasterized with poppler (AI_PDF_MODE)
  or sent natively, AI_VISION / AI_STRICT_JSON declared, honest skips
  (ai_no_vision, pdf_rasterizer_missing) instead of fake failures.
- config.ts: AI_PROVIDER/AI_BASE_URL/AI_API_KEY/AI_MODEL and per-tier
  AI_*_MODEL with the legacy BEDROCK_* names kept as the same overrides;
  getAiStatus() is the single source of truth for "is AI wired up".
- provider.ts: openai-compatible in the auto-detect chain (after Bedrock
  and the direct API); createAiClient() refuses it loudly.

Document extraction moves onto the service and gets the audit's fixes:
- Inbox documents were extracted TWICE (pipeline A ran inside
  uploadDocument() before the inbox row existed, so its dedupe branch
  never fired; 3 707 + 1 666 calls / 30 d). The inbox now declares
  extractionOwner on the upload, the extension yields, and the inbox
  mirrors its single outcome onto document_attachments from every
  writer (sync, deferred, attach, retry, MCP).
- Every "no extraction will ever happen" outcome is stamped
  (skipped:no_ai_entitlement / ai_unconfigured / system_generated /
  ...); the status route maps the quiet ones to 'disabled' on the first
  poll instead of a 30 s client timeout. Prod showed 309 of the 327
  never-extracted uploads were the paywall working silently.
- Self-generated documents (our own invoice PDFs, payout files) are no
  longer OCR'd.
- Agent invoke answers 503 ai_unconfigured when the deployment has no
  assistant backend, distinct from the paywall.

Guard: new direct-ai-client antipattern check (shrink-only allowlist of
the pre-abstraction SDK callers) plus exact pins for @anthropic-ai/sdk,
ai and @ai-sdk/openai-compatible.

Verified: 15 958 unit tests green, guards, lint ratchet, typecheck, and a
live smoke against hosted Bedrock through the new service (ping, streamed
tool turn, thinking+cache, PDF extraction).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ai): make AI_API_KEY optional for OpenAI-compatible endpoints (keyless local model servers)

A local model server (llama.cpp's server, Ollama /v1, LM Studio, vLLM)
usually has no auth. Before, the OpenAI-compatible backend required both
AI_BASE_URL and AI_API_KEY to count as configured, so running Accounted on a
local model meant setting a meaningless placeholder key.

- resolveAiProvider / hasAiCredentials: a base URL alone is now enough.
- services/openai-compatible: only send Authorization: Bearer when AI_API_KEY
  is set, so a keyless server is never handed an empty bearer; a hosted
  provider that needs a key still sets it.
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING Option 3: local-model example, key marked optional),
  DECISIONS.

Verified: with no AI_API_KEY, just AI_BASE_URL + AI_MODEL, getAiStatus()
reports configured=true / provider=openai-compatible (live). lib/ai suite
71 green; tsc, guards, lint clean. Bedrock/Anthropic logic unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-20 19:39:08 +02:00
Mattsson dfa7097f3a fix(auth): secure white-label invite and reset links (#1680) 2026-08-18 23:17:26 +02:00
Mattsson 3829b6add3 fix(ai): complete plain-key self-hosting path (#1584) 
* feat(ai): resolve the Claude backend from the environment

Tier 1 of #1406: a self-hosted deployment can now run every AI feature on a
plain ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, with no AWS account. Hosted behaviour is unchanged.

lib/ai/provider.ts resolves the backend once, from the environment:

  AI_PROVIDER              explicit override, bedrock|anthropic
  AWS static key pair      Bedrock
  ANTHROPIC_API_KEY        the direct Anthropic API
  nothing set              Bedrock, so the AWS credential provider chain
                           (instance profile, IRSA) still resolves

Bedrock deliberately wins when both credential sets are present. EU residency
in eu-north-1 is a BFL/GDPR posture rather than a default, so adding an
Anthropic key for an experiment must not silently move production inference
out of the region. AI_PROVIDER is the way to say you meant it.

Model ids are written bare in code and prefixed to eu.anthropic.* only for
Bedrock, which needs the cross-region inference profile for on-demand
throughput. An operator override that already carries a prefix passes through
untouched, so BEDROCK_MODEL_ID and friends keep working as written.

Converted call sites: the agent composer, invoice-inbox extraction, the
document-extraction model label, and both receipt-hunt clients. The last two
are not named in the issue, which predates receipt-hunt landing in main.

@anthropic-ai/sdk is declared at 0.95.0, the version @anthropic-ai/bedrock-sdk
0.29.1 already pulled in transitively, so the lockfile dedupes to one copy
with no new download.

scripts/smoke-bedrock.ts becomes scripts/smoke-ai.ts and grows two steps.
Unit tests can only prove which provider and model id get resolved; they
cannot prove the resulting request is one the backend accepts. The script now
sends real traffic over all three shapes the app uses: a plain create, a
streamed turn carrying adaptive thinking, an effort level, an hour-long cache
breakpoint and a tool, and document extraction end to end when given a file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Bergenheim <29535152+bjornbergenheim@users.noreply.github.com>

* docs(self-hosting): document the AI smoke test

The script added alongside the provider split is what closes the #1406
acceptance criterion ("document extraction and the assistant both work"), so
a self-hoster needs to know it exists. Covers both invocations and states
that it exits non-zero, which is what makes it usable as a post-deploy check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Bergenheim <29535152+bjornbergenheim@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(ai): split the smoke test's thinking probe from its tool probe

The combined probe could not falsify what it claimed to. It asked a question
that needs a tool call, so the tool was used and adaptive thinking correctly
declined to reason about it: the zero thinking-block count that came back was
uninformative rather than a signal.

2a keeps the tool and drops thinking. 2b asks a question with several
dependent steps (reverse charge, then a partial deduction, then the affected
boxes) so that a model honouring the parameter must reason, and reports the
thinking text length as well as the block count, since display:"summarized"
can yield blocks with empty text.

The cached system prompt is also padded past the 1024-token minimum cacheable
prefix. Below that the API caches nothing and reports no error, so the old
probe's cache counters read zero whether or not caching worked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Bergenheim <29535152+bjornbergenheim@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(document-extraction): stop requiring AWS_REGION in the manifest

The extension now needs one of two credential sets, AWS static keys or
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, and the manifest schema cannot express "one of". Since
requiredEnvVars only drives a build-time warning and never gates anything,
listing AWS_REGION told every self-hoster running the direct API to set a
variable that has no effect for them.

The description was also still promising Sonnet 4.6 via Bedrock specifically,
which is no longer what the extension does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Bergenheim <29535152+bjornbergenheim@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ai): read documentKind defensively in the smoke test

The field arrived with the receipt-aware extraction work, so referencing it
directly stops the script compiling against any checkout from before that
landed. tsconfig includes **/*.ts and next.config does not disable type
checking, so on such a checkout this failed the production build rather than
just the script: caught while preparing a test branch for a self-hosted
instance that had not synced yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Bergenheim <29535152+bjornbergenheim@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(deps): restore the nested @swc/helpers entry in the lockfile

Declaring @anthropic-ai/sdk with `npm install --package-lock-only` also pruned
node_modules/next-intl/node_modules/@swc/helpers@0.5.23, an optional peer entry
the local npm 11 considers redundant and the image's npm 10.9.8 does not. The
result passed every local check and failed `npm ci` inside the Docker build,
which is the only place the lockfile is actually enforced.

The lockfile is now the previous one plus the single root dependency line,
verified with `npm ci --dry-run`. @anthropic-ai/sdk needed nothing else: it was
already in the tree as a transitive dependency of @anthropic-ai/bedrock-sdk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Bergenheim <29535152+bjornbergenheim@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update DECISIONS.md

Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update Docker documentation for AI provider credentials

Clarify the role of credentials in AI provider selection and document extraction requirements.

* Update SELF-HOSTING.md with smoke-ai script details

Clarify usage of smoke-ai script for credential checks and document extraction.

* Improve error handling and logging in smoke-ai script

* fix(ai): complete plain-key self-hosting path

Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Bergenheim <29535152+bjornbergenheim@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Bjorn Bergenheim <29535152+bjornbergenheim@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: coderabbitai[bot] <136622811+coderabbitai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
 2026-08-13 15:45:24 +02:00
Mattsson 11995b1b0c feat(auth): make automatic logout an opt-in per-user setting (#1536) 
* feat(auth): make automatic logout an opt-in per-user setting

Session timeouts (30 min idle / 12 h absolute on hosted) now apply only
to users who enable "Automatic logout" in Settings > Security. Default
is off: sessions live for the full Supabase refresh-token lifetime, the
behavior from before the 2026-07 session hardening.

- user_preferences.auto_logout (migration, default false), toggled via
  the extended /api/user/preferences route
- The opt-in is snapshotted into the signed timeout cookie at mint, so
  enforcement stays DB-read-free per request; the preferences route
  clears the cookie on change so a toggle takes effect immediately
- Pre-toggle cookies are authentic-but-stale: re-minted preserving
  their timers, never routed down the tamper path, so the rollout does
  not log anyone out
- NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_TIMEOUT_FORCE_ALL=true enforces timeouts for
  every user regardless of preference (emergency lever, also plumbed
  through the Docker image); self-hosted stays disabled by default

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): resolve PR #1536 review findings

- Replace the spread upsert in /api/user/preferences with one literal
  payload per field: the phantom-column schema guard cannot resolve
  spread payloads (Unit tests 3/4 ceiling failure)
- Map the preferences 500 through getErrorMessage so the user-facing
  text is Swedish (CodeRabbit)
- fetchAutoLogoutPreference now returns null on a FAILED read instead
  of a fail-open false: callers skip minting so an unknown preference
  is never persisted into the year-long signed cookie, and the next
  request retries; failures log at error level, distinct from the
  normal opt-out path (compliance swarm GDPR Art.32(1)(b) / ISO A.8.5)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): write multi-field preference updates as one atomic upsert

A request carrying both hide_assistant_fab and auto_logout previously
issued two sequential writes, so a failure of the second returned 500
after half the request had persisted (CodeRabbit, PR #1536). One
literal upsert per accepted field combination keeps the write atomic
and stays resolvable for the phantom-column schema guard.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-12 16:45:41 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 38f5d9812e feat(receipt-hunt): find receipts in connected mailboxes and pair them on the amount (#1492) 
* feat(receipt-hunt): nightly matcher pairing unbooked purchases with held receipts

Stages an attach_document_to_transaction proposal for every unbooked card
purchase whose receipt the company already holds, so the underlag is attached
before the transaction is booked and the gap never forms. When the user later
books it, categorize-core.ts propagates the document onto the new verifikat
through the matched_transaction_id link the executor writes.

Deliberately scoped to UNBOOKED transactions. The posted-verifikat backlog is
96% imported history whose originals live in the previous system, so it stays a
pull (the verifikat_missing_document worklist) rather than a nightly push.

Ranking reuses scoreUnderlagCandidates; the pool is loaded once per company
instead of per transaction, which removes both the N+1 and the newest-50
truncation a per-transaction lookup imposes on a deep backlog.

Five guards, each mutation-tested: a confidence floor above the shared
candidate floor, an ambiguity margin so two equally-good receipts are left to
the picker rather than coin-flipped, one-receipt-one-purchase, one live
proposal per purchase, and permanent suppression of pairs a human rejected.
Suppression is derived from pending_operations history rather than a new table:
terminal rows are immutable and a rejection is already the durable "no".

Runs 05:30 UTC, after the 05:00 bank sync. Gated on RECEIPT_HUNT_COMPANY_IDS,
which hunts nobody when unset so enabling it stays a deliberate act. No
migration, no journal writes, no UI: proposals land in the existing Granskning
queue.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(receipt-hunt): dry-run mode for provkörning against a real ledger

Returns the pairings a run would stage without writing any of them, so a
company can see tonight's proposals before they reach the granskningskö and so
the matcher can be validated against production data without staging an
operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(matching): fold Swedish bank descriptors so receipts reach their purchases

calculateMerchantSimilarity compared raw bank descriptors, so a receipt from
"Alviks kött och fisk" scored 0.125 against the bank's own row for it,
"Alviks koett och fisk K3667 Kortköp/uttag" — an öre-exact pair no threshold
could reach. Adds normalizeForMatch, used for similarity only, which folds what
the card rails add and never changes identity: the K#### token, Kortköp/uttag
verbs, a leading "Kortköp YYMMDD", trailing /YY-MM-DD dates, reference numbers
glued to the name, domain wrappers, legal forms, and the three ways banks mangle
Swedish letters (ö, transliterated "oe", and ?? mojibake). Processor markers
become spaces because the merchant sits before the star in GOOGLE*PLAY and after
it in K*IKEA GALLE. Token-subset containment is scored level with substring
containment so a receipt's legal name matches the bank's trading name.

normalizeMerchantName is left byte-identical and now documents why: it is a
transitive input to categorization_templates.counterparty_name, a persisted
UNIQUE key with a hand-written SQL mirror the ledger-context RPC recomputes at
query time. Changing it would make stored keys stop equalling computed ones, so
the konteringskarta join misses and insertOrUpdateTemplate inserts a second row
per merchant instead of migrating the occurrence counts.

Aggressive folding is safe because it is applied to both sides of every
comparison, so an over-eager fold still matches; the risk is collision between
different merchants, which the new tests guard.

Measured on 27 receipt/transaction pairs humans actually confirmed in
production: recall 27/27, and 0/7 false positives on deliberately similar but
distinct merchants. Full unit suite unchanged (13,004 passing), including the 22
string pins on the frozen key path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(mail): read-only Gmail connector so receipts are found without forwarding

Forwarding was the only way a receipt reached Accounted, and it is both
unpopular (97% of companies with the problem have never used their inbox
address) and fragile: Arcim's own forward has been off for weeks and nobody
noticed. This lets the hunt look in the mailbox instead.

Scope is gmail.readonly and nothing else. It can search and download attachment
bytes, and it structurally cannot send, modify or delete: the promise the
consent screen makes is enforced by the grant, not by our code being careful.
The consequence is deliberate: the agent can prepare a forward for a portal-link
receipt but can never send one itself.

Query-then-classify, never sync. For each unexplained purchase we run a
provider-side search in a -3/+10 day window, pull metadata for a handful of
hits, and keep nothing. No mailbox is mirrored and no message body is stored,
which is what keeps this inside Google's Limited Use terms and GDPR data
minimisation. Mail is searched only for purchases Underlag could not already
explain, so a receipt we already hold never costs a mailbox read.

The query ORs merchant against amount rather than requiring both: demanding both
misses every rebrand and reseller (Anthropic bills as Claude), while the amount
alone is a strong filter inside two weeks.

mail_connections is service-role only with RLS enabled and zero policies,
because the row holds a live refresh token and RLS cannot hide a column.
Uniqueness is (company, provider, address) so a second mailbox is additive and a
reconnect updates in place. Tokens are AES-256-GCM under their own key by
preference, since a mail grant reads correspondence rather than backups.

Core reaches the extension through a registered service, mirroring
lib/email/service.ts, so lib/receipt-hunt never imports from @/extensions and a
zero-extension build still compiles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(mail): connect UI and ingest, making the hunt reach into the mailbox

Two halves that together make the connector usable.

Ingest (lib/receipt-hunt/ingest.ts, core): fetches the attachment, files it as a
document and an inbox item with source 'mail_hunt', then stages the pairing.
It lives in core because it writes documents and inbox items, and an extension
may never import another extension; the mail extension only ever hands over
bytes.

No re-matching for a hunted receipt: it was fetched WHILE SEARCHING for a
specific purchase, so the pairing is known by construction. The search is a
deliberately broad OR query, which is exactly why the proposal still goes to a
human with the mailbox, sender and subject written on it rather than being
linked automatically.

Provenance goes in channel_context, never extracted_data, because retrying
extraction overwrites extracted_data wholesale and the record of which mailbox
a receipt came from has to survive that. A partial unique index on
(company_id, channel_context->>'mail_message_id') makes re-runs and the same
receipt arriving in two mailboxes idempotent, and a 23505 is treated as success
rather than an error.

Guards, both mutation-tested: a duplicate message costs no provider call, and an
oversized attachment is skipped rather than stored. One unreadable attachment
falls through to the next and never aborts a night's hunt.

UI: /settings/mail lists connected mailboxes with their health, connects a new
one through a user-gesture tab (opened before the await, so popup blockers do
not eat it), and disconnects behind a ConfirmDialog that states the outcome up
front, including that already-approved receipts stay because they belong to the
bookkeeping now. Strings in sv and en; the read-only promise is spelled out on
the page rather than buried in a consent screen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mail): renumber migrations to clear a version collision on main

20260806150000 was already taken by preserve_preset_committed_at, and
woocommerce_connections plus enforce_balance_on_posted_insert landed after this
branch was cut. Two files sharing a version breaks every fresh database, which
only shows up on a clean setup rather than on an already-migrated one.

Applied to prod under the new versions (20260807090000 / 20260807090100), so
schema_migrations matches these filenames exactly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(receipt-hunt): make the mailbox search actually able to find an underlag

A provkörning against a real ledger returned the same seven unrelated
messages for every purchase, all reporting no attachments. Three separate
causes, each fixed and pinned:

1. `getMessageSummary` asked Gmail for `format=metadata`, which returns
   headers and omits `payload.parts` entirely. Every message therefore
   looked attachment-free, `bodyIsReceipt` was always true, and the
   `found.find(c => c.attachmentIds.length > 0)` guard in the hunt could
   never select anything: the feature could not file a single receipt.
   Gmail has no format that returns MIME structure without the body, so
   the body now comes down the wire; it is read for nothing and stored
   nowhere.

2. The bank's description is not a merchant name. "Lön Juli Jakob
   Överföring via internet" searched for "Juli" and matched most of the
   mailbox. Month names and payment-rail boilerplate are now stopwords.

3. Salary and tax runs are a company's largest outgoing rows, so they
   consumed the whole search budget hunting receipts that cannot exist.
   `canHaveEmailReceipt` skips them for the mail leg only. Deliberately
   narrow: a supplier invoice paid over bankgiro does arrive by mail, and
   an "Utlägg" reimbursement has a real receipt behind it.

Measured on the same ledger: 22 hits, 0 with attachments, 0 ingestable
-> 4 hits, all with attachments, 3 of 4 correct (Elgiganten, Sting,
Anthropic). The fourth matched a Stockholm billing address, which is why
every proposal still waits for a human.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(receipt-hunt): let a model resolve merchants and pick the receipt

The keyword hunt was failing for reasons regex tuning cannot reach, all
measured against a real mailbox rather than assumed:

- `from:anthropic.com` returns 0. Receipts arrive here by being
  forwarded, so the sender is the user, not the vendor.
- The exact charged amount returns 0. The bank posts a converted SEK
  figure that appears nowhere in a USD receipt.
- A date window around the purchase returns 0, while the same merchant
  search without one returns 10+. A forward is stamped when it was
  forwarded, sometimes months later.

So the query now searches merchant names across the whole mailbox, and
precision is restored by judgement rather than by syntax. Two model calls
per run, both through forced tool use so the reply is a shape and not
prose to be parsed:

1. `planMerchantGroups` resolves bank descriptors to merchants and merges
   repeats. Six Anthropic subscriptions become one search and one
   decision instead of six of each.
2. `assignReceipts` decides which mail, and which attachment on it, is
   the receipt for which charge, and says why in a sentence the reviewer
   reads.

The attachment, not the message, is the unit of an underlag: a single
forward routinely carries receipts for several purchases ("Fwd: Kvitton
februari" has five). Migration 20260807103000 moves the dedupe key from
message to message+attachment, with a backfill, because the old index
would have silently blocked every receipt after the first in a forward.

The model may not produce any number that reaches the ledger. It returns
ids, a confidence and a reason; amounts, dates and the write stay in
deterministic code. Its answer is validated, not trusted: an unknown
message id, an invented filename or a low confidence drops the pairing,
and any failed call proposes nothing at all. Every result still waits
for a human.

Measured on the same ledger: 0 receipts that could ever be filed -> 3
correct pairings (Elgiganten, Sting office invoice, Anthropic), each
with a stated reason. The five remaining Anthropic charges are dated
after 2026-06-15, when forwarding to the connected mailbox stopped; the
model declined them correctly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(receipt-hunt): amount first, and drop the confidence scoring

Three findings from how others build this, applied.

Production email search (Superhuman, Haystack 2026) reports that recall
comes from loosening retrieval and letting the model filter downstream,
not from tightening the query. Retrieval depth per merchant 12 -> 25, and
purchases the planner cannot name a merchant for are now searched by
amount alone instead of skipped: a line like "1260525758758
Europabetalning" identifies no merchant but is a real supplier payment
whose invoice may carry exactly that total.

Reconciliation engines weight amount far above date (Midday: 35% vs 5%)
because banks post late while amounts do not drift. The Gmail query now
leads with the amount and ORs the merchant, rather than dropping the
amount whenever a merchant alias exists. Still an OR: a receipt billed in
USD never contains the SEK figure the bank charged.

The confidence score is gone entirely. Research on verbalised confidence
finds it badly calibrated, clustered on round-number anchors and barely
better than chance at separating a model's own right answers from its
wrong ones. That matched what this ran into: the model anchored on 0.6 /
0.7 / 0.75 / 0.9, and the 0.7 threshold discarded two correct pairings.
It is replaced by an observation rather than a self-assessment, whether
the charged amount is actually visible in the mail, which is what a
reviewer checks first and what sorts the queue.

Also fixes a real defect the run exposed: the one-file-one-purchase guard
only held within a merchant group, so when the planner split one landlord
into "Sting" and "Kontorsplatser" both 15 000 kr charges were assigned the
same invoice. A file is now claimed once per run, which is the duplicate
underlag BFL forbids.

Measured on the same ledger: 3 -> 5 pairings, no duplicate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(receipt-hunt): harvest receipts, then pair them on the amount

Splits the mailbox leg in two along the line of what each side can
actually know.

The model was being asked which purchase a mail belonged to. Deciding
that needs the amount; the amount lives inside the PDF; a Gmail preview
essentially never shows it. Measured over a real mailbox, every single
pairing came back "belopp ej synligt": it was answering without the
deciding evidence, which is why it declined five of six repeat
subscriptions and why two correct pairings sat just under a threshold.

Now it answers only what a subject, a sender and a preview line support:
is this mail an underlag, and which attachment is it. Then the receipt is
fetched, the extraction that already runs on document.uploaded reads its
amount, date and vendor, and the pairing is the same deterministic
amount-and-merchant match every other underlag goes through. Amount
becomes decisive for real rather than as an instruction the model could
not act on.

The load-bearing fix is small: ingest now copies the extraction result
onto the inbox item. The pool is read from invoice_inbox_items, so a
hunted receipt with no extracted_data could never have matched anything,
and the whole mail leg was quietly incapable of producing a pairing on
amount.

Consequences, all deliberate:
- Harvesting runs BEFORE the pool is read, so a receipt found tonight is
  paired tonight rather than a night later.
- One staging path instead of two. Mail-sourced proposals carry the same
  preview and confidence as every other, plus where they came from.
- Deduped on the attachment filename, not on the message: the same
  invoice arrives as an original, a reminder and two forwards, and the
  old key filed "Invoice_13041840.pdf" four times over.
- Capped at 8 receipts per merchant per run.

Measured on the same ledger: 5 pairings attempted from thin evidence ->
16 real documents identified, each waiting on an amount it can be checked
against.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(receipt-hunt): the model reads mail, arithmetic does the matching

Collapses the mailbox leg to one model call that extracts fields, and
hands every judgement back to deterministic code.

Gone: resolving bank descriptors to merchant names, deciding which mail
belongs to which charge, and the confidence score gating the result.
Three prompts and two model calls become one, and mail-intelligence.ts
drops from 450 lines to 250.

What made this possible was measuring what a mail actually contains. The
body was being downloaded and thrown away in favour of a 200-character
snippet, and the body is where a forwarded receipt quotes its original
sender and its original date. That is the purchase date, the thing whose
absence forced the date window off entirely and made the old design miss
five of six repeat subscriptions. It was there all along.

So the model now answers only what text can support: is this an underlag,
from whom, when, and for how much if the mail says so. Fields, not
judgements. Everything after is arithmetic:

- Retrieval is deterministic. No model decides what to search for.
- Fetching is gated by worthFetching(): a stated amount is enough on its
  own, a vendor needs a plausible date, and a mail found by a purchase's
  own search is evidence in itself. That last rule is what handles a
  supplier the bank and the invoice name differently ("Kontorsplatser j
  BG" against "Stockholm Innovation & Growth AB"), which is what the
  deleted merchant-resolution call used to buy.
- The pairing is the existing scorer, reached the same way as every other
  underlag: fetch, let the extraction that already runs on upload read
  the PDF, match on the amount. Amount is decisive in fact rather than as
  an instruction the model could not act on.

Also adds the Swedish thousands-space amount formats to the query.
Measured: the Sting invoice is findable as "15 000,00" and "15 000" and
by no ungrouped form at all, so every amount search was missing them.

Measured on the same ledger: 5 thin pairings -> 8 real documents, each
with a vendor and a true purchase date, waiting on the amount in its own
PDF. Currency is never converted to make a number agree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(receipt-hunt): trust the bytes, not the mail, when filing an attachment

Found by the first live run, which fetched nothing and reported success.
Three defects, each invisible to a dry run because a dry run never
downloads anything.

1. Gmail declares a forwarded PDF as application/octet-stream, and
   uploadDocument validates content against the declared type, so the
   upload was rejected: "Filinnehållet matchar inte den angivna
   filtypen". Every forwarded receipt with a generic MIME type would
   have failed this way, silently, since ingest swallows one bad
   attachment to protect the rest of the run. The type is now sniffed
   from the magic bytes, then the filename, and only then from what the
   mail claimed.

2. The filename was re-derived by a second full message fetch inside
   fetchAttachment, which came back empty and fell back to a generic
   "underlag.pdf", discarding the real "2332687551.pdf" the search had
   already reported. The known name now wins.

3. The provkörning script imported lib/init instead of calling
   ensureInitialized(), so document.uploaded reached no handler and
   nothing was ever extracted. It also used static imports, which are
   hoisted and ran before .env.local was read, leaving the extraction
   extension unable to build a Supabase client. Both are script defects,
   not product defects: the cron route calls ensureInitialized() at
   module level as the architecture requires. The script now loads the
   environment first and imports dynamically.

Also makes the per-run fetch cap tunable (RECEIPT_HUNT_MAX_RECEIPTS) so a
pilot can be held to a couple of documents, and adds --live to the
script, which is the only way it writes anything.

Verified end to end against a real ledger, every link exercised for the
first time: two attachments fetched from Gmail, stored with their real
names and types, extraction run on both, the amount copied onto the inbox
item, and the deterministic matcher pairing Elgiganten 21 639,00 kr from
the PDF against the -21 639 kr card purchase at 0.85, staged into
Granskning as attach_document_to_transaction. The second document, a
Bolagsverket filing receipt, carries no total and correctly paired with
nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(receipt-hunt): sweep a whole mailbox, and stop lending one receipt twice

A backfill on a real ledger, 22 documents fetched from 172 messages.

Batches the extraction (25 mails per call) so a first run on an existing
company can read the whole mailbox instead of the 40 mails one call can
carry, and makes the per-run caps tunable
(RECEIPT_HUNT_MAX_MAILS, RECEIPT_HUNT_MAX_RECEIPTS) so a pilot can be
bounded. The nightly caps stay where they are: they pace the review
queue, and a backlog is a different job from a nightly tick.

Two defects the backfill exposed, neither reachable from a dry run:

The one-receipt-one-purchase rule only held inside a single run.
`spentDocumentIds` is per-invocation, so an H&M receipt was proposed
against a -358 kr purchase on one pass and a -354 kr purchase on the
next, and approving both would have put the same underlag on two
verifikat. A live proposal now claims its document across runs, the same
way it already claimed its transaction.

A document reported with no filename, on a message carrying five
attachments, was not an answer but a shrug: the caller fetched
attachment number one and hoped. Those are dropped now. A body-only
receipt, where there is nothing to choose between, still passes.

Measured after the sweep: 21 of 22 documents read correctly, and the
binding constraint on this ledger is no longer retrieval but currency.
Ten receipts are in SEK and five of those pair on the amount; twelve are
in USD or EUR, where the bank charged a converted figure that appears
nowhere in the receipt, so no comparison is possible and none is
attempted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(mail): show the provider's own mark on the mailbox settings page

Someone connecting a mailbox is picking an account at a provider, and the
provider's mark is how they recognise which one. A generic envelope
glyph said "mail" when the question is "whose".

The Google "G" already existed, drawn inline inside GoogleAuthButton for
the sign-in flow. It moves to components/ui/provider-marks so there is
one definition rather than two, and a Microsoft square joins it for the
Graph connector. Both stay inline: no external host is contacted for an
icon before anyone has agreed to anything.

These are the only coloured glyphs in an achromatic interface, which is
deliberate rather than an oversight. A brand mark is identity, not
chrome, and Google's terms require its mark unaltered rather than tinted
to match a palette.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(archive): drop the duplicate mail_connections exclusion left by the rebase

Main added the table to ARCHIVE_EXCLUDED_TABLES while this branch was
open, so rebasing produced the key twice and the zero-extension build
failed to type check. Main's entry stays, in its alphabetical place, and
keeps the sentence that answers the retention question: the grants are
not räkenskapsinformation, but the receipts they find are archived as
documents.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mail): record who disconnected a mailbox, without keeping the token

Raised by the compliance review: disconnect() hard-deleted the row with
no trace, and which mailboxes feed underlag into the books is a control
over how räkenskapsinformation is produced (BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8), so
switching one off should be reconstructable years later.

Written by hand rather than by the write_audit_log trigger the accounting
tables use. That trigger copies the whole row into audit_log, which here
would mean copying an encrypted refresh token into a second table and
keeping it after the entire point of the delete was to destroy it. The
sibling credential table shopify_connections omits the trigger for the
same reason. Only the address and provider are recorded, pinned by a test
that fails if a credential ever reaches the audit entry.

The review's two other flags were checked rather than assumed: nothing
purges mail_hunt documents, and categorize-core.ts:403 does carry the
attached document onto the verifikat when the transaction is booked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mail): bound every outbound call, and stop the token widening itself

Four findings from the review, each checked against the code first.

Neither the Gmail API nor Google's token endpoint had a deadline. Both
are awaited inside Promise.all across mailboxes, so one stalled request
held the whole company's hunt open until the platform killed the run.
Both now carry a 15s AbortSignal, which turns a stall into one mailbox
missing from tonight's sweep.

`include_granted_scopes: 'true'` let Google fold scopes this app was
granted elsewhere into the token issued for a mailbox, so a grant could
carry more authority than the consent screen showed. Removed, and pinned
by a test asserting the parameter is absent.

disconnect() ignored both statement results: a failed delete still wrote
an audit entry claiming the mailbox was disconnected while the credential
was live, and a failed audit insert passed silently. The delete now
throws, so the entry is never written for a delete that did not happen.
The audit failure is logged rather than rolled back: the two can now only
diverge one way, credential gone and note missing, and recreating a
credential to keep them in step would be worse than a missing note.

The fifth finding is real and stays open by choice, recorded in
DECISIONS.md: the cron still passes searchMail=false. A sweep of one
172-message mailbox took over 600s against a maxDuration of 300, so
enabling the mailbox leg nightly would time out mid-run. That flag and
RECEIPT_HUNT_COMPANY_IDS get flipped together once the per-company budget
is measured.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(receipt-hunt): file each attachment under its own identity

Four more findings from the review. The first is a real defect.

ingestMailCandidate loops over candidate.attachmentIds, but the dedupe
key, the mail_attachment_id provenance and the filename were all read
from index 0. Storing the second attachment therefore recorded the
first one's key and name, which mislabels the row and, because the key
is unique, permanently blocks the first attachment from ever landing.
Masked today only because the hunt narrows to a single attachment before
calling in, so nothing in the current path exercises it. All three now
come from the attachment actually being stored, and the duplicate
pre-check moved inside the loop so trying a second attachment is not
suppressed by the first already being filed. Mutation-tested.

The per-run fetch key was the bare filename, which is not an identity:
"invoice.pdf" is what half the world's billing systems attach, so a
second supplier's invoice would be dropped as a duplicate of the first.
Scoped by vendor as well, keeping the behaviour it was written for, one
fetch for an invoice that arrives as an original, a reminder and two
forwards.

Adds tests/pg/mail-hunt-file-dedupe.pg.test.ts for the new unique index:
five attachments from one forward all land, the same attachment is
refused twice, two companies hold the same file independently, other
inbox sources are untouched by the partial predicate, and the
message-scoped predecessor is gone. Written against CI's Postgres; there
is no local DATABASE_URL here, so CI is what exercises it.

--live now refuses unless RECEIPT_HUNT_CONFIRM names the same company.
The script writes to whatever .env.local points at, which for this repo
is production, and a recalled command should not be able to fire it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): cast the jsonb parameter so Postgres can type it

pg-real could not determine the type of $3 inside jsonb_build_object.
An explicit ::text is what the other pg tests do.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-10 12:23:42 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 28b58aedc4 feat(auth): sign in with Google behind NEXT_PUBLIC_GOOGLE_AUTH_ENABLED (#1441) 
Adds a 'Continue with Google' button to login and register, gated by
NEXT_PUBLIC_GOOGLE_AUTH_ENABLED so it ships dark until the Google
provider is configured in Supabase. The OAuth round-trip reuses the
existing /auth/callback PKCE exchange, which already owns MFA routing,
invite acceptance and silent-team creation. A flow=oauth marker on the
redirect lets the callback tag failures (including provider consent
denials) so the login page shows Google-specific error copy instead of
the email-confirmation framing.

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-06 21:26:09 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 398c734b93 feat(whatsapp-inbox): intake extension with webhook, phone linking and receipt ack (#1338) 
Webhook lifecycle: GET hub.challenge handshake (constant-time verify-token
compare); POST verifies X-Hub-Signature-256 over the RAW body before any
parse, Zod-parses the envelope, persists inbound rows (partial-unique wamid
= dedupe against Meta's up-to-7-day redelivery), acks 200 fast and defers
media processing via the after() idiom. Rejected and rate-limited content
always acks 200 and lands as skipped/error rows, never a retryable status.

Linking: the settings panel (Installningar -> WhatsApp) mints AC- one-time
codes (sha256 stored, 10 min TTL, single use, ambiguity-free alphabet); the
webhook consumes the code, binds phone to user (HMAC-peppered hash + AES-256-
GCM at rest) and confirms with M3. Keyword commands stopp/start/hjalp;
unknown senders get one throttled M1 greeting (1/h, 3/day) behind the
sender-quota RPC, with no media download and no content persistence.

Intake worker: atomic claim on the message row (the durable job record),
company resolution (default -> sole membership -> M6 fallback, no item),
per-company inbox quota (ack-and-drop, M17 once per 10 min per sender),
MIME allowlist, 10 MB stream-checked media download, exact sha256 duplicate
check, then the shared uploadAndExtract funnel (source 'whatsapp',
channel_context caption, whatsapp_message_id) and the M4 ack with extracted
merchant/total/date. Failures wrap to 'error' + error_message + one M18.

uploadAndExtract widened: source 'whatsapp', optional channelMeta + actorId;
email/upload paths behaviorally unchanged.

Deferred to PR4: burst debounce + combined ack (M5), in-chat company choice
(M6 buttons + 8h pin), clarifying questions M7-M10, interpret-answer LLM
call, sweep cron, retention cron.

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-05 14:47:08 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg af9db54405 docs(self-hosting): AI runs on AWS Bedrock, not ANTHROPIC/OPENAI keys (#1407) 
* docs(self-hosting): AI runs on AWS Bedrock, not ANTHROPIC/OPENAI keys

A self-hoster followed SELF-HOSTING.md, set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and
OPENAI_API_KEY, and found document interpretation dead (with a 30s
extraction-poll hang per upload). Neither key has been read since the
ai-chat / receipt-ocr / ai-categorization extensions were removed in
PR #157: all AI (document extraction and the assistant) goes through
Claude on AWS Bedrock via AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY.

- SELF-HOSTING.md, DOCKER.md, .env.example: document the Bedrock
  credentials and model overrides; point plain-key support at #1406
- SELF-HOSTING.md: drop the receipts-bucket setup for the removed
  receipt-ocr extension
- EXTENSIONS.md: replace removed extensions with live ones in trees
  and examples; drop the AI-consent system claims (lib/extensions/
  ai-consent.ts no longer exists); services-pattern example now uses
  the real stripe/skatteverket services
- lib/init.ts: startup env warning now checks the AWS keys instead of
  the two dead vars, so a misconfigured self-host logs the truth

Direct Anthropic API key support and pluggable providers: #1406.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: address review, dedupe tree entry and match provider-chain claim to code

extractInvoiceFields bails without both static AWS keys, so only the
assistant client actually falls back to the credential provider chain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-04 20:17:25 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 2296c0cd59 fix(auth): provision invitees server-side when signups are disabled (#1404) 
* fix(auth): provision invitees server-side when signups are disabled

Self-hosted installations with GoTrue disable_signup broke the invite
flow silently: invitees without an account were routed to /register,
where supabase.auth.signUp fails with "Signups not allowed for this
instance", surfaced only as a generic toast.

New server-only env flag AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED (documented in
.env.example) mirrors the GoTrue setting. When true, POST
/api/company/members/invite checks check_email_exists and, for invitees
without an account, provisions one via auth.admin.inviteUserByEmail
with a redirect back to /invite/<token>, before the Resend email and
before the invitation row is written so a provisioning failure leaves
nothing half-created and the admin can retry. The response now carries
user_provisioned alongside email_sent, and a provisioning failure
returns 502 with a Swedish message mapped through getErrorMessage
instead of a silently-successful invite.

/auth/callback now routes type=invite verifications to /reset-password
(the existing set-password surface) instead of dropping the
passwordless user on the dashboard, and preserves the invite token from
next=/invite/<token> as the pre-auth invite cookie so the existing
reset-password invite handoff accepts the membership right after the
password is saved.

getErrorMessage learns two GoTrue patterns: "Signups not allowed"
(account creation closed on this installation, contact your inviter or
administrator) so the /register dead end is explained even for flows
that bypass provisioning, and "Error sending ... email" (GoTrue SMTP
not configured) so the 502 above is actionable.

Hosted is untouched: the flag is unset there and every new code path is
gated on it.

Fixes #1335

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): restore check_email_exists RPC and harden self-host invite config

Adversarial review of #1404 found that the check_email_exists function the
invite flow depends on does not exist anywhere: it shipped in PR #229 and
was lost in the #244 migration consolidation before ever reaching prod
(verified missing on the hosted production database directly). Today
app/api/team/accept destructures only { data } from the RPC call, so
alreadyHasAccount is silently null on every deployment and the invite page
routes even existing-account invitees toward /register.

- New migration 20260804140000 restores the function exactly as originally
  shipped: SECURITY DEFINER over auth.users, EXECUTE revoked from PUBLIC,
  anon and authenticated, granted to service_role only (prevents email
  enumeration). Fixes hosted prod behavior too once applied.
- New tests/pg/check-email-exists.pg.test.ts locks in existence,
  case-insensitive matching, false-for-unknown, and the role grants.
- .env.docker.example gains the AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED block self-hosters
  actually use; both env templates now note that the GoTrue redirect URI
  allow-list must include /invite/* or the invite email redirect silently
  falls back to SITE_URL.
- Invite route test for the existsError branch: RPC failure logs a warning
  and provisioning proceeds anyway (GoTrue is authoritative).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): mask invitee email in provisioning-failure log (#1335)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-04 19:34:54 +02:00
Mattsson 1c9d378df8 feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts (#1387) 
* feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts

Hosted browser sessions now carry an HMAC-signed, HttpOnly cookie holding
session start, last activity and sign-in method, bound to the Supabase
session. Middleware enforces a 30 min idle and 12 h absolute limit
(reason-coded redirects to /login), a heartbeat route advances idle
activity from real user input, and a client controller warns 2 minutes
before expiry. BankID users are routed back to BankID on re-auth via a
short-lived method hint. API-key and MCP bearer surfaces are exempt;
self-hosted installs default off and can opt in via env vars.

Fixes #362

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): derive session-timeout signing key via HKDF

The HMAC key is now HKDF-derived with a purpose-bound info string, so
the SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY fallback never uses the privileged
credential directly as a signing key. Addresses the security review
finding on PR #1387.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): back signature bytes with a plain ArrayBuffer

crypto.subtle.verify requires a BufferSource; Uint8Array.from is typed
over ArrayBufferLike, which the Vercel TypeScript build rejects. Decode
base64url into a Uint8Array constructed over a fresh ArrayBuffer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): address session-timeout review findings

- signSessionTimeoutState returns null on signing failure instead of
  throwing, so a missing secret degrades the timeout feature in line
  with verifySessionTimeoutState rather than crashing authenticated
  requests; middleware and heartbeat skip the cookie write when null
- heartbeat initializes a fresh signed state for a missing or
  session-mismatched cookie, mirroring middleware, instead of
  returning SESSION_EXPIRED during normal initialization
- sessionStateMatchesUser treats an unresolved current session id as
  a mismatch for session-bound state so another session's cookie is
  never accepted on the userId fallback alone
- drop aria-live from the countdown DialogDescription so screen
  readers are not interrupted every second

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-04 09:59:42 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg 52ec3ce497 feat(support): open PostHog tickets from the existing support dialog (#1239) 
Enables PostHog Support through the Direct API (posthog.conversations),
restoring the second channel Recapt used to provide, but as a real ticket
linked to the person and their session replay instead of a black hole.

The in-app WIDGET stays off on purpose. It is a third-party floating chat
bubble, which is exactly what Recapt was: it would sit next to the
Assistenten FAB (which already has a hide_assistant_fab preference
because users wanted it gone), cannot follow the locked design system,
and its copy is not ours to keep Swedish. The conversations API gives the
same tickets from components/ui/support-link.tsx, which is already
on-design, Swedish and reachable from 8 surfaces.

A ticket is explicitly NOT treated as delivery. submitFeedback returns ok
only when the Resend email actually went out, even if the ticket opened.
Recapt's precise failure mode was reporting success on its own channel
while /api/support/contact was dead, and nobody is watching PostHog at
02:00. Tests pin that: ticket-only is ok:false.

Identity verification uses posthog.setIdentity(distinctId, hash) at
runtime rather than the identity_distinct_id/identity_hash init options
PostHog's settings page documents. init runs from
instrumentation-client.ts app-wide, before the user is known and
including logged-out pages, and PostHog fixes init values for the
session. setIdentity is a real method on the SDK (verified typed in
posthog-js 1.407.3), so the hash applies from AnalyticsIdentify once the
dashboard layout knows who the user is. Without the key it is skipped and
tickets fall back to browser-scoped with email recovery, which is the
normal state off hosted.

POSTHOG_SECRET_API_KEY is server-only, no NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix: it signs
identity hashes AND authenticates external API requests, so unlike the
phc_ project token it is a real credential. Only the derived per-user
HMAC crosses to the browser.

Compliance: support free text is declared as its own data category
(user.content.support) in .compliance/ropa.yaml and named on the privacy
page. Analytics events still carry no message body (the breadcrumb sends
only the subject); a ticket carries what the user wrote, because that is
the point. Keeping the purposes separate is what stops the privacy page
drifting the way the Recapt row did.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-27 16:23:32 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg d4f82cafc4 feat(analytics): add PostHog (EU) behind a same-origin proxy (#1237) 
Recapt shuts down in four days, taking product analytics and session
replay with it. This adds PostHog Cloud EU alongside it; the Recapt
removal follows separately so events can be confirmed landing first.

Wiring choices that are not the tutorial defaults:

- Same-origin reverse proxy (/rl -> eu.i.posthog.com) instead of adding
  PostHog hosts to the CSP. connect-src 'self' and script-src 'self'
  already cover it, tracking blockers have no third-party host to match,
  and the Recapt allowlist entries in next.config.ts get replaced by
  nothing at all when they go. Needs skipTrailingSlashRedirect, since
  PostHog sends trailing-slash API requests; verified that trailing-slash
  URLs on normal routes still resolve 200 rather than 404.

- /rl is excluded from the proxy.ts matcher. Middleware runs BEFORE
  next.config rewrites, so without this updateSession() treats an
  ingestion POST as an unknown protected path and 307s it to /login.
  Verified with a control: /zz/flags/ -> 307 /login, /rl/flags/ -> 200
  from PostHog. This fails silently otherwise, because asset loads keep
  working through the rewrite while no events arrive.

- persistence: 'memory' so nothing is written to the device and no
  cookie-consent banner is required. Everything post-login is unaffected:
  AnalyticsIdentify re-identifies on each dashboard load.

- session_recording.maskTextSelector: '*'. PostHog masks inputs but not
  text by default, and this app renders org numbers (which for an
  enskild firma ARE the owner's personnummer), customer names and
  balances as ordinary text. Replays show where a user gets stuck, never
  what their books say. buildGroupProperties() also refuses to send
  org_number at all, with a test pinning it.

- Error tracking registers through the existing lib/observability sink
  rather than bypassing it, so every error-level createLogger() line is
  captured already redacted. instrumentation.ts onRequestError covers
  what escapes uncaught.

Analytics is hosted-only: isAnalyticsEnabled() short-circuits on
NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED and no Docker sentinel is added, so self-hosted
runs with zero third-party runtime code. Recapt got that outcome only by
accident, via a missing sentinel; here it is explicit and tested.

vitest.config.ts aliases 'server-only' to a stub: it is a build-time
guard whose real entry point always throws, which broke 48 test files the
moment a server-only module entered the graph. request-context.ts was
already carrying the same latent trap.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-27 14:30:49 +02:00
Mattsson f3eacb436d Fix/articles (#1216) 
* fix(security): gate replace_sie_import behind owner/admin membership

The RPC was SECURITY DEFINER with EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC and anon, no
company_members lookup, no auth.uid() reference and no unauthorized raise,
while setting gnubok.allow_delete to disarm the BFL immutability and
retention triggers. Any caller holding a company_id and an import id could
hard delete another tenant's verifikationer. Confirmed live in production.

Applies the same fail closed owner/admin guard that undo_sie_import already
carries (migration 20260624120000), resolving the actor from
COALESCE(p_user_id, auth.uid()) so it denies when the role is NULL, then
revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC and anon. search_path and the raised
statement_timeout are restated, since CREATE OR REPLACE drops settings that
are not repeated.

userId is a required parameter on replaceSIEImport: the service client has a
NULL auth.uid(), so a caller without an explicit actor now fails to compile
rather than hitting the closed gate at runtime.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): validate arcim OAuth callback state server side

The callback route is skipAuth and decoded the state parameter as plain
base64url JSON, trusting consentId and provider from it. A one time code was
minted at flow start and never read. An unauthenticated attacker who learned
a consent id could run an OAuth flow on their own provider account and post
the callback with a forged state, landing their tokens on another tenant's
consent, so the victim's next migration imported the attacker's ledger.

State is now an opaque randomBytes(32) pointer to a provider_otc row,
consumed by a single atomic UPDATE guarded on used_at IS NULL and
expires_at, so a replay loses the row lock race and updates nothing.
provider is read from provider_consents rather than trusted from the client.
provider_otc already existed for exactly this purpose and was never wired up.

Also scopes getConsent to an owning company, closing a cross tenant status
oracle where the preview and migrate paths echoed a consent's status before
the scoped check ran.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): scope documents storage to company_id (phase A)

The documents bucket policies matched on auth.uid(), and upload keys were
documents/{userId}/..., so company membership was never consulted. Removing a
member revoked nothing: their session still authenticated and they kept
direct Storage read access to every receipt, supplier invoice and bank
statement they had uploaded. The same bug was fixed for sie-files in
20260416120000; this bucket was left behind.

Phase A is additive. Company scoped policies are added alongside the
uploader scoped ones, uploads move to documents/{companyId}/{userId}/..., and
reads accept either layout so nothing breaks mid migration. Phase C, which
drops the old policies, is gated on the backfill reporting zero remaining
legacy prefix objects.

The policy compares the company segment as text rather than casting to uuid
the way sie-files does: this bucket holds keys whose second segment is not a
uuid (MCP audit packages), and Postgres does not guarantee the bucket prefix
qual runs before the cast, so a planner reordering would raise 22P02 and fail
the whole query instead of filtering the row out.

deleteDocument now removes both candidate keys. Removing only the stored
pointer would leave a readable orphan copy of a document the user asked to
erase.

The backfill script is included but has never been run. It defaults to dry
run, refuses .env.local by name, and verifies each copy is readable and
SHA-256 identical before repointing the row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): enforce events:read scope and membership on /api/events

This was the only one of the three validateApiKey call sites with no
downstream guard: v1 and the MCP server both check scope and re-verify
company membership, this route did neither. An events:read scope existed and
was documented as gating the endpoint but was never called, so a legacy key
falling back to DEFAULT_SCOPES read the full log. The bound company id went
straight from the api_keys row into a service role query, so a key whose user
had been removed from the company kept reading.

Adds the scope check before any database access, re-verifies company_members
with archived_at IS NULL, honours test mode by stamping X-Gnubok-Mode instead
of ignoring it, applies minimisePayload so the pull surface can never return
a wider payload than the push surface, and replaces the three flat error
strings with the canonical envelope.

Test key reads are served rather than blocked: TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED is
gated on mutations in with-api-v1, so a read gets the same treatment as every
other v1 read endpoint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(bookkeeping): sweep remaining journal_entries!inner embeds

A previous refactor removed this pattern from lib/reports and introduced
fetchEntryLines, but the class was never swept. Seventeen sites remained and
had become the top application consumer of production database time:
measured across the resulting query shapes, 32,694 calls and 25,848 seconds
of execution, mean 790ms, with shapes averaging 2.6s and 3.0s and maxing at
7,962ms against the 8s statement_timeout, which surfaced to users as 500s on
the booking path.

PostgREST compiles an embed with filters on the embedded side into a
correlated INNER JOIN LATERAL with a parameterized LIMIT, which stops
Postgres reordering the join, so each query walked the whole
journal_entry_lines table across all tenants. Driving from the entries side
instead turns that into two indexed round trips.

Converted sites keep their existing shape: the helper reattaches the parent
entry under the same key the embed produced. Several conversions also remove
a latent silent truncation where an unpaginated query was capped at
PostgREST's 1000 row ceiling.

Two deliberate exceptions. The free text ilike legs of the MCP display query
stay on the embed, because each is capped at legLimit and that cap drives the
truncation contract the tool reports, while the helper is unbounded. The
accounts route moves to the existing get_account_usage_counts RPC instead,
since its embed was a head count and the helper returns rows.

commitEntry's write path is untouched: the change there is confined to the
read query of the pre-commit dimension rule check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): anchor v1 list cursors on created_at

Page two returned page one, forever, while still advertising a fresh
next_cursor. The three routes sorted by and encoded a Postgres date column,
which serializes as YYYY-MM-DD, but decodeDefaultCursor validates the cursor
timestamp as full ISO-8601 and returned null, so the keyset filter was never
applied and has_more never went false. An integrator syncing verifikat looped
on the newest rows indefinitely.

The transactions route already solved this and its comment names the trap;
the fix was never ported. All three now order and encode on created_at with
an id tie break, matching the transactions keyset predicate exactly.
ISO_TIMESTAMP is deliberately left alone: relaxing it would silently change
sort semantics on the route that currently works.

Default ordering therefore moves from business date to insert order. Every
business date is still on the row, and the invoices list gains date_from and
date_to filters so a date range is still reachable; the other two already had
them.

The tests use an in-memory PostgREST that actually evaluates the filters,
because the repo's pass-through mock cannot catch this class of bug: the bug
is that the filter is never sent. They walk to exhaustion with a hard
iteration cap, so an unterminated walk fails instead of hanging.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): separate dry run from commit in the idempotency hash

The request hash was built from url.pathname, which excludes the query
string, so a dry run and its commit hashed identically. Following the flow
documented in dry-run.ts, re-issuing the request with the same
Idempotency-Key returned the cached preview with Idempotent-Replayed set and
wrote nothing, while reporting 200. An agent or integrator saw success for a
write that never happened.

dry_run is folded into the hash only when true, not as an unconditional
boolean. Including it as false would change the hash of every ordinary write,
and with a 24h idempotency TTL any key in flight across the deploy would fail
the request_hash comparison and 409 on a legitimate retry. Both hash call
sites now go through one shared helper so they cannot drift into a permanent
cache miss, and dry run responses are no longer stored at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: install the Bedrock SDK out of tree in the compliance review

The Swedish accounting compliance gate had failed ten consecutive runs and so
was posting nothing. With --no-package-lock npm discarded the lockfile and
re-resolved the whole tree from package.json, floating @hookform/resolvers to
5.4.3, whose valibot ^1 peer conflicts with the pinned valibot 0.39.0.

Installing into the parent of the checkout resolves only that one package, so
an unrelated peer conflict can never take the gate down again. Node still
finds it because ESM bare specifiers walk up parent node_modules; NODE_PATH
would not have worked, as it is CommonJS only. --legacy-peer-deps was
rejected because it masks future genuine peer conflicts and still reifies the
full tree.

The same step's SDK version is aligned from 0.31.0 back to the 0.29.1 that
package.json and check:guards enforce after the streaming outage. That drift
went unnoticed because the pin guard only inspects package.json and the
lockfile, never workflow files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build(docker): generate crontabs from vercel.json

vercel.json defines 16 cron jobs; both Docker crontabs carried 9, and were
byte identical to each other. Self hosted deployments therefore never sent
recurring invoices, never dispatched webhooks and never cleaned up
idempotency keys. tax-deadlines also ran once a year on 2 January instead of
daily, and documents/verify weekly instead of daily.

Extension crons are included rather than excluded. The Dockerfile copies the
whole tree before building, so every extension cron route is compiled into
the image regardless of the enabled preset, and each returns 200 when its
extension is unconfigured, so curl -sf logs no failure. Two such entries were
already present in the crontab for extensions absent from the preset, which
settles the intent.

documents/verify is treated as drift rather than a self hosted concession:
the weekly cadence was present in the hosted crontab too, and the run is
capped at 200 documents walking a nulls-first queue, so weekly drains the
integrity queue seven times slower on a check that exists for BFL retention.

webhooks/dispatch keeps its per minute cadence, adding 1,440 requests a day
on self hosted. A gentler tick would silently stretch the first retry, since
the retry ladder opens at 60 seconds. SCHEDULE_OVERRIDES is the one line
place to change that.

A parity test asserts the path sets match minus a documented exclusion list,
and ratchets three cron routes that are currently scheduled nowhere so they
are named rather than silently rotting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(observability): add a provider agnostic error sink

There is no error tracking in this codebase: logs go to console and Vercel
retention and nowhere else, nothing alerts on the 16 cron jobs, and seven
code comments across lib, app, components and extensions asserted that Sentry
captures errors when Sentry is not a dependency. The two most recent bug
fixes on this repo were both discovered by customer email.

This adds the sink, not a vendor. No dependency is taken: the interface has a
no-op default and a registration point, so behaviour is unchanged until an
adapter is registered. Releases are tagged from the build id already inlined
by next.config.ts.

Redaction moved out of lib/logger.ts into a leaf module that both the logger
and the sink import, so there is one denylist and no path from application
data to a third party can skip the personnummer regex, including direct sink
calls that bypass the logger. That matters here because these logs carry
personnummer and financial data.

verifyCronSecret now reports its own 401s, which covers all 16 jobs without
touching a route file and catches the case where CRON_SECRET is rotated
without updating the scheduler and every job silently 401s forever. The
threshold is one failure rather than the backup alert's three: suppressing
the first occurrence is precisely how an outage stays invisible.

The seven misleading comments are corrected to describe what the code
actually does, including the two cases that still are not covered: the client
side one, since the sink is server side, and a warn level call that is not
forwarded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remediate the 2026-07-26 similar-sweep findings across all surfaces

Resolves the ~150-finding sweep (dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26.md) with
one agent per finding; every behavioural fix carries a regression test proven
to fail at HEAD. Full status, corrections to the sweep, refusals and open
decisions in dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26-remediation-status.md.

Structural roots closed:
- resolveSekAmountOrNull(): honest SEK resolution refuses instead of booking
  1:1; four duplicated toSek closures now refuse via INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING
- ledger-line-amount.ts: journal_entry_lines.currency labels the document,
  not the amount; SQL pre-filter decoy proven and fixed
- sparse-patch.ts: .partial() does not strip .default() in Zod 4.4.3; the
  exploitable salary payslip-line PATCH and KPI preferences sinks fixed
- tests/schema: migration-replay phantom-column guard (13k+ refs, closed
  CHECK sets, onConflict targets); found 28 real defects, all fixed, all
  four baselines now empty
- three new ratchet guards: sek-labelled-amount, cross-extension-import,
  ungated-extension-route

Highlights: lawful VAT-rate set on all seven invoice surfaces (ML 6 kap),
RC input VAT mismatch wired on web + both MCP callers, missing-underlag
resource delegates to the shared RPC predicate, push-notifications consent
polarity fail-closed, deadlines undo honours requested state, silent-failure
and read-side-fabrication classes fixed across settings/KPI/inbox/Stripe/
Arcim/kassaflodesanalys, error-envelope stringification fixed at 10+ sites
with isSwedishUserMessage extended.

Also includes the parallel session's MCP invoice tools (update_invoice,
recurring schedules, invoice deliveries) which share files with the sweep
work and are verified green together.

13 new migrations are NOT applied anywhere; they apply via branch merge.
20260726120000 backfills 1247 supplier-invoice rows. pg tests for new
DDL are written but unrun (no local Postgres).

Verified: 11088 tests / 881 files green, tsc 0 non-test errors, lint 0
errors, check:guards passing, MCP payload 57475/57500.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(migrations): rename replace_sie_import migration off main's 20260726090000 version

origin/main shipped 20260726090000_agent_quota_rpc_caller_guard.sql; keeping
our replace_sie_import migration on the same version would abort the Supabase
apply with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate at merge time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): remediate pre-publish deep-review findings across all slices

A 13-agent review of the full branch diff surfaced 1 critical, 5 high and
~45 further findings; this commit resolves them in one pass:

- replace_sie_import / undo_sie_import: p_user_id honored only for
  service_role callers; any other caller is pinned to auth.uid()
  (impersonation gate bypass), authz raise errcode 42501 mapped to a
  Swedish 403 in the route, new caller-guard migration for undo
- bulk_book_transactions refuses homogeneous non-SEK batches instead of
  writing foreign magnitudes into SEK ledger columns
- credit-note cap trigger: company-match on credited_invoice_id, no
  cross-tenant figures in exception text
- link_voucher RPCs resolve NULL invoice currency as SEK end to end
- personal-number ciphertext CHECK split into NOT VALID + VALIDATE
- same-currency foreign settlements clear 1510 at booking rate and book
  realized diff to 3960/7960; rate-less foreign write paths refuse
- receivables revaluation covers partially_paid and outstanding amounts
- period lock guard paginates candidates past the PostgREST 1000 cap
- documents: service-client storage removals after authz, dual-layout
  reads in integrity cron and archive export, backfill delete-source
  sweep actually deletes with hash verification and shared-key grouping
- invoice matching normalizes NULL/lowercase currencies (regression),
  duplicate candidates stop claiming amount matches they never ran
- match-invoice aborts on any booking failure (no paid-without-verifikat)
- refresh-exchange-rate reverts on concurrent booking (TOCTOU window)
- KPI preferences upsert arbiter aligned to the company-scoped constraint
- personnummer_last4 stripped from all salary responses incl. MCP tools
- worked-hours batch restores destroyed rows on conflict and error paths
- MCP: shared duplicate-claim builder (no more 'null kr'), short-circuit
  on tag_journal_lines overflow, auto_send schedules stage as high risk
- observability sink redacts emails/IBANs/API keys and keeps redacted
  stacks in prod; assorted small guards (safe-return-to /@, dry_run=True,
  cursor helper off-by-one, OAuth state TTL 10 min, arcim saveMappings
  call removed)

Full dispositions, deferred items and hand-verified accounting numbers
are documented in the PR body and DECISIONS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(personnummer): implement masking and encryption for personal numbers with tests

* fix(review): address CI and compliance-bot findings for PR #1215

pg-real: the CI image's auth shim reads the legacy request.jwt.claim.role
GUC, so both service-role simulations (runAsServiceRole and the
invoice-delivery test's local helper) never satisfied auth.role() =
'service_role' and every legitimate p_user_id path failed closed; the
shared helper now sets both GUC shapes plus SET LOCAL ROLE with a
fail-loud sanity check, and the delivery test reuses it. The link-voucher
migration had recreated both RPCs from pre-rewrite file text,
reintroducing the NULL-unsafe membership pattern the
null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet bans; both guards now use
public.caller_is_company_member() with all currency changes preserved.

Compliance bots: the customers export now emits the standard masked form
instead of raw AES-256-GCM ciphertext in the Org-/personnummer column,
and maskCustomerRow returns a non-round-trippable placeholder on decrypt
failure instead of 500ing the list. MCP parity: gnubok_lock_period's
staging pre-check now runs the exact countUnbookedInPeriod the commit
path enforces (exported from period-service; local mirror deleted), and
gnubok_agi_status resolves AGI state run-scoped so a correction run no
longer renders as already filed.

Declined with evidence: PR-Agent's opening-balances null-zeroing concern
(all mergeable columns are NOT NULL with defaults per 20260713101000).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): address codex review findings on PR #1215

- restore 20260726140000 to its preview-recorded content and restate the
  NULL-safe tenant guard under 20260727130000: a recorded migration version
  never re-runs, so the in-place edit could not reach the preview branch
- replace toFixed() with sv-SE two-decimal formatting in the ROT/RUT cap
  warning texts and update the pinned test expectations
- drop the em dash in the fiscal-periods route comment
- strip trailing whitespace in import-existing.test.ts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(reports): raise timeout on real PDF render tests

renderToBuffer does real @react-pdf layout work and exceeds the 5s
default when the full suite saturates the CPU; tests pass in isolation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): remediate the 2026-07-27 compliance and security review findings

- ROT/RUT deduction base is arbetskostnaden INKLUSIVE moms (HUSFL 2009:194
  6-9 par.): computeDeduction takes the line vat_rate, all five call sites
  pass it, and tests pin Skatteverkets worked example (18 000 kr excl =
  22 500 incl, ROT 6 750).
- Momsdeklaration: new SALES_OUTPUT_VAT_SHORTFALL warning catches output VAT
  short of the reported sales base (one-directional, never filing-blocking).
- SIE import: #RAR records validated for every year index (dates, ordering,
  18-month BFL cap as warn-and-keep).
- build-invoice-write: SEK invoices populate the *_sek twin columns (rate 1)
  so both creation paths produce the same row shape.
- CI: daily Trivy SCA scan of the npm lockfile (replaces removed Dependabot);
  compliance review fails loudly on empty review.md.
- arcim migration FX logging routed through the redacting structured logger.
- docs/security/: authorization policy for the SIE bulk-delete RPC pair and
  the observability redaction contract.
- Rewrote the swedish-payroll ob-overtime reference (was a byte-identical
  copy of sick-pay.md); skills:generate emitted the atom-body seed migration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-27 03:54:42 +02:00
Mattsson f24b26a139 fix: similar-sweep currency remediation, security hardening and v1 API fixes (#1215) 
* fix(security): gate replace_sie_import behind owner/admin membership

The RPC was SECURITY DEFINER with EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC and anon, no
company_members lookup, no auth.uid() reference and no unauthorized raise,
while setting gnubok.allow_delete to disarm the BFL immutability and
retention triggers. Any caller holding a company_id and an import id could
hard delete another tenant's verifikationer. Confirmed live in production.

Applies the same fail closed owner/admin guard that undo_sie_import already
carries (migration 20260624120000), resolving the actor from
COALESCE(p_user_id, auth.uid()) so it denies when the role is NULL, then
revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC and anon. search_path and the raised
statement_timeout are restated, since CREATE OR REPLACE drops settings that
are not repeated.

userId is a required parameter on replaceSIEImport: the service client has a
NULL auth.uid(), so a caller without an explicit actor now fails to compile
rather than hitting the closed gate at runtime.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): validate arcim OAuth callback state server side

The callback route is skipAuth and decoded the state parameter as plain
base64url JSON, trusting consentId and provider from it. A one time code was
minted at flow start and never read. An unauthenticated attacker who learned
a consent id could run an OAuth flow on their own provider account and post
the callback with a forged state, landing their tokens on another tenant's
consent, so the victim's next migration imported the attacker's ledger.

State is now an opaque randomBytes(32) pointer to a provider_otc row,
consumed by a single atomic UPDATE guarded on used_at IS NULL and
expires_at, so a replay loses the row lock race and updates nothing.
provider is read from provider_consents rather than trusted from the client.
provider_otc already existed for exactly this purpose and was never wired up.

Also scopes getConsent to an owning company, closing a cross tenant status
oracle where the preview and migrate paths echoed a consent's status before
the scoped check ran.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): scope documents storage to company_id (phase A)

The documents bucket policies matched on auth.uid(), and upload keys were
documents/{userId}/..., so company membership was never consulted. Removing a
member revoked nothing: their session still authenticated and they kept
direct Storage read access to every receipt, supplier invoice and bank
statement they had uploaded. The same bug was fixed for sie-files in
20260416120000; this bucket was left behind.

Phase A is additive. Company scoped policies are added alongside the
uploader scoped ones, uploads move to documents/{companyId}/{userId}/..., and
reads accept either layout so nothing breaks mid migration. Phase C, which
drops the old policies, is gated on the backfill reporting zero remaining
legacy prefix objects.

The policy compares the company segment as text rather than casting to uuid
the way sie-files does: this bucket holds keys whose second segment is not a
uuid (MCP audit packages), and Postgres does not guarantee the bucket prefix
qual runs before the cast, so a planner reordering would raise 22P02 and fail
the whole query instead of filtering the row out.

deleteDocument now removes both candidate keys. Removing only the stored
pointer would leave a readable orphan copy of a document the user asked to
erase.

The backfill script is included but has never been run. It defaults to dry
run, refuses .env.local by name, and verifies each copy is readable and
SHA-256 identical before repointing the row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): enforce events:read scope and membership on /api/events

This was the only one of the three validateApiKey call sites with no
downstream guard: v1 and the MCP server both check scope and re-verify
company membership, this route did neither. An events:read scope existed and
was documented as gating the endpoint but was never called, so a legacy key
falling back to DEFAULT_SCOPES read the full log. The bound company id went
straight from the api_keys row into a service role query, so a key whose user
had been removed from the company kept reading.

Adds the scope check before any database access, re-verifies company_members
with archived_at IS NULL, honours test mode by stamping X-Gnubok-Mode instead
of ignoring it, applies minimisePayload so the pull surface can never return
a wider payload than the push surface, and replaces the three flat error
strings with the canonical envelope.

Test key reads are served rather than blocked: TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED is
gated on mutations in with-api-v1, so a read gets the same treatment as every
other v1 read endpoint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(bookkeeping): sweep remaining journal_entries!inner embeds

A previous refactor removed this pattern from lib/reports and introduced
fetchEntryLines, but the class was never swept. Seventeen sites remained and
had become the top application consumer of production database time:
measured across the resulting query shapes, 32,694 calls and 25,848 seconds
of execution, mean 790ms, with shapes averaging 2.6s and 3.0s and maxing at
7,962ms against the 8s statement_timeout, which surfaced to users as 500s on
the booking path.

PostgREST compiles an embed with filters on the embedded side into a
correlated INNER JOIN LATERAL with a parameterized LIMIT, which stops
Postgres reordering the join, so each query walked the whole
journal_entry_lines table across all tenants. Driving from the entries side
instead turns that into two indexed round trips.

Converted sites keep their existing shape: the helper reattaches the parent
entry under the same key the embed produced. Several conversions also remove
a latent silent truncation where an unpaginated query was capped at
PostgREST's 1000 row ceiling.

Two deliberate exceptions. The free text ilike legs of the MCP display query
stay on the embed, because each is capped at legLimit and that cap drives the
truncation contract the tool reports, while the helper is unbounded. The
accounts route moves to the existing get_account_usage_counts RPC instead,
since its embed was a head count and the helper returns rows.

commitEntry's write path is untouched: the change there is confined to the
read query of the pre-commit dimension rule check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): anchor v1 list cursors on created_at

Page two returned page one, forever, while still advertising a fresh
next_cursor. The three routes sorted by and encoded a Postgres date column,
which serializes as YYYY-MM-DD, but decodeDefaultCursor validates the cursor
timestamp as full ISO-8601 and returned null, so the keyset filter was never
applied and has_more never went false. An integrator syncing verifikat looped
on the newest rows indefinitely.

The transactions route already solved this and its comment names the trap;
the fix was never ported. All three now order and encode on created_at with
an id tie break, matching the transactions keyset predicate exactly.
ISO_TIMESTAMP is deliberately left alone: relaxing it would silently change
sort semantics on the route that currently works.

Default ordering therefore moves from business date to insert order. Every
business date is still on the row, and the invoices list gains date_from and
date_to filters so a date range is still reachable; the other two already had
them.

The tests use an in-memory PostgREST that actually evaluates the filters,
because the repo's pass-through mock cannot catch this class of bug: the bug
is that the filter is never sent. They walk to exhaustion with a hard
iteration cap, so an unterminated walk fails instead of hanging.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): separate dry run from commit in the idempotency hash

The request hash was built from url.pathname, which excludes the query
string, so a dry run and its commit hashed identically. Following the flow
documented in dry-run.ts, re-issuing the request with the same
Idempotency-Key returned the cached preview with Idempotent-Replayed set and
wrote nothing, while reporting 200. An agent or integrator saw success for a
write that never happened.

dry_run is folded into the hash only when true, not as an unconditional
boolean. Including it as false would change the hash of every ordinary write,
and with a 24h idempotency TTL any key in flight across the deploy would fail
the request_hash comparison and 409 on a legitimate retry. Both hash call
sites now go through one shared helper so they cannot drift into a permanent
cache miss, and dry run responses are no longer stored at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: install the Bedrock SDK out of tree in the compliance review

The Swedish accounting compliance gate had failed ten consecutive runs and so
was posting nothing. With --no-package-lock npm discarded the lockfile and
re-resolved the whole tree from package.json, floating @hookform/resolvers to
5.4.3, whose valibot ^1 peer conflicts with the pinned valibot 0.39.0.

Installing into the parent of the checkout resolves only that one package, so
an unrelated peer conflict can never take the gate down again. Node still
finds it because ESM bare specifiers walk up parent node_modules; NODE_PATH
would not have worked, as it is CommonJS only. --legacy-peer-deps was
rejected because it masks future genuine peer conflicts and still reifies the
full tree.

The same step's SDK version is aligned from 0.31.0 back to the 0.29.1 that
package.json and check:guards enforce after the streaming outage. That drift
went unnoticed because the pin guard only inspects package.json and the
lockfile, never workflow files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build(docker): generate crontabs from vercel.json

vercel.json defines 16 cron jobs; both Docker crontabs carried 9, and were
byte identical to each other. Self hosted deployments therefore never sent
recurring invoices, never dispatched webhooks and never cleaned up
idempotency keys. tax-deadlines also ran once a year on 2 January instead of
daily, and documents/verify weekly instead of daily.

Extension crons are included rather than excluded. The Dockerfile copies the
whole tree before building, so every extension cron route is compiled into
the image regardless of the enabled preset, and each returns 200 when its
extension is unconfigured, so curl -sf logs no failure. Two such entries were
already present in the crontab for extensions absent from the preset, which
settles the intent.

documents/verify is treated as drift rather than a self hosted concession:
the weekly cadence was present in the hosted crontab too, and the run is
capped at 200 documents walking a nulls-first queue, so weekly drains the
integrity queue seven times slower on a check that exists for BFL retention.

webhooks/dispatch keeps its per minute cadence, adding 1,440 requests a day
on self hosted. A gentler tick would silently stretch the first retry, since
the retry ladder opens at 60 seconds. SCHEDULE_OVERRIDES is the one line
place to change that.

A parity test asserts the path sets match minus a documented exclusion list,
and ratchets three cron routes that are currently scheduled nowhere so they
are named rather than silently rotting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(observability): add a provider agnostic error sink

There is no error tracking in this codebase: logs go to console and Vercel
retention and nowhere else, nothing alerts on the 16 cron jobs, and seven
code comments across lib, app, components and extensions asserted that Sentry
captures errors when Sentry is not a dependency. The two most recent bug
fixes on this repo were both discovered by customer email.

This adds the sink, not a vendor. No dependency is taken: the interface has a
no-op default and a registration point, so behaviour is unchanged until an
adapter is registered. Releases are tagged from the build id already inlined
by next.config.ts.

Redaction moved out of lib/logger.ts into a leaf module that both the logger
and the sink import, so there is one denylist and no path from application
data to a third party can skip the personnummer regex, including direct sink
calls that bypass the logger. That matters here because these logs carry
personnummer and financial data.

verifyCronSecret now reports its own 401s, which covers all 16 jobs without
touching a route file and catches the case where CRON_SECRET is rotated
without updating the scheduler and every job silently 401s forever. The
threshold is one failure rather than the backup alert's three: suppressing
the first occurrence is precisely how an outage stays invisible.

The seven misleading comments are corrected to describe what the code
actually does, including the two cases that still are not covered: the client
side one, since the sink is server side, and a warn level call that is not
forwarded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remediate the 2026-07-26 similar-sweep findings across all surfaces

Resolves the ~150-finding sweep (dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26.md) with
one agent per finding; every behavioural fix carries a regression test proven
to fail at HEAD. Full status, corrections to the sweep, refusals and open
decisions in dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26-remediation-status.md.

Structural roots closed:
- resolveSekAmountOrNull(): honest SEK resolution refuses instead of booking
  1:1; four duplicated toSek closures now refuse via INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING
- ledger-line-amount.ts: journal_entry_lines.currency labels the document,
  not the amount; SQL pre-filter decoy proven and fixed
- sparse-patch.ts: .partial() does not strip .default() in Zod 4.4.3; the
  exploitable salary payslip-line PATCH and KPI preferences sinks fixed
- tests/schema: migration-replay phantom-column guard (13k+ refs, closed
  CHECK sets, onConflict targets); found 28 real defects, all fixed, all
  four baselines now empty
- three new ratchet guards: sek-labelled-amount, cross-extension-import,
  ungated-extension-route

Highlights: lawful VAT-rate set on all seven invoice surfaces (ML 6 kap),
RC input VAT mismatch wired on web + both MCP callers, missing-underlag
resource delegates to the shared RPC predicate, push-notifications consent
polarity fail-closed, deadlines undo honours requested state, silent-failure
and read-side-fabrication classes fixed across settings/KPI/inbox/Stripe/
Arcim/kassaflodesanalys, error-envelope stringification fixed at 10+ sites
with isSwedishUserMessage extended.

Also includes the parallel session's MCP invoice tools (update_invoice,
recurring schedules, invoice deliveries) which share files with the sweep
work and are verified green together.

13 new migrations are NOT applied anywhere; they apply via branch merge.
20260726120000 backfills 1247 supplier-invoice rows. pg tests for new
DDL are written but unrun (no local Postgres).

Verified: 11088 tests / 881 files green, tsc 0 non-test errors, lint 0
errors, check:guards passing, MCP payload 57475/57500.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(migrations): rename replace_sie_import migration off main's 20260726090000 version

origin/main shipped 20260726090000_agent_quota_rpc_caller_guard.sql; keeping
our replace_sie_import migration on the same version would abort the Supabase
apply with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate at merge time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): remediate pre-publish deep-review findings across all slices

A 13-agent review of the full branch diff surfaced 1 critical, 5 high and
~45 further findings; this commit resolves them in one pass:

- replace_sie_import / undo_sie_import: p_user_id honored only for
  service_role callers; any other caller is pinned to auth.uid()
  (impersonation gate bypass), authz raise errcode 42501 mapped to a
  Swedish 403 in the route, new caller-guard migration for undo
- bulk_book_transactions refuses homogeneous non-SEK batches instead of
  writing foreign magnitudes into SEK ledger columns
- credit-note cap trigger: company-match on credited_invoice_id, no
  cross-tenant figures in exception text
- link_voucher RPCs resolve NULL invoice currency as SEK end to end
- personal-number ciphertext CHECK split into NOT VALID + VALIDATE
- same-currency foreign settlements clear 1510 at booking rate and book
  realized diff to 3960/7960; rate-less foreign write paths refuse
- receivables revaluation covers partially_paid and outstanding amounts
- period lock guard paginates candidates past the PostgREST 1000 cap
- documents: service-client storage removals after authz, dual-layout
  reads in integrity cron and archive export, backfill delete-source
  sweep actually deletes with hash verification and shared-key grouping
- invoice matching normalizes NULL/lowercase currencies (regression),
  duplicate candidates stop claiming amount matches they never ran
- match-invoice aborts on any booking failure (no paid-without-verifikat)
- refresh-exchange-rate reverts on concurrent booking (TOCTOU window)
- KPI preferences upsert arbiter aligned to the company-scoped constraint
- personnummer_last4 stripped from all salary responses incl. MCP tools
- worked-hours batch restores destroyed rows on conflict and error paths
- MCP: shared duplicate-claim builder (no more 'null kr'), short-circuit
  on tag_journal_lines overflow, auto_send schedules stage as high risk
- observability sink redacts emails/IBANs/API keys and keeps redacted
  stacks in prod; assorted small guards (safe-return-to /@, dry_run=True,
  cursor helper off-by-one, OAuth state TTL 10 min, arcim saveMappings
  call removed)

Full dispositions, deferred items and hand-verified accounting numbers
are documented in the PR body and DECISIONS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(personnummer): implement masking and encryption for personal numbers with tests

* fix(review): address CI and compliance-bot findings for PR #1215

pg-real: the CI image's auth shim reads the legacy request.jwt.claim.role
GUC, so both service-role simulations (runAsServiceRole and the
invoice-delivery test's local helper) never satisfied auth.role() =
'service_role' and every legitimate p_user_id path failed closed; the
shared helper now sets both GUC shapes plus SET LOCAL ROLE with a
fail-loud sanity check, and the delivery test reuses it. The link-voucher
migration had recreated both RPCs from pre-rewrite file text,
reintroducing the NULL-unsafe membership pattern the
null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet bans; both guards now use
public.caller_is_company_member() with all currency changes preserved.

Compliance bots: the customers export now emits the standard masked form
instead of raw AES-256-GCM ciphertext in the Org-/personnummer column,
and maskCustomerRow returns a non-round-trippable placeholder on decrypt
failure instead of 500ing the list. MCP parity: gnubok_lock_period's
staging pre-check now runs the exact countUnbookedInPeriod the commit
path enforces (exported from period-service; local mirror deleted), and
gnubok_agi_status resolves AGI state run-scoped so a correction run no
longer renders as already filed.

Declined with evidence: PR-Agent's opening-balances null-zeroing concern
(all mergeable columns are NOT NULL with defaults per 20260713101000).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): address codex review findings on PR #1215

- restore 20260726140000 to its preview-recorded content and restate the
  NULL-safe tenant guard under 20260727130000: a recorded migration version
  never re-runs, so the in-place edit could not reach the preview branch
- replace toFixed() with sv-SE two-decimal formatting in the ROT/RUT cap
  warning texts and update the pinned test expectations
- drop the em dash in the fiscal-periods route comment
- strip trailing whitespace in import-existing.test.ts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(reports): raise timeout on real PDF render tests

renderToBuffer does real @react-pdf layout work and exceeds the 5s
default when the full suite saturates the CPU; tests pass in isolation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-27 03:34:56 +02:00
Mattsson e11f70b347 Bug/gh issues fiz (#1103) 
* refactor: optimize page loading and data fetching

* fix: resolve recurring production runtime errors

* feat: add MCP company and customer updates

* fix: handle year-end tax adjustments

* feat: harden annual report compliance

* fix: expand invoice logo and font support

* fix: sanitize API route error responses

* fix: sanitize user-facing error messages

* feat: persist onboarding and tax assessment notices

* fix: reduce cloud backup audit churn

* feat: refine invoice editor layout

* fix: show saved tax adjustments in INK2

* fix: complete annual report API mappings

* docs: record operational safeguards and decisions

* fix: harden annual report review findings

* fix: adjust column span for description based on VAT registration

* New css class name
 2026-07-21 23:00:15 +02:00
Jakob Wennberg ec27228a8e style: remove em/en dashes repo-wide, add CLAUDE.md rule against them (#890) 
Em dashes (—) and en dashes (–) had spread across comments, docs, tests,
and a few UI strings, reading as AI-generated boilerplate rather than
house style. Replaced each with punctuation matching its context: colon
for explanatory clauses, comma for asides, plain hyphen for numeric/legal
ranges (e.g. "21-23§"), "to"/"till" for date ranges, parentheses for
paired-dash asides. messages/en.json and messages/sv.json were fixed by
hand together to keep sv/en in sync.

Left untouched where the dash is the functional subject rather than
decorative punctuation: date-range-parser.ts's separator regex,
charset-repair.ts's CP1252 byte-mapping table (and its test), the SIE
encoding mojibake docs, generic-csv.ts's minus-sign normalizer, the
agent system-prompt files that already instruct against em dashes, and
a golden iXBRL test fixture compared byte-for-byte.

Also fixes two bugs surfaced along the way: an off-by-one in
ApiKeysPanel's scope-label split (a leftover from an earlier partial
pass), and a charset-repair test that had lost the literal en-dash it
exists to verify.

Regenerated the agent atom seed migration (skills:generate) since 27
SKILL.md files changed. Added a CLAUDE.md rule against em/en dashes,
with an explicit carve-out for the functional-dash cases above.

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-04 15:58:06 +02:00
Mattsson db8983ba9e Add/bokslut (#718) 
* feat(arcim-migration): Briox provider with SIE-over-API import

- Briox auth via account ID + application token (no app-level
  credentials); both tokens rotate on refresh and are persisted
- New sie-fetcher pulls the general ledger as SIE through the
  provider API for Fortnox, Briox and Bjorn Lunden
- Wizard stops on a failed SIE import and surfaces the real errors
  instead of proceeding to the misleading migrate-guard message
- PROVIDER_SIE_ONLY_FORTNOX renamed to PROVIDER_SIE_NOT_SUPPORTED;
  new PROVIDER_TOKEN_INVALID for rejected provider credentials

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(bookkeeping): per-line accruals (periodisering) on invoices and supplier invoices

Defer revenue/costs per invoice line to 29xx/17xx interim accounts with
automatic monthly dissolution (nightly cron + catch-up at registration),
schedule cancellation on credit, year-end auto-detect exclusion for
already-scheduled invoices, invoice-inbox service-period extraction for
prefill, and an MCP tool to list schedules.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(bokslut): iXBRL arsredovisning generation and Bolagsverket digital filing

Generate the annual report as iXBRL from a generated taxonomy registry
(K2 element lists, taxonomy:generate/check scripts + CI guard), expose it
via the fiscal-period API, and add the bolagsverket extension for digital
submission to eget utrymme with webhook-driven status tracking
(submissions table + pg tests, lifecycle events, year-end wizard UI).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(mcp): raise origin-guard test timeout to 20s

The dynamic import pulls in the full server module; the parse alone
flirts with the 5s default under full-suite parallel load.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Add new scripts and documentation for K2 AB taxonomy generation and validation

- Introduced `generate-taxonomy-registry.ts` to automate the generation of the iXBRL taxonomy concept registry from official element lists and tuple models.
- Added `validate-ixbrl.mjs` for validating generated iXBRL reports against the official taxonomy package using Arelle.
- Included new documentation files:
  - `k2-ab-arsredovisning-elementlista-2024-09-12_rev20250312_sv.xlsx`
  - `tuple-innehallsmodell-arsredovisning-k2-2024-09-12.xlsx`
  - `taxonomi-paket-2024-09-12_rev20250312.zip`

* Add tests for bookkeeping accruals dissolution and supplier invoices

- Implement tests for the POST /api/bookkeeping/accruals/[id]/dissolve route, covering success and error scenarios.
- Add tests for the DELETE /api/supplier-invoices/[id] route, including authentication checks and validation of invoice deletion conditions.
- Introduce tests for the Arcim migration provider client, ensuring token handling and error classification.
- Create tests for the Bolagsverket extension, validating submission role enforcement and environment settings.
- Add Zod schemas for Bolagsverket response payloads to ensure proper validation.
- Implement tests for MCP server's list accrual schedules, confirming registration and scope mapping.
- Add consistency tests for IXBRL document generation, ensuring duplicate facts and XML escaping are handled correctly.
- Introduce typed domain errors for accrual schedules to improve error handling in the service.
- Add tests for resolving consent with Briox token refresh concurrency, ensuring proper token management and error handling.

* fix(tests): update payload size guard comments to reflect recent changes in tool descriptions and ceiling adjustments

* fix(gitattributes): mark generated JSON files in bokslut taxonomy as linguist-generated

* feat(migrations): add backfill for invoices.journal_entry_id and fallback for next_voucher_number user_id

* feat(bokslut): enhance compliance and financial processing features with new submission details and security measures

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-06-12 16:35:30 +02:00
Oscar Holm 23863371dd docs: add .env.example for non-Docker local development (#663) 
Adds the .env.example file referenced by CONTRIBUTING.md, with the five
required core vars from lib/init.ts plus commented optional extension vars.
Un-ignores it in .gitignore with a !.env.example negation.

Refs #564.

Signed-off-by: Oscar Holm <oscar@numbery.se>
 2026-06-08 09:41:32 +02:00