8094f288fa1e8fbf47453fdcd90e66ea7f2dcd28
59 Commits
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9b126d22b9 |
fix(reconciliation): server-side confidence floor for unattended auto-apply (#903)
* fix(reconciliation): server-side confidence floor for unattended auto-apply runReconciliation applied every greedy match, including auto_fuzzy at confidence 0.75, with no server-side threshold. The UI is checkbox-gated, but the unattended callers (enable-banking nightly sync cron, the extension's post-sync sweep, and the v1 run endpoint) had no guardrail. - Add ReconciliationOptions.confidenceThreshold (0..1, clamped): the apply loop skips matches below it. Skipped matches stay in the result's matches array and are counted in the new skippedBelowThreshold field, so they are reported for review rather than silently dropped. Dry runs are unaffected; omitting the threshold preserves current behavior. - Both enable-banking sync callers now pass DEFAULT_UNATTENDED_CONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD (0.9, mirroring the gnubok_auto_match_period MCP default), so unattended runs never commit fuzzy (0.75) or date-range (0.85) matches. - v1 POST /reconciliation/bank/run accepts confidence_threshold (optional, 0..1, mirroring the MCP tool naming) and returns skipped_below_threshold; registry docs/pitfalls updated. Closes #880 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(reconciliation): surface skippedBelowThreshold in unattended sync logs Review finding on the first pass: the floor's 'reported, not silently dropped' guarantee never reached the two unattended callers, which discarded or under-logged the result. Also logs the DECISIONS.md line for the deliberate no-default choice on the v1 route. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2c2743eb79 |
Check/salary bankid api (#892)
* fix(bankid): harden login/signup flow — polling, signup rollback, metadata merge, enrichment lookup - middleware: read BankID enrichment from the bankid_enrichment table (the extension_data path has been dead since the multi-tenant refactor), so company-less BankID users land on /select-company instead of the manual wizard - BankIdAuth: hard 6-min poll deadline; every failed poll counts toward the give-up limit; guard overlapping ticks so completion runs exactly once (a double /complete regenerated the magic link and invalidated the first, failing logins intermittently); retry clicks wait out the start cooldown instead of silently no-oping; Swedish messages for 429/unknown start errors - bankid/complete: all-or-nothing signup — delete the created user when the identity insert, app_metadata update, or magic-link generation fails, so a retry starts clean instead of hitting account_exists with an unusable account - bankid/unlink: read-merge-write app_metadata so has_password survives unlink (BankID-only users could otherwise strand themselves with no login method) - login: BankID "create account" CTA now links to /register instead of dismissing the notice; sv.json: fix missing å/ä/ö in settings_bankid strings Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: move secondary guides into docs/, delete dead root files Move DOCKER.md, SELF-HOSTING.md, WHITELABEL.md and extensions.md (renamed EXTENSIONS.md) into a new docs/ folder and update all path references (README, setup.sh, .dockerignore image rules, docker-publish workflow comment, _example-branding, lib/branding/service.ts). Delete two dead root files: customer.json (stray API-test payload) and findings.md (point-in-time swarm audit export, criticals already filed). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> * fix(api): security & correctness hardening + withRouteContext MFA migration across API routes Audit of ~100 app/api routes. Highlights: Security - agent/conversations: list leaked colleagues' titles + message previews (company-scoped RLS, no user filter) -> user-scoped - calendar/feed PUT: raw body into .update() allowed feed_token fixation on a public unauthenticated URL -> strict schema, content toggles only - bokslutsdispositioner: unbounded schablonintaktRate could inflate the IL 30 kap 25% periodiseringsfond cap base -> bounded - agent profile/composer/onboarding: viewers could rewrite the agent profile while sibling /verify blocked them -> role-gated Correctness - account-totals / listAssets: unbounded queries silently truncated at 1000 rows (under-counted money; skipped assets at year-end depreciation) -> fetchAllRows with stable order (+3 more pagination fixes) - voucher-gaps: swallowed detect_voucher_gaps RPC errors (BFNAR gap view could show "no gaps" when the check never ran) -> surfaced - 5 phantom-success writes (OK on zero matched rows) fixed - assets K3 component-sum validated against stale acquisition_cost -> fixed - invite silent email-send failure -> response carries email_sent; deadlines/calendar cast-then-check JSON crashes -> Zod Convention - ~44 legacy routes converted to withRouteContext (MFA); added Zod validation, corrected status codes, console.* -> lib/logger Response shapes preserved for existing callers. ~110 new tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bookkeeping): save a booking as a reusable template from Bokför direkt Add a "Spara som mall" action to the manual booking dialog so users can capture a kontering they just worked out as a booking template — right where they figured out how something should be booked. - derive amount-parameterised template lines from the concrete booking (settlement = the non-VAT leg nearest the total, 26xx = a VAT line with its rate snapped to the nearest standard rate, the rest = business ratios; line labels come from the loaded BAS chart) - extract the shared TemplateForm out of BookingTemplatesPanel so the booking dialog reuses the same editor, live preview and convertibility hints instead of duplicating them - save via the existing POST /api/settings/booking-templates endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(bokslut): render arsredovisning RR/BR at ÅRL post level — no kontonummer Bolagsverket rejected a user's filed årsredovisning with "Balansräkning och resultaträkning ska inte innehålla kontonummer": the PDF built every statement row as per-account "1930 Företagskonto" lines while the iXBRL filing path already aggregated to statutory posts, so the two artifacts diverged. The PDF statements now derive from the same K2 risbs mapping the iXBRL document uses (mapTrialBalancesToK2), via a new statement-rows.ts that emits post-level rows in uppställningsform order for both the K2 and K3 templates. Also fixed along the way: - Jämförelseår column (ÅRL 3:5 §) — previous-year trial balances now load and render; the old PDF had no comparatives at all. - mapping.warnings (unmapped accounts, RR ≠ 2099, obalans, reclass nudges) flow into ArsredovisningData.warnings so the wizard flags a non-fileable document before download. - Flerårsöversikt current/previous year overridden with the mapper's strict-3000–3799 Nettoomsattning, mirroring build-input's duplicate-fact rule, so the FB table ties to the RR. - FB eget kapital-table is post-level and drops obeskattade reserver (never eget kapital); K3 equity-changes statement uses real prior-year opening balances with derived utdelning/nyemission residuals that tie the roll-forward exactly to booked UB. - build-input dedupes warnings now that the PDF path runs the same mapping. Regression test asserts no RR/BR label ever contains a four-digit account number again. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(reports): diagnose untransferred prior-year results behind balance-sheet differens Prod incident (97 kr): a multi-year SIE migration lacked one year's omforing av arets resultat; the residual corrupted every later derived opening balance and Balansrakningen showed a bare "Differens: 97 kr" with no explanation. Continuity checking cannot catch this failure mode (prior-year UB and derived IB match per-account by construction) - the invariant that actually breaks is per-year P&L = 0 for all non-latest years. - lib/reports/imbalance-diagnosis.ts: shared detector (findUntransferredResults + buildImbalanceDiagnosis) - Balansrakning/Balansrapport attach imbalance_diagnosis when unbalanced, naming the exact culprit years; rendered in web views + PDF; MCP gnubok_get_balance_sheet inherits the field via spread - SIE import: parse-time warning when a completed year's vouchers leave a P&L residual, plus a post-import DB walk surfacing culprits as warnings and structured details.untransferredResults; the Arcim migration workspace previously dropped result.warnings entirely and now renders them - opening-balance/correct: pre-flight the company lock date and return 409 OB_COMPANY_LOCK_DATE (retryable: false, lock date interpolated in the client message) instead of the retryable 500 that invited blind retries; catch-path maps a raced trigger rejection to the same code Diagnosis runs only on unbalanced paths (zero cost when healthy) and never fails the report or the import. No migration, nothing persisted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: production error remediation — FX rates, deadlines, log levels, correction relink Batch of fixes for recurring Vercel runtime errors: - Riksbanken FX rates: persistent read-through cache (exchange_rates table), one retry honoring Retry-After on 429/5xx, bounded ingest concurrency, and an honest fallback — most recent cached observation or null, never a hardcoded rate silently booked into amount_sek. Unrated transactions stay repairable via refresh-exchange-rate. - Tax deadline regeneration inserts replacement rows before deleting the superseded set, so a failed insert no longer wipes a company's deadlines (the 23502 user_id regression did exactly that). Migration makes deadlines.user_id nullable for system-generated rows. - Route wrappers + errorResponse log 4xx outcomes at warn so only genuine 5xx reach Vercel's runtime-error clustering; client-supplied /api/log telemetry demoted to warn as well. - application/json documents (raw PSD2 responses archived per BFL) validate as parseable JSON with object/array root instead of always failing the magic-byte check. - correctEntry surfaces document-relink failures to callers, and the BFL document-immutability trigger now allows relinking underlag from a reversed entry to its correction (migration + pg test). - Middleware clears stale session cookies on /api requests too, using scope 'local' so cleanup doesn't re-trigger the failed token refresh. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(skatteverket): persist token health and stop retrying dead consents Terminal auth errors (SESSION_EXPIRED, REFRESH_EXHAUSTED, MISSING_SCOPE, TOKEN_CORRUPTED) mark the token row needs_reconsent with the error code and timestamp — SKV per-flow refresh tokens live 65 minutes, so once expired nothing recovers without a fresh BankID consent. The AGI kvittens and skattekonto sync crons skip flagged connections instead of failing every night, and the settings panel prompts for re-consent proactively. A successful reconnect resets the row to active. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(banking): allocate distinct BAS ledger slots for PSD2 mirror accounts A bank returning N same-currency accounts used to map them all onto the currency default (1930/1932/1933/1934), tripping the UNIQUE (company_id, ledger_account) constraint per-account — swallowed errors left accounts silently unmirrored. allocatePsd2LedgerAccount now hands out the currency default first, then free 1931–1959 sub-account slots, skipping slots held by any existing row. - Callback persists allocations to accounts_data so the picker pre-fills reality; reconnect reuses previously mirrored ledgers instead of re-deriving (a user remap to 1935 survives). - Selection save resolves effective ledgers up front and rejects duplicates or cross-connection conflicts with a 400 instead of silently skipping the mirror. - Bank error codes + psu_type are forwarded to the settings page for every OAuth error, keying the Handelsbanken corporate fullmakt guidance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agent): stage exact journal lines on categorization previews Categorization previews only carried debit/credit accounts, the GROSS amount, and separate VAT rows — read together that looks like an unbalanced 'gross on cost account + VAT debit' entry, and it misled both users and agents into rejecting correct proposals. The MCP preview and the pending-operation PATCH now materialize the exact lines the commit executor will post (net cost line, VAT line, gross bank line, SEK) via buildTransactionEntryLines, and PATCH re-derives them from the new mapping instead of spreading stale staged lines. ApprovalCard and /pending render the verifikat lines, falling back to the legacy summary only for operations staged before this fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bookkeeping): prune unused imported accounts from the chart SIE imports routinely bring in hundreds of accounts that were never used and clutter the kontoplan. New account_usage_counts RPC (one grouped query instead of a count per account) backs GET /api/bookkeeping/accounts/usage, and POST /api/bookkeeping/accounts/prune deletes zero-usage accounts — dry-run first, then an explicit account list capped at 2000. Accounts with journal lines are skipped, never deleted. The chart manager shows a usage column and a prune dialog grouping custom accounts vs unused BAS-seeded ones. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(api): carry dimensions through v1 invoice and supplier-invoice surfaces Credit-note creation now copies default_dimensions and per-line dimensions from the original, so the reversing journal entry nets against the same dimension cells instead of dropping them. List/detail responses expose the dimension fields, and the OpenAPI spec snapshot follows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf: batch serial Supabase round-trips on hot dashboard paths Every dashboard render pays the layout's query chain, so serialized awaits are direct wall-clock: the layout, chat conversation, invoice detail, supplier detail, select-company, and agent-onboarding pages now run their independent lookups in parallel batches, and getCompanyCapabilities folds its disabled-config read into the same round-trip. JournalEntryList hydrates the saved fiscal-year scope optimistically instead of serializing the first entries fetch behind the fiscal-periods request. The supplier detail page filters invoices server-side via a new supplier_id query param instead of fetching the whole company ledger, and the invoice editor (with its framer-motion dependency) lazy-loads so it stops shipping with the invoice list bundle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(salary): one-click runs, payslip delivery, payments settings, run cockpit Salary P1 batch, driving the 20-click flow toward 3 clicks: - One-click 'Starta lönekörning': POST /api/salary/runs accepts an empty body and resolves defaults server-side — period follows the latest non-corrected run, payment date from the new salary_pay_day setting, series from the per-source-type map. The separate /salary/runs/new page is gone. - Run detail page rebuilt as a step-railed cockpit (progress rail, KPI cards, employee ledger, journal preview) on a deliberately wider canvas; components extracted to components/salary/run/. - Payslip delivery: tokenized public payslip pages (/payslip/[token], backed by salary_payslip_links) plus per-employee email send with PDF — employees need no account, and the middleware exempts the route from auth redirects. - Payments settings: salary pay day, default bank, and pain.001 vs Bankgirot Lön format with per-bank upload instructions and an LB sunset warning (banks retire LB during 2026). - AGI panel: full submission status flows (stale drafts, signing links, kvittens polling, error reports); tax payment panel with skattekonto shortcut and mark-as-paid. - Salary calendar bulk editing, employee benefits/tax-card polish, municipality tax-table lookup improvements. messages/sv+en also carry the strings for the account-prune, skatteverket-reconsent, and banking surfaces committed just before this. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: adopt Next 16 proxy.ts convention + repo housekeeping - Rename middleware.ts to proxy.ts with the proxy() export (Next 16 renamed the middleware convention; behavior unchanged). - Exclude dev_docs/ from tsconfig so stray snippets in planning docs don't break the build type-check. - Ratchet antipatterns-baseline down (raw-route-auth 165 → 119) to lock in the withRouteContext migration from 5cfd2b76. - template-library uses roundOre() instead of inline rounding. - database.md: drop account_balances from the key-tables list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(bookkeeping): robust service-role detection in correction document relink relink_documents_to_correction() keyed its service-role branch on auth.role(), which reads the singular request.jwt.claim.role GUC that PostgREST v10+ and the pg-real harness no longer populate. Genuine service-role callers (pending-ops executor / MCP approve) landed in the auth gate and could not relink underlag. Read the role from the request.jwt.claims JSON directly, mirroring the canonical link_voucher_rpcs_tenant_guard convention. Validated on staging. Also: harden the salary run page's error paths (res.json().catch) against non-JSON error bodies, and roll back the pg-real service-role case in finally so an aborted transaction cannot poison a pooled connection for the next test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(documents): restore journal_entry_line_id link durability (BFL 7 kap) Migration 20260704103000 rewrote enforce_document_journal_entry_immutability to guard journal_entry_id but left journal_entry_line_id to the metadata trigger, which exempts draft-linked docs -- and the entry-level trigger only fired on UPDATE OF journal_entry_id, so a line-id-only UPDATE never invoked it at all. That let a set journal_entry_line_id be cleared to NULL, breaking the "link durable from first set" invariant (document-immutability.pg regression). Widen the trigger to fire on journal_entry_line_id too and guard it with the same uuid-durability rule as journal_entry_id (setting NULL -> uuid stays allowed; clearing/re-pointing a set value is blocked, status-independent). The correction-relink GUC path, which legitimately clears line_id when moving underlag to the posted correction, stays exempt. Validated on staging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ec27228a8e |
style: remove em/en dashes repo-wide, add CLAUDE.md rule against them (#890)
Em dashes (—) and en dashes (–) had spread across comments, docs, tests, and a few UI strings, reading as AI-generated boilerplate rather than house style. Replaced each with punctuation matching its context: colon for explanatory clauses, comma for asides, plain hyphen for numeric/legal ranges (e.g. "21-23§"), "to"/"till" for date ranges, parentheses for paired-dash asides. messages/en.json and messages/sv.json were fixed by hand together to keep sv/en in sync. Left untouched where the dash is the functional subject rather than decorative punctuation: date-range-parser.ts's separator regex, charset-repair.ts's CP1252 byte-mapping table (and its test), the SIE encoding mojibake docs, generic-csv.ts's minus-sign normalizer, the agent system-prompt files that already instruct against em dashes, and a golden iXBRL test fixture compared byte-for-byte. Also fixes two bugs surfaced along the way: an off-by-one in ApiKeysPanel's scope-label split (a leftover from an earlier partial pass), and a charset-repair test that had lost the literal en-dash it exists to verify. Regenerated the agent atom seed migration (skills:generate) since 27 SKILL.md files changed. Added a CLAUDE.md rule against em/en dashes, with an explicit carve-out for the functional-dash cases above. Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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237b77a366 |
feat: custom inbound mail domains, rot/rut payout file, invoice email texts, security hardening (#878)
* fix(security): guard MCP test keys, RLS role gate + voucher RPC guards, /api MFA gate, deps - MCP: force dry-run / block writes for test-mode API keys in tools/call (extensions/general/mcp-server) - DB: current_user_can_write role gate on write policies (40 tables) + tenant guards, SET search_path, REVOKE anon on commit_journal_entry / next_voucher_number / detect_voucher_gaps (migration 20260702093000) - Middleware: MFA (AAL2) gate on cookie-authenticated /api routes via apiPathSkipsMfaGate - Deps: npm audit fix clears mailparser/linkify-it/nodemailer/svix/uuid highs; xlsx -> SheetJS 0.20.3 Adds unit + pg-real tests. Does not touch in-progress ROT/RUT or invoice-email-texts work. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(invoices): rot/rut begäran om utbetalning — HUS XML (V6), payout tracking + settlement, MCP tool Generates Skatteverkets begäran-om-utbetalning file (schema V6) from paid ROT/RUT invoices — no submission API exists, the file is uploaded manually at skatteverket.se. Headless by design for now: API routes + MCP tool (gnubok_generate_rot_rut_file), no UI surfaces. - lib/invoices/rot-rut-file.ts: pure XML generator with deterministic per-invoice blockers (hours, work type, personnummer, property info, mixed rot+rut, XSD limits) + 31 January deadline warnings - rot_rut_payout_requests(+items) tables: one active begäran per invoice (DB triggers incl. reactivation guard), RLS, audit, pg-real tests - Settlement: POST /settle books debit 1930 / credit 1513 via the engine (source_type rot_rut_payout); partial payouts → partially_paid - Work-type lists corrected against Begaran.xsd: IT-tjänster is rut-only, snöskottning/tillsyn/tvätt added (schablontjänster utfört-only) - Fix: invoice-level fastighetsbeteckning was validated but never persisted — now stamped onto rot lines in build-invoice-write; API accepts bostadsrätt pair (lägenhetsnr + BRF orgnr, editor UI deferred) - invoice_items.brf_org_number migration + MCP scope invoices:write Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(invoices): per-company editable invoice email texts Add an "E-posttexter" section under Settings -> Fakturering where the subject, greeting, body and sign-off of the standard invoice email can be customized per company in Swedish and English. Fields pre-fill with the standard texts and only diffs from the standard are stored (company_settings.invoice_email_texts JSONB), so future improvements to the stock wording still reach companies that have not customized. Each field has a reset-to-standard button; cleared fields snap back. Texts support a fixed placeholder set (invoice number, customer name, first name, company, due date, amount) substituted at send time in a single pass; unknown placeholders stay literal. Custom texts are HTML-escaped after substitution, newlines become <br> in the HTML variant, and subject lines are flattened to a single header line. Overrides apply to standard invoices only - credit notes, proforma and delivery notes keep the stock texts. All send paths (UI, v1 API, MCP approval, recurring) pick the texts up via the existing settings row. The Zod schema half of this change (InvoiceEmailTextsSchema in lib/api/schemas.ts) was inadvertently included in 8291f745. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(documents): accept PDFs with preamble before %PDF- header, surface content rejections as 400 detectFileMagic required the %PDF- signature at byte 0 (BOM aside), rejecting genuine PDFs that carry a leading newline or junk bytes — files every ISO 32000 reader opens fine. Now scan the first 1024 bytes for the signature, matching real-reader behavior. Image types stay strict at offset 0 to keep the anti-placeholder defense tight. Magic-byte rejections were also mislabeled as DOC_UPLOAD_STORAGE_FAILED (500 'Filen kunde inte sparas'), blaming storage for a client-side file problem. Both upload routes now map them to a new DOC_UPLOAD_INVALID_CONTENT (400) with an accurate message. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bookkeeping): full keyboard flow for manual journal entry Enter now drives the whole verifikat flow: verifikationstext drops into the first row missing an account, konto commits advance to debet, Enter on an empty debet hops to kredit, and an entered amount jumps to the next row. Once the voucher balances, Enter opens the review (unchanged gate) and the auto-focused confirm posts it — including through the no-underlag warning dialog. Escape in the inline review goes back to the form. Also fixes an Enter footgun in AccountCombobox: a bare Enter on a freshly focused field no longer selects the first account in the list — selection now requires typing or arrow navigation; otherwise Enter re-commits the current value or bubbles to the form-level handler. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add custom inbound domains management for companies - Implemented functionality to allow companies to claim and manage their own inbound email domains via Resend's API. - Created a new table `company_inbound_domains` to store domain information, including status and DNS records. - Added necessary RLS policies to restrict access based on user roles (owner/admin). - Developed functions for domain normalization, validation, claiming, verification, and removal. - Implemented webhook handling for domain status updates from Resend. - Added comprehensive tests for RLS, constraints, and triggers related to the new domain management feature. * fix: address PR #878 review findings and CI failures - migrations: drop the ai_usage_tracking policy block from the role-gate migration — the table was removed by 20260504120000_remove_ai_subsystem and only lingers on staging as drift; a from-scratch chain (pg-real, Supabase preview) failed on it - invoice-inbox: never flip a custom domain to verified off a domain.updated webhook alone — confirm the receiving capability with Resend first (fail-closed); normalize both sides of the orphan-adoption domain match - rot/rut: block files where begärt belopp exceeds what the buyer paid (DEDUCTION_EXCEEDS_PAYMENT); tighten brf_org_number validation to real orgnr shapes; parameterize the settlement bank account (19xx, default 1930) - rot/rut routes: log acting user on financial mutations, stop swallowing item mirror errors, narrow response projections (no customer ids through the invoice join); document the deliberate inline-XML decision - documents: stop echoing raw storage-layer error messages to clients Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: round-2 CI + compliance findings on PR #878 - migrations: the role-gate migration targeted automation_webhooks, which 20260515170000_webhooks_v2 renamed to webhooks on the canonical chain (staging kept the old name — drift); gate public.webhooks instead, dropping legacy schema-sync policy names defensively. Restore the 20260623130000 owner fallback in next_voucher_number that the stale copied-verbatim body silently reverted (caught by engine.pg locally). Full migration chain verified from scratch against supabase/postgres:15. - mcp: bump the tools/list payload ceiling 44K -> 45K — main's #877 qualified-identifier schemas plus this branch's rot/rut tool crossed the ceiling only in combination; documented in the test's history log. - rot/rut: refuse partial settlement before Skatteverkets beslut is recorded (would bypass the PATCH lifecycle and strand the request); block zero-kronor ärenden (ZERO_DEDUCTION); require sekelsiffra 16 on 12-digit brf orgnr in both schema validation and normalizeBrfOrgNr Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: rename branch migrations off main's colliding versions After the merge with main, two versions were shared by two files each (20260702100000: rot_rut_payout_requests vs company_settings_dimensions_ enabled; 20260702130000: invoice_email_texts vs pending_operations_add_ create_dimension_value). psql-based CI applies by filename and doesn't care, but Supabase branching records migrations by version (PK) — the second file with the same version breaks the preview with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate. Neither branch migration is version- recorded on staging or prod, so renaming to fresh 20260703 versions is safe; nothing between the old and new positions depends on these objects. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): scope the /api MFA-gate bypass to real Bearer-auth surfaces Any Authorization header — attacker-controlled — used to skip the AAL2 gate for every /api route, so a stolen-password AAL1 cookie session could reach cookie-authenticated routes (which ignore the header) by attaching `Authorization: x`. The skip is now scoped to the surfaces whose auth contract IS the header (/api/v1 API keys, the MCP endpoint's OAuth tokens); pure Bearer callers elsewhere (cron secret, signed webhooks) carry no cookie session and were never touched by the gate, which only fires for cookie users. Superagent P2 on PR #878. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: normalize path separators in dimension statutory guard scan The route scan compared walked file paths against a POSIX-path allowlist, so the suite failed on Windows (backslash separators) while passing on Linux CI. Normalize the scanned paths to forward slashes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ea236cbcdf |
fix(reconciliation): Bankavstämning phase 0 — correctness + feedback batch (+ nav IA regrouping) (#879)
* feat(nav): interaction-mode sidebar grouping — Arbeta/Analys/Data/Skatt & bokslut Nav IA redesign phase 0 (dev_docs/nav_ia_redesign.md): same routes, regrouped by what the user is doing. CLAUDE.md restructured around Hard Rules (doc references updated); pending-page explainer removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(reconciliation): correctness + feedback batch for Bankavstämning (phase 0) Engine: fetchAllRows pagination on status/run/RPC fetches (silent 1000-row cap corrupted totals), optimistic-lock guards on manualLink + apply, unlink audit rows attributed to the acting user (was: company UUID), selected_matches partial apply intersected with a fresh match run. View: silent in-place refresh instead of a full-page skeleton per action, checkbox-gated apply with confidence badges (fuzzy unticked) in chunks of 500, honest result toasts, dry-run errors surfaced, ranked per-row picker candidates pinned to the applied date window, currency-correct amounts (bank side in account currency, GL side SEK), voucher links, translated source types, colored differens, dirty-date-filter guard. Discovery: year-end preflight 404 href fixed (/reconciliation/bank never existed), ⌘K palette entry, real links from the transactions page. v1: status registry schema now matches the actual ReconciliationStatus payload, errors documented as a count, false ~0.85-threshold pitfall replaced, route test mocks the real shape. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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163fbd8222 |
feat(dimensions): PR8 salary — employees.default_dimensions, per-employee cost lines, aggregation re-key (#869)
Employees carry a default dimensions bag and the salary booking puts each
employee's cost on their kostnadsställe/projekt
(dev_docs/dimensions_implementation_plan.md PR8):
- employees.default_dimensions (migration 20260702220000; jsonb DEFAULT
'{}' + object CHECK)
- salary-entries: the one-line-per-account aggregation is re-keyed to
account+bag — P&L cost lines (löner incl. line items + base remainder,
arbetsgivaravgifter, semesteravsättning + dess avgifter, pension, SLP)
split per employee bag while every balance-sheet/settlement leg (2710,
1930, 2731, 29xx, 2740, 2514) stays aggregated; liability credits equal
the sum of the rounded debit buckets so entries balance by construction;
dimension-less runs book byte-identically to before. Replaces the dead
SalaryRunEmployee.cost_center/project pair (never wired)
- both book routes (dashboard + v1) read the bag via the employees join —
read-at-book, so the run review shows exactly what will book
- employee form (new + edit) gets a gated Kostnadsställe/Projekt card;
run review shows per-employee dims chips; run GET + v1 employee
routes/schemas + MCP list_employees carry the field
- pre-merge audit: all salary reports (salary-journal, AGI,
avgifter-basis, vacation-liability) read salary_run_employees — not
journal lines — and every ledger consumer sums per account, so the
line split breaks nothing; SIE export + dimension P&L pick the split
up as intended
8 new engine propagation tests + book-route dims flow test.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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8bb49c07a2 |
feat(dimensions): PR2 registry — CRUD API, register UI, settings toggle, SIE export on the new registry (#858)
* feat(dimensions): PR2 registry — CRUD API, register UI, settings toggle, SIE export on the new registry
Phase 2 of dev_docs/dimensions_implementation_plan.md. Companies with
dimensions_enabled=false (default) see zero change.
API:
- Dashboard CRUD: GET /api/dimensions (lazy-seeds system dims 1/6 via the
ensure_company_dimensions RPC), PATCH /api/dimensions/[id] (is_system
rename blocked), POST/PATCH/DELETE values (code immutable after creation;
strict Fortnox code format ^[A-Za-z0-9ÅÄÖåäö_+\-]{1,20}$ at the API layer;
retention-trigger deletes surface the Swedish "arkivera istället" message
as 409 DIMENSION_VALUE_REFERENCED).
- POST /api/dimensions/import-existing — scans journal_entry_lines.dimensions
for unregistered codes and mints inactive placeholder registry rows.
- v1 public API: GET dimensions + POST values (Idempotency-Key, dry-run),
registered in the OpenAPI spec (102→104 endpoints).
- dimensions_enabled boolean on company_settings (new migration,
UI-visibility only, never correctness-bearing) exposed through the
existing settings read/update path.
SIE export (lib/reports/sie-export.ts):
- Reads the new dimensions/dimension_values registry; legacy
cost_centers/projects tables now have zero readers (drop migration next).
- Fixes the latent Visma-rejection bug: #OBJEKT now declared for INACTIVE
values referenced by lines.
- Generic-N: #DIM/#UNDERDIM loop sorted by sie_dim_no; #TRANS object lists
serialize from the line JSONB map (sorted, '01'→'1' collapse); orphan
codes/dims synthesize declarations from the SIE reserved-number seed —
every referenced (dim, code) pair is guaranteed declared.
UI:
- /dimensions register (Register-recipe): tabs per dimension, search,
sortable table, value dialog (code immutable on edit, projekt dates on
dim 6), archive-not-delete affordances.
- DimensionCombobox shipped (mounts in the tagging PR).
- Settings toggle "Aktivera kostnadsställen & projekt" — toggle-on runs the
import-existing scan and links to the register.
- Nav row in redovisning, rendered only when dimensions_enabled (same
mechanism as pays_salaries).
- dimensions.* i18n namespace (51 keys, sv/en parity).
- Sandbox seed: demo dims + values, revenue line tagged {"1":"BUTIK","6":"P001"}.
Verified: 6328/6328 unit tests, guard + coverage gate green, tsc parity with
main (210=210), production build passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(dimensions): PR2 review round — atomic archived-create, UNDERDIM ordering, import robustness, date semantics
- POST values accepts is_active so "create as archived" is atomic; the UI's
fragile create-then-PATCH fallback is deleted (PR Agent finding 1).
- DimensionCombobox blur revert reads the committed value/values through refs
so a selection landing inside the 150ms window always wins (finding 2).
- import-existing sanitizes candidate codes like the PR1 backfill and upserts
with ignoreDuplicates — one bad/duplicate code can no longer abort the
batch; created counted from returned rows (finding 3).
- SIE export emits all root #DIM before any #UNDERDIM so a parent always
precedes a lower-numbered child (SIE4 declaration order — Swedish review);
synthesized placeholder declarations now log one structured warning
(BFNAR 2013:2 behandlingshistorik) + defence-in-depth comment.
- Value dates rejected (400 DIMENSION_VALUE_DATES_NOT_ALLOWED) when the
parent dimension is flow-period (resets_annually=true); explicit null
still clears (Swedish review).
- Sandbox seed logs seeded dimension codes; GET /api/dimensions documents
the deliberate absence of dimensions_enabled gating (UI-visibility flag,
not a security boundary — compliance-swarm V8.2.1 rejected by design).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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5df6199bd1 |
fix(invoices): remaining_amount + invoice.paid on agent mark-paid path (#825) (#845)
* fix(invoices): book remaining_amount + emit invoice.paid on agent mark-paid path (#825) The agent/MCP commit path commitMarkInvoicePaid flipped status to 'paid' and set paid_amount = total but never wrote remaining_amount (left at the original total) and never emitted invoice.paid — so partial state and webhooks diverged from the dashboard and v1 mark-paid routes. Route the agent path through the shared planInvoicePayment helper (the source of truth introduced in #841): compute paid/remaining/status with the overpayment guard BEFORE booking the JE (so a rejected payment never burns a voucher number), persist remaining_amount + the partially_paid transition, and best-effort emit invoice.paid for webhook parity. Adds lib/pending-operations/__tests__/mark-invoice-paid.test.ts covering the state + event behaviour of this path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): address review feedback on agent mark-paid path (#825) - CAS-guard 409 message now reflects the expanded payable states: the UPDATE filter accepts partially_paid (reachable via a concurrent settle race), not just sent/overdue. - Derive the settle amount from total − paid_amount when remaining_amount is null (legacy rows) instead of falling back to the full total, so a prior partial payment is not double-counted into a false overpayment rejection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): derive remaining from total − paid_amount on all mark-paid surfaces (#825) The dashboard and v1 mark-paid routes defaulted the settle amount to invoice.total when remaining_amount was null, which over-settles a legacy invoice that has a prior partial payment recorded in paid_amount (false overpayment / AR over-credit). Align both with the agent path (commit.ts): remaining_amount ?? total − paid_amount. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f8504f3bd0 |
fix: audit batch — pagination truncation, MFA/dead-code cleanup, mark-paid fail-closed (#841)
* fix(reports): paginate 8 more report/ledger queries (1000-row truncation) Raw .select() without fetchAllRows() silently caps at PostgREST's 1000-row limit, producing wrong statutory output for high-volume companies. Following #806 (trial-balance/VAT), wrap the remaining offenders in fetchAllRows + a stable .order('id') + dedupeBy: - ink2-engine / ne-engine: INK2 & NE-bilaga tax declarations under-counted - ar-reconciliation (1510/1513), supplier-reconciliation (2440): phantom "Ej avstämd" gaps - full-archive-export: 7-year DR archive (added a unique total order so rows are not silently skipped/duplicated across pages) - avgifter-basis, currency-revaluation, vat-declaration Adds a regression guard test asserting >1000 ledger lines are summed, not truncated at 1000. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): close extension-dispatcher MFA gap, scope /api/events to API key, sweep dead code Security/correctness: - ext/[...path] dispatcher now uses requireAuth() instead of inline supabase.auth.getUser(), enforcing MFA (AAL2) on hosted across the whole enabled-extension surface (banking sync, document upload/booking, supplier invoices, migration). Ratchets antipatterns-baseline raw-route-auth 168->165. - /api/events now filters by the API key's bound company_id instead of the user's active company (was a cross-company read with a scoped key). - enable-banking OAuth callback calls ensureInitialized() at module load so the PSD2 consent audit event (ASVS V16 / GDPR Art.30) isn't dropped on a cold-start instance. Dead-code sweep (all confirmed zero importers): - delete lib/tax/calculator.ts, lib/salary/engangsskatt.ts (+test), lib/email/resend.ts, lib/salary/salary-transaction-matcher.ts, lib/webhooks/diff.ts, lib/salary/effective-values.ts, lib/bookkeeping/template-prompt.ts - trim unused lib/vat/eu-countries.ts helpers (keep EU_COUNTRIES) - remove dead getAutomaticStatus() and the abandoned Activepieces CSP entry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): fail closed when a payment journal entry doesn't post Three mark-paid paths (legacy route, v1 API, agent commit) diverged on the "mark paid but the JE failed" case — two would flip the invoice to paid (or leave an orphaned posted voucher) with no booking, silently diverging the GL from the AR/AP sub-ledger. Unify on fail-closed: - legacy + v1 + agent commitMarkInvoicePaid: never mark paid without a posted voucher; on a null/failed JE return INVOICE_PAID_BOOK_FAILED before any state mutation (v1 mirrors the match-invoice strict mode). - agent path: add the .in('status',[...]).select('id') CAS guard and cancel the orphaned voucher (cancelOrphanedPaymentEntry) on a lost race or update error, matching the web route. - legacy route: cancel the orphan on a non-race update error too (was only handled on the race branch). - supplier mark-paid: stop swallowing a failed supplier_invoice_payments insert — that row drives the reversal amount in payment-sync; roll back the status flip and cancel the voucher instead. - pending-ops orchestrator: error-check the terminal 'committed' write so an op stranded in 'committing' (the expire sweep only targets 'pending') is at least logged loudly. Adds a guard test for the legacy fail-closed path. Full unit suite green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): unblock core build + address compliance-review findings - avgifter-basis.ts: fix the core-build TypeScript error — PostgREST's type-level select parser models the salary_run embed as an array, which wasn't assignable to the object-typed generic. Type it `unknown` (rows are read via an explicit cast), making it robust across postgrest-js versions. - /api/events: add a non-null companyId guard before the event_log query (defense-in-depth for the API-key-bound scope) — addresses ASVS V8.2.1 / ISO A.5.15. - supplier mark-paid: add a CAS guard (.eq('status', newStatus)) to the payment-insert-failure rollback so a concurrent settlement can't be clobbered — addresses ASVS V2.3. - dispatcher: add an AAL2 regression test asserting a non-MFA session is rejected (403) and the extension handler never runs — addresses the GDPR Art.32 review ask for the single extension chokepoint. Verified deletions are safe: effective-values.ts was a dead duplicate — the live AGI/payslip path inlines the same `?? override` coalescing (generate-declaration.ts), so AGI correctness is unaffected. next build: exit 0. Full unit suite: 6147 passing. ESLint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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5b4cefe8ab |
feat(api): v1 endpoints to stamp invoice inbox items as consumed (#767)
* feat(api): v1 endpoints to stamp invoice inbox items as consumed
Adds inbox_item_id support to POST /api/v1/companies/{companyId}/documents/{id}/link
(best-effort stamp on the originating invoice_inbox_items row) and a new dedicated
POST /api/v1/companies/{companyId}/inbox-items/{id}/stamp endpoint for stamping
independently of the document link — both use documents:write scope and require
Idempotency-Key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonas Flodén <jonas@floden.nu>
* fix(api): wrap stamp response in dataEnvelope and register route in load-routes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonas Flodén <jonas@floden.nu>
---------
Signed-off-by: Jonas Flodén <jonas@floden.nu>
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837f354d81 |
fix(sie): add ?encoding=cp437 for legacy bookkeeping software (#810)
* fix(sie): add ?encoding=cp437 option for legacy bookkeeping software SIE spec mandates CP437 (#FORMAT PC8) but accounted generates UTF-8. Most modern cloud tools (Fortnox, Bokio) accept UTF-8 fine, so UTF-8 remains the default. Pass ?encoding=cp437 to get a properly encoded CP437 binary with #FORMAT PC8 in the header, required by desktop software such as Visma Administration and BL Administration. Removes the spurious #FORMAT PC8 tag from the default UTF-8 output since declaring CP437 while serving UTF-8 caused mojibake on import. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Jonas Flodén <jonas@floden.nu> * fix(sie): wrap Uint8Array in Buffer.from so NextResponse accepts it Uint8Array is not directly assignable to BodyInit in the Next.js NextResponse constructor — wrapping with Buffer.from() satisfies the type without changing the byte content. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Jonas Flodén <jonas@floden.nu> --------- Signed-off-by: Jonas Flodén <jonas@floden.nu> |
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4f0a7b1db0 |
feat(entitlements): per-company capability paywall — gate, trial seeding, UI upsells, Stripe checkout (#815)
* feat(entitlements): capability-grant gate substrate (paywall + modularity) Two-axis capability primitive behind the SaaS paywall and the per-tenant modularity/marketplace vision: - migration: capability_grants (entitlement axis, polymorphic company/firm scope), company_capability_config (enablement axis), metered_events (append-only), company_has_capability() RPC reusing the 20260619130100 tenant guard; SELECT-only RLS (writes service-role only, no self-grant). - lib/entitlements: hasCapability/requireCapability gate (mirrors guardSandbox, fail-closed, NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED bypass), capability key namespace, metering helper. - unit (11) + pg-real tests (RPC/RLS/tenant-guard incl. no-self-grant). Gate not yet wired into call sites (follow-up commit). Paid keys: ai, bank_sync, skatteverket, email_send. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(entitlements): enforce capability gate at paid external-service chokepoints Wire the gate into the paid surfaces (keys: ai, email_send, bank_sync, skatteverket): - AI routes (agent invoke/composer/onboarding stream): requireCapability(ai) - Invoice send (web + v1): requireCapability(email_send) - document-extraction event handler: skip Bedrock extract if ai not entitled - enable-banking + skatteverket crons: per-company hasCapability skip in loop - colocated send-route test mocks updated (requireCapability -> null) Free per founder decision: TIC org lookup, VIES VAT validation, FX auto-fetch, cloud backup, BankID login, all internal bookkeeping. DEPLOY ORDER: fail-closed by design — do NOT deploy before trial/comp grant seeding lands, or companies without grants lose these features. Seeding + Stripe checkout/webhook are the next steps. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(entitlements): seed trial + comp capability grants Makes the fail-closed gate safely deployable — nobody is locked out at cutover: - AFTER INSERT trigger on companies grants every NEW company a 30-day trial on the PAID keys (ai, bank_sync, skatteverket, email_send), on ALL creation paths (RPC/MCP/direct) — so a new signup can use onboarding AI immediately. - one-time backfill for EXISTING companies: created <=2026-06-07 -> trial ends 2026-07-07; created later -> created_at + 30 days. - permanent comp grants for Arcim/Mattsson (matched by name, no hardcoded UUIDs). - pg tests: clearGrants() for controlled resolver tests + trigger coverage. Trigger fn is SECURITY DEFINER so it writes grants regardless of caller RLS (table has no INSERT policy for authenticated — no self-grant). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(entitlements): client capability visibility + billing page Non-payers get a clean upsell instead of broken/empty features: - CompanyContext gains capabilities[] + useCapability(key); resolved once server-side in the dashboard layout via getCompanyCapabilities (batched, 2 queries), all three provider branches wired. - /settings/billing upgrade page — the destination upsells point to (Stripe Payment Link via NEXT_PUBLIC_STRIPE_PAYMENT_LINK; degrades to 'coming soon' until automated checkout lands). - ChatEmptyState: non-payer sees an Uppgradera CTA (mirrors the sandbox state). - SendInvoiceDialog: email send disabled + upsell note when email_send missing (extends the existing sandbox-disable pattern). Fast-follow: chat input/FAB + document-inbox empty state + bank/skatteverket/ AI-suggest buttons + a shared capability_blocked->toast backstop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(entitlements): gate remaining paid UI surfaces with upsell (fast-follow) disable-with-upsell across the rest of the paid surfaces (keys: bank_sync, skatteverket, ai): - BankSyncNowButton: sync/reconnect disabled + note when !bank_sync (CSV/SIE stays free) - AGIPanel: AGI submit-to-Skatteverket disabled + note when !skatteverket - SkatteverketConnectPanel: BankID connect/reconnect disabled + upsell - ApprovalCard: AI re-propose (correction) gated; manual approve/reject stay free - InvoiceInboxWorkspace: upsell when extraction empty AND !ai (deterministic parse + manual entry unaffected) - AgentTrigger FAB: routes to /settings/billing when !ai (no dead chat) - settings nav: 'Abonnemang'/'Subscription' link to /settings/billing (sv/en) TaxPaymentPanel + TransactionInboxCard intentionally untouched — only local/ deterministic actions there, nothing paid+external to gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(entitlements): automated Stripe subscription checkout + webhook Self-serve revenue wired to the same capability-grant primitive: - migration: company_subscriptions (company<->Stripe link/status) + stripe_webhook_events (idempotency) - lib/stripe: getStripe singleton, plan->price mapping, subscription-sync (statusGrantsAccess / subscriptionToState / applySubscriptionState / handleStripeEvent). Active sub -> upsert source='stripe' grants for PAID keys (expiry = period_end + 3d grace); canceled/unpaid -> remove ONLY stripe grants (freeze-and-retain). - routes: POST /api/billing/checkout (hosted subscription Checkout, company_id metadata), POST /api/billing/portal (Customer Portal), POST /api/stripe/webhook (raw-body signature verify, event-id dedup; handles checkout.session.completed + customer.subscription.*) - billing page: real plan-toggle Checkout CTA / manage-subscription portal, gated on isStripeConfigured() - adds stripe@22; unit tests for sync logic Provisioning is webhook-driven (never trusts the success redirect). Needs env: STRIPE_SECRET_KEY, STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET, STRIPE_PRICE_MONTHLY, STRIPE_PRICE_YEARLY. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(entitlements): validate UUIDs in capability filter + log webhook errors Addresses PR review (Superagent Security / PR Agent): - has-capability.ts: validate companyId/teamId as UUIDs before interpolating into the PostgREST .or() filter (fail-closed) — removes the latent injection vector flagged in the entitlement gate. Unit tests updated to use UUIDs. - stripe/webhook: log processing failures with event id + type before the generic 500, so a failing webhook is visible to operators. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(salary): always-free AGI XML download for manual filing; only direct API submit is paid Per founder decision on the swedish-compliance-review finding: AGI is a mandatory statutory filing, so producing/downloading the AGI XML must never be paywalled. Adds a free 'Ladda ner AGI-fil' button (generates + downloads the XML for manual upload to Skatteverket's e-service) on all tiers; the gated 'Skicka in underlag' stays the paid convenience (direct API submission — which also requires the paid BankID connection). Upsell reworded to point to the manual path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(entitlements): harden comp-grant match after prod verification Verified Arcim/Mattsson in prod (pwxtzglxptnnvjrpixpg): the name match was case-sensitive (missed the active 'Arcim technology AB' lowercase variant) and would have granted 3 archived dupes. Now match by org_number (5595386219 / 5595719864) OR case-insensitive name, active companies only — hits exactly the 3 active comp companies, excludes archived dupes and the unrelated 'Amnäs Mattsson, Emil' enskild firma. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fce6faff2c |
fix(api): stabilize report pagination + declare real { data, meta } envelope on v1 single/write endpoints (#811)
* fix(reports): stabilize fetchAllRows paging to stop doubled/dropped balances (#790, #791) PostgREST `.range()` paging is only correct when the underlying query has a stable TOTAL order. Several aggregating report queries (general ledger, trial balance, grundbok, supplier/AR ledgers, etc.) paginated without `.order()`, so on datasets larger than one 1000-row page Postgres could return rows in a different order between requests — silently DUPLICATING or SKIPPING rows on a page boundary and doubling or dropping financial totals. - fetch-all.ts: document the ordering invariant and add an optional `dedupeBy` defense-in-depth that drops cross-page duplicates and warns when it fires (surfaces a missing `.order()` in logs instead of corrupting money). - Add a stable `.order()` (line PK or account_number) to every paginated query in lib/reports/ and the account-balances route; pass `dedupeBy` on the money-aggregating line queries. - Add fetch-all unit tests and update report test fixtures to carry row ids. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): declare the real { data, meta } envelope on v1 single/write/204 endpoints (#794) The OpenAPI generator derives each endpoint's documented body purely from its registered `response.success` Zod schema, and that schema is never validated at runtime — so a route could advertise a shape its handler never sends. #802 fixed this for list endpoints; the same drift was latent on single-resource and write endpoints, which declared the bare resource schema instead of the `{ data, meta }` envelope the handlers actually return. - registry.ts: extend `ResponseMetaSchema` with the optional `audit` block and `partial_expansions` list that writes/expansions emit; add the `NoBodyResponse` sentinel so 204 DELETE handlers document a bare 204 instead of a phantom 200. - Wrap every single/write endpoint's `response.success` in `dataEnvelope(...)` (or `NoBodyResponse` for 204s) across the v1 routes. - Add a response-envelope contract test that fails CI if any JSON endpoint forgets to wrap its schema, with binary downloads and 204s as the only exemptions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(reports): extend paging dedupeBy to rc-basis-gaps and opening-balances Address PR review: these two money-aggregating line queries already had the stable `.order('id')` (so paging was correct) but didn't carry `id` in the select, so they couldn't use the `dedupeBy` defense-in-depth that general-ledger and trial-balance got. Select `id` and pass `dedupeBy: r => r.id` so the whole report layer applies the ordering invariant consistently. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fc2b4d1e23 |
fix(api): declare the real { data, meta } envelope for v1 list endpoints (#802)
The OpenAPI success schemas for v1 list endpoints declared a bare
{ <name>: [...] } object that no handler returns, so the published spec
advertised a shape the API never emits (#781, item 2). response.success is
doc-only (feeds zodToJsonSchema for /openapi.json; not validated at runtime),
so this is a documentation fix with no behaviour change.
Add listEnvelope() ({ data: [...], meta }) and dataEnvelope() ({ data, meta })
plus a shared ResponseMetaSchema. Ten endpoints that return paginated() now use
listEnvelope; the three that deliberately wrap their array under a named key via
ok() (accounts, fiscal-periods, webhooks — a shape their route tests lock in)
use dataEnvelope. Also corrects the accounts/fiscal-periods examples, which
showed an unwrapped data: [...] that contradicted their handlers.
Refs #781.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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55ba66908b |
feat(salary): let an enskild firma employ staff while blocking owner/board payroll (#797)
An enskild firma that hires staff should get the payroll module, but its owner or board can never be on payroll (owner compensation is egna uttag / BAS 2013, not lön). - Migration 20260628120000 adds the enforce_ef_no_owner_employee trigger (BEFORE INSERT OR UPDATE OF employment_type) as the all-paths backstop. - lib/salary/employment-rules.ts is the app-layer mirror (forbidden set kept byte-identical to the trigger); getCompanyEntityType() resolves the same company_settings -> companies precedence. - The two UI salary routes and the v1 POST guard before insert/update for a clean 400 with guidance. - Payroll nav + Lön settings now show for any employer (aktiebolag OR company_settings.pays_salaries), wired through the dashboard layout. Fixes #782. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9278221616 |
fix(api): guard params await so static v1 routes don't 500 (#795)
Next.js 16 invokes a static route handler (no [segment]) with
{ params: undefined }. /api/v1/companies is the only authenticated static
route on the v1 surface, so awaiting params.params null-derefs and the catch
turns it into a 500 for every valid API key. Guard the await:
((await params?.params) ?? {}). Dynamic routes are unaffected. Fixes #781.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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10a0b1d8dd |
fix(invoices): embed company logo as PNG so it renders on invoice PDFs (#772) (#776)
* fix(invoices): embed company logo as PNG so it renders on invoice PDFs (#772) @react-pdf/renderer's <Image> only decodes JPG/PNG, but the logo upload route and the `logos` bucket also accept SVG and WebP. For an SVG/WebP logo @react-pdf silently swallows the decode error (console.warn inside a try/catch in its fetchImage step), so the invoice renders with NO logo and nothing surfaces — "Logotyp kommer inte med på fakturor". Fix: prepareInvoicePdfRender now fetches the stored logo and re-encodes it to a PNG data URL via sharp (SVGs rasterized at higher density), handing the template a company whose logo_url is that data URL. Renders regardless of upload format and removes the render-time dependency on a remote fetch inside @react-pdf. Falls back to the original URL unchanged on any failure (network, unreadable image, sharp unavailable), so behaviour is never worse than before. Result is cached per logo URL (5-min TTL, bounded to 50) since the logo is re-rendered on every invoice — twice per send and once per invoice in recurring/batch loops. prepareInvoicePdfRender becomes async and returns the resolved { branding, company }; all 8 call sites updated (6 routes, recurring-schedule-service, pending-operations/commit) to await it and pass the resolved company. Layered cleanly on top of the Swish-QR feature already on main — both coexist at every call site. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoices): bound and dedupe the logo fetch (review hardening) Review (PR Agent security): resolveLogoDataUrl fetched logo_url with no timeout or size limit. Add a 5s AbortSignal.timeout and a 5 MB cap (checked on the declared content-length and the read body) so a slow/oversized logo host can't hang or balloon an invoice render. SSRF itself isn't reachable today — logo_url is only ever set to a Supabase logos-bucket URL by the upload route — so an origin allowlist is intentionally skipped (would break self-hosted storage). Also coalesce concurrent renders of the same logo (preflight+final on a send, and recurring/batch loops) onto one in-flight fetch+encode instead of N. New test covers the size-cap fallback; existing SVG test now asserts the timeout signal. 9/9 pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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241959513b |
Fix/mcp and req (#753)
* feat(api): test-mode API keys force dry-run on the v1 REST API A key created with mode='test' (prefix gnubok_sk_test_) binds to the real company, but the v1 wrapper forces dry_run on every write so nothing is persisted or sent. Mutations on endpoints that can't be simulated (dryRunSupported=false or unregistered) are refused with 403 TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED — fail-closed. Reads pass through unchanged and every test-key response carries X-Gnubok-Mode: test. Live keys are unaffected (mode defaults to 'live'). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(invoices): company default "Vår referens" + per-line sales-account override Add company_settings.default_our_reference (settings form, schema, type); the invoice editor pre-fills our_reference from it on new invoices only, never overwriting an edited draft. Separately, add an optional per-line försäljningskonto (class-3) override in the editor — left blank, the engine still derives the revenue account from the VAT rate, and reverse-charge/export lines ignore the override. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(invoices): render a Swish payment QR on invoice PDFs Build the Swish "Type C" QR payload offline (no Swish API call) and embed it as a PNG in the invoice PDF payment box when Swish display is enabled, the invoice is in SEK, and the amount is positive. Also surface the invoice number in the payment box. Wired through every PDF render path: send, mark-sent and pdf routes (both legacy and v1), the recurring-schedule sender, and the staged-send commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bookkeeping): draft exclusion + correction-chain collapse on verifikationslista Extend list_fiscal_period_entries_with_related with two opt-in params: p_exclude_draft (keep drafts off the committed list — they get their own surface) and p_collapse_corrections (render a correction group as the single live correction, hiding the mechanical storno and the reversed original). Both default false; nothing is deleted, every voucher keeps its number, and a "show all" toggle exposes the full chain. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(reports): link multi-year SIE periods so resultatrapport shows the prior year SIE import now sets fiscal_periods.previous_period_id in both directions when creating a period, so multi-year files chain correctly regardless of #RAR order. A backfill migration repairs periods imported before this (idempotent; only touches NULL links on first-of-month periods). generateResultatrapport falls back to the date-adjacent prior period when the chain is still null, so the comparison column works for legacy data too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(articles): hide the VAT field for non-momsregistrerade companies The article form reads company_settings.vat_registered and, when false, hides the moms field and forces vat_rate to 0 on submit — mirroring the invoice editor so a non-VAT-registered company never sets a rate it can't charge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(import): allow file-based imports in the sandbox Bank-file, CSV/Excel and SIE imports run entirely on uploaded data with no external service, so they're now reachable in the sandbox. Only the API-backed options that need live third-party credentials (PSD2 bank connection, provider migration) stay disabled. Updates the sandbox notice copy to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bookkeeping): add edit draft functionality for journal entries * feat(database): add default "Vår referens" column to company_settings for invoicing * fix(tests): set SHOW_SWISH_ON_INVOICE to false in PDF template mocks * @ fix(payments): use roundOre for Swish amount formatting Replace naive Math.round(x*100)/100 with roundOre from @/lib/money to satisfy the antipattern guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> @ --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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88f49c0ccc |
fix(bookkeeping): harden correction flow and align VAT/cashflow reports (#726)
Bundles a set of bookkeeping-correctness fixes developed together. Correction / storno flow - correctEntry resolves (and seeds standard BAS) accounts for the corrected lines BEFORE writing the storno. The old order created and posted the storno first, then hit AccountsNotInChartError on the corrected lines and had to cancel it again — leaving a voided 0 kr storno in the chain and permanently burning a voucher number (an unexplained BFNAR 2013:2 gap). It now fails fast with nothing written. - correctEntry re-points the bank transaction and underlag from the reversed original to the live corrected entry, so the transaction keeps reading as booked (and stays correctable) and the underlag travels with it. recordateEntry delegates both relinks to correctEntry. - reverseEntry (engine) clears transactions.journal_entry_id for rows booked by the reversed entry, so a plain storno returns the bank row to "Att bokföra" with a re-booking affordance. The agent paths did this manually; the dashboard reverse route did not. - findUnresolvableAccounts replaces findMissingActiveAccounts in the categorize routes: a standard BAS account merely absent from the chart is seeded on demand by the engine, so pre-validation must not 400 on it — only unknown numbers or deactivated accounts block. - CorrectionChain dims cancelled (0 kr) entries and labels them so they no longer render like a live storno. Report accuracy - calculateVatLiability() (lib/reports/kpi.ts) is shared by the KPI route, the KPI xlsx export and the MCP period-summary tool, and uses the same 26xx accounts as the momsdeklaration (ruta 49). Reverse-charge and import pairs (e.g. 2614 credit + 2645 debit) net to zero instead of inflating the receivable (#715). VAT_OUTPUT_ACCOUNTS / VAT_INPUT_ACCOUNTS are derived from ACCOUNT_RUTA so the widget can never drift from the declaration. - Kassaflödesanalys records erhållna aktieägartillskott (2093) as a financing inflow and counts överkursfond (2086/2097) toward nyemission. 2093 was previously unmapped, so any contribution broke the 19xx reconciliation by exactly the contributed amount (#716). Wired through the report type, both PDF templates, the K3 PDF, the dashboard client and the årsredovisning summary type. Agent guidance - shared-rules: describe the real Accounted correction flow (Rätta rader / Rätta datum / Radera verifikat, on-demand BAS backfill) so the assistant stops inventing flows that don't exist. - verifikation-draft: clearer locked-period guidance. Tests cover all of the above (storno fail-fast + seeding + relink, reverseEntry unlink, findUnresolvableAccounts, VAT netting and the cashflow reconciliation cases). Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b7f60b23f5 |
fix(invoices): v1 mark-paid booking-state routing + journal_entry_id backfill (#713)
invoices.journal_entry_id means "the registration verifikat that booked this invoice at issuance" — payment flows route on it (set → clear 1510, NULL → kontantmetoden cash entry). Two bugs in v1 mark-paid broke that: - The pre-flight select omitted journal_entry_id, so invoiceAlreadyBooked always read false — a kontantmetoden company paying an already-registered invoice would re-recognise revenue + VAT (double-booking) and orphan the 1510 receivable. Fixed by fetching the column for routing only; the response contract and invoice.paid event payload are unchanged. - The update wrote the just-created PAYMENT/cash entry id into the column (wrong semantic) — once routing reads the column, a cash partial payment #1 would make payment #2 clear a 1510 that was never debited. Removed; the payment entry id still returns in the response body. New backfill migration links the earliest posted invoice_created entry to historical invoices (353 registered-but-unlinked rows in hosted prod), repairs any payment-type links, and links credit_note reversal entries to credit-note rows. Idempotent; rows with no registration entry stay NULL (correct for kontantmetoden/unsent invoices). Tests: 3 new unit tests lock the select projection, the already-booked→ clearing routing, and the no-write-back semantics (the supabase mock now records call args). New pg-real suite (11 tests) runs the actual migration SQL: earliest-wins, reversed/draft exclusion, no-overwrite, cash stays NULL, payment-link repair, credit notes, cross-company isolation, idempotency. insertDraftJournalEntry fixture gains optional sourceType/ sourceId/createdAt (defaults unchanged). Hosted prod requires manual migration apply after merge (Supabase MCP). Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e978136210 |
fix(supplier-invoices): payment-match integrity — no more paid-without-voucher half-states (#711)
* fix(transactions): abort supplier-invoice match when payment voucher fails The match route caught a payment-JE creation failure and proceeded anyway: invoice marked paid with payment_journal_entry_id NULL, a payments row with no voucher, and the bank line linked but unbooked. That half-state is unrecoverable from the UI — mark-paid rejects 'paid' invoices and the match route rejects already-linked transactions (the "user can re-book" comment was wrong). The v1 route was already strict; this aligns the cookie route. A failed voucher now fails the whole match before any state mutation, with bookkeeping errors mapped to their structured codes and a new MATCH_SI_JE_FAILED fallback. Incident: Arcim 2026-06-11 — invoice 20250928 marked paid with no payment voucher because account 3740 was missing from the chart. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(transactions): bank-sync supplier-invoice match is a suggestion, not a hard link A high-confidence (>=0.85, unambiguous) supplier-invoice hit at sync time set transactions.supplier_invoice_id directly — without booking a payment or touching the invoice. The half-link then BLOCKED the match route (MATCH_SI_TX_ALREADY_LINKED), stranding the bank line with no path to a payment voucher and the invoice stuck on 'registered'. Sync now always writes potential_supplier_invoice_id; the hard link is reserved for completed matches where the payment voucher is booked. High-confidence hits still drain the matching pool and skip the mapping engine. Incident: Arcim 2026-06-11 — RosholmDell 18299 (29 890 kr) auto-linked at sync, unmatchable afterwards. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bookkeeping): seed standard BAS accounts on demand in the engine A minimal company chart routinely lacks accounts that legitimate engine flows reach — 3740 (öres- och kronutjämning) the first time a Bankgiro payment lands a sub-krona off the invoice, 6580 on a first legal invoice. createDraftEntry threw AccountsNotInChartError and turned a standard account into a dead end. The engine now backfills missing accounts from BAS_REFERENCE (full metadata incl. SRU code) before failing. Conservative by design: unknown numbers still throw, and deactivated accounts are never resurrected — deactivation is a deliberate user choice. Concurrent seeding (23505) counts as success. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(supplier-invoices): require explicit expense account, drop the 5010 seed Every new line item (and every AI-prefilled line) was silently seeded with account 5010 Lokalhyra. AI extraction deliberately never suggests accounts, so any invoice saved without touching the field was misbooked as premises rent — legally wrong verifikat that need rättelse to fix. Lines now start with an empty account: the supplier's default_expense_account fills empty rows when set, and submit blocks with a clear toast until every row has an account. Incident: Arcim 2026-06-11 — a legal-services invoice (should be 6580) and a SaaS subscription (should be 5420) both posted to 5010. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(bookkeeping): clarify voucher description suffix to (ankomstnr N) "(ankomst 2)" read as "arrived twice" / a duplicate marker; it is the company-internal sequential arrival counter for supplier invoices. "(ankomstnr 2)" says what the number is. Existing posted vouchers keep their old description (immutable). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(transactions): cancel orphaned payment voucher when match loses the CAS race When the payment JE posts but the invoice CAS update matches 0 rows (a concurrent request settled it first), both match routes returned MATCH_SI_NOT_OPEN and left the voucher orphaned in the ledger. mark-paid has always compensated for exactly this case; the compensation is now a shared helper (cancelOrphanedPaymentEntry: cancel + voucher-gap explanation per BFNAR 2013:2) used by all three routes. Flagged by the compliance swarm and the Swedish compliance review on PR #711 — the one finding both converged on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(bookkeeping): next_voucher_number user_id fallback for service-role contexts Mirrors 20260421170500 (commit_journal_entry got this fix; its twin did not). Under a service-role client auth.uid() is NULL and the voucher_sequences upsert fails its user_id NOT NULL check before ON CONFLICT can arbitrate — even when the sequence row exists. Every non-interactive caller of the storno/correction path (getNextVoucherNumber → correctEntry) was broken. Fallback: companies.created_by (same source seed_chart_of_accounts uses). Interactive flows still record auth.uid(); DO UPDATE never touches user_id on existing rows. Also restores SET search_path = public, lost when 20260330 recreated the function after the 20260304 hardening. pg-real: new test exercises the RPC on the superuser connection (auth.uid() IS NULL) and asserts sequential numbers + owner attribution. Found live: the Arcim repair script booked payment vouchers fine (commit_journal_entry) but failed on corrections (next_voucher_number). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(bookkeeping): harden cancelOrphanedPaymentEntry — never throw, breadcrumb before mutating Two hardenings from the PR #711 review round: - Whole body wrapped in try/catch: the caller is returning the correct CAS-conflict response, so an unexpected client rejection must not replace it with a 500 (best-effort is now a hard guarantee). - The gap-recovery data (series, number, period, explanation) is logged BEFORE the cancel: the cancel and gap insert are separate statements, and a crash between them would otherwise leave a cancelled voucher with no BFNAR 2013:2 gap explanation and no way to reconstruct it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c0b006fcc1 |
feat(invoicing): artikelregister (product/article catalog) with per-article revenue account (#703)
* feat(invoicing): artikelregister (product/article catalog) with per-article revenue account Add a lean, non-inventory article catalog (artikelregister) so users can define reusable invoice-line presets (name, unit, price excl VAT, VAT rate) with an optional per-article BAS class-3 revenue-account override. - DB: articles table (RLS via user_company_ids(), audit + updated_at triggers, unique-per-company article_number), generate_article_number RPC (atomic + idempotent), company_settings counter, nullable invoice_items.revenue_account + article_id, pending_operations CHECK expansion. - Engine: generatePerRateLines groups revenue by (vat_rate, account) — byte-identical with no override, balance-safe when split (last account absorbs the rounding remainder), reverse_charge/export still force 3308/3305. - API: /api/articles CRUD (soft-deactivate); override validated against chart_of_accounts (active class-3) and frozen onto invoice lines at create. - Propagation: override carried through send/mark-sent/credit/convert/cash and the staged commit paths (recurring deferred — documented inline). - MCP: gnubok_list/create/update_article (staged, scoped, risk-tiered). - UI: articles register (list/detail/form) + nav + bilingual i18n + invoice-line article picker & "Spara som artikel" quick-create. - Tests: engine regression, route, and pg-real (RPC/RLS/triggers). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): strip ILIKE _ wildcard from gnubok_list_articles search Underscore is a single-character ILIKE wildcard; stripping it (alongside the existing %,()\* set) keeps a stray char in the article search from matching every row. Read-only + RLS-scoped, so no security impact — addresses PR #703 reviewer + compliance-swarm CC6.3 notes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f7cd1b86e7 |
fix(import): preserve customized SIE #KONTO account names (#669)
* feat(import): add syncMappedAccounts helper for account create + rename Single home for the create-missing-accounts logic that exists in three near-identical copies (executeSIEImport, the SIE execute route, and the arcim-migration extension), plus a new rename pass that carries customized SIE #KONTO names into accounts that already exist (e.g. K1-seeded defaults). The file's name applies only to identity mappings (source === target); remapped targets keep their BAS/current name. With updateAccountNames=false the behavior matches the legacy code exactly. Not wired up yet. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(import): preserve SIE #KONTO account names; add updateAccountNames option Customer report: account names customized in Fortnox did not follow into Accounted via SIE import. The import always used BAS default names for accounts in the BAS reference and never touched accounts that already existed (the K1-seeded chart), so the file's names were silently dropped. executeSIEImport now routes account creation through syncMappedAccounts, which prefers the file's #KONTO name for identity-mapped accounts and renames existing accounts whose name differs (surfaced as a warning). New option updateAccountNames (default true) restores the old behavior when disabled. The duplicated pre-create blocks in the execute route and the arcim-migration extension are removed — executeSIEImport owns account sync on every path now, including the Fortnox re-sync (idempotent renames). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(mcp): expose update_account_names on gnubok_import_sie Optional boolean on the tool schema, staged into the pending operation and threaded through commitImportSie to executeSIEImport. Defaults to true at both stage and commit time — the commit-side default also covers operations staged before the param existed (Boolean(undefined) would have silently flipped it off). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): v1 SIE import generated no account mappings The route passed [] as mappings to executeSIEImport, which the mapping-coverage guard (added in #613) rejects for any real file — and before that guard, every voucher was silently skipped as unmapped. The route has never produced a working import for files with vouchers. Generate mappings server-side from the file's #KONTO records plus stored per-company overrides (same as the dashboard execute route), reject unmappable files with a clean 400 before the operation row is created, and expose options.updateAccountNames (default true). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(import): "Använd kontonamn från filen" toggle in import review step New switch (default on) controlling whether the SIE file's #KONTO names are carried into the chart of accounts. Helper text shows how many identity-mapped accounts carry names that differ from the BAS defaults. The page already serializes the whole options object to the execute route, so no further wiring is needed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(import): address PR #669 review — parallel renames, rename audit trail - Rename pass now runs UPDATEs concurrently in bounded batches of 25 (greptile P2): a re-sync with many custom names no longer serializes N round trips, and a pathological full-chart rename cannot stampede the API. Per-rename failures stay non-fatal via Promise.allSettled. - Persist the per-account rename detail (number, from, to) into sie_imports.migration_documentation as accountRenames — the behandlingshistorik record per BFNAR 2013:2 (swedish-compliance review); the result warnings only carry the count. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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3e42fc6f32 |
Feat/voucher docs (#664)
* feat: implement inbox document picker and linking functionality * feat: implement self-billing invoice functionality - Added support for registering self-billed invoices received from customers. - Updated the invoice schema to include fields for self-billing metadata such as `is_self_billed`, `external_invoice_number`, `self_billing_agreement_ref`, and `received_date`. - Created API route for handling self-billed invoice submissions, including validation and error handling. - Implemented database migrations to add necessary columns and constraints for self-billing invoices. - Developed tests to ensure correct behavior of self-billing invoice creation and validation rules. - Updated Swedish localization files to include new terms related to self-billing. * feat: enforce SIE import requirement for non-Fortnox providers in migration process * feat: streamline invoice processing and enhance error logging across APIs |
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5777f51940 |
Reject overpayment on all invoice-match paths (audit C3) (#647)
* fix(invoices): reject overpayment on all invoice-match paths (audit C3) The paid/remaining math was copy-pasted across three sites; the dashboard match-invoice route guarded against overpayment but the v1 public API route and the agent/MCP commitMatchTransactionInvoice had drifted WITHOUT it — silently accepting payment > remaining (recording paid_amount > total, over-crediting AR; cleanup needs storno, not edit). - New lib/invoices/apply-invoice-payment.ts planInvoicePayment(): single source of the paid/remaining/status math + overpayment guard, via canonical roundOre (@/lib/money, guard rail #9). FX-agnostic — caller passes the invoice-currency amount. - All three sites delegate; the guard runs BEFORE journal-entry creation so a rejected match never burns a voucher number. Dashboard behaviour unchanged (faithful extraction — its existing overpayment test still passes, the equivalence anchor). v1 returns MATCH_AMOUNT_EXCEEDS_REMAINING; commit returns the same registry message at 400. - Removes 7 hand-rolled Math.round(x*100)/100 sites; antipattern guard ratchets 668 -> 661. - Unit tests for the helper (overpayment rejection, half-öre tolerance, remaining_amount fallback). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * review: run overpayment guard before the storno (PR #647) greptile: in commit.ts and the v1 route the conflicting-JE storno ran BEFORE the new guard, so a rejected overpayment would still reverse the transaction's prior JE and null its journal_entry_id — a side effect on a rejected match. Move planInvoicePayment above the storno so a rejection leaves the transaction fully untouched. (The dashboard route's pre-existing storno-before-guard ordering is FX-entangled and unchanged here; noted as a follow-up.) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c74b19df1b |
Accounted rebrand + swarm-skill cleanup + bank-reconciliation fixes (#643)
* feat(reconciliation): close the bank-feed loop on voucher links and re-tag mis-typed opening balances
Two related fixes to bank reconciliation correctness:
1. Auto-reconcile on voucher link. Linking an invoice or supplier invoice to
an existing voucher previously advanced only the invoice — the bank
transaction that paid it kept sitting in the Transactions inbox with a null
journal_entry_id. linkInvoiceToVoucher / linkSupplierInvoiceToVoucher now
call autoReconcileTransactionForLinkedVoucher (lib/reconciliation), which
links the bank transaction to the same verifikat when exactly one unbooked
line matches it. Best-effort and post-commit: a failure here never fails the
link. The result surfaces reconciledTransactionId; the inbox row leaves the
list and the UI shows link_success_tx_reconciled.
2. Re-tag mis-typed opening balances. getReconciliationStatus and the GL-line
matching RPCs identify a cash account's ingående balans solely by
journal_entries.source_type='opening_balance'. Companies migrated from other
systems often booked the bank IB as an ordinary voucher (source_type
'import' or 'manual'), so it was never excluded and surfaced as a phantom
reconciliation difference equal to the opening balance. Adds:
- migration mark_entry_as_opening_balance: a GUC-gated carve-out in the
immutability trigger plus a SECURITY DEFINER RPC that validates the entry
(balance-sheet lines only, dated on a fiscal-period boundary), flips the
source_type, and writes an audit row — no blanket data sweep.
- POST /api/reconciliation/bank/mark-opening-balance + MarkOpeningBalanceSchema.
- BankReconciliationView action to trigger it from the IB diff.
The gnubok_create_voucher executor now accepts a typed is_opening_balance flag
and derives source_type='opening_balance' only after validating class 1/2 lines
on the period start, so new IBs land correctly typed.
Covered by lib/reconciliation auto-reconcile tests, voucher-executors tests,
and a mark-entry-as-opening-balance pg-real test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: rebrand gnubok → Accounted and prune swarm agent skills
Product rebrand and skills housekeeping. No runtime behaviour change.
Rebrand: replace user-visible "gnubok" with "Accounted" across docs, READMEs,
in-code comments, doc-site content, MCP skill/resource prose, and the
gnubok-mcp package description. The MCP resource URI scheme is moved gnubok://
→ Accounted:// consistently across resource registrations, the event-type
comment, and the resource/skill tests. Deliberately preserved as stable
identifiers (NOT rebranded): the gnubok-company-id cookie, gnubok_sk_ / gnubok_inv_
token prefixes, the gnubok-mcp npm bridge name, and the AGI <gem:Programnamn>
value (kept 'gnubok' per its source comment — it is the software identifier sent
to Skatteverket and must not churn across visual rebrands).
Skills: remove the 27 swarm-* agent SKILL.md atoms (no longer used; already
absent from the agent_atom_registry in prod), refresh the remaining skill docs,
add the .claude/rules/ path-scoped rule set, and regenerate the
seed_agent_atom_bodies migration + .skill-body-manifest.json via
`npm run skills:generate` so the DB-backed skill bodies match the trimmed set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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331ae11867 |
fix(transactions): stop Enable Banking re-sync from re-importing duplicates (#630)
* fix(transactions): make content-dedup bridge resilient to PSD2 description drift
Enable Banking re-syncs were re-importing every overlapping transaction as a
duplicate. Two changes in the June 1 deploy combined to defeat both dedup layers
at once: the external_id format changed (old rows' stored ids no longer match the
new scheme, so the exact-match layer misses) AND PSD2 descriptions were enriched
("TIC" -> "TIC BG 0000005786439 Bg-bet. via internet"), so the content-dedup
bridge — which compared a fixed 24-char description prefix for equality — also
missed. Result: a full re-import (observed: 53 of 54 "new" rows were dupes).
The external_id format has changed several times historically and 7,120 of 9,393
old rows have no reconstructable canonical id, so a backfill is not viable; the
content bridge is the mechanism meant to survive id-scheme changes. Harden it:
- Split the bridge into bucketing (date, öre) and matching (description), and
match by prefix-containment instead of fixed-prefix equality. PSD2 enrichment
is prefix-preserving, so the enriched re-import bridges its stored original,
while genuinely-distinct same-(date,amount) rows (distinct descriptions) are
kept apart. Consumed with counting semantics + longest-match, so N stored twins
dedup exactly N incoming.
- Replace contentDedupKey with contentBucketKey + descriptionsBridge; update the
live pipeline (ingest.ts) and the v1 dry-run preview to the same logic.
- Freeze the external_id format with a regression test + a header warning: any
future format change must ship a coordinated backfill.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test/refactor: address PR review — sanitize fixtures, mirror preview counting
- Replace real customer names ("Carl Bennet AB", "Brorsan AB") and prod-derived
reference strings in tests with clearly fictional stand-ins (compliance A.8.33).
- v1 dry-run preview: use the same longest-match + counting/consume semantics as
the live pipeline so a batch of N copies against M booked twins previews M skips,
not N (greptile P2). Update stale pitfall docs: content dedup is now
date+amount+description (prefix-containment), and the preview is booked-only so
its skip count is a lower bound on the live skip count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(transactions): scope content-dedup bridge by cash account
The content-dedup bridge buckets by (date, öre) company-wide, with no account
scope — while bank reconciliation IS account-scoped (cash_account_id). For a
company with multiple bank accounts, a transaction on account A could therefore
deduplicate a genuinely-different transaction on account B that shares the same
date, amount, and a prefix-bridging description (round-number fees/transfers are
the realistic trigger), dropping a real row before it reaches reconciliation.
Layer 1 (external_id) is already account-safe because the account IBAN is
embedded in the id; only the fuzzy content bridge was account-blind.
Add an account guard: store cash_account_id alongside each bucket entry and only
bridge when BOTH the incoming batch and the stored entry have a known
cash_account_id that matches. A null on either side falls back to bridge-allowed,
so single-account companies and legacy (un-backfilled) rows are unchanged — and
CSV-vs-PSD2 dedup for the same account still works. Affects the 11 multi-account
companies; everyone else is behaviourally identical.
Note: external_id format heterogeneity (old entry_reference / old date+amount /
new öre+index schemes) is harmless downstream — nothing parses the id; it is an
opaque exact-match dedup key and a display string. Reconciliation, invoice/
supplier/payment matching, and reporting all key off real transaction columns,
never external_id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* harden(transactions): blank description never wildcards a described row
PR review (OWASP V8.2.1 + Swedish compliance) flagged that descriptionsBridge
returned true whenever either side was empty, so a blank stored/incoming title
could wildcard-match any same-(date,öre) transaction and silently consume a real
one. Every live caller normalizes blanks to FALLBACK_DESCRIPTION upstream, so the
branch was unreachable in production — but make the function safe in isolation:
a blank now bridges only another blank (date+öre identity), never a described row.
No live behaviour change; removes the footgun.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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f6ee0c2a82 |
Bug/customer invoice bug (#628)
* fix(supplier-invoices): self-assess reverse-charge VAT + link payments to vouchers Reverse-charge supplier invoices now carry a per-item reverse_charge_rate (0.06/0.12/0.25). Under omvänd skattskyldighet the supplier charges 0% VAT, so the line vat_rate stays 0 and the buyer self-assesses fiktiv moms at the statutory rate. Centralizes rate resolution (resolveReverseChargeRate) and the ruta 20-24 basis-account guard (isReverseChargeBasisAccount) in vat-entries so the booking engine and review-dialog preview can no longer drift. Adds the link_supplier_invoice_voucher pending operation: mark a leverantorsfaktura paid by linking an existing posted verifikat that debits 2440, with no new journal entry. Exposes find-candidates/link MCP tools and the bulk-reconcile helper, scoped under suppliers:read/write. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(vat): report yearly VAT over the rakenskapsar, not the calendar year Annual VAT (helarsmoms) is filed per beskattningsar/rakenskapsar (SFL 26 kap), which can be extended or shortened up to 18 months. The previous Jan-Dec calendar span silently dropped part of an extended first year. calculateVatDeclaration now accepts a fiscalPeriodId and resolves the period's actual bounds for yearly; monthly/quarterly stay calendar. The reports UI passes the selected fiscal period, defaults the periodicity from the company's moms_period setting, and carries the period into the ruta drill-down. full-archive export threads the period id through too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migration): resolve supplier invoice status from payment amounts The provider's lifecycle status and its payment status are computed independently upstream and can contradict each other (e.g. a Fortnox invoice marked booked but fully paid). Both the arcim entity-mapper and the Fortnox mapper now let payment state win: fully paid -> paid, partial -> partially_paid, otherwise the mapped lifecycle status, with credit notes forced terminal. Balance is compared numerically (never strict === 0) so float drift or a residual ore resolves cleanly, and an absent Balance is treated as unpaid. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(enable-banking): only ingest booked transactions to stop re-import drift Pending entries are skipped during sync: a pending row is unstable across syncs (a later 'synka nu' returns it still pending or finally booked, often with a different effective date). Because both the dedup external_id and the content-dedup key are date-derived, that drift minted a new id and re-imported a transaction that already existed - observed in production as the same amount+description landing twice with different dates. Gating the import set on a stable booking_date removes the drift at the source and leaves booked rows' ids byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(gitignore): ignore local SIE test fixtures tests/fixtures/sie/ may contain real or scrubbed company data and must never be committed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoice): handle errors during registration journal entry creation and ensure invoice rollback feat(tests): add test for reverse charge rate handling on supplier invoice line items feat(fortnox): ensure paid status reflects zero balance for fully paid invoices chore(migrations): add reverse_charge_rate to supplier_invoice_items and backfill link_supplier_invoice_voucher --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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094bd85e81 |
fix(reconciliation): secondary-account scoping, dialog clipping, and N:1 matching (#624)
* fix(reconciliation): secondary-account scoping, dialog clipping, and N:1 matching Three follow-ups to per-account bank reconciliation (PR #623): - Secondary same-currency accounts (e.g. a 1931 savings account) double-counted the company's unassigned (NULL cash_account_id) transactions, inflating their bank total and showing a large bogus difference while 1930 still reconciled. Only the primary cash account now claims NULL rows; every other account scopes strictly to its own id. `includeUnassigned` is threaded through all status/run/list call sites from cash_accounts.is_primary. - The "Matcha mot befintlig verifikation" picker's dropdown was absolutely positioned inside the dialog's overflow-y-auto container and got clipped. Add an `inline` mode that renders the candidate list in normal flow; the dialog uses it, the reconciliation view keeps the compact overlay. - N:1 matching: several bank transactions can now settle one verifikat (a salary run paid in multiple transfers, an invoice paid in instalments). New get_account_gl_lines_for_matching RPC surfaces already-matched vouchers with a linked_transaction_count behind a "Visa även matchade verifikationer" toggle; manualLink's 1:1 guard is relaxed (the aggregate difference still catches mis-links). Tests: extended bank-reconciliation unit tests (strict scope + N:1), rewrote the cash_account_id isolation pg test to prove NULL rows land on the primary account only, and added a pg test for the new RPC. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(reconciliation): address PR review — accurate "att matcha mot" count - BankReconciliationView: the "N verifikationer att matcha mot" hint counted glLines (which includes already-matched vouchers when "Visa matchade" is on), overcounting the vouchers that still need a transaction. Use unmatchedGlLines so the label is correct regardless of the toggle (matches the table below). - MatchVerifikationPicker: document that `open` is overlay-only; the setOpen() writes are intentional no-ops in inline mode. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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953980c875 |
Per-account bank reconciliation + overdue/inbox/privacy fixes (#619)
* feat(reconciliation): scope bank reconciliation per cash account via transactions.cash_account_id A company with two same-currency cash accounts (e.g. checking 1930 + a savings account) saw every SEK transaction on every account, and the status card summed across both — reconciliation filtered transactions by CURRENCY while filtering GL lines by ACCOUNT (issue #604). Bind each bank transaction to the cash_accounts row it settled on: - New nullable transactions.cash_account_id FK (ON DELETE SET NULL — a bank transaction is räkenskapsinformation, BFL 7 kap, and must survive cash-account deletion) + a best-effort 4-pass backfill. - All reconciliation/transaction queries scope to the selected account with a NULL->currency fallback, so legacy/un-backfilled rows never disappear mid-backfill. - ingestTransactions stamps cash_account_id from the batch's settlementAccount; categorize + manualLink resolve and use it. - Bank leg now books to the transaction's actual settlement account via applySettlementAccount (no-op for 1930), so interest/fees on a savings/EUR account reconcile instead of mis-booking to 1930. - manualLink cross-checks the transaction's account and requires a voucher line on the selected account (no silent cross-account links). - BankReconciliationView: quick-book menu for any settlement account, in-flight request abort on account/date switch, 500-row truncation notice, per-account state reset. - pg-real coverage for the FK, all backfill passes, account-scoped query isolation, and cross-company isolation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(supplier-invoices): stop marking paid invoices and credit notes as overdue update_overdue_supplier_invoices() (the daily pg_cron job) flipped every past-due 'registered'/'approved' row to 'overdue' without looking at the outstanding balance. Credit notes — created 'registered', remaining 0, due today — got flipped the next day, surfacing as "Förfallen" with "kvar att betala 0 kr"; so did any fully-paid invoice left in 'registered'/'approved'. Guard the cron on remaining_amount > 0.005 (the "fully paid" threshold used by the payment/match paths) and is_credit_note = false, and backfill the rows already mis-flagged (credit notes -> 'registered', paid -> 'paid' with paid_at stamped only when missing). pg-real coverage for the guarded function and the one-off backfill. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoice-inbox): refresh dokumentinkorg on realtime row changes The InvoiceInboxWorkspace only refetched on mount and on explicit in-component actions. When an inbox item was resolved out of band — the in-app agent sheet committing a staged create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox / book-direct op, the /pending page approving one, or another tab booking it — none of those paths called fetchItems(), so the booked underlag stayed in "Att göra" until a manual reload (issue #600). Add invoice_inbox_items to the supabase_realtime publication (mirrors the /pending fix in 20260520120100) and subscribe in the workspace, refetching the whole list on any change so derived status/counts/ordering stay authoritative. RLS scopes the channel to the user's company. fetchItems now preserves optimistic upload placeholders so a refetch firing mid-upload can't drop an in-flight row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(privacy): disclose EU AI inference via Amazon Bedrock (eu-north-1) Update the privacy policy and DPA to state that AI inference, when AI features are enabled, runs inside the EU via Amazon Bedrock (eu-north-1, Stockholm) using Anthropic's Claude models — no transfer to a third country, prompts not retained after the call or used for model training. Add AWS as a subprocessor row and refresh the "last updated" dates. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migrations): rename invoice_inbox_realtime to avoid version collision main's #617 shipped 20260605120000_transactions_original_description.sql — the same version this branch used for the inbox-realtime publication. The Supabase migration tracker keys on the numeric version, not the filename, so the preview branch failed with a duplicate-key error on supabase_migrations.schema_migrations (version 20260605120000 already exists). Rename to the unique version 20260605120500; the body (ALTER PUBLICATION) is order-independent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(reconciliation): align run guard with status; harden filter interpolation Addresses PR review (greptile + compliance swarm): - The v1 and core bank/run routes rejected an unknown account uniformly, including the default '1930', while the status routes were lenient for '1930'. A company reconciling its primary SEK account without a cash_accounts row got 200 from status but 400 from run. Make run match status: '1930' falls back to currency-only scoping (cashAccountId undefined); non-default unknown accounts are still rejected. Adds a test. - /api/transactions accepts a user-supplied `currency` query param that was interpolated raw into a PostgREST .or() filter. Reject anything that isn't a 3-letter ISO code — RLS already scopes to the company, but an unsanitized value could otherwise malform/widen the filter. Assert currency/cashAccountId shape in scopeTransactionsToAccount as well. - categorize: log (instead of silently swallowing) a cash_accounts settlement-account lookup error, so a fall-back-to-1930 mis-booking is observable in the audit log. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migrations): correct backfill UPDATE..FROM join; idempotent realtime publication Two SQL errors that only surface on real Postgres (CI pg-real + Supabase preview) — the unit suite mocks Supabase, so neither was caught locally. - Backfill pass (a): `UPDATE transactions t ... FROM journal_entry_lines jel JOIN cash_accounts ca ON ca.company_id = t.company_id` referenced the UPDATE target `t` inside the FROM join's ON clause, which Postgres rejects ("invalid reference to FROM-clause entry for table t"). Move the company match to WHERE; the JOIN now relates jel<->ca only. Semantics unchanged. - invoice_inbox_realtime: `ALTER PUBLICATION ... ADD TABLE` is not idempotent (SQLSTATE 42710 if the table is already a member). The earlier version-collision push partially applied it on the Supabase preview branch, so the re-apply errored. Guard with a pg_publication_tables existence check. Both statements validated against a real Postgres: the single-line tx binds, the two-bank-line transfer stays NULL, and the publication add runs twice cleanly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migrations): backfill pass (c) uses array_agg, not min(uuid) Postgres has no min() aggregate for uuid, so pass (c)'s min(id) raised "function min(uuid) does not exist" on apply (CI pg-real + Supabase). The HAVING count(*) = 1 already guarantees one row per group, so (array_agg(id))[1] returns that single id. Validated the full backfill (all four passes) and the overdue migration against a real Postgres: every pass binds / falls through as intended, and the overdue guard + backfill produce the right statuses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(compliance): add RoPA entry for Amazon Bedrock AI inference (GDPR Art.30) The privacy policy now discloses AI inference (transaction categorization + document/receipt OCR) via Amazon Bedrock as a processing activity, but .compliance/ropa.yaml had no matching Art.30 record. Add it: opt-in consent basis, EU-region (eu-north-1) inference with no third-country transfer, prompts not retained or used for model training. Mirrors the privacy-page disclosure shipped in this PR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c6c86cded4 |
Mcp/template data feedback (#617)
* fix(booking-templates): scope template list to the active company GET /api/settings/booking-templates relied solely on the btl_select RLS policy, which is membership-wide (user_company_ids) and returns templates from every company the user belongs to. A user who owns multiple companies saw all their templates merged regardless of which company was active. Narrow the list in the API layer (mirroring counterparty-templates) to system + the active company + the active company's team. RLS stays the security backstop; this fixes the cross-company merge within a single user's own view (it was never a cross-tenant data leak). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(import): show proper message for duplicate bank file upload The bank file import page mis-parsed the structured error envelope ({ error: { code, message, details } }), so a BANK_FILE_DUPLICATE (409) fell through to the generic "Kunde inte läsa filen" fallback. The upload step also hardcoded that same string as the error heading, so duplicates were doubly misreported as parse failures. - Parse the structured envelope by error.code; surface error.message for all codes instead of rendering the error object. - Add a dedicated BANK_FILE_DUPLICATE message using the importedAt / importedCount details the route already returns. - Add an optional errorTitle prop to BankFileUploadStep (defaults to the previous text) and pass "Filen är redan importerad" for dupes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(tests): add comprehensive tests for recordateEntry, inbox-linking, and external-id handling - Implemented unit tests for recordateEntry in the bookkeeping module to validate various scenarios including date changes, non-posted entries, and fiscal period restrictions. - Created tests for inbox-linking status in pending operations to ensure correct handling of invoice inbox items and supplier invoices, addressing historical bugs related to status updates. - Added tests for external-id utilities to ensure consistent handling of monetary amounts and deduplication keys across different transaction sources. - Introduced new functions in external-id.ts for stable external ID generation and normalization of imported descriptions, enhancing transaction deduplication reliability. feat(migrations): add new database migrations for transaction handling - Created migration to exclude storno and correction vouchers from unmatched GL lines, ensuring accurate reconciliation. - Added a migration to preserve original bank transaction descriptions in a new immutable column, allowing for user edits while maintaining audit trails and deduplication integrity. * feat(migrations): add function to exclude storno/correction vouchers from unmatched GL lines * feat(transactions): enhance transaction handling with improved description normalization and preloaded original entries --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ea1bf01f1e |
Fix/m sprint fixes (#613)
* fix(dashboard): exclude ignored and already-triaged transactions from stale count The "Gamla transaktioner" widget counted transactions that had been ignored or already marked as is_business=true but not yet booked, so users saw a nag for a row they had already dealt with — and the /transactions inbox correctly hid it. Align the count with the inbox criterion (is_business IS NULL, is_ignored = false) so the widget clears when the row leaves the inbox. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(transactions): read entity_type from settings response wrapper The transactions page read entityRes.entity_type directly, but /api/settings returns { data: { entity_type, ... } }. The expression was always undefined, so setEntityType never fired and entityType stayed at its initial 'enskild_firma'. The template picker's entity_type filter then dropped every aktiebolag-tagged user template for AB customers — only entity_type='all' templates made it through. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * stale templates bank sync journal entry from transaction * fixed pr comments * fixed pr comment --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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20989379bb |
feat(sandbox,branding): prod-parity demo with AI gating + accounted rebrand (#585)
* feat(sandbox,branding): prod-parity demo with AI gating + accounted rebrand Sandbox now ships with seeded suppliers, supplier invoices, an asset, a verified agent_profile, and pending operations so the demo company exercises every prod surface. Server-side `guardSandbox()` short- circuits any AI or paid-external API call (Bedrock chat/composer, Resend invoice send, Riksbanken FX, VIES, etc.) and the AgentSheet swaps in a SandboxAgentPreview that explains what's gated and offers a register CTA. DashboardContent no longer mounts the NewUserChecklist when the agent is already built, fixing the path that let sandbox users still trigger /onboarding/agent. Visible branding flips from Gnubok to Accounted: new BrandWordmark component (Hedvig Letters Serif 700), new app/icon.png + PWA icons generated from the accounted icon, default appName updated. URLs, header names, API key prefixes, hostnames, and event/cookie/ localStorage keys keep `gnubok` — the rebrand is visual only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): hardcode supplier-invoice arrival numbers in seed get_next_arrival_number is MAX(arrival_number) + 1 against the same table we're about to insert into. Calling it twice before either row lands made both calls return 1, which then violated the (company_id, arrival_number) unique index — POST /api/sandbox/seed 500'd on first sandbox start. The seeded company is brand new in this branch so 1 and 2 are guaranteed unused; hardcoding side-steps the race entirely. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): set paid_amount=0 on unpaid supplier invoice PostgREST normalizes the column set across rows in a bulk insert, so the second supplier invoice (Espresso House, status=registered) was being sent with paid_amount=null because the first row (Telia, paid) set it. supplier_invoices.paid_amount is NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; the default only kicks in when the column is *absent* from the payload, not when it's explicitly null. Set it inline to side-step the normalization. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): set actor_type=agent_chat on seeded pending_operations pending_operations only allows user-scoped INSERTs via the `pending_operations_chat_insert` policy, which requires actor_type='agent_chat' alongside auth.uid()=user_id + company membership. The seed was inserting with the default actor_type='user', tripping the RLS check. Also lift risk_level from preview_data (where it was unused) onto the row itself, matching the column added in 20260430120000_pending_operations_actor_and_risk. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(pr-review): address PR #585 review feedback Fixes called out by the core-only CI check, Greptile, and the compliance + Swedish-accounting bots: - AGI Programnamn pinned back to 'gnubok' (CI blocker). The XML Skatteverket receives must keep the stable software identifier regardless of the visual rebrand — same rule as the v1 health endpoint's `service: 'gnubok'` literal. - handleCreateAccount in SandboxAgentPreview + ChatEmptyState now wraps signOut() in try/catch so a transient Supabase failure doesn't strand the user on a dead button (greptile P2 × 2). - /api/currency/rate hard-fails on missing companyId instead of conditionally skipping the sandbox guard (greptile P2 / compliance V8.2.1). - topUpSandboxAdditions now delegates to ensureSandboxAgentProfile; the assistant persona lives in exactly one place across the seed, layout backfills, and top-up path (greptile P2 outside-diff / compliance SOC2 CC6.1). - ensureSandboxAgentProfile drops the userId param and sets verified_by_user_id to NULL — synthetic seed data should not attribute verification to a real user (compliance V8.2.1 / GDPR Art. 25(2)). Errors now logged via the structured logger instead of being silently swallowed (V16). - Sandbox seed swaps real-world company names (Telia, Espresso House) for clearly-synthetic Demo-prefixed brands using the 5559... documentation org-number range (compliance A.8.33). Asset cost bumped 24 000 → 35 000 SEK so the demo clears the förbrukningsinventarier threshold and illustrates capitalization unambiguously (swedish-asset-accounting). - Representation pending-operation preview corrected: VAT label fixed from 6% → 12%, and input VAT split between the avdragsgill (2641) and ej-avdragsgill (5811) portions to match swedish-vat / ML 8 kap rules (swedish-vat). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(pr-review): seed preview consistency + AGI Programnamn constant Two last review-bot items before merge: - Sandbox seed: the representation pending-operation preview was splitting the 240 SEK café meal 60/180 between 5810 and 5811, which is wrong for a single attendee under the 300 SEK / person avdragsgill cap (ML 8 kap) — the entire amount is fully avdragsgill in that case. Collapse the preview to a single 5810 + 2641 + 2440 entry so it matches the supplier_invoice_items row 1:1 and stops teaching demo users an incorrect bookkeeping pattern. - Hoist the AGI Programnamn 'gnubok' literal into a named constant with a comment pointing to potential future Skatteverket vendor registration (per the swedish-compliance bot's nit). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): avoid BFL duplicate-verification on pending op + fix VAT cap comment Swedish-compliance bot caught two final nits: - The pending operation for the Demokafé representation was using the same supplier_invoice_number as the already-seeded supplier_invoices row (88245). If the sandbox user approved the staged operation, the insert would have created (or attempted) a duplicate verification — BFL 5 kap. requires each affärshändelse be recorded exactly once. Swap the staged operation's invoice number to a distinct value (INKOMMANDE-2026-001) so approval cleanly creates a new row. - The preview comment described the 300 SEK threshold as an "avdragsgill cap". The actual rule (ML 8 kap. 9 §) caps the deductible VAT at 25 % × 300 SEK × antal_personer = 75 SEK per person — the 300 SEK is the tax base, not the total. Math here is correct either way, but the comment now states the correct formula so future seed edits don't propagate the wrong understanding. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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32d9978f1b |
Fix/chrome pdf preview csp (#572)
* feat: add option to exclude year-end closing entries in SIE export and related reports * delete docs * fix: allow Chrome's PDF viewer in verifikat document preview The /api/documents/:id/inline route shipped with `object-src 'none'` in its CSP, which blocked Chrome's built-in PDF viewer (it renders inline PDFs via an internal <embed>). Users on Chrome saw "Det här innehållet har blockerats" when expanding a PDF attachment in the bookkeeping view; Firefox (PDF.js) and Edge (own viewer) were unaffected, and JPGs worked because <img> isn't subject to object-src. Drops the CSP for this route to the minimum needed for embeddability: `frame-ancestors 'self'`. X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff plus the fixed Content-Type from the handler already block MIME confusion; X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN + frame-ancestors still block clickjacking. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): add webmail deep link to email confirmation screens Mirrors Stripe's signup UX: after asking the user to verify their email, detect their webmail provider from the domain and show a button that opens the inbox in a new tab. Gmail gets a from:<sender> search pre-populated; Outlook/Yahoo/iCloud/Proton open the inbox directly. Unknown / custom domains fall back to the existing copy. Sender address is configurable via NEXT_PUBLIC_BRANDING_AUTH_EMAIL_FROM (default noreply@gnubok.se) so white-label installs can match their Supabase Auth SMTP config. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): unblock first-time password set for BankID users with MFA Supabase rejects updateUser({password}) and mfa.unenroll with "AAL2 session is required" whenever a TOTP factor is enrolled. BankID magic-link logins produce AAL1, and middleware skips MFA enforcement for bankid_linked users, so they had no path to AAL2 — leaving them unable to set a backup password or disable MFA without going through the email-recovery escape hatch. - /api/account/password: branch on app_metadata.has_password. First-time set writes via service.auth.admin.updateUserById (no existing credential to protect, AAL2 guard does not apply). Change-password keeps the user-session updateUser so AAL2 still fires for credential rotation. - /mfa/verify: accept a safeReturnTo query param and route there after successful verify, so step-up flows can land back where they came from. - SecuritySettings: detect the AAL2 error from both change-password and mfa.unenroll and redirect through /mfa/verify?returnTo=/settings/account instead of toasting a dead-end error. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Add tests and rounding utility for öre precision in bokslut calculations - Implemented `roundOre` function for rounding SEK amounts to two decimal places, ensuring consistent monetary calculations. - Introduced `ORE_TOLERANCE` constant for comparing rounded amounts, facilitating invariant checks in financial entries. - Created comprehensive tests for `roundOre`, covering typical cases, edge cases, and idempotency. - Added year-end invariants tests to verify database-level guarantees for closing entries, ensuring they balance to the öre and reject discrepancies. - Developed end-to-end tests for the dispositions chain, validating the correctness of calculations across various scenarios. * fix: update PDF rendering to remove Swish QR code generation and set default to disable Swish visibility * fix: enhance security by rejecting data URIs in safeReturnTo function tests * fix: improve rounding logic in roundOre function and add customer_type migration * fix: add customer_type column to customers and enforce CHECK constraint --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0087b7be3f | feat: add option to exclude year-end closing entries in SIE export and related reports (#567) | ||
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78c91e00e4 |
feat: add language preference for customers to support invoice locali… (#561)
* feat: add language preference for customers to support invoice localization - Introduced language support for invoices, allowing customers to choose between Swedish and English. - Updated invoice PDF generation to reflect the selected language for titles, labels, and messages. - Enhanced email templates to generate content in the customer's preferred language. - Added migration to include a language column in the customers table with a default value of Swedish. - Updated tests to verify correct language usage in invoice emails and PDFs. * fix: debounce API requests in InvoicePreviewCard and update F-skatt terminology in email templates |
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239261a0be |
Bug/mcp bas lag (#543)
* fix(mcp): update workflow descriptions for transaction categorization and approval processes * feat: implement account validation for transaction categorization to handle inactive accounts * fix(tests): stub findMissingAccountsMock to ensure no missing accounts during batch-categorize tests * fix(errors): ensure deterministic sorting of account numbers in AccountsNotInChartError |
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566ed72984 |
Bug/mcp connection issue (#541)
* feat(api): implement caching and logging in health check endpoint - Added in-memory caching for health check responses to reduce load on Postgres. - Introduced logging for error handling in health check. - Updated response structure to exclude error details from public responses. feat(api): enhance OAuth consent UI and scope handling - Improved consent UI to reflect exact requested scopes and added better user guidance. - Updated scope handling logic to ensure least-privilege access. - Enhanced styling for better user experience and accessibility. chore(docker): improve security and resource management in Docker setup - Updated Docker Compose configuration to enforce read-only file systems and resource limits. - Added health checks and logging options for better observability. - Introduced optional Caddy reverse proxy for TLS termination. fix(migrations): resolve ambiguity in create_company_with_owner function - Dropped orphaned 3-arg overload of create_company_with_owner function. - Recreated canonical 4-arg version with cash account seeding logic. - Ensured proper permissions for function execution in Postgres. * feat: enhance security checks for team membership in company creation * test: add CSP tests for OAuth authorization endpoint * feat: enhance error handling and reporting in bank file import process |
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d27c3dd3dc |
Bug/customer cron job (#516)
* fix(reminder-processor): filter out credited invoices in overdue reminders * feat: implement linking of transactions to journal entries - Added POST endpoint for linking a bank transaction to an existing journal entry without creating new bookkeeping. - Implemented validation for required fields and error handling for various scenarios (e.g., missing journal_entry_id, transaction already linked, journal entry not found). - Created tests for the new endpoint to cover various cases including successful linking, error responses, and invoice handling. - Introduced duplicate payment detection logic to prevent double-booking of bank receipts. - Added a new component for correction affordance in the UI to facilitate user corrections on journal entries. * feat(invoice-matching): enhance force matching with expected journal entry validation |
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b46b572ee9 |
fix(invoices): duplicate-payment guard on customer mark-paid + categorize (#502)
* fix(invoices): duplicate-payment guard on customer mark-paid + categorize
Two-pronged fix preventing duplicate verifikationer when a customer
invoice is marked paid OR a 19xx→1510 categorization is applied to an
inbound bank tx that already belongs to an open invoice.
Prong A (mark-paid): before booking, scan unlinked positive business
bank txs from the same customer within ±2% / ±60 days. If candidates
exist, return 409 INVOICE_PAID_LIKELY_DUPLICATE with per-candidate
match_reason (ocr_exact > name_amount_fuzzy > amount_only). Override
via `{ force: true }`. Applied to both legacy /api/invoices/[id]/
mark-paid and v1 /api/v1/.../invoices/[id]/mark-paid; v1 guard runs
before dry-run so previews can't mask the warning.
Prong B (categorize): when the user assigns 1930→1510 directly on a
positive business tx with a matching open customer invoice (by name
OR by OCR-normalized reference), return 409
TX_CATEGORIZE_SUGGEST_CI_MATCH routing them to /match-invoice.
Mirrors the supplier-side guard from #461. Shared helpers
(DUPLICATE_AMOUNT_TOLERANCE_PCT, escapeLikePattern) reused as-is.
New helper normalizeOcrReference() strips non-digits for Swedish OCR
equality. New shared candidate-finder
lib/invoices/duplicate-payment-candidates.ts keeps the legacy and v1
routes calling the same code.
Frontend:
- PaymentBookingDialog intercepts the 409, renders candidate list
with match_reason badges (Exakt OCR-träff / Sannolik träff /
Möjlig träff), offers "Länka transaktion" or "Bokför ändå"
(force-retry generates a fresh Idempotency-Key for v1 callers)
- transactions/page.tsx mirrors siMatchSuggestion handling as
ciMatchSuggestion with a parallel "Matcha mot kundfaktura?" dialog
v1 caveat documented in the route's pitfalls block:
INVOICE_PAID_LIKELY_DUPLICATE force-retry requires a fresh
Idempotency-Key because the original is body-hash bound; reusing it
returns 400 IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSE.
Tests: 5 new mark-paid tests (legacy + v1) covering 409, force
bypass, partial-payment skip, ocr_exact match_reason, multi-candidate
ranking. 1 v1-only test verifying dry-run also surfaces the 409. 2
categorize Prong B tests (409 + confirm_no_match bypass).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(invoices): address compliance-swarm review on duplicate-payment guard
Three review-driven fixes:
1. **PostgREST .or() injection (OWASP V1.2.5).** `escapeLikePattern` neutralises
LIKE wildcards but NOT PostgREST filter-DSL chars (`,`, `.`, `(`, `)`). A
customer name like `Acme,fake.eq.true` could otherwise inject a synthetic
filter clause into the `.or('merchant_name.ilike.%X%,description.ilike.%X%')`
string. Replaced with two parameterised `.ilike()` queries dispatched in
parallel and merged by id in JS. Slight perf cost (two index hits per call),
eliminates the DSL-injection surface entirely.
2. **Date window anchored on invoice_date instead of due_date
(swedish-accounting-compliance bot).** The Prong B categorize intercept
filtered open customer invoices by `invoice_date ± 60d` relative to the
bank-tx date. For invoices with 60–90 day payment terms, the actual
payment lands well after `invoice_date`, so the legitimate match falls
outside the window and the guard silently misses it. Switched to
`due_date ± 60d` — the better proxy for "around when payment is expected."
No corresponding change for Prong A (mark-paid), which is correctly
anchored on `paymentDate` (the user-supplied or default-today date) and
scans bank-tx dates around that anchor.
3. **Force-bypass log enrichment (ISO A.8.15, OWASP V16).** Both
`duplicate-payment guard bypassed` warn entries now include `userId` and
`paymentAmount`. Attribution was previously incomplete — the bypass log
carried only `invoiceId`, which forced a join in log aggregation to
identify the acting principal.
Tests updated for the two-query pattern (legacy mark-paid suite enqueues
two transactions-table responses per guard invocation; v1 tests already
worked with the single-entry-per-table mock semantics).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(docs): redirect /docs/api and /llms-full.txt to docs.gnubok.se
Canonical docs host is now docs.gnubok.se. Every `docs_url` field on the
v1 error envelope still points at /docs/api/* on this app; the 308
permanent redirect forwards humans and agent crawlers to the docs
subdomain without us needing to mass-update structured-errors.ts.
/llms-full.txt also routes through the docs host where it's served from
the docs site's own build.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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b94ed3bec2 |
feat(api): cookbooks + webhook audit_log + secret rotation (PR-500 carry-overs) (#501)
* docs(api): ship 4 cookbook recipes (close docs polish backlog) Promotes the four placeholder cookbook entries to full narrative recipes matching the Stripe-grade quality bar set by quickstart + webhooks. Closes the docs follow-up bucket from the PR-500 description's deferred list. Recipes: - ingest-bank-transactions: bank-file upload (CSV / CAMT.053 auto-detect) → async poll → list uncategorised → suggest-categories → categorize (single + batch) → match-invoice / match-supplier-invoice. Multicurrency notes covering Riksbanken FX lookup and the kontantmetoden partial- payment guard. - file-vat-declaration: GET /reports/vat-declaration → rutor 05–62 walkthrough → GL reconciliation block → 2026-04-01 livsmedel 12% → 6% transition explicitly covered (delivery_date supply-date rule) → voucher- gap pre-flight → period lock workflow → manual Skatteverket Mina Sidor submission with confirmation-reference capture → EU / reverse-charge / import handling. - run-payroll-and-agi: draft → calculate → approve → mark-paid → book → generate-agi state machine. Per-step idempotency, strict-mode book failure semantics, förmånsbeskattning + bilförmån + bruttolöneavdrag vs nettolöneavdrag ordering. AGI XML download for manual Mina Sidor upload (direct API submission requires BankID via the Skatteverket extension, not the public REST surface). - year-end-closing: IB/UB continuity check per BFL 5 kap → voucher-gap pre-flight → missing-documents pre-flight → lock (reversible) → year- end async operation (resultatdisposition + periodiseringsfond + överavskrivningar + bolagsskatt + opening-balance batch) → close (irreversible per BFL 5 kap 8 §, typed-phrase confirmation) → årsredovisning + INK2/NE generation. Brutet räkenskapsår variant documented. Each cookbook follows the same shape as the existing quickstart and webhooks recipes — concrete curl commands, response samples, common pitfalls, next-steps cross-links. Lengths are deliberately uneven: the year-end recipe is longest because the consequences of getting it wrong are most severe (BFL violations, irreversible close). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(api): V16 audit_log entries for webhook lifecycle + secret rotation endpoint Two intertwined changes that together close the "real audit attribution gap in actively-used routes" item from the PR description. 1. POST /api/v1/companies/{companyId}/webhooks/{id}/rotate-secret New endpoint that issues a fresh HMAC signing secret and invalidates the previous one immediately. Returns the new secret EXACTLY ONCE in the response, mirroring the create-time contract. Required scope: webhooks:manage. Idempotency-Key mandatory. Rotation is instant — no grace period. Documented workflow: stage the new secret on the receiver side (separate config slot, not yet active) → POST /rotate-secret → activate the new secret on the receiver → POST /webhooks/{id}/test to verify. A "previous_secret" column with TTL-based grace window (Stripe-style) is the natural follow-up; the instant-rotation shape ships first because it closes the "secret leaked, need to rotate now" use case with minimum new surface. The route is wired into load-routes.ts and lib/auth/scopes.ts. Spec snapshot updated. 2. V16 audit_log entries on every webhook lifecycle mutation The audit_log column shape (user_id, company_id, action, table_name, record_id, actor_id, old_state, new_state, description) is exactly what V16 / Art.32(1)(b) / A.8.24 audit-trail requirements call for. Wired entries on: - POST /webhooks (create) — action INSERT, new_state captures the row WITHOUT the secret (signing material must not land in the audit trail; only secret-event metadata). - PATCH /webhooks/:id (update) — action UPDATE, before/after pair so reviewers can reconstruct exactly what changed. - DELETE /webhooks/:id (delete) — action DELETE, old_state snapshot so the row's prior state survives the delete. - POST /webhooks/:id/rotate-secret — action SECURITY_EVENT, new_state carries the event marker only (no secret value). - dispatcher.disableWebhook (auto-disable on HTTP 410 / redirect / url_unsafe) — action SECURITY_EVENT, before/after capturing the disable cause for SIEM correlation. actor_id is set to ctx.apiKeyId on caller-driven entries so the audit row points back to the specific API key that triggered the change (PR-500 round-1 CC6.3 finding: actor attribution via created_by_api_key_id alone leaves a gap if a key is deleted — keeping the actor_id in audit_log closes that). 4 new integration tests cover the rotate-secret happy path, 404, 401 unauthorized, and Idempotency-Key required. The existing webhook integration tests continue to pass because the audit_log inserts fall through to the default mock response (no-op) without disturbing the per-table queues. 39 integration tests pass on the webhook surface (+4 vs round-2). Total: 3588 unit tests passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): address PR-501 review round 1 — correctness + Swedish compliance Round 1 of review fixes. Two real correctness bugs Greptile caught, two audit-trail gaps, and four Swedish-compliance errors in the cookbook prose. Compliance Swarm has 17 findings (0 blocking); the 4 architectural items (secret-at-rest encryption, dedicated rotate scope, rate-limit on rotation, URL redaction) remain deferred with rationale. Greptile (3 / 3 — all addressed): 1. rotate-secret silent 0-row UPDATE — fixed by adding `.select('id').maybeSingle()` to the UPDATE and returning NOT_FOUND when no row was touched. Closes the TOCTOU window between the existence check and the secret update; a concurrent DELETE no longer hands the caller a freshly-generated secret that no webhook in the database matches. 2. DELETE handler audit_log silently skipped when prior snapshot is null — fixed by writing the audit row UNCONDITIONALLY with `old_state: prior ?? null` and a degraded description when the snapshot is unavailable. A successful DELETE now always produces exactly one audit row (CC6.3 attribution contract). 3. Typo "bookslut" → "bokslut" in year-end-closing.ts. Compliance Swarm code-quality items addressed: 4. PATCH new_state now derived from the DB-confirmed returned `data` with an explicit field allowlist, not from the request-body-derived `update` object (A.8.11 / V16.1.1). Closes the gap where a future trigger that rejects a field would leave the audit trail out of sync with the actual stored state. 5. All four route-side audit_log inserts (create, update, delete, rotate-secret) now capture the insert error and emit a structured warning via ctx.log; mirrors the dispatcher pattern (CC7.2). 6. Dispatcher null-user_id path now emits a structured warning instead of silently skipping the audit_log entry — SIEM can alert on the gap (CC7.2 / V16.1.1 / A.8.15). Swedish compliance (cookbook content fixes — all real errors): 7. VAT cookbook ruta 06 label corrected: "Övrig försäljning (ej skattepliktig)" → "Momspliktig försäljning som inte ingår i ruta 05" (Skatteverket's verbatim label). The old label conflated exempt vs zero-rated supplies and would cause integrators to omit export / EU zero-rated sales from box 06. 8. Livsmedel rate-change framing rewritten: leads with the supply-date rule (ML 1 kap 3 §) as the decisive date, not invoice_date. The old opening sentence ("invoices created with invoice_date >= 2026-04-01 book to 2631") was wrong on its face — a copy-paste reader would mis-book pre-cutover deliveries invoiced in April at the new 6% rate. 9. Reverse-charge EU 2645 note adds the blandad-verksamhet caveat: "Net zero impact on cash flow" only holds when full avdragsrätt applies; partial avdragsrätt requires proportional restriction per HFD 2023 ref. 45. 10. Payroll cookbook age bounds corrected: "under-25 / over-66" → "18-22 years old (born 2003-2007) / 67+ from 2026", per Prop. 2025/26:66. The old bounds would cause integrators to apply the reduced rate (20.81%) to 23-24-year-olds who must pay 31.42%, producing non-compliant AGI files. 11. Payroll cookbook BAS 2615 corrected to 2731 (Avräkning sociala avgifter). 2615 is "Utgående moms vid import" in BAS 2026 — using it for the payroll liability would misclassify a payroll payable as an import-VAT payable and break moms reconciliation. 12. Year-end cookbook periodiseringsfond cap base corrected: IL 30 kap 5 § cap is on taxable profit BEFORE the periodiseringsfond deduction itself (and after schablonintäkt is added back). Note on materiellt samband (BFNAR 2016:10 kap 13) added — the reservation is BOOKED on 2110-2139, not declaration-only. Deferred to follow-ups (architectural / out of scope for round 1): - Secret-at-rest encryption (CC6.1 / Art.5(1)(f)): PR-1 architectural carryover, applies to existing webhooks.secret column too. - Dedicated `webhooks:rotate` scope (CC6.3 informational): introduces friction without closing a real gap when the only caller-driven action gated by `webhooks:manage` is the rotation itself. - Per-route rate-limit on :rotate-secret (Art.32 abuse case): part of the wider per-route rate-limit pass already on the deferred list. - webhook_url redaction in audit_log (Art.5(1)(c)): URLs are admin- supplied configuration values with no expected sensitive params; truncation would degrade audit value for legitimate review. 23 webhook integration tests pass locally (no regressions). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): address PR-501 review round 2 — atomic mutations + audit completeness + cookbook compliance Round 2 of review fixes. Compliance Swarm flagged refinements to the round-1 fixes; Swedish-compliance had a fresh batch of cookbook items (including a self-contradiction in payroll pitfalls I missed last round). All addressed. Code changes — atomicity + audit completeness: 1. rotate-secret collapsed to a single UPDATE … RETURNING (V8.2.1). The preflight existence-check SELECT was redundant after round 1 added .select().maybeSingle() on the UPDATE — the same null-row signal indicates non-existence, but in one round trip with no TOCTOU window. RETURNING `name` so the audit_log description still carries a human identifier without a second read. 2. DELETE handler collapsed to atomic .delete().select().maybeSingle() (V8.2.1). Eliminates the pre-read TOCTOU window entirely. A 0-row delete (already-deleted webhook) still returns 204 — idempotent DELETE — and the audit entry captures the attempt with old_state: null. Description discriminates the two cases ("deleted: name" vs "delete attempted on missing id"). 3. Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, private on the rotate-secret response (Art.25). The HMAC secret is sensitive credential material returned exactly once; this header prevents any intermediary (CDN, proxy, gateway access log, browser cache) from persisting the response body in a store with a different retention policy than intended. 4. Dispatcher auto-disable now writes the audit_log entry UNCONDITIONALLY (A.8.15 / V16.1.1 / CC7.2). Previously a null prior snapshot or a legacy null user_id caused the audit row to be silently skipped — only a warn log was emitted. Now writes user_id=NULL when unavailable (post-multi-tenant-refactor schema allows it; row is invisible under user RLS but queryable under service-role review, which is correct for system-initiated SECURITY_EVENT records). Description discriminates the snapshot- available / snapshot-unavailable cases. Swedish compliance — cookbook content fixes (all real errors): 5. VAT cookbook rounding rule corrected: SFL 22 kap 1 § mandates TRUNCATION of öre (Math.floor for positive amounts), not half-up rounding. Last round mislabeled this as "Math.round (half-up)"; the SRU filing skill is canonical and uses truncation. Using Math.round would produce values that differ from Skatteverket's expectations and cause GL-reconciliation mismatches at the öre level. 6. VAT reconciliation block now includes 2614 (Utgående moms vid omvänd skattskyldighet, matches ruta 30). The previous list of 2611/2621/2631/2641/2645 omitted 2614; a reconciliation that skips it would show rutor_match_gl: true even when the 2614 balance is non-zero and un-reconciled. 7. Livsmedel rate-change adds a one-sentence caveat for continuous/ subscription supplies — the supply-date framing in round 1 was too tight for cases where multiple deliveries roll up into a subscription. Confirms against ML 1 kap 3 § rather than assuming a single delivery date is decisive. 8. Payroll pitfalls bullet contradicted step 2 — "Employees under 26 (2024 rule for 2026 birth year ≥ 2001)" rewritten to match step 2: "18–22 years old at the start of 2026 (born 2003–2007) AND 67+ from 2026". An integrator reading only the pitfalls section would have applied the reduced rate too broadly, producing underpaid arbetsgivaravgifter and a non-compliant AGI. 9. Year-end periodiseringsfond cap now states schablonintäkt explicitly: 1.94% × outstanding prior-year balance (SLR + 1% for 2026) is ADDED to taxable income before the 25% cap is computed. Last round mentioned the "BEFORE the periodiseringsfond deduction" ordering but elided the schablonintäkt step; omitting it produces a cap that's too low when prior-year reserves exist. 10. Year-end SRU format characterization corrected: SRU is plain text encoded in ISO 8859-1, NOT XML. iXBRL (XML-based) is the Bolagsverket digital annual-report format — a separate artefact for a separate authority. Round 1 conflated them. Deferred (architectural / out of scope, documented in commit): - Audit-log dead-letter queue / SIEM alert escalation (Art.32 / A.8.15): infra setup, not code-PR scope. The warn-on-failure path is the in-process surface; durable delivery is a SRE/SIEM concern. - Secret encryption at rest (CC6.1): PR-1 architectural carryover. - webhook_url + description redaction in audit_log (Art.5(1)(c)): URLs are admin-supplied configuration values; redaction would degrade audit reconstructibility without closing a real PII gap. - PATCH old_state TOCTOU via Postgres function (CC6.3): the read- then-write pattern produces an append-only audit row capturing the read state; the small race window is non-load-bearing for audit purposes and a stored-procedure refactor exceeds the cost/value. 23 webhook integration tests pass locally (no regressions). Type-check clean for all changed files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): address PR-501 review round 3 — real cookbook tax errors + cache-control on create Round 3 closes two tax-impact errors in the cookbooks plus the consistency gap on the create response. Compliance Swarm's remaining findings are recurring architectural carryovers or oscillation against prior rounds. Real cookbook errors (would mislead integrators): 1. Schablonintäkt rate corrected. Round 2 hardcoded 1.94% — that's the 2024 rate (SLR 0.94% + 1%). For 2026 SLR is 2.55%, so the rate is 3.55%. A wrong rate produces a too-low add-back, a too-high periodiseringsfond cap, and an IL 30 kap compliance error for any integrator copying the cookbook number. Rewrite to describe the formula (SLR + 1%, where SLR is the Riksbank statslåneränta on 30 Nov of the preceding year) with the 2026 figure as an example, and note the engine reads the canonical rate from `tax_rates`. 2. SRU format is a TWO-file pair, not one. Round 2 correctly said "plain text encoded in ISO 8859-1 (NOT XML)" but described it as a single file. Skatteverket requires both INFO.SRU (metadata header) AND BLANKETTER.SRU (declaration body) uploaded together — a single-file upload is rejected by their validation. Fix the prose to describe the two-file pair explicitly. Code consistency: 3. POST /webhooks (create) now returns the same `Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, private` + `Pragma: no-cache` headers as the rotate-secret endpoint (A.8.12). Both endpoints return the HMAC secret exactly once; both need the same intermediary-cache prevention. Smaller cookbook refinements (round 3 bot follow-ups): 4. VAT reconciliation block now includes 2615 (Utgående moms vid import, matches ruta 60) — the previous list covered 2611-2645 but omitted import VAT. A reconciliation that skips 2615 would show rutor_match_gl: true falsely for any importer. 5. Service supply-date fallback statement qualified to "one-off service supplies where delivery and invoice coincide" — long- running service contracts (subscriptions, maintenance) have per-delprestation skattskyldighet and need an explicit delivery_date per billing cycle. 6. Payroll elder-reduction boundary clarified: "67 years or older AT THE START OF the income year (1 January 2026)" — a 66-year- old whose 67th birthday falls in February does NOT qualify in 2026. Prevents misreading the pithy "67+ from 2026" as a birthday-during-year rule. Bot oscillation (skipping with rationale documented here for posterity): - Compliance Swarm Art.25 now asks to REMOVE webhook_url from DELETE old_state — direct contradiction with CC6.3's round-1 ask for complete attribution. webhook_url is admin-supplied configuration, not PII; keeping it preserves audit reconstructibility. - Swedish-compliance flags the unconditional re-delete audit row as "polluting" the behandlingshistorik — direct contradiction with Compliance Swarm V8.2.1 + CC6.3 round-1 / round-2 asks for unconditional writes. The audit_log is operational, not BFL räkenskapsinformation (which lives on journal_entries and related tables under explicit immutability triggers). Audit trail completeness wins over BFL purity for this table. Architectural carryovers (already documented in earlier commit bodies as deferred to follow-up PRs): - Secret encryption at rest (CC6.1, recurring) - Audit-log dead-letter / SIEM alerting (Art.32 / A.8.15, infra) - webhook_url userinfo stripping (A.8.11 low — URLs are admin- configured, no expected credentials; validating at registration would be a registration-time concern, not audit-time) 23 webhook integration tests pass. Type-check clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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afb21ea638 |
feat(api): Phase 6 PR-3 — substrate hardening (SKIP LOCKED + DNS pinning + test debt) (#500)
* feat(api): operations table immutability trigger BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8 § behandlingshistorik integrity: once an operations row is in a terminal status (succeeded / failed / cancelled) the audit record of what happened becomes immutable. Adds the BEFORE UPDATE and BEFORE DELETE triggers that the webhook_deliveries table already has (20260515170000 / 20260515190000), mirroring their predicate shape and error code exactly. Closes the Phase 4 PR-2 (PR #469) review-round carry-over flagged by Swedish-compliance: previously a future bug, a privileged operator, or a compromised service-role caller could rewrite "this year-end close succeeded" to "failed" by updating an already-terminal row. The running → succeeded/failed/cancelled transition itself stays legal because the trigger keys on OLD.status, which is non-terminal at the moment of the legitimate UPDATE. pg test covers all transitions (allowed and blocked) plus DELETE on both terminal and non-terminal rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(api): atomic SKIP LOCKED claim for webhook dispatch Replaces the SELECT-then-UPDATE-intersect pattern in the dispatcher with a single-roundtrip SQL function using FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED. PostgREST can't express SKIP LOCKED through the JS client, so the previous shape relied on a CAS guard inside an UPDATE WHERE status IN ('pending','failed') to ensure only one of two overlapping cron ticks claimed any given row. The CAS pattern was correct (under load — receivers >60s could push a batch past the next minute's tick) but burned two round trips and forced the application to negotiate the locking semantics in JS. The function form moves the contention to the DB, where SKIP LOCKED makes a row held by a concurrent tick simply invisible to the second caller. One round trip, no JS-side intersect. All filter semantics are preserved verbatim inside the function: status IN ('pending','failed'), next_attempt_at <= now, webhook_id IS NOT NULL, ORDER BY next_attempt_at ASC, LIMIT batchSize. p_batch_size is bounded (0, 1000] to forestall a runaway lock-set in case a caller misconfigures it. pg test covers basic claim (pending + failed), future-due skip, dangling- row (webhook_id IS NULL) skip, terminal-status skip, batch-size limits, out-of-range argument rejection, and the SKIP LOCKED invariant itself using two concurrent pool clients in BEGIN — the second caller does not see the row A locked, no double-delivery. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(api): pinned-IP HTTPS dispatch (close DNS-rebinding window) The url-guard.ts file header openly flagged the remaining gap: "a separate DNS-rebinding window (between dispatch-time validation and the actual fetch) remains; closing that requires a custom HTTPS agent that pins the resolved IP — tracked for follow-up." This closes it. The previous shape was: 1. validateWebhookUrl() → DNS resolves to [public IP], returns ok 2. fetch(webhook_url) → re-resolves DNS; an attacker who flipped the A record in the interval gets a private-IP socket The new pinnedHttpsFetch helper validates DNS once, then opens a node:https.request to that pinned IP — but keeps the original hostname in the TLS SNI extension (so the receiver's cert validates) and in the HTTP Host header (so vhost routing still works). The request socket never re-resolves DNS, foreclosing the rebind race entirely. Built on node:https.request rather than undici's Agent so the project doesn't take on a new dep — the stdlib API is also more explicit about the SNI / Host / pinned-IP split. Test seam injects both validateUrl and httpsRequest so the unit tests verify the pinning shape without standing up an HTTPS server. The dispatcher's attemptDelivery is rewritten as a switch over the four PinnedFetchResult kinds (ok / unsafe_url / redirect_blocked / timeout / transport_error). The previous fetch-based code path that distinguished redirect rejection by string-matching err.message is gone — the new result type makes the distinction structural. 8 unit tests cover the SNI/Host/pinned-IP shape, port handling, redirect_blocked, transport_error, timeout, response-body truncation, first-IP determinism, and the validation short-circuit (never opens a socket when the URL fails the SSRF guard). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(api): pg tests for webhook substrate triggers (PR-1 test debt) CLAUDE.md ("Testing" + "Migration Rules") mandates a *.pg.test.ts for any PR touching a trigger / RPC / RLS / DEFERRABLE constraint. Phase 6 PR-1 (#496) shipped three webhook_deliveries triggers without the accompanying pg test; this closes that debt. Triggers covered: - enforce_webhook_delivery_immutability (BEFORE UPDATE) - block_webhook_delivery_terminal_delete (BEFORE DELETE) - assert_webhook_delivery_company_match (BEFORE INSERT) 13 cases verify the lifecycle the dispatcher depends on remains mutable (pending → in_flight, in_flight → failed, failed → in_flight, in_flight → delivered) while terminal-status rows (delivered / dead) are write- locked and the cross-tenant INSERT path is refused with the ERRCODE=check_violation contract documented in the migration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(api): integration tests for webhook routes (PR-1 test debt) CLAUDE.md mandates integration tests under app/api/v1/ for every route. Phase 6 PR-1 (#496) shipped the eight v1 webhook routes (five under /companies/{companyId}/webhooks/ + the cross-tenant /webhook-deliveries/ {id}/retry) without them; closes that debt. 19 cases for the /webhooks/ verticals: POST /webhooks create + secret-once + payroll-scope gate + SSRF GET /webhooks list (no secret) + empty list GET /webhooks/:id detail (no secret) + 404 PATCH /webhooks/:id update + active=true re-enable + SSRF re-check + empty-body DELETE /webhooks/:id 204 hard delete POST /webhooks/:id/test enqueue + 404 + disabled-rejection GET /webhooks/:id/deliveries happy path + ownership 404 7 cases for the retry route: POST /webhook-deliveries/:id/retry dead → fresh pending row, live-status refusal, cross-tenant 404, disabled-webhook gate, SSRF re-check, delivery 404, webhook-gone 404 Both files mirror the suppliers/customers integration test pattern: Proxy-backed Supabase mock with per-table queues, validateApiKey + validateWebhookUrl stubbed to control auth and DNS deterministically. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): address PR-500 review round 1 — pg-real CI fix + 4 review items 1. pg-real CI was red on this PR: the new webhook trigger pg.test.ts and claim-due-webhook-deliveries pg.test.ts fixtures tried to INSERT into `webhooks.user_id`, which doesn't exist in the migration history. The column was never declared in automation_webhooks (20260415000000) nor added by webhooks_v2 (20260515170000) — so a fresh schema replay had no such column. The webhook create route (`webhooks.create`) was also referencing this non-existent column in its INSERT, so the production route was latent-broken since PR-1 and never exercised against a fresh DB. Drop the `user_id` field from both the route INSERT and the pg fixtures. Actor attribution lives on `created_by_api_key_id` (which leads back to the owning user via `api_keys.user_id`). 2. Greptile P2 #1 — `recoverStuckInFlight` carried a redundant `.not('status','in','(delivered,dead)')` filter alongside `.eq('status','in_flight')`, with a comment that incorrectly described PostgreSQL's UPDATE re-evaluation semantics. Under READ COMMITTED, UPDATE re-evaluates WHERE against each row's CURRENT value when it acquires the row lock — a row that raced to terminal status will fail `status='in_flight'` on re-evaluation and be skipped, no immutability trigger fires. Drop the redundant filter and rewrite the comment. 3. Greptile P2 #2 — added explicit pg test verifying `in_flight` rows are skipped by `claim_due_webhook_deliveries`. The status filter is what prevents double-delivery and is the entire point of the SKIP LOCKED substrate; making that invariant load-bearing in the test suite forecloses a future filter expansion silently regressing it. 4. Greptile P2 #3 — pinned-fetch registered both `res.on('end', finalize)` and `res.on('close', finalize)`. Node fires BOTH on normal completions, so finalize ran twice; the outer `settled` guard squashed the double-resolve but the header reconstruction still ran twice. Switch to `once` + self-removing pair so finalize runs exactly once on whichever event fires first (normal: end; truncation: close). 5. Compliance Swarm V8.2.1 — the retry route only checked `webhooks:manage` even when retrying `salary_run.* / agi.*` deliveries. Mirror the create-route elevated-scope gate so a key with only `webhooks:manage` cannot re-emit payroll payloads carrying personnummer / lönesummor / skatteavdrag. New integration test verifies the gate returns 403 INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE with `required_scope: payroll:read`. 35 tests pass locally (+1 vs pre-fix). Type-check clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): address PR-500 review round 2 — 2 small precision fixes 1. Compliance Swarm Art.32 / A.8.24 — response_body size cap was enforced only at the application layer (pinnedHttpsFetch's maxResponseBytes=4096 constant). A future refactor that bypassed the truncation, or a non- dispatcher write path into webhook_deliveries.response_body, would silently land large blobs in a column adjacent to event payloads carrying personal data. Add a CHECK constraint at the DB layer with a generous ceiling (8 KB — double the application cap so legitimate dispatcher writes never hit it; only a regression surfaces as a check_violation). 2. Compliance Swarm CC6.6 — pinned-fetch substitutes the validated IP for `host` while keeping the original hostname in `servername`. A reader could reasonably worry that the IP substitution weakens TLS hostname verification. Document explicitly that Node's default `checkServerIdentity` matches the cert's SAN/CN against `servername` (not `host`), so a forged endpoint at the pinned IP with a valid cert for a different hostname would fail the handshake. No code change — the default behavior is correct; the comment forecloses future "this looks dangerous" review-round noise on the same line. Items NOT addressed (with rationale documented elsewhere): - Compliance Swarm V8.2.1 (retry route 404-vs-404 information leak): delivery IDs are UUIDs; the "leak" is the ability to probe existence of an opaque 128-bit identifier the caller already has, which is not meaningfully different from probing for any opaque token. Both branches return the same structured 404 envelope. - Compliance Swarm CC7.2 (restore the .not() defense-in-depth filter): direct contradiction of last round's Greptile P2 fix. Greptile's PG-semantics analysis is correct — under READ COMMITTED, UPDATE re-evaluates WHERE against the row's current value when it acquires the lock, so .eq('status','in_flight') already handles the race. Adding a redundant .not() restores a misleading comment without closing a real gap. This is the documented Compliance Swarm oscillation pattern from the project's Phase 4 lessons. - Compliance Swarm CC6.1 (webhook secret encryption-at-rest): architectural choice from PR-1; not in PR-3 (substrate hardening) scope. Belongs to a future hardening PR. - Swedish-compliance review (operations queued/running rows hard- deletable): deliberate operability tradeoff — operators need to clear stuck/queued entries that crashed mid-flight. Blocking all deletes would force a manual DB intervention every time a worker crashed before reaching terminal status. The audit trail starts at terminal-state mutation, which IS blocked. - Swedish-compliance review (salary_run.* / agi.* payload anonymisation after 7 years): already on the deferred-list as part of the 90-day TTL cleanup cron item from the PR description. Belongs to a retention-policy follow-up PR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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feat(api): Phase 6 PR-1 — webhooks substrate (delivery pipeline + routes) (#496)
* feat(api): Phase 6 PR-1 — webhooks substrate (delivery pipeline + routes) First half of the final API plan phase. Ships the webhook delivery substrate end-to-end: schema, in-process fan-out from the event bus, per-minute Vercel cron dispatcher with HMAC signing + exponential backoff, and the seven v1 routes that let an integrator manage subscriptions and replay failed deliveries. Mirrors the architectural shape of Phase 4 PR #469 (new substrate + register routes + cron worker + audit table with immutability trigger). Migration (supabase/migrations/20260515170000_webhooks_v2.sql): - Repurpose automation_webhooks → webhooks. Drops the legacy UNIQUE (company_id, event_type) — multiple receivers per event are valid (Stripe pattern). Adds name, description, secret, created_by_api_key_id, api_version_pinned, disabled_at, disabled_reason. Backfills any pre-existing rows with a placeholder secret before the NOT NULL constraint is added. - New webhook_deliveries table — pending|in_flight|delivered|failed| dead state machine, attempts + next_attempt_at fields for the dispatcher, response_status/body/headers capture for receiver-side debugging, partial-index on (next_attempt_at) WHERE status IN ('pending','failed') for the worker pickup. - BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8 § immutability: BEFORE UPDATE trigger blocks writes when OLD.status IN ('delivered','dead'). The :retry route bypasses this by INSERTing a fresh row pointing at the same payload, never mutating the terminal one. - RLS: members SELECT own-company deliveries; writes restricted to service role. lib/webhooks/{handler,dispatcher,signing,diff}.ts: - handler.ts subscribes to 24 public CoreEventTypes and inserts one webhook_deliveries row per active subscription matching (company_id, event_type). Wired into ensureInitialized() via registerWebhookHandler() so every API route that emits events also enqueues webhook deliveries — same module-level pattern as the supplier-invoice and event-log handlers. - dispatcher.ts is the per-minute cron worker. Claims up to 50 due rows, POSTs each one with HMAC signature, updates row to delivered (2xx), failed (other → bumps next_attempt_at by exponential backoff), or dead (HTTP 410 OR attempts exhausted). HTTP 410 additionally auto-disables the webhook. 10s request timeout, 4 KB response-body cap. Backoff: 1m / 5m / 30m / 2h / 12h / 24h / 48h (7 retries, ~72h total) — matches Stripe. - signing.ts: Stripe-style X-Gnubok-Signature: t=<unix>,v1=<hex> with HMAC-SHA256 over `${t}.${rawBody}`. Constant-time verify with default 5-min tolerance window for the cookbook examples. generateWebhookSecret() returns 256 bits of crypto-random hex. - diff.ts: computePreviousAttributes() for Stripe-style update events. Stubbed in PR-1 (every emit passes null); each route's emit() call site captures the prior row in a follow-up so receivers don't need a second GET. v1 routes (app/api/v1/...): - /companies/{companyId}/webhooks GET (list) + POST (create) - /companies/{companyId}/webhooks/{id} GET / PATCH / DELETE - /companies/{companyId}/webhooks/{id}/test POST :test - /companies/{companyId}/webhooks/{id}/deliveries GET (cursor-paginated) - /webhook-deliveries/{id}/retry POST :retry POST /webhooks generates the HMAC secret server-side and returns it EXACTLY ONCE in the response — every subsequent endpoint omits it (same shape as the existing api_keys table). Idempotency-Key required on POST; dry-run supported. PATCH active=false manually pauses (sets disabled_at + disabled_reason = 'manually_disabled'); active=true clears the disable bookkeeping that the dispatcher's HTTP-410 auto-disable may have set. event_type is immutable — delete and recreate to change. POST /webhook-deliveries/{id}/retry lives outside /companies/{id}/ because callers reference deliveries by id; tenancy is enforced inside the handler via company_members lookup. Re-enqueues by INSERT (immutability trigger blocks in-place mutation), so the original row stays in the audit log. /api/webhooks/dispatch/cron: - withCronContext-wrapped, CRON_SECRET-guarded. - Returns dispatch summary { picked, delivered, failed, dead } in the body so an operator can grep Vercel logs to see per-tick throughput. - Per-minute schedule added to vercel.json (* * * * *). lib/auth/scopes.ts: webhooks:manage scope (already in API_KEY_SCOPES since the catalogue placeholder was added pre-Phase-6) extended with :test, :deliveries, and :retry route entries. Substrate-only by design. The PR's review-round commits will add: - claim_due_webhook_deliveries(p_now, p_limit) SQL function for proper FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED claim (current select-then-update has a tight CAS race window that the partial index narrows but a SQL function tightens further). - Integration tests under app/api/v1/companies/[companyId]/webhooks/__tests__/ covering list, create-returns-secret-once, list-never-returns-secret, PATCH active toggle, DELETE cascade, :test enqueue, :retry rejects non-terminal status, IDOR (cross-company), missing-Idempotency-Key, scope-deny. - *.pg.test.ts for the immutability trigger (CLAUDE.md mandate for any PR touching a trigger / RLS policy). - 30-day TTL cleanup cron for webhook_deliveries (same shape as the existing event_log cleanup at /api/events/cleanup/cron). Phase 6 PR-2 ships the docs polish (cookbook suite, error reference, signature-verify samples in Node + Python, versioning + deprecation policy, llms-full.txt rebuild, spec-snapshot test). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): address PR-496 review round 1 — 4 real bugs + retention FK Fixes the 4 real bugs Greptile flagged on the round-1 review of the Phase 6 PR-1 webhooks substrate, plus the swedish-compliance-bot finding about 7-year audit retention on accounting-event delivery rows. Compliance Swarm noise items are documented inline (see end of this commit body) rather than ping-ponged. FIXED — real bugs: 1. **dispatcher: SELECT-then-UPDATE double-delivery race** (lib/webhooks/dispatcher.ts:claimDueDeliveries) The previous implementation returned the full SELECT result set regardless of whether the CAS UPDATE actually claimed any rows. Per-minute Vercel cron has best-effort single-instance semantics — under load (50 deliveries × 10s timeout = up to 500s > 60s) the next tick can fire while this one is still running and pick up the same SELECT batch. Both ticks would then dispatch the same deliveries. Fix: have the UPDATE return the IDs it actually claimed via `.select('id')`, intersect with the candidate set, and only dispatch that intersection. The CAS guard `(status IN ('pending','failed'))` ensures at most one tick wins for any given row. 2. **dispatcher: `clearTimeout` called before response body read** (lib/webhooks/dispatcher.ts:attemptDelivery) The AbortController timeout was cleared before `readBoundedText`, so a slow body stream could stall the entire serial dispatch batch indefinitely. Fix: move the clearTimeout to a `finally` block AFTER the body read so the abort stays armed across the whole HTTP cycle. 3. **signing: `verifySignature` throws RangeError on invalid hex** (lib/webhooks/signing.ts) The guard compared hex-string lengths before calling timingSafeEqual, but `Buffer.from(v1, 'hex')` silently drops invalid hex bytes — a v1 that is the right hex length (64 chars for SHA-256) but contains non-hex characters decodes to a SHORTER buffer than `expected`. timingSafeEqual then throws RangeError instead of returning false. Receivers using this helper to verify inbound webhook signatures would crash on a forged or corrupted header instead of cleanly rejecting it. Fix: compare buffer lengths AFTER decoding. 4. **GET /webhooks response shape mismatch** (app/api/v1/companies/[companyId]/webhooks/route.ts) The handler passed a flat array to `paginated()`, producing `data: [...]`, but the registered WebhooksListResponse schema and the inline example both document `data: { webhooks: [...] }`. Any client built against the spec would not find the expected key. Fix: switched from `paginated()` (which is for top-level array payloads) to `ok()` and wrapped as `{ webhooks: data ?? [] }` to match the schema. The webhook-count ceiling per company is bounded, so dropping cursor pagination on this surface is fine for v1.0. FIXED — swedish-compliance: 5. **Webhook DELETE no longer destroys accounting-event audit trail** (supabase/migrations/20260515180000_webhook_deliveries_retention.sql, app/api/v1/companies/[companyId]/webhooks/[id]/route.ts, lib/webhooks/dispatcher.ts) swedish-compliance-bot flagged that ON DELETE CASCADE on webhook_deliveries.webhook_id let a webhook DELETE silently remove terminal delivery rows that constitute behandlingshistorik for accounting events (journal_entry.committed, period.locked, salary_run.booked, agi.generated, ...). BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8 § requires 7-year retention of these rows. Fix: new migration changes the FK to ON DELETE SET NULL and makes webhook_id nullable. Webhook DELETE now leaves the delivery audit trail in place — it just loses the back-reference to the no-longer- existing webhook row. The dispatcher SELECT was updated to filter `webhook_id IS NOT NULL` so dangling pending/failed rows go dormant in the audit trail rather than retrying against nothing. Documentation updated on the DELETE route header + endpoint description + pitfall list to reflect the new semantic. FIXED — defense in depth: 6. **Retry route: re-verify webhook still belongs to caller's company immediately before INSERT** (app/api/v1/webhook-deliveries/[id]/retry/route.ts) Compliance Swarm V8.2.1 (medium) flagged that the retry endpoint verified tenancy via the delivery's company → company_members lookup, then INSERTed a fresh delivery without re-checking that the parent webhook still existed in that company at INSERT time. A webhook deleted between the membership check and the INSERT would have left a dangling row; a webhook re-registered to a different company would let the caller redeliver to a webhook they never created. Fix: explicit re-fetch of the webhook scoped to (id, company_id) immediately before INSERT, with NOT_FOUND if the webhook is gone or VALIDATION_ERROR if it's been disabled. DEFERRED — documented inline: - **OWASP V14.2 plaintext webhooks.secret**: Inline rationale added to lib/webhooks/signing.ts:generateWebhookSecret(). Outbound HMAC signing requires the original byte sequence on every delivery, so one-way hashing is precluded by definition. Stripe / GitHub / Slack / Twilio all follow the same pattern. Defense in depth: service- role-only writes on webhooks, column-level select projection on every read endpoint (the row never includes secret outside the create response), Supabase encryption-at-rest. Re-evaluate when KMS-backed signing becomes available without per-call latency cost. - **Compliance Swarm V13.2 cron uses CRON_SECRET only**: false positive — matches the documented Vercel cron pattern used by every other cron in the project (deadlines, invoice reminders, document verify, sandbox cleanup, event log cleanup, ...). - **Compliance Swarm V1.2 cursor pagination injection**: false positive — `decodeDefaultCursor` in lib/api/v1/pagination.ts already validates `ts` against a strict ISO 8601 regex and `id` against a UUID regex, returns null otherwise. The bot couldn't see the helper's internals. - **Compliance Swarm V8.2.1 retry-route TOCTOU on tenancy** (high): the secondary company_members lookup is deliberate — the route lives outside /companies/{id}/ tree because callers reference deliveries by id (already noted in the file header). The defense- in-depth tightening at INSERT time (item 6 above) closes the practical TOCTOU window. Round-2 may add an atomic DB function if swarm escalates this. - **Compliance Swarm V2.4 no rate limits on :test / :retry**: defer to Phase 6 PR-2 alongside the per-route rate-limit pass we owe across the v1 surface (Phase 3 deferral list). - **Compliance Swarm V16 audit logging on webhook secret generation / deletion**: defer to Phase 6 PR-2 (audit-event durability is on the Phase 6 architectural-floor list per Phase 4 lessons-learned). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): address PR-496 review round 2 — SSRF, tenancy, retention triggers Round 2 of the Phase 6 PR-1 review cycle. Compliance Swarm went 23 → 24 between rounds (oscillation pattern documented in Phase 4 lessons). This commit fixes 7 real items, four of them surfaced by the round-1 commit opening up new attack surfaces / new audit gaps. FIXED: 1. **SSRF: webhook_url HTTPS-only + private/loopback/link-local/CGNAT/ metadata IP rejection** (V12.1, V1.2, CC6.6) New helper lib/webhooks/url-guard.ts validates webhook_url at three layers: - Zod schema (Create + Patch) rejects non-https before the handler runs. - Route handler runs validateWebhookUrl() which performs DNS lookup and rejects IPs in 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16, 127/8, 169.254/16 (link-local + AWS/GCP/Azure metadata 169.254.169.254 explicitly classified), 100.64/10 (CGNAT), 0/8, plus IPv6 ::1, fc00::/7, fe80::/10, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 ::ffff:<v4> via recursive reclassification. - Dispatcher re-runs the same check immediately before each outbound POST — DNS rebinding / record swap between webhook creation and dispatch is the common bypass and the create-time check alone is insufficient. A failure at dispatch time marks the delivery dead with reason='url_unsafe:<class>' AND auto- disables the webhook. The dispatch-time check adds one DNS lookup per delivery, which is acceptable on the per-minute cron with batches up to 50. 2. **Cross-tenant dispatch refusal** (A.8.3) loadWebhooksByIds now selects company_id alongside id/webhook_url/ secret. The dispatch loop asserts webhook.company_id === delivery.company_id BEFORE signing. A poisoned delivery row pointing at another tenant's webhook (compromised service-role write, future buggy code path) is refused with status='dead' and reason='cross_tenant_mismatch' rather than dispatched with the wrong tenant's secret. 3. **DB-level invariants for retention + tenancy** (supabase/migrations/20260515190000_webhook_deliveries_db_guards.sql) Two triggers the application can never bypass: - block_webhook_delivery_terminal_delete (BEFORE DELETE): raises check_violation when OLD.status IN ('delivered','dead'). Closes the BEFORE UPDATE-only loophole the round-1 immutability trigger left open. BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8 § retention is now enforced against DELETE as well as UPDATE. - assert_webhook_delivery_company_match (BEFORE INSERT): raises check_violation when NEW.company_id doesn't match the parent webhooks.company_id. Mirrors the application-layer dispatcher assertion at the database boundary so even a misbehaving service-role caller can't enqueue a cross-tenant delivery. webhook_id IS NULL bypasses the check (dangling rows from webhook DELETE under the round-1 ON DELETE SET NULL FK have no parent to compare against). 4. **Stuck in_flight row recovery** (operational, swedish-compliance note) Before claiming new rows, dispatcher sweeps in_flight rows whose updated_at is older than 2× REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS back to 'failed' with next_attempt_at = now. A cron killed mid-flight (Vercel function timeout, hard crash, manual termination) would otherwise leave rows marked in_flight forever, violating the audit trail's "every row reaches a terminal state" invariant. 2× REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS gives an unambiguous "this is stuck, not in-flight" boundary — a live attempt cannot exceed REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS plus the body read. 5. **Response-body content-type filter + header allowlist** (CC7.2, A.8.12, Art.32(1)(b)) readBoundedText now drops response_body unless Content-Type starts with text/plain or application/json — receivers returning HTML error pages routinely echo PII, request bodies, or stack traces back from their error renderers, all of which would land in our delivery audit log otherwise. Bytes are still drained so the connection stays reusable. headersToObject now filters to a small allowlist (content-type, content-length, date, server, x-request-id, cf-ray). Set-Cookie, Authorization, WWW-Authenticate, and vendor x-* headers are dropped before persistence. 6. **Test payload data minimisation** (Art.25(2)) The :test event payload no longer includes api_key_id. The X-Gnubok-Delivery header on the outbound request already correlates to the audit trail on the gnubok side, so the receiver gains nothing from seeing an internal credential identifier. 7. **Silent-drop log promoted to error** (PI1.3) handler.ts:fanOutToWebhooks logs at error (not warn) when an event payload is missing companyId. Every CoreEvent payload variant types companyId as required, so a missing value indicates an emit-site bug that silently breaks webhook delivery — must be visible in monitoring, not buried in routine warn-noise. DEFERRED (remaining oscillation, documented in commit body): - **V14.2 / Art.5(1)(f) plaintext webhooks.secret**: documented inline in lib/webhooks/signing.ts as accepted-risk per Stripe / GitHub / Slack precedent. The bot will continue to flag it every round; the documented decision is the established pattern. KMS integration is a cross-cutting concern that touches the auth layer too — not a Phase 6 PR-1 scope. - **Art.5(1)(e) 90-day TTL cleanup cron for non-accounting deliveries**: on the deferred list, ships in Phase 6 PR-2 docs/cron suite. - **V2.4 rate limits on :test and :retry**: deferred to Phase 6 PR-2 alongside the v1-wide rate-limit pass (Phase 3 deferral list). - **V16 audit log on webhook secret/delete lifecycle**: deferred to Phase 6 PR-2. - **A.8.24 plaintext secret in migration backfill log**: false positive, the migration comment notes "no production rows" so no real backfill ever runs. Compliance Swarm count expected to drop from 24 → ~10–14 on round 3 as the SSRF + cross-tenant findings clear together. Architectural floor is the V14.2 plaintext-secret oscillation + V16 audit-event-durability (deferred to PR-2) — that's the merge-ready signal per Phase 4 lessons. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): address PR-496 review round 3 — 5 fixes + migration consolidation Compliance Swarm went 24 → 16 (5 high / 8 medium / 3 low) after round 2, clearing the SSRF + cross-tenant cluster as predicted. Round 3 closes the remaining real items, leaving the architectural floor (V14.2 plaintext, V16 audit log, V2.4 rate limits, Art.5(1)(e) TTL — all deferred to Phase 6 PR-2). That's the documented merge-ready signal. FIXED: 1. **Deliveries list — webhook ownership pre-check** (V8.2.1 medium) GET /webhooks/{id}/deliveries already filters by (company_id, webhook_id) so a cross-tenant id returns nothing, but emitting an explicit 404 when the webhook doesn't belong to the caller's company matches the pattern used for :retry and :test (round 2 fix not propagated to deliveries) and gives a clean signal vs a confusing empty list. Defense in depth alongside RLS. 2. **url-guard: enumerate ALL DNS records** (V1.2 medium) Replaced single dns.lookup with parallel dns.resolve4 + dns.resolve6. A hostname with two A records [public, private] returns either non-deterministically per call — single-lookup validation could return the public IP at create time and the private IP at dispatch. Multi-record enumeration rejects if ANY resolved address is unsafe. Per-family ENODATA / ENOTFOUND is normal (v6-only or v4-only host) and treated as "no records of that family" rather than hard failure; other DNS errors propagate. New 'no_dns_records' reason for the case where neither family resolves anything. The DNS-rebinding window between dispatch-time validation and the actual fetch remains — closing it requires a custom HTTPS agent that pins the resolved IP, tracked for follow-up. Multi-record enumeration shrinks the practical bypass surface substantially. 3. **markDead no longer stamps delivered_at** (swedish-compliance) delivered_at means "the receiver acknowledged the event". For dead rows (HTTP 410, attempts exhausted, webhook deleted, cross-tenant mismatch, unsafe URL) the receiver did NOT acknowledge — leaving delivered_at NULL keeps audit semantics clean. An auditor querying `WHERE delivered_at IS NOT NULL` correctly sees only genuinely delivered rows. The terminal-state timestamp lives on `updated_at` (auto-stamped by the table's BEFORE UPDATE trigger). 4. **Elevated scope check for salary/agi event subscriptions** (swedish-compliance, GDPR Art.32) Subscribing to salary_run.* or agi.generated routes personnummer + lönesummor + skatteavdrag to an external receiver — payroll-grade exposure. POST /webhooks now requires BOTH webhooks:manage AND payroll:read for these event types. A key minted only for webhook management can no longer reach the payroll surface; integrators building payroll integrations must mint a key with the payroll scope alongside webhook management. The check uses a regex (^salary_run\.|^agi\.) so future payroll event types automatically inherit the gate. Same pattern will extend to other sensitive event families when they ship. 5. **Migration consolidation: fold retention into 170000** (swedish-compliance) The round-1 retention migration (20260515180000) was a follow-on that ALTERed the FK from ON DELETE CASCADE to ON DELETE SET NULL. swedish-compliance flagged that if 170000 ever applied in isolation (rollback of 180000, partial replay), CASCADE would silently delete accounting-event audit rows. Edited 170000 to declare the FK with ON DELETE SET NULL and nullable webhook_id directly. Deleted 180000. Migration 190000 (DB guards from round 2) updated to reference 170000 as the source of the SET NULL FK. All in-code references to "20260515180000" updated to "20260515170000" (DELETE route header, dispatcher comments). Net result: a single migration shipping a correct table from the start, no chained ALTER, no isolation risk. DEFERRED (architectural floor, all bound for Phase 6 PR-2): - **V8.2.1 retry ctx.userId may be null for API-key callers**: false positive — validateApiKey unconditionally returns a real userId; the wrapper sets ctx.userId = auth.userId for every authenticated call. - **V1.2 DNS rebinding TOCTOU between validate and fetch**: high-effort proper fix needs a custom HTTPS agent that pins the resolved IP. The multi-record check substantially shrinks the practical bypass window; full closure tracked for PR-2 hardening. - **V16.1 cross-tenant log not in security-event taxonomy**: this project doesn't have a separate security-event log substrate — log.error with structured fields is the established pattern. - **V4.3 dispatch summary in cron response body**: same shape every other cron uses (deadlines, invoice reminders, document verify, ...). CRON_SECRET-gated; project pattern. - **V5.3 / Art.5(1)(f) response_body returned to API callers**: already addressed by round-2 content-type filter — only text/plain or application/json gets persisted. Residual oscillation; the bot didn't see the new filter. - **Art.5(1)(e) 90-day TTL non-accounting deliveries**: Phase 6 PR-2 cron suite. - **Art.32(1)(b) / V14.2 plaintext webhooks.secret**: established defer, documented inline in signing.ts (Stripe / GitHub / Slack precedent). - **swedish-compliance company_id FK CASCADE**: system-wide pattern (every per-company table cascades on company delete). Cross-cutting compliance decision, not webhook-specific. - **swedish-compliance period.unlocked emitted before DB commit**: cross-cutting refactor of the entire event-bus emit pattern across every v1 route. Project-wide concern, not Phase 6 PR-1 scope. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): address PR-496 review round 4 — 2 critical fixes + 5 hardening Two critical items + 5 supporting hardening fixes. The criticals were both surfaced after round 3 — one by the Supabase preview build, one by swedish-compliance — and would have caused real failures in production. CRITICAL: 1. **Supabase Preview reconciliation broken by round-3 migration deletion** Round 3 deleted supabase/migrations/20260515180000_webhook_deliveries_ retention.sql after folding its FK fix into 170000. The Supabase preview branch had already applied 180000 and tracks the set of applied remote migrations — when a previously-applied filename disappears locally the preview build fails with "Remote migration versions not found in local migrations directory". Fix: restored 180000 with the original idempotent ALTER content. On a fresh install 170000 creates the FK with SET NULL directly so 180000's ALTER is a no-op (DROP IF EXISTS + ADD with the same constraint shape). On the existing preview branch the second run is also a no-op — the FK already has the SET NULL shape from the original 180000 application. Idempotent retro-application is intentional; documented in the file header. 2. **`recoverStuckInFlight` queries a column that doesn't exist** swedish-compliance bot caught that lib/webhooks/dispatcher.ts: recoverStuckInFlight filters `.lt('updated_at', stuckBefore)` against webhook_deliveries.updated_at, but migration 170000 never declared the column. The query would return zero rows at runtime; stuck in_flight rows would stall forever, breaking the BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8 § audit-log completeness guarantee that every delivery row must reach a terminal state. Fix: new migration 20260515200000_webhook_deliveries_updated_at.sql adds the column with NOT NULL DEFAULT now() and wires it to the project-wide update_updated_at_column() trigger function. The new trigger runs BEFORE UPDATE — the immutability check_violation guards from migrations 170000 + 190000 fire FIRST on terminal rows, so no audit-row mutation can occur via the timestamp bump. HARDENING: 3. **Dispatcher: fetch redirect: 'error'** (V1.2 medium) A receiver returning 3xx could redirect the dispatcher to a private/internal address AFTER the SSRF guard validated the original webhook_url. Pass redirect: 'error' so any redirect throws and the delivery enters the failed/retry path with a clean diagnostic. Receivers that legitimately move endpoints should ask integrators to update the webhook URL via PATCH. 4. **Defensive ctx.companyId early-return** (V8.2.1 medium) The deliveries list route used `ctx.companyId!` non-null assertion. The wrapper guarantees companyId for routes inside /companies/{id}/, but a misconfiguration would silently produce `WHERE company_id = NULL` (always-empty result) rather than a hard auth failure. Added an explicit early INTERNAL_ERROR return when ctx.companyId is falsy. Drops the `!` everywhere in the file. 5. **Per-delivery structured logs** (V16 low) Added info/warn-level outcome logs at the dispatch loop boundary with deliveryId, webhookId, companyId, eventType, attempt fields. Per-tenant audit-trail reconstruction now works from log aggregation alone without grepping individual mark*-helper writes. Failure types (delivered / failed / dead) emit at correct levels; webhook auto-disable surfaces as a distinct warn line. 6. **Strip userId from outbound webhook payloads** (Art.5(1)(c)) New minimisePayload() in handler.ts drops the internal Supabase auth.users.id UUID before insert into webhook_deliveries. The companyId stays (it's the tenant scope, useful for multi-tenant receivers). Centralising the projection means future tightening (e.g. stripping personnummer fields from payroll payloads if those ever land in the payload shape) goes here, not per-emit-site. 7. **Migration legal citations** (swedish-compliance precision) swedish-compliance noted the citations conflated BFL 7 kap (the 7-year retention period) with BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8 § (audit-log integrity). Both apply but they're distinct grounds. Updated comments in 170000 and 190000 + the trigger error message in 190000 to cite both correctly. REMAINING DEFERS (architectural floor — Phase 6 PR-2 territory): - **V14 / Art.32 plaintext webhooks.secret**: established defer per Stripe / GitHub / Slack precedent; documented inline in signing.ts. - **V8.2.1 retry endpoint userId may be null for API-key callers**: false positive — validateApiKey unconditionally returns a real userId; ctx.userId is always set after auth. - **V1.2 DNS rebinding TOCTOU between validation and fetch()**: high- effort fix needs a custom HTTPS agent that pins the resolved IP. Multi-record check (round 3) + redirect: 'error' (this round) substantially shrink the practical bypass window. Full closure is Phase 6 PR-2 hardening. - **V2.3 dry-run rate limiting**: Phase 6 PR-2 with the v1-wide rate-limit pass. - **V16.1 cross-tenant log not in security-event taxonomy**: project doesn't have a separate security-event log substrate. - **Art.9 DPIA entry for outbound payroll webhooks**: out-of-repo documentation work, tracked separately. - **Art.5(1)(e) 90-day TTL non-accounting deliveries**: Phase 6 PR-2 cron suite. - **swedish-compliance company_id FK CASCADE**: system-wide pattern; cross-cutting decision, not webhook-specific. - **swedish-compliance period.unlocked emit-before-commit**: cross- cutting refactor of every v1 route's event-bus emit timing. Compliance Swarm count expected to drop materially as the V1.2 + V8.2.1 + V16 cluster clears. If the next round plateaus at the documented architectural floor (~5–9 findings, all in the deferred list above), that's the merge-ready signal per Phase 4 lessons. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): address PR-496 review round 5 — 5 small fixes (audit gaps + hardening) Round 5 closes the actionable items round 4 surfaced. Compliance Swarm went 16 → 23 between rounds (severity dropped — 0 critical, 5 high, 10 medium, 8 low — the bot is now surfacing low-severity items it skipped before; classic plateau approach). Round 5 fixes 3 real gaps + 2 documentation-precision items, all small. FIXED: 1. **`request_id` populated at every webhook_deliveries INSERT site** (swedish-compliance — BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8 § behandlingshistorik) The webhook_deliveries.request_id column was declared in migration 170000 with the documented intent of correlating each delivery row back to the originating API request, but no INSERT call site ever set it — the column was always NULL, breaking audit-trail traceback. - test/route.ts and retry/route.ts now stamp ctx.requestId. - handler.ts:fanOutToWebhooks (the async fanout from the event bus) can't recover the originating request id — the event bus emit is decoupled from the route's request context. Synthesised a 'whfan_<uuid>' batch correlation id so the column is never NULL and rows from the same emission can be grouped. Threading the originating request_id through the event payload itself is a future-direction improvement (would require touching every emit site across the v1 surface). 2. **Retry route re-runs minimisePayload before INSERT** (A.8.12 medium) The retry endpoint was inserting o.payload verbatim — a delivery from before the round-4 minimisation tightening would have its unminimised payload re-delivered on retry. minimisePayload exported from handler.ts; retry now applies it. Idempotent on already- minimised payloads, so no semantic change for current data. 3. **Stuck-recovery sweep guarded against terminal-row race** (swedish-compliance — operational integrity) recoverStuckInFlight filtered status='in_flight' but Postgres applies the predicate to the CURRENT row state at UPDATE time. A row that raced from in_flight to delivered/dead between SELECT and UPDATE would be picked up by the bulk UPDATE; the BEFORE UPDATE immutability trigger would then raise check_violation, aborting the ENTIRE bulk UPDATE statement and leaving legitimately stuck rows unrecovered. Added `.not('status', 'in', '(delivered,dead)')` as defense in depth. The sweep is now safe across mixed batches even when one row terminalizes mid-flight. 4. **'server' header dropped from response_headers allowlist** (A.8.12 low) Receiver infrastructure version strings (nginx/1.21.6, Apache/2.4.41, ...) carry no diagnostic value but routinely leak into a multi- tenant audit table. Removed from SAFE_RESPONSE_HEADERS. 5. **Migration citations narrowed: don't over-claim BFL on non-accounting rows** (swedish-compliance — legal precision) The immutability triggers apply uniformly to all terminal delivery rows, but BFL 7 kap 1 § retention only applies to rows derived from räkenskapsinformation (journal_entry.*, period.*, salary_run.booked, agi.generated, invoice.paid, supplier_invoice.paid). For non- accounting events (customer.created, document.uploaded, transaction.categorized, webhook.test) the same lock applies as gnubok's operational audit-log integrity policy — NOT as a BFL obligation. Updated comments in 170000 and the trigger error message in 190000 to draw the distinction; BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8 § audit-log integrity continues to apply uniformly. REMAINING DEFERS (architectural floor — Phase 6 PR-2): - V14 / Art.32 / V9.1 / A.8.24 / CC6.1 plaintext webhooks.secret (5 separate findings of the same documented-defer item; established Stripe / GitHub / Slack precedent inline in signing.ts). - V8.2.1 retry endpoint userId may be null for API-key callers — false positive, validateApiKey unconditionally returns userId; bot has re-flagged 5 rounds in a row (entrenched oscillation). - V1.2 cursor pagination injection — false positive, decodeDefaultCursor validates ISO 8601 + UUID via regex. - V13 cron secret verification — false positive, withCronContext validates Authorization: Bearer. - V1.2 DNS rebinding TOCTOU — high-effort fix needs custom HTTPS agent pinning resolved IP. Multi-record check (round 3) + redirect: 'error' (round 4) substantially shrink the practical window. Phase 6 PR-2. - V2.4 rate limits on :test / :retry — Phase 6 PR-2 v1-wide pass. - V16.1 / A.8.15 / A.8.16 / CC7.2 SIEM / log drain / monitoring — out-of-repo infra, tracked separately. - Art.5(1)(e) 90-day TTL non-accounting deliveries — Phase 6 PR-2. - Art.9 DPIA entry for outbound payroll webhooks — out-of-repo doc. - Art.25(2) payload field-level redaction (response_body for payroll events) — defensive defer; current emit-site payloads don't carry personnummer or salary fields per the CoreEvent type definitions. - swedish-compliance company_id FK CASCADE — system-wide pattern, cross-cutting decision. - swedish-compliance period.unlocked emit-before-commit — cross- cutting refactor of every v1 route's event-bus emit timing. - PI1.3 SELECT-then-UPDATE claim race — already addressed in round 1 with the CAS-then-intersect pattern. Bot's recommended SQL function approach is the documented round-1 follow-up. Compliance Swarm count expected to plateau in the 12–18 range — all remaining items either deferred to PR-2, recurring oscillation false positives, or cross-cutting concerns outside the webhook surface. That's the documented merge-ready signal per Phase 4 lessons-learned. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(api): address PR-496 review round 6 — 3 small fixes (last actionable items) Closes the 3 genuinely-new actionable items round 5 surfaced. Every remaining swarm finding now falls into one of: established Phase 6 PR-2 defer (V14 plaintext, V2.4 rate limits, V1.2 DNS rebinding, Art.5(1)(e) TTL, V16/A.8.15/A.8.16/CC7.2 SIEM), oscillation false positive (V8.2.1 retry userId, V1.2 cursor, V13 cron secret), already-addressed (Art.5(1)(c) response_body content-type filter, response_headers allowlist, BFL citation narrowing), or cross-cutting (FK CASCADE, period.unlocked emit timing, plaintext secret variants × 5). FIXED: 1. **`granted_scopes` removed from INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE response details** (Art.5(1)(f) medium) POST /webhooks elevated-scope error echoed the API key's full scope set back to the caller and into ctx.log structured fields. Required scope alone is sufficient for the caller to understand what they need; the granted set is sensitive and should not surface in error envelopes or logs. 2. **Redirect error → terminal `dead` + auto-disable** (CC6.7 medium) Round 4's redirect: 'error' on fetch causes the runtime to throw a TypeError when the receiver returns 3xx. The catch was mapping it to retryable 'failed', so a stubborn-redirect receiver burned all 8 retry attempts (~72h) before going dead. Detect the redirect-shaped error message and short-circuit to dead + auto-disable, mirroring the HTTP 410 treatment. Operator surfaces the misbehaving receiver immediately rather than after three days of log noise. Detection uses /redirect/i on the error message — Node's undici has used several wordings ('unexpected redirect', 'redirect mode is set to error', etc.) across versions; case-insensitive substring is the stable shape. 3. **Retry route re-runs `validateWebhookUrl` against current URL** (CC6.6 medium) The retry handler verifies the webhook's existence + active state + tenancy match, but never re-ran the SSRF guard against the webhook's CURRENT url. A URL changed via PATCH between the original delivery and this retry call would slip a fresh delivery row into the queue that the dispatch-time guard would only catch on the next cron tick. Validating in the retry handler refuses the request up-front with VALIDATION_ERROR — the audit trail gets a clean refusal rather than a deferred 'dead' row with reason='url_unsafe'. REMAINING (architectural floor — not blocking merge): - 5 plaintext webhooks.secret findings (V14 / V11.1 / Art.32 / A.8.24 / CC6.1) — established Stripe / GitHub / Slack precedent, documented inline in signing.ts. - V8.2.1 retry endpoint userId may be null for API-key callers — false positive, validateApiKey unconditionally returns userId. Bot has re-flagged 7 rounds in a row. - V1.2 cursor pagination injection — false positive, decodeDefaultCursor validates ISO 8601 + UUID via regex. - V13 cron secret verification — false positive, withCronContext validates Authorization: Bearer. - V8.2.1 deliveries cross-webhook leak — false positive, bot acknowledges the .eq('webhook_id') filter handles it. - V1.2 DNS rebinding TOCTOU — Phase 6 PR-2 (custom HTTPS agent that pins resolved IP). - V2.4 rate limits on :test / :create / :retry — Phase 6 PR-2 with v1-wide rate-limit pass. - V16.1 / A.8.15 / A.8.16 / CC7.2 SIEM / log drain / monitoring — out-of-repo infra. - Art.5(1)(c) response_body / response_headers — already addressed by round-2 content-type filter + round-2 allowlist + round-5 'server' drop. - Art.5(1)(e) 90-day TTL non-accounting deliveries — Phase 6 PR-2. - Art.25(2) per-event-type field projection (personnummer / lönesummor) — current CoreEvent type definitions don't carry these fields; defensive defer. - Art.9 DPIA / RoPA entries for outbound webhooks — out-of-repo doc. - A.8.28 computePreviousAttributes diff — previous_attributes is null in PR-1; populated in follow-up. - A.5.17 / V11.1 secret in response logged — depends on whether the logging middleware captures response bodies (it doesn't, per project pattern). Defensive defer. - CC9.2 TLS validation / CC3.2 credential-pattern scrub — out-of-scope hardening. - swedish-compliance company_id FK CASCADE — system-wide pattern, cross-cutting decision. - swedish-compliance period.unlocked emit-before-commit — cross- cutting refactor of every v1 route's event-bus emit timing. - swedish-compliance non-terminal accounting row delete — defensible: pending/failed transition to terminal within minutes; blocking deletes there would prevent legitimate cleanup. - swedish-compliance BFL citation in trigger error message — addressed in round 5 (narrowed to "audit-log integrity policy" with BFL only attaching to accounting-event rows). If round 7 plateaus or the count drops, that's the merge-ready signal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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1163fd3bee |
fix(invoices): drop UTKAST banner from sent/archived PDFs (#495)
The "UTKAST – inte en giltig faktura" banner in pdf-template.tsx fires
whenever `invoice.status === 'draft'`. All four send-equivalent code
paths render the PDF while the in-memory invoice still reads 'draft',
so the customer's email attachment and the archived underlag are both
stamped as not-a-valid-faktura.
- /api/invoices/[id]/send: status flip happens after email delivery
(kept that way so a provider failure leaves the row in draft); render
with `{ ...invoice, status: 'sent' }` instead of mutating order.
- /api/invoices/[id]/mark-sent: DB flip happens before render but the
in-memory copy is never re-fetched.
- /api/v1/companies/.../invoices/[id]/send: same shape as the internal
send route; extend the existing `renderableInvoice` override.
- lib/pending-operations/commit.ts (MCP send path): same shape.
The banner condition itself is unchanged — the genuine draft preview
(`/api/invoices/[id]/pdf`) still surfaces the watermark correctly.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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523a8650cc |
feat(api): Phase 5 PR-3 — reports + import async (final Phase 5 PR) (#490)
* feat(api): Phase 5 PR-3 — reports + import async (final Phase 5 PR)
Combines the originally-planned PR-3 (import) and PR-4 (reports) into one
final Phase 5 PR per the user's "split into two PRs" scoping after PR-2.
16 new endpoints, 12 new tests, 1 shared helper. 502 v1+salary tests
total (was 490 before this PR).
Endpoints (16):
**JSON reports (14):**
- trial-balance, balance-sheet, income-statement, general-ledger,
journal-register, vat-declaration, monthly-breakdown, ar-ledger,
supplier-ledger, continuity-check, salary-journal, avgifter-basis,
vacation-liability — all wrap existing `lib/reports/*` generators
byte-equivalently with the dashboard.
- New shared helpers (`lib/api/v1/report-period.ts`):
- `loadPeriodFromQuery(request, ctx)` — parse + validate the
`period_id` query param, fetch the fiscal_periods row scoped to
the caller's company, return a discriminated result so the route
either gets a typed period or a pre-built 400/404 response.
- `safeGenerate(fn, ctx)` — wrap a lib generator call in a try/catch
that surfaces a structured REPORT_GENERATION_FAILED instead of
letting the raw error leak.
- Net effect: each report route stays at ~50 lines of business logic
while preserving complete OpenAPI documentation per endpoint.
**Binary report (1):**
- sie-export: returns text/plain UTF-8 SIE4 content with
Content-Disposition: attachment. OWASP V3.2 sanitisation strips
everything but [0-9a-fA-F-] from the period_id before splicing into
the filename header.
**Async imports (2):**
- POST /imports/sie: multipart, 50 MB cap, 5-minute maxDuration. Auto-
detects encoding (CP437/Windows-1252/UTF-8), parses, dedupes by
SHA-256 hash, then calls executeSIEImport(). Records lifecycle on
the `operations` table for `GET /operations/{id}` polling. Returns
the 202 envelope from `accepted()`.
- POST /imports/bank: multipart, 10 MB cap. Auto-detects format across
11 bank format modules (SEB, Swedbank, Handelsbanken, Nordea,
Nordea Business, Lansforsakringar, Lunar, ICA Banken, Skandia,
CAMT053, generic CSV) — or honors a `format` override. Calls
`ingestTransactions()` with the parsed transactions; updates the
`bank_file_imports` row to completed; emits `transaction.synced`
per ingested row through the standard ingest path. Same operations
table polling shape.
Both imports execute INLINE today. A future cron worker can take over
by flipping `initialStatus` from `'running'` to `'queued'` in
startOperation — the response contract stays identical.
Deferred to a follow-up (each has lib-module structure quirks that
warrant their own focused PR):
- `kpi` — composition of multiple lib generators rather than wrapping one
- `audit-trail` — lives in lib/core/audit/ not lib/reports/
- `ne-bilaga` + `ink2` — each has its own subdir + engine layer
- `periodisk-sammanstallning` — JSON + CSV variants with complex params
- PDF variants of balance-sheet / income-statement / etc. — agents can
render from JSON; binary PDF is nice-to-have not must-have for v1
Tests:
- 12 new integration tests (route-layer contract: auth/scope, period_id
validation, the shared loadPeriodFromQuery helper, the safeGenerate
error path, sie-export Content-Type + Content-Disposition, vat-
declaration query-param validation, generator pass-through). The
lib functions have their own unit tests; route tests focus on the
wrapper.
- 502 total v1 + lib/salary tests pass.
- Type-check clean.
3 new structured-error codes: SIE_IMPORT_DUPLICATE, BANK_IMPORT_FAILED,
BANK_FILE_FORMAT_UNKNOWN. Plus the existing SIE_PARSE_FAILED /
SIE_IMPORT_FAILED / BANK_FILE_NO_TRANSACTIONS reused.
Plan doc updated to mark Phase 5 complete (3 PRs shipped: PR-1
registers, PR-2 lifecycle, PR-3 reports+imports).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(api): address PR-490 review round 1 — 3 Greptile P1 bugs + 5 defensive items
Compliance Swarm landed at 17 findings (5 high + 10 medium + 2 low) on the
first round; Swedish bot at 8; Greptile flagged 3 inline P1 bugs. CI all
green from the first push.
FIXED — Greptile P1 bugs (all 3 confirmed real):
- **VAT declaration cross-field bounds**
(app/api/v1/.../reports/vat-declaration/route.ts). The schema
validated `period` as 1-12 for every period_type. A caller could pass
period_type=quarterly + period=7 (or yearly + period=5) and the route
would forward garbage to calculateVatDeclaration — the agent might
submit a nonsensical declaration to Skatteverket. Added a
.superRefine() that enforces: monthly → 1-12, quarterly → 1-4,
yearly → must equal 1. Swedish-compliance bot flagged the same
concern independently.
- **SIE import options JSON.parse unguarded**
(app/api/v1/.../imports/sie/route.ts). The route inlined
`JSON.parse(optionsRaw)` inside the Zod safeParse call. A malformed
options string threw SyntaxError before Zod ran, producing an
unhandled 500 instead of the documented 400 VALIDATION_ERROR.
Wrapped in an explicit try/catch that returns a structured 400 with
the parse-error message.
- **Bank import upsert conflict key cross-company collision**
(app/api/v1/.../imports/bank/route.ts). The `bank_file_imports`
unique constraint is (user_id, file_hash) from the single-tenant
single-company-per-user era. If the same user uploads the same file
to two companies they're a member of, the second upload's upsert
(with onConflict='user_id,file_hash') would silently overwrite the
first row's company_id. Added a pre-check that loads the existing
row by (user_id, file_hash) and returns
BANK_IMPORT_DUPLICATE_OTHER_COMPANY (409) if the company_id
differs. The proper fix is a migration widening the unique index to
(user_id, file_hash, company_id) — engine-PR-queue concern.
FIXED — defensive items from Compliance Swarm V2.2, V5.2:
- **General-ledger account_from/account_to validation**
(V2.2). The query params were passed straight through to the
generator without format checks. Added a `^\d{3,8}$` regex
(covers 4-digit BAS today + sub-account schemes up to 8 digits).
- **SIE import file header sanity check**
(V5.2). Before invoking parseSIEFile we now check the first 4 KiB
of the decoded content for at least one of #FLAGGA / #PROGRAM /
#FORMAT / #SIETYP — the mandatory SIE4 header records. An HTML /
executable / JSON payload that got past the multipart filter would
lack all of them and gets a structured 400 SIE_PARSE_FAILED
instead of being fed to parseSIEFile.
FIXED — doc / metadata corrections (Swedish bot):
- **VAT description**: Expanded the rutor list from "05/10/11/12/30/31/
32/39/40/48/49" to include the import-VAT rutor 20-24, 35-36, 50,
and 60-62. Matters because agents read the description to decide
what fields to map; an incomplete list causes agents to omit import
VAT.
- **Continuity-check citation**: Replaced the wrong "BFL 5 kap 7 §"
citation (which is rättelse, not IB/UB continuity) with the correct
derivation — BFL 5 kap (löpande bokföring) + BFNAR 2013:2 + SIE4
spec's #IB(N) = #UB(N-1) invariant.
- **Vacation-liability description**: Clarified that the "sums to BAS
2920" guarantee only holds when no employees use `semesterersattning`
(which is expensed immediately, not accrued). The exclusion of
vacation_rule='semesterersattning' and 'none' was already mentioned
in pitfalls; now the legal-basis text is consistent.
DOCUMENTED (architectural floor / dashboard parity / engine concerns —
not changed):
- **V8.2.1 path-based tenant check** (4th repeat across phases). The
wrapper resolves companyId from the URL AND verifies company_members
membership before any handler runs.
- **V5.2 bank file magic-byte check**: defensible defense-in-depth, but
the dashboard's /api/import/bank-file/parse uses the same content-
+ filename + format-module detection pattern. Diverging in v1 would
break parity. Tracked for a cross-cutting "tighten upload validation"
PR.
- **V16 error log internals leak**: the error responses do surface
err.message in the operation_id error envelope, but this is the
intentional contract for an integrator polling operations/{id}.
Stack traces are not included.
- **Art.32 SIE raw fileContent persisted**: the executeSIEImport helper
receives the raw content for hash + parse purposes; whether it
persists it beyond the import transaction is an engine-layer
concern. Tracked.
- **Art.25(1) journal-register + general-ledger no pagination**:
dashboard parity. The reports are designed to return the period's
full content because period-bounded reports have natural size limits
(a single fiscal year). Cursor pagination would diverge from
dashboard behavior.
- **Swedish: SIE export UTF-8 vs CP437**: legacy SIE consumers (BL
Administration, older Hogia/Visma) want CP437. The dashboard serves
UTF-8 today and modern SIE consumers accept it. Diverging in v1
would break parity. If real-world legacy-consumer demand surfaces,
add a `?encoding=cp437` override; not building on speculation.
- **Swedish: SIE #FLAGGA mutation, bank_file_imports mutability**:
schema + engine concerns; v1 mirrors dashboard behavior.
- **Swedish: avgifter-basis age-tier verification**: requires reading
the lib generator's internals; tracked.
1 new structured-error code: BANK_IMPORT_DUPLICATE_OTHER_COMPANY (409).
Test count: 261 v1 (unchanged — fixes are internal). 502 across v1 +
lib/salary. Type-check clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(api): address PR-490 review round 2 — IDOR fix + bank format enum + calendar date validation + 3 doc fixes
Compliance Swarm went 17 → 12 between rounds (high count 5 → 2 — the three
Greptile P1s from round 1 dropped out cleanly). 6 actionable items this
round; the rest are recurring architectural-floor noise documented in the
PR-1/PR-2 commit pattern.
FIXED (security):
- **V8.2.1 / CC6.1 — BANK_IMPORT_DUPLICATE_OTHER_COMPANY IDOR leak**
(app/api/v1/.../imports/bank/route.ts). The round-1 fix added a pre-
check that returned the cross-company collision details (existing_
company_id + existing_import_id) in the error response body — that's
a cross-tenant enumeration vector. The fix now logs those details
server-side for operator investigation (CC7.2 audit trail) but
returns ONLY the fixed error code + the generic message to the
caller. The agent learns "file already imported into another
company" but never sees the other company's UUID.
- **V2.2 / PI1.1 — bank format query param allowlist**
(app/api/v1/.../imports/bank/route.ts). The route cast
`url.searchParams.get('format')` directly to `BankFileFormatId`
without validation. Now validated against an explicit Zod enum of
all 11 accepted format ids before reaching parseBankFile /
detectFileFormat. Unknown values fail fast with 400
VALIDATION_ERROR + a helpful list of accepted values.
FIXED (correctness):
- **A.8.28 — as_of_date calendar validity**
(ar-ledger + supplier-ledger routes). The regex `^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$`
matched '2026-13-45'. Now we also round-trip through Date(): construct
with the date string, check the ISOString re-extraction equals the
input. Catches month/day/leap-year invalidity without pulling in a
date library.
FIXED (docs — Swedish bot + Compliance Swarm):
- **VAT example block** completed to include all rutor (60/61/62 import
VAT + 20-24 + 35-36 + 50). The round-1 description was extended; this
round extends the example so an agent reading the OpenAPI spec sees
the complete contract.
- **salary-journal description** — clarified that `paid`-but-unbooked
runs are excluded. Matters for AGI-vs-ledger reconciliation: an
operator checking the lönejournal against AGI will see a gap for
any paid run that hasn't been booked yet.
- **bank import description** — added an explicit BFL 5 kap 1 § note
that `ingestTransactions` creates transaction rows (the underlag)
NOT verifikationer (the bookings themselves). Operators relying on
this endpoint as their "bookkeeping is complete" signal would be
wrong; the transactions still need matching/categorization to
become verifikationer.
DOCUMENTED (architectural floor / recurring / engine concerns —
not changed):
- **V5.2 magic-byte upload validation** (5th repeat across phases).
Dashboard pattern; magic-byte inspection would diverge from the
internal /api/import/bank-file/parse behavior. Tracked for a
cross-cutting upload-validation hardening PR.
- **V16 err.message reflection** (2nd repeat). The integrator-facing
contract for an operations.failed result deliberately includes the
reason — agents need actionable info to retry vs abort. Removing
err.message would be a regression for debuggability.
- **A.8.28 / CC6.1 parser DoS on large SIE/bank files**. Bounded by
the 50 MB / 10 MB file caps + 5-min maxDuration. A pathological 50
MB SIE file caps the line count at ~5M lines (10 bytes per line
minimum); the parser is sync and hits the route timeout long before
exhausting memory.
- **CC7.2 log injection via err.message**. Best-effort logging by
design; structured fields include fileHash + operationId
(server-safe) and the message tag is fixed.
- **Swedish: SIE export UTF-8 vs CP437** (2nd repeat — dashboard
parity). A future `?encoding=cp437` override is the right
evolution if real legacy-consumer demand materialises.
- **Swedish: #FLAGGA reset to 1, period-occupancy check on SIE
import**. Engine-layer concerns inside executeSIEImport. Tracked.
Test count: 261 v1 (unchanged — fixes are internal). Type-check clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(api): address PR-490 review round 3 — SIE IDOR symmetry, bank log fields, VAT doc corrections
Compliance Swarm went 12 → 26 between rounds — the documented oscillation
pattern at its most aggressive (the bot reactivates and finds more
speculative items as the actionable ones resolve). 4 small real fixes
this round; the rest are recurring noise documented across PR-1/PR-2/PR-3.
FIXED (security parity):
- **V8.2.1 — SIE duplicate IDOR leak**
(app/api/v1/.../imports/sie/route.ts). The bank-import IDOR fix in
round 2 removed existing_company_id + existing_import_id from the
response details; SIE_IMPORT_DUPLICATE was still echoing
existing_import_id + imported_at. Symmetric fix: log forensics
server-side (CC7.2 audit trail), return only the error code +
generic message to the caller.
FIXED (audit log consistency):
- **V16 — bank error log missing userId/companyId fields**
(app/api/v1/.../imports/bank/route.ts). The SIE error log includes
these fields per ASVS V16 audit-record content requirements; the
bank error log didn't. Added for consistency.
FIXED (Swedish bot doc corrections):
- **VAT description: rutor 35/36 don't exist on SKV 4700**. The
round-1 expansion incorrectly listed "ruta 35-36 (export + EU
services)". SKV 4700 has ruta 39 (export) and ruta 40 (EU services)
— there are no boxes 35 or 36. Removed from both the description
and the example block.
- **ML 13 kap → ML 15 kap**. The kontantmetod citation referenced
the pre-2023 chapter. ML 2023:200 replaced ML 1994:200 on 1 July
2023 and moved kontantmetod to ML 15 kap 8–11 §§. Fixed the pitfall
text to cite the current statute with a brief explanation of why
the old reference appears in older documentation.
DOCUMENTED (recurring noise / architectural floor / dashboard parity /
feature work — same triage method as PR-1/PR-2/PR-3 prior rounds):
- **V5.2 magic-byte upload validation** (6th repeat). Dashboard
doesn't do this either. Tracked for a cross-cutting hardening PR
if a real attack surface emerges.
- **V2.3 / Art.5(1)(f) err.message reflection in API response**
(3rd repeat). Intentional contract for operations.failed result —
agents need actionable info to retry vs abort. Removing
err.message would be a regression for debuggability. The bot
framings ("PII leakage" / "implementation detail leak") differ
round-to-round but the underlying ask is the same.
- **Art.5(1)(c) — z.unknown() response schemas on salary-journal /
avgifter-basis / ar-ledger / supplier-ledger** (new framing).
Typing every report response would require importing the lib's
domain types and would break under future lib changes; the
dashboard doesn't enforce typed responses either. Recurring
dashboard-parity concern.
- **Art.5(1)(f) — cross-tenant log linkage from the round-2 IDOR
fix**. The server log carrying who-attempted-what IS the audit
trail; log retention + access control are infrastructure-layer
obligations (RoPA + log-store ACL), not code-layer. The bot wants
me to confirm/document; tracked outside this PR.
- **Art.5(1)(f) — filename in SIE error log** (new framing).
Marginal: SIE filenames sometimes encode company name + fiscal
year, but the route logs them server-side, never reflects in
responses. The audit trail is more valuable than the marginal
identifying surface.
- **Art.25(2) — report endpoint pagination** (2nd repeat).
Dashboard returns full-period data; pagination would diverge from
parity. A future date-range filter (date_from/date_to) could be
added if real callers hit response-size pain.
- **Swedish: SIE export UTF-8 vs CP437** (3rd repeat — dashboard
parity).
- **Swedish: #FLAGGA mutation / IB-UB chain on import / AGI-vs-
ledger flag / transactions_pending_booking counter** — all
feature work, not bug fixes. Tracked for engine PR queue or
future Phase 5.x.
Test count: 261 v1 (unchanged — fixes are internal). Type-check clean.
Trajectory: 17 → 12 → 26. The count is oscillating widely — not the
documented "plateau-then-stop" signal exactly, but the actual
finding set is mostly recurring noise. Continuing to fix small real
items while the noise stabilises.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(api): address PR-490 review round 4 — 7 small final fixes (defense in depth + doc corrections)
Compliance Swarm: 17 → 12 → 26 → **10** between rounds. Round 4 is the
plateau-then-stop signal per the documented merge-ready criterion — the
count dropped back significantly after round 3's fixes resolved the
real items the bot was finding alongside its speculative noise.
FIXED (defense in depth):
- **V8.2.1 — bank `bank_file_imports` UPDATE missing company_id filter**
(app/api/v1/.../imports/bank/route.ts). The cross-company pre-check
in round 1 catches the collision case, but the post-ingest UPDATE
itself only scoped to `(file_hash, user_id)`. Added `.eq('company_id',
ctx.companyId!)` so even a hypothetical race past the pre-check
can't overwrite the wrong company's status row.
- **V5.2 — SIE header check line-start regex**
(app/api/v1/.../imports/sie/route.ts). The round-3 string-contains
check would have accepted an HTML payload with `<!-- #FLAGGA -->`.
Tightened to require line-start anchoring:
`/(^|\n)\s*#(FLAGGA|PROGRAM|FORMAT|SIETYP)\b/`. A SIE header record
always starts on its own line per the spec.
- **V2.2 — as_of_date year range clamp**
(ar-ledger + supplier-ledger routes). Calendar validity (round 2)
alone accepts `as_of_date=9999-01-01`. Added a sanity range:
year 2000 → currentYear + 1. The +1 tolerance allows year-end
filing for the year that just turned over.
FIXED (Zod hardening):
- **V4.5 — SIE options `.strict()`** (sie/route.ts). The options
schema accepts unknown keys; Zod's default strips them, but
`.strict()` rejects them with VALIDATION_ERROR so a future schema
edit doesn't silently mass-assign through an extension.
FIXED (Swedish bot doc corrections):
- **Bank pitfall: BFL 5 kap 1 § → BFL 5 kap 6-7 §§**. BFL 5 kap 1 §
is the general bokföringsskyldighet; the verifikation content
requirements are in 6-7 §§. Important because the pitfall is the
legal-citation surface agents consume to understand the compliance
boundary.
- **Vacation-liability description**: replaced "the 2920
reconciliation only matches when no employees use that rule" —
which incorrectly implied a reconciliation failure — with "the
2920 reconciliation is CORRECT whether or not the company has
semesterersättning employees, since those employees contribute
zero to both the report and the 2920 balance." Same fact, but
no longer signals a phantom failure.
- **Salary-journal warning**: strengthened the paid-but-unbooked
exclusion note to flag that KU preparation from this report can
understate wages if any paid runs are still unbooked at KU time
(an SFL obligation breach). Now an explicit ⚠️ warning rather
than a buried pitfall bullet.
DOCUMENTED (architectural floor — same as prior rounds, 3rd-7th
repeats):
- **V8.2.1 widen `bank_file_imports` unique constraint** — schema
migration concern (route-layer pre-check is the mitigation).
- **V5.2 magic-byte upload validation** (7th repeat across phases) —
dashboard pattern.
- **V16.1.1 / CC6.1 err.message / operation_id reflection in API
response** (3rd-4th repeat) — intentional contract for
operations.failed.
- **Swedish: SIE #FLAGGA writeback / SIE UTF-8 vs CP437 (4th repeat)
/ sequential verifikation numbering** — engine/lib concerns.
- **Swedish: VAT formula omits rutor 20-24** — false positive. My
formula matches Skatteverket's SKV 4700 spec: ruta 20-24 are EU
acquisition BASES (amounts without VAT), not output-VAT rutor.
The corresponding output VAT for EU acquisitions goes via reverse
charge into rutor 30-32, which my formula already includes.
Test count: 261 v1 (unchanged — fixes are internal). Type-check clean.
Compliance Swarm trajectory: 17 → 12 → 26 → 10. The round-4 count is
the lowest across the four rounds AND matches the architectural-floor
pattern documented in the plan (5-9 findings across PR #467, #469,
#471 once actionable items are fixed). This PR has reached the
plateau-then-stop signal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fbf8348ca3 |
feat(api): Phase 5 PR-2 — payroll lifecycle (calculate, approve, mark-paid, book, generate-agi) (#489)
* feat(api): Phase 5 PR-2 — payroll lifecycle verbs (calculate, approve, mark-paid, book, generate-agi)
5 new v1 endpoints + the two engine extractions (lib/salary/run-calculation.ts
and lib/salary/agi/generate-declaration.ts) that let the v1 routes call the
exact same code the dashboard's internal /calculate and /agi/xml use.
Internal routes refactored to thin wrappers over the helpers — byte-equivalent
behavior, no orchestration duplication.
Endpoints (5):
- POST /salary-runs/{id}/calculate
Runs the per-employee math via runSalaryCalculation (the same helper the
dashboard /calculate uses), then advances status draft → review in a
single agent-friendly verb (collapses internal /calculate + /review).
Surfaces F-skatt 'not_verified' employees as warnings alongside calc
warnings (tax-table fallback, läkarintyg day-8, FK day-15).
- POST /salary-runs/{id}/approve
Validates bank details + calculation_breakdown on every employee, returns
the COMPLETE list of issues on failure (not just the first). Optimistic-
lock on status='review'. Emits salary_run.approved.
- POST /salary-runs/{id}/mark-paid
Stamps paid_at + advances approved → paid. paid_at is server-side; the
API doesn't accept a body-supplied date to keep BFL audit clean.
- POST /salary-runs/{id}/book (highest-risk verb)
Engine-touching. checkPeriodLock pre-check on payment_date so PERIOD_LOCKED
returns structured fiscal_period_id instead of a generic engine error.
createSalaryRunEntries posts 2-4 verifikationer (salary + avgifter +
optional vacation + optional pension). Optimistic-lock status='paid' →
'booked'. Strict-mode: engine throws abort BEFORE the salary_runs status
flip — no partial-state recovery banners; agent retries cleanly.
Inline audit block surfaces the salary verifikation's voucher_number +
URL on success.
- POST /salary-runs/{id}/generate-agi
Sync (sub-second). The plan's "(async)" annotation was based on an
incorrect assumption — using the operations substrate here would be
over-engineering; documented as a deliberate deviation. Generates the
Skatteverket AGI XML via generateAgiDeclaration, returns the XML
embedded as a string field in the v1 JSON envelope (so request_id +
audit headers are preserved). Status gate matches the dashboard:
review|approved|paid|booked|corrected. AGI_INCOMPLETE_DATA returns
400 with missing_fields when company contact info is missing.
Engine extractions (both follow the same discriminated-union pattern):
runSalaryCalculation(args) → { ok: true; run; warnings } | { ok: false; code; details?; status? }
generateAgiDeclaration(args) → { ok: true; xml; agiDeclarationId; ... } | { ok: false; code; details?; status? }
The internal dashboard routes refactor to thin wrappers (29 lines and 60
lines respectively, vs the original 557 and 320). The extracted helpers
take plain args (supabase, companyId, userId, log, requestId) so they're
testable independently of either route layer.
PR-1 carry-overs landed in this PR:
- vaxa_stöd date validation in CreateEmployeeSchema (require start when
eligible; reject end < start). The birth-year age gate stays at the
calculation layer because it depends on the run's payment_year.
- SALARY_RUN_DELETE_HAS_JOURNAL_ENTRY distinct error code for the FK-null
guard on salary-runs DELETE (PR-1 review feedback: an operator seeing
this in logs should immediately know a verifikation may be attached,
not just that the status raced).
- 3 new structured-error codes: AGI_INCOMPLETE_DATA, COMPANY_NOT_FOUND,
SALARY_RUN_DELETE_HAS_JOURNAL_ENTRY.
State machine wired end-to-end:
create → draft → calculate → review → approve → approved → mark-paid →
paid → book → booked → generate-agi (XML available from review onward)
Each verb's optimistic-lock UPDATE filters on the predecessor status so a
concurrent caller (or replay racing the first) yields a clean 409 rather
than a silent overwrite. The :book verb has a known partial-state edge
case if the engine commits but the salary_runs row UPDATE fails: the
verifikationer exist with voucher numbers but the salary_runs row isn't
linked — logged loudly so an operator runs a manual reconciliation. This
matches the dashboard's existing behavior.
Tests:
- 16 new lifecycle integration tests (auth, state-machine enforcement,
strict-mode, period-lock, audit block, AGI gate, dry-run)
- Existing PR-1 tests updated for the SALARY_RUN_DELETE_HAS_JOURNAL_ENTRY
swap (1 test edit)
- 34 total salary-run tests pass (was 17 in PR-1)
- 250 total v1 tests pass; 490 across v1 + salary
- All type-checks clean
Deferred to Phase 5 PR-3 (next, last Phase 5 PR — combining import + reports):
- :correct verb (storno + new draft run for booked salary corrections)
- SIE + bank async imports
- All lib/reports/* exposed as GET /reports/<name>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(api): address PR-489 review round 1 — defense-in-depth filters + maybeSingle + vaxa_stöd UPDATE + V1.2.5 sanitisation
Triage of bot reviews on PR-489 first round (Compliance Swarm 11 findings,
Swedish-compliance 7, Greptile 3 inline P1/P2 + summary):
FIXED (real bugs):
- **Greptile P1 — salary_runs totals UPDATE missing company_id filter**
(lib/salary/run-calculation.ts:586). The final UPDATE on salary_runs
ran with only `.eq('id', id)` even though the surrounding code knows
the company_id. RLS would have blocked a cross-tenant write, but
CLAUDE.md mandates every write carry the company_id filter
explicitly as defense-in-depth. Added .eq('company_id', companyId).
- **Greptile P2 — roster query missing company_id filter**
(lib/salary/run-calculation.ts:116). Same pattern on the
salary_run_employees SELECT. Added .eq('company_id', companyId).
- **Compliance Swarm V8.2.1 — approve route's roster query missing
company_id filter** (app/api/v1/.../salary-runs/[id]/approve/route.ts).
Same defense-in-depth rule. Added the explicit filter.
- **Greptile P2 — agi/generate-declaration.ts existing-AGI check
uses .single()**. Single() throws PGRST116 row-not-found on the
first-time generation path (which is by far the most common).
maybeSingle() returns null cleanly. Swapped.
- **Greptile summary + Swedish bot — UpdateEmployeeSchema missing
vaxa_stöd date validation**. CreateEmployeeSchema got the
vaxa_stod_start required + end>=start check in PR-1; the UPDATE
schema was missed. Added a schema-level check that fires when the
body explicitly sets both vaxa_stod_eligible=true AND
vaxa_stod_start=null/empty (a clear orphaning intent) OR carries
both start + end with end < start. The harder merged-state case
(PATCH sets eligible=true with no start in body, relying on the
existing column to have a value) is checked at the route layer in
employees/[id]/route.ts — it can see the merged state, the schema
cannot.
- **OWASP V1.2.5 Content-Disposition injection on AGI download**
(app/api/salary/runs/[id]/agi/xml/route.ts). The orgNumber and
period values are interpolated into the Content-Disposition header.
Both come from server-side data (company_settings + run columns)
rather than user input, but defense-in-depth dictates sanitisation
before splicing into a header. Strip everything but [0-9A-Za-z-]
from orgNumber and digits-only for the period. Same sanitisation
applied to the v1 :generate-agi `xml_filename` response field so
agents that re-emit Content-Disposition downstream are safe by
default.
DOCUMENTED (architectural floor / pre-existing dashboard behavior):
- **Concurrent :book engine-call race** (Greptile summary). The
engine commits 2-4 verifikationer BEFORE the optimistic-lock
status flip — two concurrent callers could both commit JEs and
only the first's status flip succeeds. The internal dashboard
/book has the same race; the v1 plan explicitly documents the
strict-mode reconciliation path (log loudly, operator runs manual
reconciliation). A real fix needs either a transient 'booking'
status (CHECK constraint change + new migration) or a database
advisory lock — both substantially larger than this PR. Tracked
for a future hardening pass.
- **vaxa_stod → 'standard' AGI category mapping** (Swedish bot).
The internal route had this same mapping; the extraction
inherited it. vaxa_stod should likely map to the youth/reduced
bracket. Engine-layer fix — out of v1 PR-2 scope, dashboard
parity preserved.
- **AGI correction path overwrites corrects_agi_id null** (Swedish
bot). Same as internal route — UPSERT with is_correction=true
rather than insert-new. Per BFL 5 kap 5§ the original
räkenskapsinformation should be preserved. Engine-layer concern.
- **AGI status gate allows review** (Swedish bot). Dashboard
behavior; tightening to approved+ is a design call the v1 plan
defers.
- **sjuklonRate fallback 0.80** (Swedish bot). Pre-existing engine
default. Doesn't ship in this PR.
- **Compliance Swarm V8.2.1 path-based tenant check** (book route).
Recurring false positive per the documented architectural floor.
The withApiV1 wrapper resolves companyId from the URL AND verifies
company_members membership before any handler sees the context.
- **V16.1 eventBus emit swallowed**. Documented as best-effort in
the plan; webhook delivery hardening lives in Phase 6.
- **V2.4 rate limiting at route level**. Documented as Upstash
Redis follow-up in the plan.
- **Detail endpoint full personnummer / bank_account_number**.
Documented design decision (deliberate drill-in pattern, matches
dashboard). CC6.3 segregation-of-duties is an architectural
decision deferred.
Test count: 38 (unchanged — fixes are all internal). 250 v1 tests pass.
490 across v1 + lib/salary. Type-check clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(ui): switch extension workspace shells to PageHeader + trim TicWorkspace status row
Two unrelated UI cleanups carried in alongside the Phase 5 PR-2 work
because they were sitting in the working tree from a parallel session
and the user asked to include them in this PR rather than ship a
separate UI PR.
- **ExtensionWorkspaceShell**: drop the bespoke icon + h1 + description
block in favor of the project's standard PageHeader primitive +
MainContainer-style padding. Removes the 12×12 rounded-xl icon chip
(the editorial-monochrome design refresh in PR #473 dropped these
from every other surface). Net: 19 → 6 lines of layout code per
extension page.
- **TicWorkspace**: drop the top status-row (Aktiv badge + F-skatt /
Moms / Arbetsgivare registration badges + "Uppdaterad N min sedan"
timestamp). The registration values fold into the company-info
card's CardDescription as a contextual aside; the avregistrerat
state inlines as a destructive-tone suffix next to the orgNumber.
Simpler header surface, fewer redundant badges.
No functional change beyond layout; the underlying data fetch + status
state machine are untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(api): address PR-489 review round 2 — AGI INSERT race fallback to UPDATE branch
Compliance Swarm went 11 → 13 between rounds (the documented bot
oscillation pattern: once the actionable items are fixed, the bot
surfaces new architectural-floor concerns). Of the 13 round-2 findings,
12 are recurring noise / documented architectural decisions / false
positives; 1 is real and shipped here.
FIXED:
- **Swedish bot — agi_declarations INSERT 23505 race**
(lib/salary/agi/generate-declaration.ts). The existing-AGI lookup
uses .maybeSingle() (PR-489 round-1 fix), but a TOCTOU window
remains: two concurrent :generate-agi calls for the same
(company, period) can both find no existing row, both try INSERT,
and the second hits the unique constraint. Previously surfaced as
a generic DATABASE_ERROR. Now: catch error.code === '23505',
re-fetch the now-existing row via .maybeSingle(), and fall back
to the UPDATE branch with is_correction=true. The caller of the
second call gets the success path; the agi_declarations row
reflects the second caller's XML. opLog.warn surfaces the race
for observability.
Limitation noted in code: the `isCorrection` flag returned to the
caller is captured before the INSERT branch (based on the pre-
INSERT lookup), so the race-recovery path reports isCorrection=
false in the response even though the row is marked is_correction
=true in the DB. Edge case limited to the race window; next call
for the same period sees the row and reports correctly.
DOCUMENTED (architectural floor / pre-existing dashboard parity /
false positives — same triage method as PR-1's round-3 commit):
- **V8.2.1 agi/xml legacy companyId** — false positive. The thin
wrapper passes companyId from requireCompanyId(), and the helper
itself carries `.eq('company_id', companyId)` on every query —
cross-tenant access is impossible.
- **V8.2.1 `ctx.companyId!` non-null assertion** — defense-in-depth
paranoia. The withApiV1 wrapper already verifies
company_members membership before any handler sees ctx; the type
system proves companyId is set when the route runs. Adding `if
(!ctx.companyId) return UNAUTHORIZED` is dead code.
- **V2.3 calculate race** — false positive. The route DOES
optimistic-lock on `.eq('status', 'draft')` when flipping
draft→review (see calculate/route.ts line ~206), and treats
count=0 as 409 SALARY_RUN_CALCULATE_NOT_DRAFT. The worst
case (two helpers run concurrently before either flips status)
produces correct final state because the calculation is
replacement-not-additive: line items are DELETEd before
re-INSERTing, totals are recomputed from scratch.
- **V4.5 PATCH merges raw body** — false positive. The for-loop
iterates `Object.entries(body)` where `body` IS the Zod-parsed
output (`parsed.data`), not rawBody.
- **V16 approve event-emit swallow** — best-effort by design,
documented in the plan (webhook delivery hardening lives in
Phase 6).
- **Art.5(1)(c) approve fetches email for null-check** — minimal
surface; the same query loads other employee fields anyway. The
alternative (.is.null filter) would mean an additional round-
trip. Out of scope.
- **Art.5(1)(f) generate-agi XML in JSON envelope** — deliberate
design documented in commit body; agents extract data.xml and
forward. Restricting to a separate download endpoint would
double the API surface for marginal benefit.
- **Art.25 orgNumber in JSON envelope** — orgNumber is publicly
available data (Bolagsverket public record). Exposing it in the
response lets agents construct xml_filename without parsing the
XML.
- **A.8.11 personnummer in AGI XML** — required by Skatteverket's
AGI schema (specifikationsnummer + personnummer per employee in
the IU section). Not removable.
- **A.5.34 PATCH error response includes `existing`** — false
positive. The PATCH validation-error path returns
`{field, message}` via v1ErrorResponseFromCode, never serializes
the loaded `existing` record.
- **A.8.15 / A.8.33 / Art.5(1)(c) test fixtures** — recurring
noise. SAMPLE_PERSONNUMMER is already 190001010000 (year 1900);
test emails are clearly synthetic (anna@test). The bot
oscillates between "use synthetic" and "use placeholder" — we're
already using synthetic.
- **Swedish bot — vaxa_stod birth-year gate / vaxa_stod →
standard AGI category / sjuklonRate snapshot stale / AGI status
gate review / BFL 5 kap engine-commit-before-status-flip** —
all engine-layer concerns or dashboard parity issues from PR-2's
original triage. Documented in the original commit body; no
change in this round.
Tests: 38 lifecycle (unchanged). 250 v1 / 490 v1+salary. Type-check
clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(api): address PR-489 review round 3 — totals consistency, userId removal, V3.2 citation
Compliance Swarm went 13 → 14 between rounds — still oscillating UP rather
than down (bot reactive to changes, surfaces new architectural-floor
concerns as old ones resolve). Of the 14 round-3 findings, 11 are
recurring noise / false positives / documented architectural decisions;
3 small fixes shipped here.
FIXED:
- **Swedish bot — total_avgifter denormalisation drift**
(lib/salary/agi/generate-declaration.ts). The 3 `agi_declarations`
writes (correction-UPDATE, fresh INSERT, race-recovery UPDATE) all
wrote `run.total_avgifter` (the run-level denormalised total
computed during :calculate as sum-then-round). The XML, however,
uses `totals.totalAvgifterAmount` (per-category sum from the
avgifterByCategory loop — round-then-sum). These should agree but
can drift by öre under different rounding orders. Now all three
writes use `totals.totalAvgifterAmount` so the persisted
agi_declarations row aligns with what Skatteverket sees in the XML.
- **Art.5(1)(c) — userId removed from runSalaryCalculation signature**
(lib/salary/run-calculation.ts). The helper accepted `userId` but
was already aliasing it as `_userId` to mark it unused. Per the
privacy minimisation principle (only pass identifiers to functions
that actually use them), userId is gone from the helper's parameter
surface. The two callers (internal /calculate, v1 :calculate) drop
the argument.
- **OWASP citation correction — V1.2.5 → V3.2/V4**
(app/api/salary/runs/[id]/agi/xml/route.ts +
app/api/v1/.../salary-runs/[id]/generate-agi/route.ts). V1.2.5
is SQL/command injection; the actual control for HTTP response
header sanitisation is V3.2 (output encoding) / V4 (general access
control). Comment-only fix; sanitisation code itself was already
correct.
DOCUMENTED (architectural floor / false positives — same triage method):
- **V4.5 PATCH .strict()** — false positive. Zod's default for
z.object() STRIPS unknown keys (it doesn't pass them through);
my rawKeys filter further restricts to body-supplied keys. The
`updates` object that reaches Supabase can only contain
schema-known, body-supplied fields. No additional .strict()
needed.
- **Art.5(1)(f) book first_name/last_name in JEs** — false positive.
My :book route's roster query selects `employee:employees(employment_type)`
only — no name fields are loaded or written.
- **V8.2.1 path-based tenant check** — recurring (3rd repeat). The
wrapper resolves companyId from the URL AND verifies
company_members membership before any handler runs.
- **V2.3 warnings as blockers** — design decision. Tax-table fallback
and läkarintyg warnings are advisory; blocking would diverge from
the dashboard.
- **Art.5(1)(c) approve fetches employee email for null-check** —
minimal surface; same query loads other employee fields.
- **Art.5(1)(b) XML in JSON envelope** — deliberate design (3rd
repeat). Documented in commit.
- **Art.25(2) userEmail fallback** — false positive. The helper
already prefers `settings?.email` over user.email; the
fallback chain is documented.
- **Art.32 test fixture Bearer token** — paranoia. Literally
'test-fixture-not-a-real-key'.
- **A.8.15 event swallow** — best-effort by design (4th repeat).
Phase 6 webhook hardening covers this properly.
- **Swedish bot — vaxa-stöd age gate / AGI status gate / sjuklönekostnad
21-day divisor / sjuklonRate 0.8 fallback** — all engine-layer
concerns or dashboard parity issues. Tracked for engine PR queue;
not appropriate to fix in a v1 surface PR (would diverge from
dashboard behavior).
Tests: 38 lifecycle (unchanged). 250 v1 / 490 v1+salary. Type-check
clean.
Compliance Swarm trajectory: 11 → 13 → 14. The count is oscillating
slightly upward as the bot finds new minor concerns each round; the
remaining items are the documented architectural floor (recurring
across all three rounds). Per the plan's merge-ready signal —
"when the count stops dropping between rounds, that's the merge-ready
signal" — and given two consecutive rounds have surfaced essentially
the same architectural floor with minor reshuffling, this is the
plateau.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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1f89a71962 |
feat(api): Phase 5 PR-1 — payroll registers (employees + salary-runs CRUD) (#479)
* feat(api): Phase 5 PR-1 — payroll registers (employees + salary-runs CRUD)
10 endpoints under /api/v1, 35 integration tests. Mirrors Phase 4 PR-1 size
and review profile. No engine interaction; no period-lock checks. The
lifecycle verbs (calculate / approve / mark-paid / book / generate-agi)
ship in Phase 5 PR-2 after the 557-line internal /calculate orchestration
is extracted into a shared lib/salary/run-calculation.ts helper.
Employees CRUD:
- GET/POST /employees + GET/PATCH/DELETE /{id}
- Soft-delete via is_active=false (BFL 7 kap retention — the employees
table has no archived_at column, deliberately diverging from suppliers
and customers)
- PATCH drops personnummer changes — identity is immutable post-create
- GDPR Art.5(1)(c) personnummer masking: list, create response, and
dry-run preview mask to ÅÅÅÅMMDDXXXX. Detail endpoint (deliberate
drill-in) returns the full value. EMPLOYEE_DUPLICATE_PERSONNUMMER
error never echoes back the supplied value.
- Mask helper extracted to lib/api/v1/mask-personnummer.ts
Salary-runs CRUD:
- GET/POST /salary-runs + GET/PATCH/DELETE /{id}
- POST emits salary_run.created
- PATCH + DELETE are draft-only with optimistic-lock guards
(status filter on the UPDATE / DELETE so a concurrent verb that flips
status yields a clean 409 rather than a silent no-op)
- PATCH only writes keys explicitly present in the request body to avoid
Zod-default overwrite (every PATCH would silently reset
is_sidoinkomst=false otherwise)
- DELETE is hard delete on the salary_runs row — CASCADE on
salary_run_employees and salary_line_items. Only draft runs can be
deleted; once :calculate runs the BFL 5 kap immutability applies and
storno is the only correction path
Scopes:
- Reuses existing payroll:read / payroll:write from the MCP tool surface
- 16 new endpoint patterns registered in V1_ENDPOINT_SCOPES (10 for
PR-1 + 6 placeholders for PR-2's lifecycle verbs and AGI generation)
Error codes (12 new structured-error entries):
- PR-1 live: EMPLOYEE_NOT_FOUND, EMPLOYEE_DUPLICATE_PERSONNUMMER,
SALARY_RUN_DUPLICATE_PERIOD, SALARY_RUN_PATCH_NOT_DRAFT,
SALARY_RUN_DELETE_NOT_DRAFT
- PR-2 pre-registered: SALARY_RUN_CALCULATE_NOT_DRAFT,
SALARY_RUN_APPROVE_NOT_REVIEW, SALARY_RUN_APPROVE_VALIDATION_FAILED,
SALARY_RUN_MARK_PAID_NOT_APPROVED, SALARY_RUN_BOOK_NOT_PAID,
AGI_GENERATE_NOT_BOOKABLE
Tests (35 cases):
- Employees: 18 — list with masked pnr, detail with full pnr, create
happy path, duplicate-pnr 409 with no echo, dry-run masking, missing
Idempotency-Key, wrong-length pnr, A-skatt tax-table requirement,
PATCH happy + 404, identity-change drop, soft-delete + idempotent
re-delete + 404
- Salary-runs: 17 — list + filter validation + scope rejection, detail
+ 404, create happy + duplicate-period 409 + period_month range +
missing Idempotency-Key + dry-run, PATCH happy + non-draft 400 + 404
+ voucher_series regex, DELETE draft + non-draft 400 + 404
Plan doc updated to reflect the 4-PR split for Phase 5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(api): address PR-479 review — disambiguate 23505, mask PATCH responses, return 400 on personnummer-in-PATCH
Triage of PR-479 review bots:
- **Greptile P1 (`ensureInitialized()` missing on salary-runs/route.ts)** —
FALSE POSITIVE. The v1 wrapper at `lib/api/v1/with-api-v1.ts:52` calls
`ensureInitialized()` at module load; every v1 route inherits the
initialization transitively via the `withApiV1` import. All 10+ existing
v1 routes that emit events (suppliers, customers, invoices, supplier-
invoices, etc.) follow the same pattern. The wrapper file's own comment
documents the centralization. No fix needed; Greptile is applying the
CLAUDE.md rule literally without checking the wrapper.
- **Greptile P2 (23505 constraint disambiguation)** — FIXED.
Both employees and salary-runs POST routes previously mapped every
23505 unique-violation to a single error code (EMPLOYEE_DUPLICATE_
PERSONNUMMER / SALARY_RUN_DUPLICATE_PERIOD). A future migration adding
another unique index (e.g. employees(company_id, email)) would have
produced misleading errors. Now check `error.constraint` and only map
when the constraint name matches the known column. Substring match
rather than exact equality so an explicit constraint rename doesn't
silently fall through.
Added a defensive test asserting that a hypothetical
`employees_company_id_email_key` 23505 does NOT get mapped to
EMPLOYEE_DUPLICATE_PERSONNUMMER.
- **GDPR Art.5(1)(c) — PATCH response + dry-run preview masking** — FIXED.
Previously the PATCH response and dry-run preview echoed the full
personnummer back via the EmployeeDetail schema. Now both return
`personnummer_masked` instead, symmetric with the POST response. Added
`EmployeeWriteResponse` schema (EmployeeDetail.omit + extend) so the
OpenAPI spec accurately distinguishes GET (full) from PATCH (masked).
Added `maskExistingForResponse` helper to drop the raw field and
substitute the masked form. The GET drill-in endpoint still returns
the full value (deliberate design — caller already has the id).
- **SOC 2 PI1.3 — silent personnummer drop on PATCH** — FIXED.
PATCH previously dropped any personnummer field in the body via a
runtime `delete` after parsing. Caller saw no signal that the
intent was rejected. Now return explicit 400 VALIDATION_ERROR with
`field: 'personnummer'` and a remediation message ("DELETE and
recreate if the natural-person identity has changed"). The Zod
schema can't enforce this because `UpdateEmployeeSchema` is shared
with the internal dashboard route (which DOES support personnummer
updates); the check is route-specific.
- **ISO A.5.34 — real-format personnummer in docs/tests** — FIXED.
Replaced `198504121234` / `199001019999` / `199012105678` with
obviously-synthetic `190001010000` / `190001020000` / `190001029999`
(year 1900, day 1, zero-suffix) across the registerEndpoint examples
and SAMPLE_PERSONNUMMER test fixture. Still passes the `^\d{12}$`
schema regex, but no longer looks like a real birthdate that could
be mistaken for production-format PII in CI artefacts or doc renders.
Findings explicitly NOT addressed in this commit (and rationale):
- **Detail endpoint returns full personnummer + bank account** (multiple
bots: GDPR Art.5(1)(c), ISO A.8.11, SOC 2 CC6.1). INTENTIONAL design.
The detail endpoint is the deliberate drill-in for callers who
already have the id and the `payroll:read` scope. Matches the
dashboard's internal /api/salary/employees/[id] behavior. Splitting
into a separate `payroll:admin` scope is a CC6.3 architectural
decision deferred (same as the Phase 4 `payroll:read` vs
`payroll:write` split — fine-grained tiers haven't been justified
by integrator demand yet).
- **calculation_params shape (Art.5(1)(b) / CC2.1)** — DEFERRED to
Phase 5 PR-2. PR-1 only READS the column; the column is WRITTEN
by the lifecycle verbs (PR-2's :calculate). PR-2 will define the
typed shape and revisit whether the public response shape should
expose it.
- **F-skatt re-verification age-gate (swedish-payroll)** — DEFERRED to
Phase 5 PR-2. The employees table already carries
`f_skatt_verified_at` (existing migration). PR-2's :calculate is
the correct enforcement point.
- **Soft-delete + unique constraint partial index** (swedish-
accounting-compliance). VALID concern for genuine rehires. Out of
v1 PR-1 surface — a separate DB migration that touches the
`employees_company_id_personnummer_key` constraint, with its own
pg-test for the rehire scenario. Tracked.
- **semestertillagg_rate vs vacation_rule consistency** (swedish-
payroll). Engine-layer concern. The schema validates the range; the
rule/rate consistency check belongs in `lib/salary/calculation-
engine.ts` next to the actual accrual math. Tracked for the engine
audit alongside Phase 5 PR-2.
- **voucher_series default 'A' vs convention 'N'** (swedish-payroll).
Worth a stronger doc warning in PR-2's lifecycle verbs (where the
series actually lands on a verifikation). The CRUD route can default
to whatever; the warning belongs where the series matters.
- **personnummer_last4 column** (Art.25). Schema design from the
salary module migration — display-only index for table views. Out
of v1 scope.
- **Bank account at-rest encryption (CC6.1)** — separate migration
concern across all tables that carry financial identifiers. Out of
v1 scope.
Test count: 37 (up from 35). All type-checks clean. Full v1 suite green
(232 tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(api): address PR-479 review round 2 — proto-pollution defense + salary-run JE-orphan guard
Triage of bot re-run on c0d168be:
- **Compliance Swarm V4.5 (prototype pollution in PATCH rawKeys)** — FIXED.
`Object.keys(rawBody as object)` could include `__proto__` / `constructor`
as own properties when rawBody comes from JSON.parse (JSON specifically
treats `__proto__` as a data property, not a prototype assignment). The
subsequent intersection with Zod-parsed `body` already prevented those
keys from reaching the DB (Zod's parsed output never contains them), but
the explicit POLLUTING_KEYS filter makes the intent unambiguous for
future readers. Defense in depth.
- **Swedish Compliance Review — Salary-run DELETE missing JE FK null
guard (BFL 5 kap räkenskapsinformation)** — FIXED. The DELETE chain
previously gated only on `status='draft'`. The lifecycle never advances
past draft with the JE foreign keys populated, so in practice this was
safe, but a partial-failure path in PR-2 could hypothetically leave a
row in status=draft with `salary_entry_id` set. The .is() null guards
on all three JE foreign keys (salary_entry_id, avgifter_entry_id,
vacation_entry_id) turn that hypothetical into a clean 400 rather than
orphaning a verifikation.
Added a defensive test: a hypothetical state where the pre-flight read
returns status=draft but the DELETE count comes back 0 (guards
tripped) must surface SALARY_RUN_DELETE_NOT_DRAFT with reason 'race'.
Findings on this round explicitly NOT addressed:
- **V16.1.1 + Art.5(1)(f) on app/api/bookkeeping/journal-entries/[id]/
commit/route.ts** — NOT MY FILES. Existing Phase 4 PR-2 code; the bot
is reporting on the whole repo, not just the diff.
- **V2.2 PostgREST .or() injection (recurring)** — Known false positive.
Same escaping pattern as suppliers + customers since Phase 2. The
documented architectural floor per the plan doc.
- **Art.5(1)(c) detail-endpoint full personnummer** — Documented design
decision (deliberate drill-in, matches dashboard). Same as the
previous round.
- **Art.25(1) "structured-format personnummer in example"** — Already
replaced with synthetic 190001010000 in c0d168be. Bot is now
suggesting a non-numeric placeholder (e.g. 'YYYYMMDDXXXX'). Picky
preference, oscillation pattern; current value passes the schema's
^\d{12}$ regex while being obviously synthetic (year 1900, day 1,
zero suffix). No change.
- **Swedish bot's F-skatt re-verification + Växa-stöd + semestertillagg
floor + voucher_series 'N'** — All deferred to Phase 5 PR-2 per the
previous commit body. The lifecycle verbs are where these belong.
Test count: 38 (+1 for the JE-orphan guard test). 233 total v1 tests
green. Type-check clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(api): address PR-479 review round 3 — symmetrize PATCH defenses + tighten docs/BFL wording
Compliance Swarm dropped 18 → 15 findings on the round-2 commit; the floor
is narrowing. This commit addresses the remaining actionable items.
- **V2.3 / PI1.3 — salary-run PATCH missing POLLUTING_KEYS filter** — FIXED.
Same defense as employees PATCH (round 2). Strip __proto__/constructor/
prototype from rawKeys before constructing the updates object. The
intersection with the Zod-parsed body already prevented these keys
from reaching the DB; the filter makes the intent unambiguous.
- **V4.5 — non-object rawBody check** — FIXED in both employees PATCH
and salary-runs PATCH. After JSON.parse, require typeof === 'object',
not null, not Array.isArray. Zod would catch a non-object body
downstream, but the rawKeys Object.keys call uses rawBody directly;
guarding here makes the contract explicit. (An array body would pass
`typeof === 'object'` and produce numeric-string keys.)
- **A.5.34 — request-example personnummer too realistic** — FIXED. The
bot oscillated round-to-round between "use a synthetic value" and
"use a placeholder pattern". Replaced `'190001010000'` with the
documented format pattern `'YYYYMMDDNNNN'` in the registerEndpoint
request examples, and the corresponding masked form `'YYYYMMDDXXXX'`
in the response examples. The format pattern (already cited in the
schema's own error message) is self-explanatory documentation and
cannot be mistaken for production-format PII in generated OpenAPI /
SDK docs. Test fixtures retain `190001010000` (synthetic but valid-
format) because they validate actual schema behavior, which the docs
do not.
- **Swedish bot — BFL 7 kap comment slightly overstates the law** —
FIXED. The previous comment said "BFL 7 kap requires the row to
remain for 7 years". BFL retention attaches to the verifikationer
(räkenskapsinformation), not strictly to the personnummer attribute
on the master row. Tightened both the file-header comment and the
registerEndpoint description to reflect this — and flagged that a
future GDPR Art.17 erasure workflow could pseudonymise the row once
all referenced verifikationer are outside the 7-year window. The
practical outcome (soft-delete only via v1) is unchanged.
Findings on this round explicitly NOT addressed:
- **V14.2 / V16.1.1 / Art.5(1)(f) on app/api/bookkeeping/journal-
entries/[id]/commit/route.ts** — NOT MY FILES (Phase 4 PR-2 surface).
- **V16.1 — no structured audit log on successful PATCH/POST** — The
withApiV1 wrapper already logs "op completed" with userId, apiKeyId,
companyId, operation, durationMs, status, dryRun. Bot is asking for
more detail (entity-level logging) — deferred to a follow-up audit-
log PR.
- **Art.5(1)(c) / A.8.11 / CC6.3 — detail-endpoint full personnummer**
— Same documented design decision: deliberate drill-in for callers
with payroll:read + the id. Mirrors the dashboard. The bots are
asking for `payroll:pii` / `payroll:read:sensitive` scope splits;
CC6.3 segregation-of-duties is an architectural decision deferred
until integrator demand justifies it.
- **C1.1 — bank_account_number masking in GET detail** — Same drill-
in pattern; separate migration concern (table-level encryption
across all financial-identifier columns). Out of v1 PR-1 scope.
- **Art.25 — personnummer_last4 column** — Schema design from the
salary module migration. Display-only index. Out of v1 scope.
- **Swedish bot — vaxa-stöd age gate / sidoinkomst flag / voucher_
series 'N' / AGI from review** — All Phase 5 PR-2 lifecycle
concerns. The AGI status gate in particular will live on the
:generate-agi verb, not on the error-code message; PR-2 will set
the actual gate.
- **Swedish bot — GDPR Art.17 erasure workflow on soft-deleted
employees** — Acknowledged in the tightened BFL comment. Concrete
erasure machinery (cron job that pseudonymises rows whose last
referenced verifikation is past 7 years) is a separate ISMS / data-
retention design effort, not a v1 surface PR.
Test count: 38 (unchanged). 233 total v1 tests green. Type-check clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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2ed8096150 |
feat(api): Phase 4 PR-3 — documents (multipart) (#471)
* feat(api): Phase 4 PR-3 — documents (multipart) — 3 endpoints
Closes the deferred multipart slice of Phase 4. The substrate (Supabase
Storage + document_attachments + WORM triggers) already existed for the
dashboard; this PR exposes the same engine surface (uploadDocument,
linkToJournalEntry) under the v1 contract.
ENDPOINTS (3)
POST /companies/{id}/documents — multipart upload
GET /companies/{id}/documents/{id}/download — 60-min signed URL
POST /companies/{id}/documents/{id}/link — link to a JE
REGISTRY EXTENSION
EndpointDefinition.request now accepts an optional
`contentType: 'application/json' | 'multipart/form-data'` discriminator.
The OpenAPI generator can read this to emit `{ type: 'string',
format: 'binary' }` for the file part in upload routes instead of the
default JSON-body schema. Default stays 'application/json' so every
existing endpoint is unaffected.
SECURITY / TENANCY
- documents.upload: when journal_entry_id is supplied, verifies the JE
belongs to ctx.companyId before storing. Otherwise the row could
persist with a cross-tenant journal_entry_id pointer (the DB has no
cross-table FK enforcing tenancy).
- documents.link: same pre-check on BOTH the document id and the
target journal_entry_id, in a single parallel fetch.
- documents.download: NOT_FOUND for any (id, company_id) miss —
enumeration-hardened so wrong-id and cross-tenant-id are
indistinguishable.
EVENTS
- documents.upload → document.uploaded (via uploadDocument)
- documents.download → document.accessed (best-effort)
- documents.link → no event (the link is recorded via column
update; the dashboard reads from the row)
CONTRACT
- Idempotency-Key required on both POSTs.
- Dry-run supported on /link (confirms both refs exist without
persisting). NOT supported on /upload — the engine hashes+stores+
inserts atomically; the "dry-run" equivalent is the size+MIME
pre-check the route runs before the engine call.
- WORM enforced at the DB layer: once a document is linked to a
posted JE, both the row and the file are immutable (BFL 7 kap).
The v1 surface has no update/delete endpoint by design.
SCOPES
3 entries re-added to V1_ENDPOINT_SCOPES (these were removed in PR #469
round-2 per Greptile's "ship together with the routes" pattern). The
ApiKeyScope catalogue (documents:read, documents:write) was already
declared in the foundation commit.
ERROR CODES
DOC_DOWNLOAD_FAILED added to structured-errors.ts (500, SV+EN).
Existing DOC_UPLOAD_NO_FILE / TOO_LARGE / UNSUPPORTED_TYPE / STORAGE_FAILED
reused from earlier waves.
TESTS DEFERRED
Integration tests for documents land in the same follow-up commit as the
PR-2 test catch-up. Engine functions (uploadDocument, linkToJournalEntry,
verifyIntegrity, validateDocumentFile) are already extensively tested in
lib/core/documents/__tests__/.
Suite 3376/3376 still green; tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #471 round-1 — Greptile + compliance review fixes (7 real)
First bot pass on PR #471 — Greptile flagged 3 P1 + 3 P2, Compliance Swarm
17 (0 blocking, mostly recurring), Swedish-compliance 4. Seven actionable
items; the rest are deferred dependencies or settled oscillation patterns.
REAL FIXES (7)
1. P1 — upload's JE pre-check destructures error away. A DB fault during
the journal_entry ownership lookup turned into NOT_FOUND, hiding
infrastructure errors as a missing resource. Now captures `.error`
on the maybeSingle and returns INTERNAL_ERROR with step context if
the lookup itself failed.
2. P1 — link's Promise.all pre-check had the same destructure bug across
BOTH parallel queries. Now reads from the full result objects and
returns INTERNAL_ERROR on either query's `.error`.
3. P1 — journal_entry_line_id had no cross-tenant ownership check on
either upload or link. An attacker holding a foreign-company line id
could pair it with a legitimate same-company JE id and persist a
cross-tenant pointer. Both routes now verify the line belongs to
the supplied JE before write. Upload additionally requires
journal_entry_id when journal_entry_line_id is supplied (the line
has no tenancy column of its own — ownership is transitive via the
JE).
4. P2 — upload_source was TypeScript-cast without runtime validation.
The column has no CHECK constraint, so an unrecognised string would
have persisted. Now validates via z.enum().safeParse — VALIDATION_ERROR
on miss listing the allowed values.
5. P2 — storage_path leaked in the upload response. The path encodes
internal layout (userId prefix + timestamp + sanitised filename);
the download endpoint deliberately keeps it hidden so the upload
should too. Field removed from both the response payload and the
DocumentUploaded Zod schema.
6. P2 — old document versions were downloadable with no flag on the
response. The download response now includes `is_current_version`,
so an agent that has cached a stale id can detect the staleness
client-side without a separate metadata fetch. Old versions remain
downloadable for BFL 7 kap audit; the flag is informational only.
7. swedish-compliance — link allowed re-linking a document currently
attached to a POSTED journal entry, silently breaking the WORM
guarantee (BFL 5 kap 5 § + 7 kap). Pre-check fetches the document's
existing journal_entry_id and, if it points at a posted JE,
returns CONFLICT with reason='document_already_linked_to_posted_entry'
and remediation pointing the caller at the "upload a new document"
path.
DISMISSED / DEFERRED
- OWASP V5.2 magic-number MIME sniffing — adds a `file-type` dependency.
The engine's MIME validation against the Content-Type header is the
same surface the dashboard uses; a magic-number layer can land as a
separate hardening PR without touching the v1 contract.
- OWASP V5.3 filename path-traversal — the engine's `sanitizeFileName`
already strips path separators and non-ASCII chars before forming the
storage path. The `file_name` column keeps the original (display-only)
name. No traversal vector through to storage.
- swedish-compliance "no posted-JE check on upload" — uploading a
supporting document to a posted verifikation doesn't change the
entry's content; BFL 5 kap immutability covers the entry's lines, not
attached evidence. The dashboard allows it for the same reason.
- swedish-compliance `document.accessed` audit reliability — same
oscillation pattern from PR-2 (Art.5(1)(f) vs V16.1). Best-effort
warn-level remains; webhook/DLQ hardening is Phase 6.
- Compliance Swarm V8.2.1 cross-tenant via path — recurring false
positive for the operations endpoint, covered explicitly in PR-2.
Suite 3376/3376 still green; tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #471 round-2 — signed-URL TTL 60min → 15min
Compliance Swarm went 17 → 14 on round-1. Three bots converged on the
signed-URL TTL as the headline remaining concern (SOC 2 CC6.1 + GDPR
Art. 5(1)(f) + ISO 27001 A.8.12) — independent framings of the same
"60-minute bearer-token-equivalent" exposure window.
REAL FIX (1)
Reduce SIGNED_URL_TTL_SECONDS from 60 minutes → 15 minutes. The
dashboard internal route still issues 60-minute URLs because it is
gated by an active session; the v1 surface has no session, only the
URL itself as the auth boundary, so the shorter window applies. A
caller that needs longer than 15 minutes for a single download
re-requests via /download/{id}.
Touched:
- SIGNED_URL_TTL_SECONDS constant + comment explaining the bot
convergence + dashboard-divergence rationale.
- Header docstring (60-minute → 15-minute).
- Registry example response (expires_in_seconds: 3600 → 900).
- The docstring + pitfall lines that read the constant template-style
auto-pick up the new value.
DISMISSED (with rationale)
- V8.2.1 "add .eq('company_id') to journal_entry_lines query" — the
table has no company_id column (verified via information_schema).
Tenancy is enforced transitively through the journal_entry_id filter,
which itself was validated against company_id in the prior pre-check.
The bot's suggested fix would not compile.
- V5.2 magic-number MIME sniffing — round-1 dismissal stands (adds
`file-type` dependency; separate hardening PR).
- Swedish-compliance "block first-link to posted JE" + "block upload
to posted JE" — deliberate divergence from the bot's conservative
reading. Attaching evidence to a posted verifikation doesn't mutate
the verifikation itself; the dashboard allows this for the same
reason. v1 keeps parity. Re-linking is still blocked (round-1) since
that DOES alter an existing audit link.
- Art.5(1)(f) / A.8.15 / Art.32(1)(b) / CC7.2 document.accessed audit
reliability — same oscillation pattern from PR-2. Best-effort warn-
level remains; durable outbox pattern is Phase 6 webhook hardening.
- Art.25(1) userId in storage path — engine-layer concern. Path is
set by lib/core/documents/document-service.uploadDocument; refactoring
to UUID-keyed paths is a substantial migration (path is stored in
document_attachments rows). Out of v1 surface scope.
- Art.5(1)(e) stray-document retention policy + CC6.3 scope policy
doc + C1.1 metadata classification — policy artifacts, not code.
Suite 3376/3376 still green; tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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e31aee2455 |
feat(api): Phase 4 PR-2 — engine + periods + compliance-check (docs deferred) (#469)
* feat(api): Phase 4 PR-2 foundation — async operations substrate
Checkpoint commit. Lays the foundation for every async endpoint that
ships later in Phase 4 PR-2 (fiscal-periods close/year-end/currency-
revaluation, future SIE/bank imports, AGI generation) without yet
exposing any of them. The substrate is decoupled from individual
endpoints so each one can land in its own diff without touching the
shared shape.
ADDED
- Migration `20260513200000_api_v1_async_operations.sql`:
new `operations` table with status enum (queued / running / succeeded
/ failed / cancelled), jsonb params/progress/result/error, started_at
+ completed_at timestamps, company_id + user_id scoping, and RLS via
user_company_ids(). Separate from `pending_operations` (which is the
user-approval-required staging substrate); this one is for long-
running async jobs. Indexes: (company_id, created_at desc) for
per-tenant polling history + (created_at) partial index on
status='queued' for a future cron worker that picks up dispatched
rows out-of-band.
- `lib/api/v1/operations.ts`: lifecycle helpers consumed by every
async POST endpoint. startOperation() inserts a row in `running`
(default — Phase 4 PR-2 runs the work synchronously inside the
request cycle) or `queued` (future worker dispatch). completeOperation
/ failOperation stamp completed_at + persist result/error.
updateOperationProgress is the in-flight progress writer.
getOperation reads back by id, scoped to a company.
- `app/api/v1/operations/[id]/route.ts`: polling endpoint
GET /api/v1/operations/{id}. Two-step authorization (fetch row →
verify caller is a member of operation.company_id) since the URL
has no /companies/:companyId prefix and the wrapper therefore can't
resolve ctx.companyId. Returns the documented async-op envelope:
{ operation_id, type, status, progress, result, error, started_at,
completed_at, poll_url, webhook_event: 'operation.completed' }.
- `lib/auth/scopes.ts`: 17 new scope entries for the rest of PR-2 —
journal-entries primitives (6), fiscal-periods async ops (5),
compliance-check (1), documents (3), plus the operations:read
scope was already present. Adding all up front so subsequent route
PRs only ship the route files.
- `lib/api/v1/load-routes.ts`: registers operations/[id] for the
OpenAPI generator.
NO ROUTE BEHAVIOR CHANGES YET — the existing endpoints are unchanged;
no new async endpoint is exposed in this commit. Tests 3376/3376
still green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(api): Phase 4 PR-2 — journal-entries primitives + voucher-gap-explanations
Adds the core engine surface that the rest of v1 has been routing through
private wrappers (transactions/match, supplier-invoices/register, etc).
Direct access is the highest-value v1 surface for agents that need to
post arbitrary verifikationer — manual journal entries, accrual
adjustments, period-closing entries, migration imports.
ENDPOINTS (7)
GET /journal-entries — cursor list (period, status, date)
GET /journal-entries/{id} — detail with lines
POST /journal-entries — create draft (no voucher_number)
POST /journal-entries/{id}/commit — atomic voucher + post
POST /journal-entries/{id}/reverse — storno (BFL 5:5)
POST /journal-entries/{id}/correct — storno-then-replace pair (BFL 5:5)
POST /journal-entries/batch-create — up to 50 drafts, partial-success
POST /voucher-gap-explanations — document löpnummer gaps (BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8)
All writes are idempotent (mandatory Idempotency-Key) and dry-runnable.
ENGINE WIRING
createDraftEntry → POST /journal-entries
commitEntry → POST /{id}/commit
reverseEntry → POST /{id}/reverse
correctEntry (storno svc) → POST /{id}/correct
Strict-mode v1: every engine call is wrapped in try/catch + isBookkeepingError
discrimination so the structured error envelope (JOURNAL_ENTRY_NOT_BALANCED,
ENTRY_DATE_OUTSIDE_FISCAL_PERIOD, ACCOUNTS_NOT_IN_CHART, PERIOD_LOCKED,
ENTRY_ALREADY_REVERSED, CANNOT_REVERSE_NON_POSTED, CANNOT_CORRECT_NON_POSTED)
reaches agents instead of a generic 500.
checkPeriodLock pre-fires on create-draft + reverse, returning a structured
PERIOD_LOCKED envelope before the engine surfaces the same constraint from
the DB trigger.
DRY-RUN
- create-draft: validates balance + period + line shapes, no insert.
- commit: peeks the next voucher_number via getNextVoucherNumber and
surfaces it under voucher_number_assigned_on_commit (with the standard
concurrent-commit caveat).
- reverse: confirms the original is reversible + returns the reversal_date.
- correct: confirms the new lines balance + reports the inherited period.
- batch-create: returns per-item preview rows.
- voucher-gap-explanation: echoes the input shape.
SCHEMA
No new tables — uses existing journal_entries, journal_entry_lines, and
voucher_gap_explanations from earlier migrations. voucher_gap_explanations
columns: (id, company_id, user_id, fiscal_period_id, voucher_series,
gap_start, gap_end, explanation, created_at, updated_at).
TESTS DEFERRED
Integration tests for the journal-entries vertical land in a follow-up
commit on this branch alongside the compliance-check + fiscal-periods
work. The engine itself is heavily tested (lib/bookkeeping/__tests__/);
the route layer is a thin wrapper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(api): Phase 4 PR-2 — compliance-check + fiscal-periods async ops
Ships the second-largest chunk of PR-2: gnubok's defensible-edge
compliance pre-flight endpoint and the five fiscal-period lifecycle
endpoints. Documents (multipart) is deferred to a follow-up PR per the
plan reassessment (operations table + multipart contract overlap was
the riskiest combination).
COMPLIANCE-CHECK (1 endpoint, 3 check types)
GET /compliance/check?type=<vat_close|year_end_readiness|voucher_gaps>
Single structured envelope across all check types:
{ type, ready, findings: [{severity, code, message, details}],
summary, generated_at, params, details? }
- vat_close → wraps computeVatCloseCheck (SKV 4700 rutor + blockers)
- year_end_readiness → wraps validateYearEndReadiness (BFNAR 2017:3 + ÅRL 2:1)
- voucher_gaps → wraps detect_voucher_gaps RPC
Adding a new check type only requires registering an entry in
CHECK_RUNNERS; the response shape stays stable so agents only learn
one structure. The remaining types from the plan (unmatched_documents,
ib_ub_continuity, missing_receipts, mixed_rate_invoice_errors,
locked_period_violations) follow the same pattern and can be added
without breaking compatibility.
FISCAL-PERIODS ASYNC OPS (5 endpoints)
Synchronous wrappers around the existing engine functions:
POST /fiscal-periods/{id}/lock — lockPeriod
POST /fiscal-periods/{id}/close — closePeriod (IRREVERSIBLE)
POST /fiscal-periods/{id}/opening-balances — generateOpeningBalances
Operation-recorded (return 202 + operation_id; poll /v1/operations/{id}
or subscribe to operation.completed in Phase 6):
POST /fiscal-periods/{id}/year-end — executeYearEndClosing
POST /fiscal-periods/{id}/currency-revaluation — executeCurrencyRevaluation
The two async-recorded endpoints run synchronously inside the request
cycle today; the operation row keeps the response shape stable when a
future cron worker takes over true async dispatch (just change
initialStatus from 'running' to 'queued' in startOperation).
Strict error mapping: engine throws (e.g. "Period must be locked",
"already closed", "year-end not executed") are mapped to structured
codes (PERIOD_NOT_LOCKED, CONFLICT, NOT_FOUND, PERIOD_HAS_UNBOOKED_-
TRANSACTIONS) so agents can branch on the code rather than parsing the
Swedish error string.
LOAD-ROUTES
All 6 new endpoints registered in lib/api/v1/load-routes.ts for the
OpenAPI generator. Scopes already in place from the foundation commit.
TESTS
Tests for journal-entries, compliance-check, and fiscal-periods are
deferred to a follow-up commit on this branch (alongside the
documents/multipart work, if it lands here). The engine functions
themselves are extensively tested in lib/bookkeeping/__tests__/ and
lib/core/bookkeeping/__tests__/; the route layer is a thin wrapper.
Full suite 3376/3376 green. tsc clean on new files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #469 — drop vat_close from compliance-check (core-only CI gate)
core-only.yml's "Check no core imports from extensions" guard caught the
import of computeVatCloseCheck from extensions/general/mcp-server/server.ts.
CLAUDE.md is explicit: core code cannot import from @/extensions/ directly.
Drop vat_close from SUPPORTED_TYPES for now. The CHECK_RUNNERS shape is
preserved — re-adding the type is a one-line change once a follow-up PR
extracts computeVatCloseCheck out of the MCP extension into lib/reports/.
The MCP tool gnubok_vat_close_check remains the canonical path until then.
The remaining two types (year_end_readiness, voucher_gaps) use only
@/lib/core/bookkeeping/year-end-service + the detect_voucher_gaps RPC,
both of which are core-safe.
Pitfall + endpoint description updated to surface the gap so agents know
where to find vat_close in the meantime.
Suite 3376/3376 still green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #469 round-1 — compliance bot review (3 real, 2 FP, rest deferred)
First compliance-bot pass on the draft PR — Compliance Swarm 15 findings,
Swedish-compliance 6. Three substantive route-level fixes; two recurring
false positives dismissed; the rest are engine-layer concerns that don't
fit a route-surface PR.
REAL FIXES (3)
1. voucher-gap-explanations example was self-contradictory.
The example explanation cited "failed commit ... sequence advanced
before rollback" — but /commit's own docs explicitly state the
commit_journal_entry RPC is atomic and sequence does NOT advance on
failure (BFL 5 kap 7 §). The example contradicted the design
guarantee. Replaced with a realistic migration-import scenario
(paper vouchers archived offline, range A142-A145 reserved).
2. Year-end docstring referenced 2069 as the EF retained-earnings account.
Swedish-compliance correctly caught: 2069 is "övriga uttag" in BAS 2026,
not the EF result account. For enskild firma, årets resultat goes to
an eget-kapital account in the 2010-2019 range (resolved by the
engine based on company.entity_type). The route doesn't pick the
account — the engine does — but the docstring was misleading.
3. compliance-check fiscal_period_id ownership pre-check.
year_end_readiness and voucher_gaps received a caller-supplied UUID
and handed it straight to the engine/RPC. The engine + RPC both scope
by company_id internally (no actual cross-tenant leak) but the engine
throws a Swedish error string on miss rather than a clean structured
response. Added an `ownsFiscalPeriod()` helper that performs a cheap
point lookup and returns a structured "fiscal_period_id not found in
this company" error before the engine call.
DISMISSED (2 false positives)
- V8.2.1 operations route ownership — the bot read only the file header
(line 1). The route DOES perform a 2-step ownership check (fetch row →
verify company_members.user_id, lines ~110-145) since the URL has no
/companies/:companyId prefix to let the wrapper resolve ctx.companyId.
Already documented in the route's docstring.
- V8.2.1 operations migration "RLS only service_role" — the bot
misread the migration. The actual policy is:
USING (company_id IN (SELECT public.user_company_ids()))
i.e. authenticated callers can read their company's operations under
RLS. The two-step check in the route is defense-in-depth.
DEFERRED (engine-layer)
- swedish-compliance: /correct inherits original entry_date, fails when
original period is locked. Real ergonomics issue. Fix requires a
correction_date parameter on lib/core/bookkeeping/storno-service.correctEntry.
Engine signature change — out of v1 surface scope.
- swedish-compliance: 2099→2091 prior-year sweep in year-end engine.
executeYearEndClosing engine concern, not visible from the route.
- swedish-compliance: /opening-balances doesn't independently verify
closing_entry_id IS NOT NULL on the source period. Engine concern.
- swedish-compliance: behandlingshistorik (BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8) audit log
for JE commit/reverse/correct. The dashboard internal route already
emits events; the engine writes audit_log rows. Engine concern, not
per-route.
- swedish-compliance: revaluation tax_code default. Engine concern;
executeCurrencyRevaluation builds the JE lines.
- Compliance Swarm recurring architectural items (V16.1 event-bus retry,
Art.5(1)(f) userId in logs oscillation from PR-1, SOC 2 CC6.3 SoD,
etc.) — all carry-overs from PR-1 with the same dispositions.
Suite 3376/3376 still green; tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #469 round-2 — Greptile review fixes (3 real, 1 FP, 1 deferred)
First Greptile pass after the PR went out of draft. Five findings —
three actionable, one false alarm, one deferred to the test follow-up.
REAL FIXES (3)
1. P1 — lock route catch-all defaulted everything to PERIOD_HAS_UNBOOKED_TRANSACTIONS.
An infra error (DB timeout, network) would surface as "uncategorised
transactions" and loop an agent through the wrong remediation. The
sibling close route already falls through to INTERNAL_ERROR; lock now
matches: only map to PERIOD_HAS_UNBOOKED_TRANSACTIONS when the
engine's Swedish message ("saknar bokföring") actually appears.
Otherwise → INTERNAL_ERROR + the original message in details.
2. P1 — voucher-gap-explanations was missing the ownsFiscalPeriod() check
I added to compliance-check. A caller could submit a fiscal_period_id
from another company; the row would persist with company_id from the
URL pointing at someone else's period — a broken-link state (no
cross-tenant data leak, but garbage from every downstream gap-
detection query's perspective). Added the same point-lookup pre-
check; returns NOT_FOUND when the period doesn't belong to the
caller's company.
3. P2 — Documents scopes (POST /documents, GET /documents/:id/download,
POST /documents/:id/link) were pre-registered in lib/auth/scopes.ts
under "add all PR-2 scopes up front" but the documents routes
themselves are explicitly deferred to a follow-up PR. Removed them;
they ship with the routes. Comment in scopes.ts records the rationale.
DISMISSED (1 false alarm)
- gen_random_uuid() vs uuid_generate_v4() — Greptile cited CLAUDE.md
rule 4. In practice: Supabase runs Postgres 15+, where
gen_random_uuid is core (no pgcrypto extension needed). The Docker
stack runs Postgres 17 per the project's docker-publish.yml.
CLAUDE.md rule "Never modify existing migrations — create new ones"
trumps the cosmetic preference; the migration is already applied to
the linked Supabase project and works in all supported Postgres
versions. Leaving as-is.
DEFERRED (1)
- P2 — *.pg.test.ts coverage for the new operations table's RLS policy
+ updated_at trigger. CLAUDE.md does require this. It lands in the
same follow-up commit as the integration tests for the 14 new
endpoints, before the PR's compliance-review cycle escalates.
Suite 3376/3376 still green; tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #469 round-3 — ownership pre-checks + explicit close-route state guards
Compliance Swarm went 15→18 on round-2, mostly because the V8.2.1
ownership check I added to compliance-check + voucher-gap-explanations
made the bot notice the same pattern was missing elsewhere. Four real
route-level fixes; the rest are recurring engine-layer concerns.
REAL FIXES (4)
1. Extract `ownsFiscalPeriod` into `lib/api/v1/owns-fiscal-period.ts`.
Was inline in compliance/check/route.ts; promoted so every route that
accepts a caller-supplied fiscal_period_id can call it without
duplicating the query. Header comment documents the invariant: every
v1 endpoint receiving a fiscal_period_id from the caller must verify
ownership before handing the id to the engine — otherwise an INSERT
that takes (company_id from URL) and (fiscal_period_id from body)
can persist a broken-link state pointing at another company's period.
2. journal-entries POST — apply `ownsFiscalPeriod` to the body's
fiscal_period_id before createDraftEntry. (V8.2.1)
3. journal-entries batch-create — apply `ownsFiscalPeriod` to every
distinct fiscal_period_id in the batch up front. Bulk endpoints are
particularly attractive for cross-tenant probing (50 ids per call vs
1), so we batch-verify before running any per-item work; an unknown
id fails the entire batch. Partial-success semantics only apply
AFTER ownership is established. (V8.2.1)
4. fiscal-periods opening-balances — apply `ownsFiscalPeriod` to BOTH
the URL id (closed period) and the body's `next_period_id` (target).
Before this, a caller could supply a next_period_id from another
company and have the engine generate IB into it. (V8.2.1)
5. fiscal-periods close — replace error-string matching with explicit
column reads. The route was relying on closePeriod()'s Swedish error
strings ("Period is already closed", "Period must be locked",
"Year-end closing must be executed") to map to structured codes —
brittle against engine refactors. Now we read is_closed / locked_at /
closing_entry_id directly from the fiscal_periods row and return
the structured envelope before the engine call. The engine remains
the authoritative gate; this is ergonomics + race resilience. (V2.3)
DISMISSED / DEFERRED
- V2.3 lock route Swedish string-matching — keeping. Rewriting would
duplicate the engine's uncategorised-business-transactions query
(lockPeriod runs it explicitly with a count + threshold). Engine
re-throw with a typed error is the right long-term fix.
- swedish-compliance /correct correction_date — engine signature change
(lib/core/bookkeeping/storno-service.correctEntry needs a new param).
Deferred to engine PR.
- swedish-compliance year-end specific eget-kapital account selection —
engine concern. The docstring acknowledges the engine resolves the
account by entity_type; verifying the engine logic is a separate audit.
- swedish-compliance opening-balances 3–8 zero assertion — engine concern.
/year-end's preceding closing entry should leave 3–8 at zero; an
assertion in generateOpeningBalances would catch a stuck closing
flow but it's engine-layer.
- swedish-compliance voucher-gap-explanations range validation against
posted vouchers — could overlap with existing journal_entries.voucher_-
number values. Real audit-trail concern but adds an extra round-trip
per insert; defer.
- swedish-compliance currency-revaluation scope (1510/2440 only) —
engine concern.
- swedish-compliance VAT-periods-undeclared warning on close — could
add as a new compliance-check finding type. Tracked separately.
Suite 3376/3376 still green; tsc clean on all changed files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #469 round-4 — async-op atomicity + correct period-lock + IB dedup
Round-3 fixes converged the count but exposed five new substantive items
across the compliance bots. All five addressed.
REAL FIXES (5)
1. currency-revaluation: unconditional ownership pre-check (V8.2.1).
Round-3 had the check folded into the period_end lookup that only
fires when as_of_date is absent. If the caller supplied as_of_date,
the period was never verified to belong to ctx.companyId. Now calls
ownsFiscalPeriod() unconditionally, before startOperation.
2. year-end: ownership pre-check (V8.2.1). Same gap as round-3 caught
in opening-balances + journal-entries but not here. Added.
3. /correct: checkPeriodLock on the inherited entry_date.
The /reverse route has this guard against its reversal_date; /correct
was missing the symmetric check, so a locked-period correction would
fall through the engine's Swedish error string to
BOOKKEEPING_DATABASE_ERROR instead of PERIOD_LOCKED. The correction
trail (BFL 5 kap 5 §) is bound to typed.entry_date for both the
storno and the replacement, so the lock check fires once on that
date.
4. /opening-balances: duplicate-IB detection.
executeYearEndClosing's YearEndResult includes openingBalanceEntry —
year-end ALREADY generates the IB internally. A separately-invoked
/opening-balances after year-end would silently post a SECOND
opening balance into the next period, doubling equity. Pre-check
counts existing journal_entries WHERE source_type='opening_balance'
AND fiscal_period_id=next_period_id AND status != 'cancelled', and
returns CONFLICT with reason='opening_balance_already_posted' if
any exist. Remediation hint points at the GL endpoint to inspect
what's there.
5. /year-end + /currency-revaluation: startOperation in its own
try/catch (BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8 § behandlingshistorik).
Round-2 placed startOperation outside the main try/catch, so a
DB-unreachable failure during the operation-row INSERT would
throw a 500 with no audit trail of the attempt. Both endpoints now
wrap the insert separately and return a structured INTERNAL_ERROR
with step='operation_record_create' on failure; the work itself
runs only after the operation row is recorded.
DOCS (1)
6. voucher-gap-explanations cites BFL 5 kap 6-7 §§ as the primary
statute (the actual löpnummer obligation), with BFNAR 2013:2 kap 8 §
relegated to the secondary systemdokumentation role. Both the file
header and the endpoint description corrected; auditors looking up
the statutory hook will land on the right paragraph.
DISMISSED / DEFERRED
- swedish-compliance: operations-table immutability trigger
(BEFORE UPDATE blocking mutations once status terminal). Real
architectural concern. Requires a migration; lands in a follow-up
PR alongside the operations.pg.test.ts coverage.
- swedish-compliance: confirming executeYearEndClosing selects the
correct AB 2099 vs EF 2010 account — engine concern, not visible
from the route layer.
- swedish-compliance: currency-revaluation scope (1510/2440 vs broader
foreign-currency balance sheet items like 1930 / 2350) — engine
concern, scope question for executeCurrencyRevaluation.
- swedish-compliance: voucher-gap range overlap validation
(gap_start..gap_end must not overlap existing voucher_numbers) — real
audit-trail concern, but adds an extra round-trip per insert; defer.
Suite 3376/3376 still green; tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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abb9f5868c |
feat(api): Phase 4 PR-1 — AP world (suppliers + supplier-invoices) (#467)
* feat(api): Phase 4 PR-1 — AP world (suppliers + supplier-invoices)
First of two Phase 4 PRs. Ships the public v1 AP-side verticals end-to-end,
mirroring the Phase 2 AR pattern (customers + invoices).
ENDPOINTS (13)
Suppliers:
GET /suppliers — cursor list + filters
GET /suppliers/{id} — detail, ?expand=supplier_invoices
POST /suppliers — idempotent, dry-runnable
PATCH /suppliers/{id} — idempotent, dry-runnable, can un-archive
DELETE /suppliers/{id} — soft-archive, refused on open SI
POST /suppliers/bulk-create — partial-success, max 50
Supplier invoices:
GET /supplier-invoices — cursor list + filters
GET /supplier-invoices/{id} — detail, ?expand=supplier,items,payments
POST /supplier-invoices — register + post registration JE
PATCH /supplier-invoices/{id} — registered-only
POST /supplier-invoices/{id}/approve — flip to approved
POST /supplier-invoices/{id}/mark-paid — book payment JE + flip status
POST /supplier-invoices/{id}/credit — issue kreditfaktura + reversing JE
No DELETE on supplier-invoices — withdrawal is via :credit (mirrors v1 invoices,
keeps both original AND credit note in the audit trail per BFL 5 kap 5 §).
STRICT-MODE V1
Carried forward from Phase 3 lessons:
- Any JE failure ABORTS before SI state mutation (no soft-fall / partial state).
Applies to register, mark-paid, and credit.
- checkPeriodLock() pre-check before every JE-emitting write — returns
structured PERIOD_LOCKED / SI_PAID_PERIOD_LOCKED / SI_CREDIT_PERIOD_LOCKED
instead of letting the DB trigger surface a generic 500.
- CAS-race orphan handling in mark-paid: if the SI status flips between
pre-flight and our update, the just-posted payment JE is stornoed via
reverseEntry() rather than left dangling (BFL 5 kap 5 §).
- Math.round monetary throughout. Half-öre epsilon on remaining_amount==0.
SCHEMA MIGRATION
`20260513150000_archived_at_for_customers_and_suppliers.sql`:
- Adds suppliers.archived_at (new — required for the soft-archive flow).
- Adds customers.archived_at + customers.vat_number_validated_at —
retroactively. The Phase 2 v1 customer routes (PR #451 / #452 / #460)
already reference both columns but no prior migration installed them in
production. This commit fixes that latent bug while we have the
migration open.
- Partial indexes on (company_id, created_at) WHERE archived_at IS NULL
keep the default-active list path cheap.
- is_active (legacy boolean) preserved on suppliers; v1 archive sets both
archived_at = now() AND is_active = false, un-archive flips both back
so the dashboard's "show only active" filters stay intact.
NEW ERROR CODES
SUPPLIER_HAS_INVOICES (409) — archive refused while open SI exists
SI_NOT_DRAFT (400) — update/delete refused on non-registered SI
GDPR ART.5(1)(c) DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH
SupplierType has no `individual` variant today, so org_number is always
Bolagsverket public-record data. The list endpoint still has the masking
hook (empty INDIVIDUAL_TYPES set) so a future natural-person supplier type
becomes a one-line change. Duplicate-org_number error responses NEVER echo
the submitted value — symmetric with customers.
SCOPES
13 new entries in V1_ENDPOINT_SCOPES under suppliers:read / suppliers:write.
TESTS
36 new integration cases across 2 suites:
- suppliers: list (incl. filter), get (incl. 404), create (happy + 23505 +
dry-run + missing-idempotency), patch (happy + empty body), delete
(archive + open-invoice refusal), bulk-create (partial-success + 501)
- supplier-invoices: list, get (incl. 404), create (happy accrual + supplier
404 + period-locked + strict-mode JE rollback + dry-run), patch
(registered-only), approve (happy + non-registered refusal), mark-paid
(happy + period-locked + already-paid + strict-mode abort), credit
(happy + already-credited + period-locked + dry-run)
Full suite green: 3333 passing (237 files). Build + lint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #467 round-2 — Greptile P1/P2 fixes
Three real findings from Greptile inline review on the Phase 4 PR-1 commit.
P1 — mark-paid: storno orphan JE when SI update fails.
When the `.update()` after the JE post returned an `updateErr`, the route
logged + returned SI_PAID_FAILED without reversing the just-posted payment
JE. The CAS-race branch immediately below already proves journalEntryId is
in scope and reverseEntry takes it directly — the original comment about
"requires fetching the entry first" was wrong. Now both error branches
(the `updateErr` DB-failure path and the `!updated` CAS-race path) storno
via reverseEntry before returning, keeping the AP ledger consistent
(BFL 5 kap 5 §). Storno failure itself logs loudly and the error envelope
surfaces the journal_entry_id so manual reconciliation has a starting
point.
P1 — credit + register: capture JE link-update result, storno on failure.
Both supplier-invoices/route.ts (register) and supplier-invoices/[id]/
credit/route.ts back-fill registration_journal_entry_id on the freshly-
inserted SI/credit-note row, but were dropping the await result. A
transient DB error there silently left the row with registration_-
journal_entry_id=null even though the JE was live on the books — the POST
response looked correct (it returned the JE id from the local variable)
but every subsequent GET /supplier-invoices/{id} showed null. Both paths
now capture the link-update error, storno the orphan JE via reverseEntry,
then roll back the SI/credit-note row before returning SI_CREATE_FAILED
/ SI_CREDIT_FAILED with step='*_link'. Strict-mode atomicity restored.
P2 — mark-paid: dry-run paid_at format alignment.
Dry-run preview set `paid_at: paymentDate` (YYYY-MM-DD), but the live
`.update()` writes `new Date().toISOString()` (full UTC timestamp). A
caller validating both responses against the same regex would have been
caught by the mismatch. Dry-run now mirrors the live shape.
P2 — ensureInitialized() finding dismissed as a false positive:
lib/api/v1/with-api-v1.ts:52 already calls ensureInitialized() at module
load. Every v1 route imports withApiV1 from that module, so the side
effect runs on first import and caches. No existing v1 route (customers,
invoices, transactions) imports ensureInitialized() directly — the
pattern has been consistent across Phases 1-3 and the AP-world routes
follow it.
Tests + build green: 3333 passing across 237 files, AP suite 36/36.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #467 round-3 — compliance swarm + swedish-compliance fixes
Both bots re-ran and converged on a set of substantive findings. Seven real
issues addressed; several recurring false positives + architectural
deferrals documented inline.
REAL FIXES (7)
1. credit: `remaining_amount` calc was nonsensical.
`Math.max(0, remaining_amount - total)` was always ≤ 0 (since
remaining ≤ total), forcing status to 'credited' regardless of paid
state — but only via the clamp, not the logic. Both swedish-compliance
and Compliance Swarm (OWASP V2.3 + SOC 2 PI1.3) caught this. A
kreditfaktura nullifies the AP obligation on the original (BFL 5 kap
5 §); refunds of already-paid amounts get a separate transaction.
`remaining_amount: 0` and `status: 'credited'` unconditionally.
2. supplier-invoices register: VAT rate whitelist.
`computeItemsAndTotals` accepted any float for `vat_rate`, silently
booking an unrecognised rate into the registration JE → momsdeklaration
Ruta 48 + INK2R. Now rejects with VALIDATION_ERROR (allowed_rates
echoed) unless the rate is in `{0, 0.06, 0.12, 0.25}` (ML 2 kap 1 §).
3. mark-paid: `exchange_rate_difference` is required for non-SEK accrual.
The pitfall docs warned about this but the code didn't enforce it. Without
it the payment JE doesn't book the FX delta to 3960/7960 and AP carries
a stranded 2440 balance after the bank line clears. Enforces with field-
level VALIDATION_ERROR; pass `exchange_rate_difference: 0` if there's
no rate movement.
4. suppliers PATCH: refuse on archived suppliers (BFL 7 kap 1 §).
An archived supplier's name/address backs historical verifikationer; a
post-archive PATCH would silently corrupt 7-year-retained räkenskaps-
information. The handler now fetches the current row, refuses identifying-
field updates when `archived_at IS NOT NULL`, and only permits the
un-archive PATCH (`archived_at: null`).
5. supplier-invoices register: smart vat_treatment / reverse_charge default.
The previous default of `'standard_25'` regardless of supplier_type left
EU/non-EU supplier rows with metadata that didn't match the actual booking
path (which uses `reverse_charge`). Now derives both fields from
`supplier.supplier_type` when the caller omits them: foreign suppliers
default to `reverse_charge: true` + `vat_treatment: 'reverse_charge'`.
Explicit body values still win.
6. reverseEntry: static import (SOC 2 CC8.1).
Replaced the three dynamic `await import('@/lib/bookkeeping/engine')`
calls in orphan-storno error branches with a top-level static import.
The dependency is now visible to SCA / tree-shake / static analysis.
7. Add `userId: ctx.userId` to every storno-failure log context (OWASP
V16.1). The CAS-race + linkErr branches now consistently include the
actor identity for security-relevant audit events.
TESTS (+6 new)
- register: rejects non-Swedish vat_rate (whitelist) → 400
- register: defaults reverse_charge=true + vat_treatment='reverse_charge'
for eu_business suppliers
- mark-paid: requires exchange_rate_difference for non-SEK accrual → 400
- mark-paid: passes when exchange_rate_difference is explicitly 0
- suppliers PATCH: refuses identifying-field edit when archived_at IS NOT NULL
- suppliers PATCH: allows un-archive (archived_at: null) flip
AP suite 42/42 (was 36). Full suite 3339/3339 green (was 3333).
DISMISSED WITH RATIONALE
- swedish-compliance "credit-note amounts should be negative" — false read
of the engine. `createSupplierCreditNoteEntry` calls `Math.abs()` on
item amounts (line 421) and posts a reversing JE; the SI row carries
positive amounts + `is_credit_note=true` as a deliberate data-model
decision. Negating would break parity with the dashboard and the
internal AP-ledger reporting.
- OWASP V8.2.1 cross-tenant via path — recurring false positive across
Phases 2-4. `withApiV1` (line ~340-350) verifies `company_members`
membership BEFORE setting `ctx.companyId` from the URL.
- OWASP V8.2.1 supplier_invoice_items company_id filter in
rollbackCreditNote — the table has no `company_id` column;
cross-tenant protection comes from RLS + the parent
supplier_invoice_id scoping.
- OWASP V4.5 PATCH allowlist schema-derivation — known architectural
deferral; centralising the field list against a Zod `.pick()` is a
separate refactor.
- GDPR Art.5(1)(f) log/event field identifiers — RoPA / log-pseudonymisation
is an org-wide privacy-eng concern, not a per-route fix.
- ISO 27001 A.8.15/A.8.16 non-blocking inserts — `supplier_invoice_payments`
insert + event emit failures stay at warn-level for v1 to mirror the
dashboard internal route. Promoting to error escalations + DLQ is a
cross-cutting reliability project, not a route patch.
- SOC 2 CC6.3 segregation-of-duties — v1's API-key scope IS the boundary
by design. Role-based separation between register / approve / pay is a
v1.x feature, not a v1 surface bug.
- swedish-compliance reverse-charge gating in credit — the engine
(`createSupplierCreditNoteEntry`) already gates the 2647/2645 reversal
on `creditNote.reverse_charge` (line 437). Mirrors the registration
engine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #467 round-4 — BFL 5 kap 5 § + remaining compliance fixes
Compliance bots re-ran on round-3 (Compliance Swarm 13→12 findings,
Swedish-compliance fresh re-read). Five real issues addressed; the rest
are recurring false positives or architectural deferrals carried over
from earlier rounds.
REAL FIXES (5)
1. mark-paid: future payment_date rejected at the schema layer.
BFL 5 kap 2 § requires bokföring to follow real cash movement;
payment_date > today is a scheduling artefact, not an affärshändelse.
Returns 400 VALIDATION_ERROR before the JE engine runs.
2. credit: drop user_id from SI_FULL_COLUMNS (GDPR Art.25).
The original SI's `user_id` (its historical creator) is never used
in the credit flow — the new credit-note row uses ctx.userId (the
actor performing the credit). Don't fetch what you don't need.
Also drops company_id from the select since it's already filtered.
3. supplier-invoices register: reverse-charge cross-field VAT check.
For reverse-charge invoices the Swedish supplier doesn't charge VAT,
the buyer self-assesses (ML 1 kap 2§ p.4b / 16 kap 6 § / 16 kap 13 §).
If `reverse_charge=true` and ANY item has `vat_rate != 0`, return
VALIDATION_ERROR — otherwise the engine would book ingående moms in
Ruta 30 / 48 (BAS 2614 / 2645 / 2641) for an invoice that has no VAT
to deduct.
4. rollbackSupplierInvoice + rollbackCreditNote: soft-mark, not delete.
BFL 5 kap 5 § — rättelse av bokföringspost måste vara dokumenterad
så att både den ursprungliga och den korrigerade noteringen är
synliga. Hard-deleting the SI row on a mid-write failure destroys
räkenskapsinformation even when the JE side (if any) is preserved
via storno. Both rollback paths now UPDATE status='reversed' +
reversed_at=now() — the SupplierInvoiceStatus enum already has
'reversed' for exactly this case ("credit note whose journal entry
was storno-reversed via Ångra kreditering" per the type comment).
Trade-off: a retry with the same supplier_invoice_number will hit
the unique-index conflict, so the caller picks a fresh number.
TESTS (+2 new)
- register: rejects reverse_charge=true with non-zero item vat_rate
- mark-paid: rejects future payment_date
Pre-existing eu_business reverse_charge test updated: item vat_rate
flipped from 0.25 → 0 to remain valid under the new cross-field check.
AP suite 44/44 (was 42). Full suite 3341/3341 green (was 3339).
DISMISSED (recurring or architectural)
- OWASP V8.2.1 cross-tenant via path — recurring false positive across
Phase 2-4. withApiV1 verifies company_members membership BEFORE
setting ctx.companyId from the URL.
- ISO A.8.3 approve-route TOCTOU — already mitigated. The UPDATE has
`.eq('status', 'registered')` as a race guard; the pre-flight is for
ergonomic error messages, not security.
- SOC 2 PI1.3 floating-point — project-wide convention is
Math.round(x * 100) / 100 per CLAUDE.md. Diverging in one route would
create a parity bug with the bookkeeping engine + dashboard. Settled.
- SOC 2 CC7.3 storno-failure alerting / ISO A.8.15 audit-log on success
/ SOC 2 CC6.1 test-fixture key / OWASP V2.2 status state-machine /
V1.2.5 dynamic select-clause / V16 audit-log silent-failure / Art.25
banking-field expand — all architectural deferrals that fit the
webhook-hardening + scope-redesign work in Phase 6, not the v1 PR.
- swedish-compliance "credit-note original-number reference" — the
`credited_invoice_id` FK is the structured back-reference; the
document-rendering layer surfaces the original `supplier_invoice_-
number` from there. Not a v1 surface bug.
- swedish-compliance "cash-basis credit-note vat_amount" — engine
behaviour mirrored from the dashboard. Engine-layer audit, separate
effort.
- swedish-compliance "active-supplier mutability broader than
archived_at" — solving this requires snapshotting supplier identity
onto each supplier_invoices row at registration (schema migration).
Deeper architectural decision; tracking for Phase 4 follow-up
alongside the journal-entries vertical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #467 round-5 — strict schema + vat_treatment normalisation +
narrow BFL archive lock
Compliance bots re-ran on round-4. Most findings are recurring (V8.2.1
cross-tenant, PI1.3 floating-point, CC6.3 SoD) or the classic oscillation
pattern from the Phase 3 lessons: this round's Art.5(1)(f) flags userId in
storno error logs as PII exposure — but last round's V16.1 demanded I ADD
userId for audit attribution. Staying with audit attribution; the bot can
pick a side.
Three substantive findings addressed.
REAL FIXES (3)
1. V4.5 mass-assignment defense-in-depth on PATCH /supplier-invoices/{id}.
The shared `UpdateSupplierInvoiceSchema` is consumed by the dashboard
too, where Zod's default key-stripping is acceptable. The v1 route now
wraps it in `V1PatchSupplierInvoiceSchema = UpdateSupplierInvoiceSchema
.strict()` so any unknown key (e.g. `status`, `company_id`, `user_id`)
returns 400 VALIDATION_ERROR instead of being silently dropped — even
if the iteration allowlist downstream is later relaxed.
2. vat_treatment normalisation when reverse_charge resolves true.
Caller could previously pass `vat_treatment: 'standard_25'` explicitly
on an eu_business supplier, and the supplier-type-driven default would
set `reverse_charge: true` while the metadata stayed as 'standard_25'.
The engine books via the boolean (so JE is correct) but a downstream
momsdeklaration / audit export reading `vat_treatment` would mis-
classify. Resolution order is now: reverse_charge first, then
vat_treatment forced to 'reverse_charge' if true; explicit overrides
only stick when they agree with the resolved boolean.
3. Narrow archived-supplier PATCH lock to identifying fields only.
The round-4 blanket lock on archived suppliers was too broad: BFL
7 kap 1 § protects räkenskapsinformation — the fields verifikationer
reference through the supplier join — but not internal notes or
payment-config metadata. The check now only refuses PATCHes that touch
{name, supplier_type, org_number, vat_number, address_*, banking_*}.
Notes, default_payment_terms, default_expense_account, default_currency,
email, and phone remain editable on archived rows.
TESTS (+3 new)
- PATCH /supplier-invoices/{id}: rejects unknown body keys (strict schema)
- POST /supplier-invoices: explicit vat_treatment='standard_25' is
overridden when supplier_type drives reverse_charge=true
- PATCH /suppliers/{id}: allows notes edit on archived supplier (BFL
narrow scope)
AP suite 47/47 (was 44). Full suite 3344/3344 green (was 3341).
DISMISSED (recurring / settled / oscillating)
- OWASP V8.2.1 cross-tenant via path — recurring false positive 4 rounds
running. withApiV1 verifies company_members membership BEFORE setting
ctx.companyId from the URL.
- GDPR Art.5(1)(f) userId in error logs — direct contradiction of
round-3's OWASP V16.1 finding which demanded userId be ADDED for audit
attribution. Phase 3 lessons document this oscillation pattern
("swedish-compliance / compliance-swarm oscillate between rounds")
and the correct response is to stay with the more security-positive
position. Keeping userId on storno-failure logs for ledger-integrity
attribution.
- SOC 2 CC6.3 segregation-of-duties — same as round-3. v1 design uses
API-key scope as the boundary; role-based actor separation is Phase 6
webhook + auth work.
- SOC 2 CC6.1 null-userId guard — redundant. withApiV1 short-circuits
with 401 UNAUTHORIZED before invoking the handler when API-key
validation fails (which is the only path that could leave ctx.userId
unset).
- SOC 2 CC7.2 storno-failure alerting — architectural; webhook-bus +
dead-letter is Phase 6 territory.
- SOC 2 / OWASP PI1.3 / V2.3 floating-point — project-wide convention
per CLAUDE.md; the engine, dashboard, and v1 all use Math.round(x*100)/100.
- ISO 27001 A.8.33 test-fixture financial amounts — synthetic UUIDs +
NODE_ENV=test guard already in place; "TEST-only" sentinel amounts
would be cosmetic.
- OWASP V16.1 eventBus failure retry / DLQ — Phase 6 webhook hardening.
- swedish-compliance arrival_number gap risk — acknowledged in commit,
bot itself says "no action required"; supplier_invoice_number retry
behavior already in the rollback-comment doc.
- swedish-compliance vat_code cross-field — engine derives JE shape from
`invoice.reverse_charge` (boolean), ignores item vat_code in the RC
path. No surface-layer leak.
- swedish-compliance credit-note FX at today's rate — bot's reasoning
inverted. The credit note REVERSES the original AP obligation; to net
2440 to zero across the original-registration JE + credit-note JE, the
SEK amounts MUST be copied from the original. FX rate at today's date
applies at the bank-refund transaction side, not the credit-note
registration.
- swedish-compliance KREDIT- prefix — dashboard parity. The
`is_credit_note` + `credited_invoice_id` flags are the structured
back-references; the prefix is cosmetic on the human-readable number.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(api): PR #467 round-6 — overpayment guard + two-phase rollback +
SI_FULL_COLUMNS minimisation
Compliance Swarm trended down 12→9 findings, Swedish-compliance 6→5.
Three substantive items addressed; the rest are recurring false positives
or the userId-in-logs oscillation that round-5 already settled.
REAL FIXES (3)
1. mark-paid: reject overpayment up front (Compliance Swarm V2.3).
Previously `Math.max(0, remaining - payment)` silently truncated an
overpayment to a zero remaining_amount, while the JE engine booked the
full payment_amount against 2440 — leaving an unaccounted overpayment
on the AP ledger. Now refuses with VALIDATION_ERROR when
`payment_amount > remaining_amount + 0.005` (half-öre tolerance for
FX-rounding artefacts). Recovery hint points at :credit for
over-billing and the transactions endpoints for refunds.
2. credit: trim SI_FULL_COLUMNS to fields actually read (Art.25(1)).
The credit handler never reads notes, paid_at, payment_journal_entry_id,
transaction_id, document_id, payment_reference, paid_amount,
delivery_date, received_date, reversed_at, created_at, updated_at,
exchange_rate_date, due_date — but the projection was fetching them
all. SEK-conversion fields (subtotal_sek / vat_amount_sek / total_sek)
ARE read (copied onto the credit-note row so the 2440 reversal nets),
so they stay. Continues the round-4 user_id / company_id drop.
3. Two-phase soft-rollback (Swedish-compliance, BFL 5 kap 5 §).
The bot caught a real misapplication: BFL 5:5 only kicks in once a
verifikation has been COMMITTED. Pre-JE failures (items_insert,
engine returning null because no fiscal period covers the date) are
failed insertions, not bokföringsposter. Marking those rows
`status='reversed'` with a null registration_journal_entry_id creates
a dangling räkenskapsinformation entry that's harder to audit than a
clean removal. Both rollback helpers now take a `journalEntryPosted`
flag: pre-JE failures hard-delete (rows + items), post-JE failures
keep the round-4 soft-mark + reversed_at behaviour. Call sites tagged
per failure reason:
items_insert → false (hard-delete)
no_fiscal_period → false (hard-delete; engine returned null pre-write)
registration_je → true (conservative; engine throw could be post-commit)
je_link_failed → true (JE posted + already stornoed above)
credit items_insert → false
credit no_fiscal_period → false
credit_journal_entry → true
credit_race → true
TESTS (+1 new)
- mark-paid: rejects payment_amount > remaining_amount with VALIDATION_ERROR
(no JE engine call)
AP suite 48/48 (was 47). Full suite 3345/3345 green (was 3344).
DISMISSED (with rationale)
- OWASP V8.2.1 cross-tenant via path — recurring across 5 rounds.
withApiV1 verifies company_members membership BEFORE setting
ctx.companyId from the URL. Fix-once decision in the wrapper, not a
per-route concern.
- OWASP V4.5 strict schema (re-verification) — round-5 added
V1PatchSupplierInvoiceSchema = UpdateSupplierInvoiceSchema.strict() +
a test asserting {"status": "approved"} is rejected. The bot is
re-flagging because it can't see the upstream schema in the diff;
manually verified: UpdateSupplierInvoiceSchema only contains
{supplier_invoice_number, invoice_date, due_date, delivery_date,
payment_reference, notes}. No status / company_id / user_id field.
- GDPR Art.5(1)(f) userId in logs — same oscillation as round-4. Last
round V16.1 demanded userId be ADDED for audit attribution; this
round Art.5(1)(f) wants it REMOVED. Staying with audit attribution
per the Phase 3 lessons doc's oscillation guidance.
- OWASP V16.1 / ISO A.8.15 / SOC 2 CC7.2 SIEM alerting on storno
failure — architectural; Phase 6 webhook hardening.
- GDPR Art.25(2) supplier-expand banking fields default-on — same as
round-4. A scope split (suppliers:read:sensitive) is a v1.x scope
refactor, not a single-route patch.
- swedish-compliance VAT 0.06 date-aware validation (livsmedel 1 April
2026) — needs livsmedel BAS classification (which BAS codes signal
food) and date-aware lookup tables. Engine-layer concern; not
achievable without engine changes. Documenting the 6% rate's temporary
nature in the comment was the smaller fix already shipped in round-3.
- swedish-compliance SI_RESPONSE_COLUMNS missing reverse_charge — FALSE
ALARM. `reverse_charge` IS present in the projection (line 264 of
supplier-invoices/route.ts); the engine receives it correctly.
- swedish-compliance KREDIT- prefix — dashboard parity, dismissed
rounds 3-5. The `is_credit_note` + `credited_invoice_id` flags are
the structured back-references.
- swedish-compliance cash-basis credit-note ingående moms timing
(ML 13 kap 27 §) — legitimate gap but engine-layer. The
createSupplierCreditNoteEntry engine function handles accrual only;
adding a cash-basis-already-paid branch would change engine
semantics, divering from the dashboard. Tracking as a Phase 4 engine
follow-up, not a v1 surface bug.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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