6a68ecb4d4b6faafee46a64366ceffbaacda2d02
8 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 bjornbergenheim
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43a71aec3c |
fix(supabase): stop server clients leaking a 30s refresh ticker per request (#1612)
* fix(supabase): stop server clients leaking a 30s refresh ticker per request
`autoRefreshToken` defaults to true in supabase-js, and off-browser
@supabase/auth-js starts the refresh ticker unconditionally:
// in non-browser environments the refresh token ticker runs always
this.startAutoRefresh()
That is a setInterval firing every 30 s. It calls unref(), so the process
still exits, tests pass, and Vercel never notices because the process is
torn down long before the tickers accumulate. But unref() does not make a
timer collectable: it stays registered in the event loop and remains a GC
root for its callback, which closes over the GoTrueClient, the
SupabaseClient, and the whole request scope around it.
A long-running self-hosted instance therefore leaks one timer plus one
entire request graph (socket, IncomingMessage, ServerResponse, headers,
route context: ~100 kB) per client constructed. One died of "JavaScript
heap out of memory" after 42 h, the last 24 of them completely idle. The
heap snapshot showed 445 retained request graphs and ~1050 Timeouts in
the 30 000 ms bucket, retained via `autoRefreshTicker`, and the rate
matched the traffic exactly: the Docker healthcheck polls /api/health
every 30 s and the webhook dispatch cron runs every minute, so
3 clients/min x 148 min = 444.
- new lib/supabase/service-client.ts: createServiceRoleClient() applies
SERVER_AUTH_OPTIONS, spread LAST so a caller passing its own auth block
cannot re-enable the ticker
- 22 call sites migrated; only booking-templates/sync/cron had ever
passed the options itself
- guard 9 in no-new-antipatterns.mjs fails CI on any new value import of
supabase-js's createClient outside the wrapper; type-only imports are
fine. Verified to fail on a deliberate regression and pass once fixed
- browser clients untouched: a signed-in tab genuinely needs the refresh,
and lib/supabase/client.ts is built on createBrowserClient anyway
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(checks): catch namespace imports in the leaky-supabase-client guard
The guard only matched named imports, so
import * as sb from '@supabase/supabase-js'
sb.createClient(url, key)
reached createClient through member access without ever naming it, and
passed. Verified against the real script before and after: the shape is
flagged now, and `import type * as sb` still passes.
Namespace value imports are treated as leaky outright rather than tracking
member access, which keeps the check a regex over source text with no new
dependency.
Review also suggested excluding *.test.tsx alongside *.test.ts. Skipped: the
repo has no .test.tsx files, and all four sibling checks in this file use
`.test.ts`. Diverging in one of them would read as an accident; if such files
appear, all four should change together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Mattsson
|
526f0315d0 |
fix(sandbox): loop small cleanup batches (8s cap is real), clear last FK blockers (#1452)
* fix(sandbox): loop small cleanup batches (8s cap is real), clear last FK blockers Draining the prod backlog exposed two final issues: - The function-level statement_timeout shipped in 20260807150000 does NOT lift authenticator's 8s cap: the timer arms when the top-level statement starts (verified empirically on prod: SET LOCAL 2s canceled the RPC despite its 290s proconfig; matches the 2026-08-04 SIE-import finding). The route now loops batches of 10 (~220ms/user with the account_id index, so ~2.2s per batch), each rpc() call being its own statement with its own 8s window. The loop stops when a batch makes no progress or the 240s time budget nears; capacity is 250 users/night. - processing_history.company_id and invoice_deliveries.company_id are plain NO ACTION FKs, so sandboxes whose visitor produced AI telemetry or sent a demo invoice could never be deleted (7 of ~510 backlog users). A data-driven sweep of every NO ACTION FK into companies confirms these two plus the already-handled audit_log are the only such tables with sandbox rows. cleanup_sandbox_user (migration 20260807160000) deletes them explicitly; the pg fixture now seeds a processing_history row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(test): use valid processing_history aggregate_type/event_type in sandbox fixture aggregate_type is CHECK-constrained and event_type is an FK to the seeded processing_event_types lookup; the guessed values failed all five fixture-dependent pg tests in CI. Validated against staging: Document/DocumentIngested inserts and tears down cleanly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): bypass invoice-delivery delete guard in teardown, cover both blocker tables in pg fixture CodeRabbit's fixture ask exposed a real gap: enforce_invoice_delivery_immutability silently swallows DELETEs (RETURN NULL plus a SECURITY_EVENT audit row) for terminal rows, so the explicit invoice_deliveries delete was a no-op and the companies FK still blocked teardown for sandboxes that sent a demo invoice. The trigger's DELETE branch now honors the gnubok.sandbox_cleanup flag with the same per-row sandbox re-verification as every other guard; base definition 20260803224000, all other branches untouched. The pg fixture seeds an invoice plus a marked_sent manual delivery, and a new test pins the zero-settings refusal path the Swedish review asked about. Validated on staging end-to-end. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
|
bd7a423b86 |
fix(sandbox): fit the nightly cleanup inside PostgREST's 8s session cap (#1451)
* fix(sandbox): fit the nightly cleanup inside PostgREST's 8s session cap Follow-up to #1449. Profiling the repaired teardown on prod puts one sandbox user at ~3s (the auth.users delete fans out over ~250 FK triggers; FK indexes were tried inside an aborted transaction and do not help), while every PostgREST session inherits authenticator's statement_timeout = 8s. The nightly RPC call therefore times out and ROLLS BACK wholesale: a second silent-failure mode for the same cron. - cleanup_expired_sandbox_users gets a function-local statement_timeout of 290s (same sanctioned pattern as undo_sie_import, 20260702154500) via migration 20260807150000. - The cron route bounds each night to 60 users (~180s), exports maxDuration = 300, and the backlog drains over a few nights. - Tests: route asserts the bounded rpc call and the maxDuration budget; the pg suite pins proconfig containing statement_timeout=290s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(db): index journal_entry_lines.account_id (chart-account cascade seq-scans 730k rows) Caught live during the backlog purge: DELETE FROM auth.users cascades chart_of_accounts deletion, whose ON DELETE SET NULL fires an unindexed UPDATE over journal_entry_lines per account (~37 per sandbox company). This is the bulk of the ~3s per-user teardown cost. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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f7f3a31f8e |
fix(sandbox): repair the silently-failing nightly sandbox cleanup and lock down its RPCs (#1449)
* fix(sandbox): repair the silently-failing nightly sandbox cleanup and lock down its RPCs
The daily cleanup cron has deleted nothing for months: cleanup_sandbox_user
died on the journal-line immutability trigger for every user (the seed posts
vouchers since spring), and cleanup_expired_sandbox_users swallowed each
failure as a WARNING while reporting success. 658 expired sandbox users plus
21 orphaned anonymous users had accumulated in prod auth.users.
- cleanup_sandbox_user sets the sanctioned gnubok.allow_delete flag plus a
new transaction-local gnubok.sandbox_cleanup flag, only after verifying
is_sandbox; write_audit_log, audit_log_immutable (DELETE only, per-row
sandbox re-check), enforce_dimension_registry_guards (DELETE only) and
enforce_pending_operations_no_delete (DELETE only) respect it
- clears salary_runs voucher-link FKs and purges the sandbox company's
audit rows before the auth.users cascade
- cleanup_expired_sandbox_users returns {cleaned, failed, orphans_removed},
additionally sweeps expired anonymous users that never got a
company_settings row, and takes an optional p_limit for bounded batches;
the cron route logs failures at error level and accepts both return shapes
- both RPCs lose their default PUBLIC EXECUTE grant (anon and authenticated
could call them via PostgREST) and are now service_role-only
- validated by replaying the full delete chain against prod inside aborted
transactions (21 users sampled across all seed eras, zero failures) and a
committed staging run; pg-real suite + cron route unit tests added
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): per-row sandbox re-verification in teardown guards, is_anonymous column guard
Resolution pass for PR #1449 review findings and the pg-real CI failure:
- Swedish accounting review: enforce_dimension_registry_guards and
enforce_pending_operations_no_delete now re-verify per row that
OLD.company_id belongs to a sandbox company (same pattern as
audit_log_immutable) instead of trusting the gnubok.sandbox_cleanup flag
alone. Because that re-check needs company_settings to still exist,
cleanup_sandbox_user deletes pending_operations and dimensions explicitly
before the auth.users cascade.
- pg-real CI: auth.users.is_anonymous does not exist in the CI
supabase/postgres image (or on older self-hosted stacks); the orphan sweep
in cleanup_expired_sandbox_users is now guarded on the column's existence,
and the pg test skips the orphan assertions on such stacks.
Re-validated on staging end-to-end: {cleaned: 5, failed: 0,
orphans_removed: 1}, fresh users and non-sandbox rows untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): make company_settings.is_sandbox write-once, prove orphan sweep fails loudly
Round-2 review findings (Swedish accounting review on PR #1449):
- Every teardown bypass trusts company_settings.is_sandbox, and RLS lets an
owner update their own settings row via PostgREST, so a real company that
flipped the flag would become eligible for full deletion by the nightly
cron. New trigger makes the flag write-once (no application path updates
it; a future sandbox-to-real conversion would ship its own migration).
- New pg test pins the reviewer's remaining concern: an anonymous user who
somehow has bookkeeping but no company_settings row is NOT silently
deleted by the orphan sweep; the unbypasseed immutability triggers make
the deletion fail loudly into the summary's failed count.
Validated on staging: flip blocked in both directions, unrelated
company_settings updates unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): guard is_sandbox provenance at INSERT, make orphan sweep exclusions explicit
Round-3 review hardening, approved by Emil:
- is_sandbox = true can now only be created by an anonymous-user JWT (the
sandbox seed's actor), service_role, or a direct database session. A
regular authenticated user could previously insert their settings row
pre-flagged and have the nightly cron destroy their real books, which
BFL 7 kap. forbids even self-inflicted. Claims are read from the
request.jwt.* GUCs directly so the check behaves identically on hosted,
self-hosted, and the CI auth shim.
- The orphan sweep now explicitly excludes anonymous users attached to any
companies or company_members row, instead of relying on downstream
immutability triggers throwing (emergent safety) to protect half-seeded
users.
- pg tests updated accordingly: blocked/allowed provenance paths, and the
half-seeded user is proven unreachable rather than merely failing loudly.
Validated on staging: authed insert blocked, anonymous-claim insert
allowed, half-seeded user untouched, sweep summary failed=0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): all-rows sandbox check, cleared bypass flags, tighter insert guard
CodeRabbit review pass on PR #1449 (its first non-rate-limited run):
- cleanup_sandbox_user now requires EVERY company_settings row of the user
to be sandbox-flagged, not an arbitrary single row: a hypothetical
mixed-company user would otherwise have their real company's rows reached
by the user-scoped deletes.
- Both bypass flags are cleared before the RPC returns, so later work in
the same transaction (the expired loop's next iterations, the orphan
sweep) never runs with them still armed.
- The is_sandbox insert guard now treats ANY PostgREST claims context
(claims json without a role claim included) as guarded, instead of
falling open when the role claim is absent.
- The flag-leak pg test now runs inside an explicit transaction (the old
version could not observe transaction-local GUCs at all), and a new test
covers the mixed sandbox/real user refusal.
Declined: replacing the em dashes inside the two replicated Swedish
exception messages; they are byte-identical copies of the strings already
deployed by migration 20260702084500 and changing them would alter live
user-facing errors out of scope.
Validated on staging: mixed user refused, flags cleared post-teardown,
role-less claims blocked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Jakob Wennberg
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ec27228a8e |
style: remove em/en dashes repo-wide, add CLAUDE.md rule against them (#890)
Em dashes (—) and en dashes (–) had spread across comments, docs, tests, and a few UI strings, reading as AI-generated boilerplate rather than house style. Replaced each with punctuation matching its context: colon for explanatory clauses, comma for asides, plain hyphen for numeric/legal ranges (e.g. "21-23§"), "to"/"till" for date ranges, parentheses for paired-dash asides. messages/en.json and messages/sv.json were fixed by hand together to keep sv/en in sync. Left untouched where the dash is the functional subject rather than decorative punctuation: date-range-parser.ts's separator regex, charset-repair.ts's CP1252 byte-mapping table (and its test), the SIE encoding mojibake docs, generic-csv.ts's minus-sign normalizer, the agent system-prompt files that already instruct against em dashes, and a golden iXBRL test fixture compared byte-for-byte. Also fixes two bugs surfaced along the way: an off-by-one in ApiKeysPanel's scope-label split (a leftover from an earlier partial pass), and a charset-repair test that had lost the literal en-dash it exists to verify. Regenerated the agent atom seed migration (skills:generate) since 27 SKILL.md files changed. Added a CLAUDE.md rule against em/en dashes, with an explicit carve-out for the functional-dash cases above. Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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5725c25bf1 |
Logs/improved logging (#398)
* feat(mcp): add create_transactions tool with /pending approval gate New MCP tool gnubok_create_transactions stages 1–10 transactions per call as pending_operations of type create_transaction (risk: medium). Each item becomes its own card on /pending; on confirm, the executor inserts the row into transactions with import_source='mcp' so MCP-staged ingestion is distinguishable from PSD2 sync. Designed for skill workflows that pull external data (e.g., Airtable) and want the user to gate the writes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(bas): strip concatenated group headers from corrupted account names A chart-data import bug had glued the next group's header onto the last account in each preceding group across all eight bas-data class files (e.g. account 2670 read "Utgående moms på försäljning inom EU, OSS 27 PERSONALENS SKATTER, AVGIFTER OCH LÖNEAVDRAG"). The corrupted names surface in transaction dropdowns, ledgers, SIE exports and årsredovisning, and risk VAT miscategorization on the OSS (2670) and blandad-verksamhet (6999) accounts specifically. - Cleans 69 account_name and 64 description fields across class-1..8 files - Adds a regression test asserting no name contains a concatenated header - Ships an idempotent safety-net migration that updates already-seeded chart_of_accounts rows, gated on the corrupted string so user customizations are preserved Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(errors): add structured error codes and handling for various operations - Introduced a new structured error registry in `structured-errors.ts` to standardize error handling across the application. - Added Swedish and English messages for various error scenarios, including validation, authorization, and bookkeeping errors. - Implemented a client-side error toast in `use-error-toast.ts` to display user-friendly error messages with remediation hints. - Created a wrapper for recording operation outcomes in `record-operation.ts`, enhancing audit capabilities for operations. - Developed a provider call wrapper in `with-provider-call.ts` to handle external HTTP calls with structured logging and error mapping. - Added a new SQL migration to extend the processing history with new event types and aggregate types for better operational telemetry. * Refactor supplier API routes to use context-based logging and error handling - Replaced direct Supabase client usage in GET and POST routes with context-based approach using `withRouteContext`. - Enhanced error handling to provide structured error responses for supplier creation and listing. - Updated logging to include request IDs for better traceability. - Introduced new error codes for supplier-related operations. - Refactored tax deadlines cron job to utilize context and improved error handling. - Updated ESLint configuration to enforce logging practices across API and lib directories. - Enhanced arcim migration extension with structured error handling and logging. - Added classification for provider errors to improve user-facing error messages. - Introduced request ID in extension context for better log correlation. * fix(route-context): update DynamicParams type for improved type safety in route handlers * feat(transactions): add 'create_transaction' operation to PendingOperationType * fix(route): ensure companyId is non-nullable in loadAndDeriveAbsence function * fix(route-context): ensure companyId is always non-null by short-circuiting with COMPANY_CONTEXT_MISSING --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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550cadcb06 |
fix: harden auth, cron secrets, and provider flows (GNU-17) (#148)
- Replace === with crypto.timingSafeEqual in all 7 cron routes via shared lib/auth/cron.ts - Add in-memory rate limiting (60 req/min) and expires_at support to calendar feed - Add exponential backoff on MFA verify after 3 failed attempts - Add 60s cooldown on password reset requests - Validate bank callback auth code format before API call - Redact session IDs from bank sync and callback logs - Validate OAuth redirect_uris against allowlist (claude.ai, claude.com, localhost) - Remove excessive PII/debug console logging from login page Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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109f860e22 |
Sandbox (#8)
* feat: add sandbox infrastructure — migration, types, and middleware Add database migration for sandbox support: - Add `is_sandbox` boolean column to company_settings - Update 4 enforcement trigger functions (journal entry immutability, journal entry line immutability, retention enforcement, document deletion blocking) to bypass checks for sandbox users - Add `cleanup_sandbox_user()` SECURITY DEFINER function that handles FK-safe deletion order (document_attachments → journal_entry_lines → journal_entries → supplier_invoices → auth.users cascade) - Add `cleanup_expired_sandbox_users()` function that loops over sandbox users older than N hours with per-user error handling Update TypeScript types: - Add `is_sandbox: boolean` to CompanySettings interface - Add `is_sandbox: false` to makeCompanySettings() test factory Update middleware: - Add `/sandbox` to public routes so the landing page is accessible without authentication Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add sandbox landing page, seed API, cleanup cron, and banner Sandbox landing page (app/sandbox/page.tsx): - Client component matching the existing auth page aesthetic - Auth check: if logged in as real user, shows message to use incognito - Otherwise shows feature overview (invoices, transactions, bookkeeping, reports) with "Starta sandbox" button - On click: signInAnonymously() → POST /api/sandbox/seed → redirect - Uses window.location.href for full page load (ensures middleware picks up new session cookies) Seed API (app/api/sandbox/seed/route.ts): - POST handler gated to anonymous users only (403 for real users) - Idempotent: returns { seeded: false } if company_settings exists - Seeds ~40 rows: profile, company_settings (is_sandbox: true, onboarding_complete: true), chart of accounts (via RPC), fiscal period, 3 customers (Swedish business, EU business, individual), 4 invoices (paid/sent/overdue/draft), 4 invoice items, 2 posted journal entries with 5 lines, 8 transactions (3 categorized, 2 income, 3 uncategorized), 2 deadlines - Journal entries inserted directly (not via engine) to avoid event emission, using next_voucher_number() RPC Cleanup cron (app/api/sandbox/cleanup/cron/route.ts): - GET handler with CRON_SECRET Bearer token auth - Creates service role Supabase client - Calls cleanup_expired_sandbox_users RPC (24h default) Sandbox banner (components/dashboard/SandboxBanner.tsx): - Amber bar with dismiss button (client state, reappears on reload) - Text: "Sandlådemiljö — dina data raderas automatiskt efter 24 timmar" - "Skapa konto" link to /register Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: integrate sandbox into dashboard — banner, nav, settings safeguards Dashboard layout (app/(dashboard)/layout.tsx): - Fetch is_sandbox from company_settings - Render SandboxBanner at top of page for sandbox users - Pass isSandbox prop to DashboardNav - Hide RecaptIdentify analytics for sandbox users Root page (app/page.tsx): - Same sandbox banner and isSandbox prop treatment as dashboard layout (root page has its own layout, not wrapped by (dashboard)/layout) DashboardNav (components/dashboard/DashboardNav.tsx): - Add optional isSandbox prop - Change logout button text to "Avsluta sandbox" when isSandbox - Redirect to /sandbox instead of /login on logout for sandbox users - Applied to both desktop sidebar and mobile drawer logout buttons Settings page (app/(dashboard)/settings/page.tsx): - Hide "Bank (PSD2)" tab entirely for sandbox users — prevents connecting real bank accounts from a temporary anonymous session - Hide "Radera konto" card for sandbox users — account auto-deletes via cron, and the delete flow requires email confirmation Vercel config (vercel.json): - Add sandbox cleanup cron at 04:00 UTC daily (/api/sandbox/cleanup/cron) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove audit trigger for non-existent tax_codes table Migration 018 referenced public.tax_codes which was never created (migration 012 is a placeholder). This caused failures when running migrations from scratch on a fresh database. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove ALTER FUNCTION for 3 non-existent functions Removed search_path pinning for create_invoice_with_items, seed_asset_categories, and update_reconciliation_session_counts — none of these functions were ever created in any migration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove ALTER for generate_invoice_number (created in later migration) The function is created in migration 20260306 with search_path already set, but migration 20260304 tried to ALTER it before it existed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fixed redirect issue * Update app/api/sandbox/seed/route.ts Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Update app/api/sandbox/seed/route.ts Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Update app/sandbox/page.tsx Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * Fixed catch block issue --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |