* fix(providers): stop dead-ending on a resource 403, and stop dropping every migrated kreditfaktura
Two independent defects in the provider migration, both customer-visible.
A per-resource 403 was classified as a dead grant. classifyProviderError mapped
any 401 or 403 to PROVIDER_AUTH_EXPIRED, which is fatal, so a Fortnox account
without leverantorsregister permission aborted the whole migration at the
suppliers step with "Anslutningen har gatt ut. Ateranslut" even though the same
token had just succeeded on the previous step. Reconnecting can never fix that,
and steps 4 and later never ran. The provider's own reason ("Saknar behorighet
for leverantorsregister.") never reached the user. A 403 is now non-fatal once
the same token has already succeeded in the run, the migration continues, and
the provider's reason is surfaced. A 401, or a 403 on the first call, keeps the
auth-expired path.
fetchCompanyInfoDirect swallowed every error and returned null, which made the
existing PROVIDER_API_MODULE_INACTIVE remediation unreachable: a Visma customer
whose api_standard module is off got a silent 200 with an empty company card
instead of the precise Swedish explanation that was already written.
Kreditfakturor were dropped entirely. entity-mapper wrote document_type
'credit_note', but invoices_document_type_check allows only invoice, proforma
and delivery_note, and credit notes are modelled by credited_invoice_id. Every
migrated kreditfaktura was rejected and counted as skipped. One customer
imported 255 sales invoices and 0 credit notes on 2026-08-31; AR and revenue
are overstated by the credited amounts, and kreditfakturor are
rakenskapsinformation. They now import as invoice rows with reversed amounts
and status 'credited', following the in-app credit convention. They import
unlinked: no provider DTO carries a reference to the invoice being credited, so
there is nothing to match on and guessing would corrupt the AR ledger. The
wizard says so instead of burying them in skipped.
Also makes the OAuth callback non-replayable from browser history (no-store
plus history replacement), which is what the "state rejected" events were: a
replay of a callback that had already succeeded seconds earlier. No
already-connected page, so consumed-vs-unknown state stays unobservable to an
unauthenticated caller. Expected PSD2 session expiry drops from error to warn.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc
* fix(arcim): entity line needs the failed flag
The unlinked-credit-note row omitted `failed`, which the entityLines element
type requires. Caught by the zero-extensions build, not by vitest: the unit
suite does not typecheck.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc
* fix(arcim): write the missing-reference disclosure onto the credit note itself
Review finding (swedish-compliance-review-bot): ML 17 kap 22-23 § wants a
kreditfaktura to reference the invoice it credits, and BFL 5 kap 6-7 § wants a
verifikation to reference its underlag. No provider DTO carries that reference,
so the pairing cannot be resolved at import and guessing it would corrupt the
AR ledger. Reporting the count in the migration wizard is not enough: a result
screen is not rakenskapsinformation, and the gap has to be legible on the
record itself years later.
The disclosure now goes into invoices.notes and supplier_invoices.notes,
preserving whatever note the provider sent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016ifKg6Ec67A39oxfGPU1yc
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
636 lines
25 KiB
TypeScript
636 lines
25 KiB
TypeScript
import { type SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import { createServiceRoleClient } from '@/lib/supabase/service-client'
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import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { syncAccountTransactions } from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/sync'
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import {
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runUnattendedReconciliationSweep,
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toSweepSummary,
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} from '@/lib/reconciliation/unattended-sweep'
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import {
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isConsentExpiringSoon,
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getDaysUntilExpiry,
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probeSessionHealth,
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SessionExpiredError,
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REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE,
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SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE,
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} from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/api-client'
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import { getEmailService } from '@/lib/email/service'
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import {
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generateConsentExpiryEmailHtml,
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generateConsentExpiryEmailText,
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generateConsentExpiryEmailSubject,
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} from '@/lib/email/consent-notification-templates'
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import { ensureInitialized } from '@/lib/init'
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import { getCompanyIdsWithCapability } from '@/lib/entitlements/has-capability'
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import { CAPABILITY } from '@/lib/entitlements/keys'
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import { withCronContext } from '@/lib/api/with-cron-context'
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import { errorResponse, errorResponseFromCode } from '@/lib/errors/get-structured-error'
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import { getBranding } from '@/lib/branding/service'
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import { fetchAllRows } from '@/lib/supabase/fetch-all'
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import type { StoredAccount } from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/types'
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ensureInitialized()
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// Without this export the route runs under the platform default (60s), which
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// is why the sync loop used to self-limit to 50s and starve the queue: ~17
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// connections per day against 100+ entitled active connections, so any given
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// connection only got an automatic sync every 4-7 days.
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export const maxDuration = 300
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const MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_RUN = 300
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// Connections synced concurrently within one wave. Enable Banking calls are
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// I/O-bound, so a small fan-out multiplies throughput without hammering the
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// ASPSPs; per-connection error isolation is preserved inside each wave.
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const SYNC_CONCURRENCY = 4
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/**
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* GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/sync/cron
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* Automatic daily bank transaction sync
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* Runs at 05:00 UTC (07:00 Swedish time)
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*
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* Sized so one run covers every entitled active connection (Vercel Pro 300s
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* timeout, 4-way concurrency). Prioritizes connections not synced for the
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* longest time, so anything cut off by the time budget is first tomorrow.
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* Deduplication via external_id makes repeated runs safe.
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*/
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export const GET = withCronContext('cron.bank_sync', async (_request, ctx) => {
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const supabaseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL
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const supabaseServiceKey = process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
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if (!supabaseUrl || !supabaseServiceKey) {
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return errorResponseFromCode('INTERNAL_ERROR', ctx.log, {
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requestId: ctx.requestId,
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details: { reason: 'Missing Supabase configuration' },
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})
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}
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const supabase = createServiceRoleClient(supabaseUrl, supabaseServiceKey)
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// Clean up stale pending connections (older than 1 hour)
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const oneHourAgo = new Date(Date.now() - 60 * 60 * 1000).toISOString()
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const { data: stalePending } = await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.delete()
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.eq('status', 'pending')
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.lt('created_at', oneHourAgo)
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.select('id')
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if (stalePending?.length) {
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ctx.log.info('cleaned up stale pending connections', { count: stalePending.length })
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}
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let candidateConnections
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let entitledCompanyIds
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try {
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candidateConnections = await fetchAllRows(
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({ from, to }) => supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.select('*')
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.eq('status', 'active')
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.order('last_synced_at', { ascending: true, nullsFirst: true })
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.order('id', { ascending: true })
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.range(from, to),
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{ dedupeBy: connection => connection.id },
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)
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entitledCompanyIds = await getCompanyIdsWithCapability(
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supabase,
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candidateConnections.map(connection => connection.company_id),
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CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
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)
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} catch (error) {
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ctx.log.error('failed to build entitled bank sync work list', error as Error)
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return errorResponse(error, ctx.log, { requestId: ctx.requestId })
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}
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// Apply the batch limit only after entitlement filtering. Otherwise old
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// free-tier rows can permanently occupy the head of the queue and prevent
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// every paying connection behind them from syncing.
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const connections = candidateConnections
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.filter(connection => entitledCompanyIds.has(connection.company_id))
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.slice(0, MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_RUN)
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ctx.log.info('bank sync work list built', {
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candidates: candidateConnections.length,
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entitledCompanies: entitledCompanyIds.size,
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selected: connections.length,
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})
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// No early return on an empty set: the health probe below still has work to
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// do (a company whose only connection is parked in 'pending_selection' has
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// nothing to sync but can absolutely have a dead session).
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const startTime = Date.now()
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// 230s of the 300s maxDuration for the sync loop; the rest is reserved for
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// the health probe pass and response teardown below.
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const TIME_BUDGET_MS = 230_000
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const baseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'
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const results: {
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connectionId: string
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userId: string
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bankName: string
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imported: number
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duplicates: number
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errors: number
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// 'skipped' = nothing was fetched from the bank (every account deselected),
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// so this run proves nothing about whether the session is still alive. Kept
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// distinct from 'synced' because the health probe below keys on it.
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status: 'synced' | 'skipped' | 'expired' | 'expiring_soon' | 'error'
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daysUntilExpiry?: number | null
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}[] = []
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// One PSD2 session can back several companies (lib/session-sharing.ts), and
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// they all carry the same consent_expires. Keyed per (user, session) so a
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// user with four companies on one consent gets one warning mail, not four.
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const notifiedSessions = new Set<string>()
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const notifyKey = (c: { user_id: string; session_id: string | null }) =>
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`${c.user_id}:${c.session_id ?? 'none'}`
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const syncConnection = async (connection: (typeof connections)[number]) => {
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try {
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const daysLeft = getDaysUntilExpiry(connection.consent_expires)
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const isExpired = daysLeft !== null && daysLeft <= 0
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if (isExpired) {
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await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.update({ status: 'expired' })
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.eq('id', connection.id)
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// Send expiry notification, once per shared consent
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if (!notifiedSessions.has(notifyKey(connection))) {
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notifiedSessions.add(notifyKey(connection))
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await sendConsentExpiryNotification(
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supabase, connection, 0, true, baseUrl
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)
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}
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results.push({
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connectionId: connection.id,
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userId: connection.user_id,
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bankName: connection.bank_name,
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imported: 0,
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duplicates: 0,
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errors: 0,
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status: 'expired',
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daysUntilExpiry: 0,
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})
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return
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}
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const expiringSoon = isConsentExpiringSoon(connection.consent_expires)
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// Send consent expiry notifications at 7-day and 3-day thresholds
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if (
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expiringSoon &&
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daysLeft !== null &&
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(daysLeft <= 3 || daysLeft === 7) &&
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!notifiedSessions.has(notifyKey(connection))
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) {
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notifiedSessions.add(notifyKey(connection))
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await sendConsentExpiryNotification(
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supabase, connection, daysLeft, false, baseUrl
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)
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}
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const toDate = new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]
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// First sync: 90-day lookback (PSD2 max). Subsequent: 7-day window.
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// Gate on initial_sync_completed_at, not last_synced_at: manual "Sync now"
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// sets last_synced_at without doing the deep backfill, and we want the cron
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// to still fall back to 90 days if the inline activation backfill failed.
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const isFirstSync = !connection.initial_sync_completed_at
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const lookbackDays = isFirstSync ? 90 : 7
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if (isFirstSync) {
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ctx.log.info('first sync for connection: using 90-day lookback', {
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connectionId: connection.id,
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lookbackDays,
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})
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}
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const fromDate = new Date(Date.now() - lookbackDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
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.toISOString()
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.split('T')[0]
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// Keep the full list for the DB write-back so we don't drop accounts
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// the user has opted out of. Sync only the enabled subset (treating
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// undefined as enabled for back-compat with older rows).
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const allAccounts = (connection.accounts_data as StoredAccount[] || []).map(a => ({ ...a }))
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const accounts = allAccounts.filter(a => a.enabled !== false)
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if (accounts.length === 0) {
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ctx.log.info('all accounts disabled: skipping sync', {
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connectionId: connection.id,
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totalAccounts: allAccounts.length,
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})
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results.push({
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connectionId: connection.id,
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userId: connection.user_id,
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bankName: connection.bank_name,
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imported: 0,
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duplicates: 0,
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errors: 0,
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status: 'skipped',
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daysUntilExpiry: daysLeft,
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})
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return
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}
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// Detect SIE overlap: skip auto-categorization if the sync range
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// overlaps with a completed SIE import to prevent double-booking
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const { data: sieOverlap } = await supabase
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.from('sie_imports')
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.select('id')
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.eq('company_id', connection.company_id)
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.eq('status', 'completed')
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.gte('fiscal_year_end', fromDate)
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.limit(1)
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.maybeSingle()
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// First sync uses strategy=longest to pull the deepest history available
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// from the ASPSP. Incremental syncs skip it: the implicit default is
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// faster and we already have the older data.
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const syncOptions = {
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...(sieOverlap ? { skipAutoCategorization: true } : {}),
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...(isFirstSync ? { strategy: 'longest' as const } : {}),
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}
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const syncResults = await Promise.all(
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accounts.map(account => syncAccountTransactions(
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supabase,
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connection.company_id,
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connection.user_id,
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connection.id,
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account,
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fromDate,
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toDate,
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undefined,
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syncOptions
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))
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)
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const totalImported = syncResults.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.imported, 0)
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const totalDuplicates = syncResults.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.duplicates, 0)
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const totalErrors = syncResults.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.errors, 0)
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// Batch reconciliation sweep when SIE overlap detected. One scoped run
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// per enabled cash account (issue #1298): a pooled run matched every
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// same-currency account's transactions against 1930's GL lines and could
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// persist a cross-account journal_entry_id.
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if (sieOverlap && totalImported > 0) {
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try {
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const reconResult = await runUnattendedReconciliationSweep(
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supabase,
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connection.company_id,
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connection.user_id,
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{ dateFrom: fromDate, dateTo: toDate },
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)
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// Stamp the outcome so the UI can render "Vi matchade X av Y" and the
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// review surface knows there is something to granska.
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await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.update({
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last_sie_sweep: toSweepSummary(reconResult, { dateFrom: fromDate, dateTo: toDate }),
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})
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.eq('id', connection.id)
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if (reconResult.applied > 0 || reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold > 0) {
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ctx.log.info('batch reconciliation after sync', {
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companyId: connection.company_id,
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applied: reconResult.applied,
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skippedBelowThreshold: reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold,
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accounts: reconResult.accounts.map((a) => ({
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accountNumber: a.accountNumber,
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applied: a.applied,
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skippedBelowThreshold: a.skippedBelowThreshold,
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})),
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})
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}
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} catch {
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// Non-critical
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}
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}
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// Successful sync: update connection and clear any previous error state.
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// Write allAccounts (not accounts) so disabled accounts stay in the row.
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const completedAt = new Date().toISOString()
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let initialSyncFields: Record<string, unknown> = {}
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if (isFirstSync) {
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// Aggregate returned booking dates across enabled accounts so the UI
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// can show "we requested X but the bank returned Y to Z".
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const minDates = syncResults.map(r => r.returnedMinBookingDate).filter((d): d is string => !!d)
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const maxDates = syncResults.map(r => r.returnedMaxBookingDate).filter((d): d is string => !!d)
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initialSyncFields = {
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initial_sync_completed_at: completedAt,
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initial_sync_requested_from: fromDate,
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initial_sync_returned_min_date: minDates.length > 0 ? minDates.reduce((a, b) => (a < b ? a : b)) : null,
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initial_sync_returned_max_date: maxDates.length > 0 ? maxDates.reduce((a, b) => (a > b ? a : b)) : null,
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initial_sync_lookback_days: lookbackDays,
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}
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}
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await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.update({
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accounts_data: allAccounts,
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last_synced_at: completedAt,
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...initialSyncFields,
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...(connection.error_message ? { error_message: null } : {}),
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})
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.eq('id', connection.id)
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results.push({
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connectionId: connection.id,
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userId: connection.user_id,
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bankName: connection.bank_name,
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imported: totalImported,
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duplicates: totalDuplicates,
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errors: totalErrors,
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status: expiringSoon ? 'expiring_soon' : 'synced',
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daysUntilExpiry: daysLeft,
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})
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} catch (error) {
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// A dead PSD2 session (closed/expired/invalid consent) is a re-auth
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// condition, not a transient failure: flip it to 'expired' (same state
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// the consent-elapsed branch uses) so the UI offers a reconnect instead
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// of a retry. Other errors stay 'error'.
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//
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// error_message is rendered verbatim on the settings panel, so it gets
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// the short Swedish user message in both cases: the raw Enable Banking
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// error body (an English JSON envelope) stays in the server log below.
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const isSessionDead = error instanceof SessionExpiredError
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const failureStatus = isSessionDead ? 'expired' : 'error'
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const failureMessage = isSessionDead ? REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE : SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE
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// An expired PSD2 consent is the normal end of a bank grant and the row
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// is flipped to 'expired' for the user to reconnect: a warning, not an
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// error. Only genuine sync failures belong in the error panel.
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const failureContext = {
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connectionId: connection.id,
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userId: connection.user_id,
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bankName: connection.bank_name,
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consentExpires: connection.consent_expires,
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lastSyncedAt: connection.last_synced_at,
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}
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if (isSessionDead) {
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ctx.log.warn('bank session expired for connection', {
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...failureContext,
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reason: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
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})
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} else {
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ctx.log.error('sync failed for connection', error as Error, failureContext)
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}
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await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.update({ status: failureStatus, error_message: failureMessage })
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.eq('id', connection.id)
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results.push({
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connectionId: connection.id,
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userId: connection.user_id,
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bankName: connection.bank_name,
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imported: 0,
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duplicates: 0,
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errors: 1,
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status: failureStatus,
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})
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}
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}
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// Concurrency is per COMPANY, not per connection: the unattended sweep after
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// an SIE-overlap sync is company-scoped (it reconciles every cash account of
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// the company), so two connections of one company syncing concurrently would
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// run two identical whole-company sweeps whose read-time "unlinked GL lines"
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|
// snapshots race, and both can claim the same journal entry for different
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// bank transactions. Grouping keeps one company's connections sequential
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|
// while unrelated companies still fan out.
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|
const companyGroups = new Map<string, typeof connections>()
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|
for (const connection of connections) {
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|
const group = companyGroups.get(connection.company_id)
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if (group) group.push(connection)
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else companyGroups.set(connection.company_id, [connection])
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|
}
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const groups = [...companyGroups.values()]
|
|
|
|
const syncCompanyGroup = async (group: typeof connections) => {
|
|
for (const connection of group) {
|
|
// Re-check inside the group too: a company with many connections would
|
|
// otherwise run to completion past the budget and eat the health-probe
|
|
// and teardown margin before the between-waves check fires.
|
|
if (Date.now() - startTime > TIME_BUDGET_MS) return
|
|
await syncConnection(connection)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Waves of SYNC_CONCURRENCY company groups: the budget check sits between
|
|
// waves, and each connection keeps its own try/catch above, so one slow or
|
|
// failing bank affects at most its own wave slot.
|
|
for (let offset = 0; offset < groups.length; offset += SYNC_CONCURRENCY) {
|
|
if (Date.now() - startTime > TIME_BUDGET_MS) {
|
|
ctx.log.info('time budget reached', { processedSoFar: results.length })
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
await Promise.all(groups.slice(offset, offset + SYNC_CONCURRENCY).map(syncCompanyGroup))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Health probe for connections this run did NOT prove alive by syncing them.
|
|
//
|
|
// A sync failure is the only thing that used to move a connection off
|
|
// 'active', which leaves two silent holes: connections the loop skipped
|
|
// (capability not entitled, every account deselected, time budget reached)
|
|
// and connections that never sync at all because they are still parked in
|
|
// 'pending_selection'. Both kept rendering as healthy with a stale
|
|
// last_synced_at while their PSD2 session was already dead bank-side, so the
|
|
// user read old balances as current. Probing costs one cheap session call
|
|
// per connection and only ever acts on a definite 'dead'.
|
|
const probeResults: { connectionId: string; bankName: string }[] = []
|
|
// Total-elapsed ceiling (measured from startTime, like TIME_BUDGET_MS): the
|
|
// probe pass gets whatever the sync loop left of it, with 20s of maxDuration
|
|
// spare for teardown.
|
|
const PROBE_BUDGET_MS = 280_000
|
|
const provenAlive = new Set(
|
|
results.filter(r => r.status === 'synced' || r.status === 'expiring_soon').map(r => r.connectionId)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
const { data: unverified, error: unverifiedError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.select('id, company_id, user_id, bank_name, session_id, status, last_expiry_notification_at')
|
|
.in('status', ['active', 'pending_selection'])
|
|
.not('session_id', 'is', null)
|
|
.order('last_synced_at', { ascending: true, nullsFirst: true })
|
|
.limit(100)
|
|
|
|
if (unverifiedError) {
|
|
ctx.log.error('failed to fetch connections for health probe', unverifiedError, {
|
|
message: unverifiedError.message,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Probe per DISTINCT session, not per connection. One session can back
|
|
// several companies (lib/session-sharing.ts), so probing per row would spend
|
|
// four identical API calls on one consent and mark only one company dead at
|
|
// a time. A session is one live-or-dead fact: the verdict applies to every
|
|
// row holding it.
|
|
type UnverifiedConnection = NonNullable<typeof unverified>[number]
|
|
const probeGroups = new Map<string, UnverifiedConnection[]>()
|
|
// A session that synced successfully for ANY of its companies is alive, so
|
|
// skip the whole group rather than re-probing it through a sibling row.
|
|
const provenAliveSessions = new Set(
|
|
(unverified ?? [])
|
|
.filter(c => provenAlive.has(c.id))
|
|
.map(c => c.session_id as string)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
for (const connection of unverified ?? []) {
|
|
const sessionId = connection.session_id as string
|
|
if (provenAliveSessions.has(sessionId)) continue
|
|
const group = probeGroups.get(sessionId)
|
|
if (group) group.push(connection)
|
|
else probeGroups.set(sessionId, [connection])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (const [sessionId, group] of probeGroups) {
|
|
if (Date.now() - startTime > PROBE_BUDGET_MS) {
|
|
ctx.log.info('probe budget reached', { probedSoFar: probeResults.length })
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Per-session isolation, matching the sync loop above: without it a single
|
|
// network blip aborts probing for every remaining candidate in the batch
|
|
// and the coverage gap stays silent until tomorrow's run.
|
|
try {
|
|
const health = await probeSessionHealth(sessionId)
|
|
if (health !== 'dead') continue
|
|
|
|
const groupIds = group.map(c => c.id)
|
|
const { error: updateError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({ status: 'expired', error_message: REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE })
|
|
.in('id', groupIds)
|
|
|
|
// Only claim the connections were marked dead once the write landed.
|
|
// Notifying (and counting) on an unpersisted update would tell the user
|
|
// to re-authorize while the rows still read 'active'.
|
|
if (updateError) {
|
|
ctx.log.error('failed to mark probed-dead connections as expired', updateError, {
|
|
connectionIds: groupIds,
|
|
})
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// One dead consent, one mail, however many companies share it.
|
|
const first = group[0]
|
|
if (!notifiedSessions.has(notifyKey(first))) {
|
|
notifiedSessions.add(notifyKey(first))
|
|
await sendConsentExpiryNotification(supabase, first, 0, true, baseUrl)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx.log.info('health probe found a dead session', {
|
|
connectionIds: groupIds,
|
|
sharedAcrossCompanies: group.length > 1,
|
|
bankName: first.bank_name,
|
|
})
|
|
for (const connection of group) {
|
|
probeResults.push({ connectionId: connection.id, bankName: connection.bank_name })
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
ctx.log.error('health probe failed for session', err as Error, {
|
|
connectionIds: group.map(c => c.id),
|
|
bankName: group[0]?.bank_name,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const totalImported = results.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.imported, 0)
|
|
const totalExpired = results.filter(r => r.status === 'expired').length
|
|
const totalExpiringSoon = results.filter(r => r.status === 'expiring_soon').length
|
|
const totalFailed = results.filter(r => r.status === 'error').length
|
|
|
|
ctx.log.info('bank sync summary', {
|
|
processed: results.length,
|
|
totalImported,
|
|
totalExpired,
|
|
totalExpiringSoon,
|
|
totalFailed,
|
|
probedDead: probeResults.length,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
return NextResponse.json({
|
|
processed: results.length,
|
|
totalImported,
|
|
totalExpired,
|
|
totalExpiringSoon,
|
|
totalFailed,
|
|
probedDead: probeResults.length,
|
|
probeResults,
|
|
results,
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Send consent expiry notification email.
|
|
* Guards with last_expiry_notification_at to avoid spamming (2-day cooldown).
|
|
*
|
|
* Paused by default (founder call 2026-07-29, after the probe backlog drain
|
|
* mass-emailed 24 users at once): the settings panel and attention surfaces
|
|
* already flag a dead connection in-app. Set BANK_CONSENT_EXPIRY_EMAILS=true
|
|
* to resume sending; the status transitions below run either way.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function sendConsentExpiryNotification(
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
|
|
supabase: SupabaseClient<any>,
|
|
connection: Record<string, unknown>,
|
|
daysLeft: number,
|
|
isExpired: boolean,
|
|
baseUrl: string
|
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
try {
|
|
if (process.env.BANK_CONSENT_EXPIRY_EMAILS !== 'true') return
|
|
|
|
// Check cooldown: skip if notified within last 2 days
|
|
const lastNotified = connection.last_expiry_notification_at as string | null
|
|
if (lastNotified) {
|
|
const hoursSinceNotified = (Date.now() - new Date(lastNotified).getTime()) / (1000 * 60 * 60)
|
|
if (hoursSinceNotified < 48) return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const emailService = getEmailService()
|
|
if (!emailService.isConfigured()) return
|
|
|
|
const userId = connection.user_id as string
|
|
|
|
// Look up user email
|
|
const { data: userData } = await supabase.auth.admin.getUserById(userId)
|
|
if (!userData?.user?.email) return
|
|
|
|
// Look up company name
|
|
const { data: companySettings } = await supabase
|
|
.from('company_settings')
|
|
.select('company_name')
|
|
.eq('company_id', connection.company_id)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
const emailData = {
|
|
bankName: connection.bank_name as string,
|
|
daysUntilExpiry: daysLeft,
|
|
renewalUrl: `${baseUrl}/settings/banking`,
|
|
companyName: companySettings?.company_name || '',
|
|
isExpired,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await emailService.sendEmail({
|
|
to: userData.user.email,
|
|
subject: generateConsentExpiryEmailSubject(emailData),
|
|
html: generateConsentExpiryEmailHtml(emailData),
|
|
text: generateConsentExpiryEmailText(emailData),
|
|
replyTo: getBranding().supportEmail,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Update last notification timestamp
|
|
await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({ last_expiry_notification_at: new Date().toISOString() })
|
|
.eq('id', connection.id as string)
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// Notification failure must not break the cron job: log only.
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
|
|
console.error('[bank-sync-cron] failed to send consent expiry notification:', error)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|