Files
accounted/lib/core/documents/document-service.ts
T
Jakob WennbergandClaude Fable 5 968161b42b fix(documents): read attachments with service client so colleague uploads open (#1207)
The documents bucket SELECT policy only covers the uploader's own folder
(documents/{uid}/...), but document_attachments rows are company-scoped.
Every surface that touched storage with the user-bound client therefore
failed for attachments uploaded by another member of the same company
(colleague uploads, email-inbox ingest attributed to the company creator):

- GET /api/documents/:id 500ed with "Failed to create download URL", so
  viewing a bilaga on a verifikat or supplier invoice was broken for
  every member except the uploader (support case: Odin Aero, where all
  40 documents live in the owner's folder and the second member could
  open none of them).
- GET /api/documents/:id/integrity 500ed the same way.
- POST /api/documents/:id/verify failed the storage download.
- invoice-inbox retry-extraction could not download the attachment.
- cloud-backup user-triggered syncs silently dropped colleague-uploaded
  documents from the Drive archive (manifest rows flipped to 'error').

Fix: authorize on the user client (RLS + explicit company filter, plus
the membership check where present), then do the storage read with the
service-role client. This is the pattern the inline proxy route and the
v1 download route already use; these five call sites were left behind.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 12:34:11 +02:00

514 lines
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TypeScript
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import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
import { createServiceClientNoCookies } from '@/lib/auth/api-keys'
import { eventBus } from '@/lib/events'
import type { DocumentAttachment, DocumentUploadSource } from '@/types'
/**
* Document Service - WORM-style document archive
*
* Handles document upload with SHA-256 integrity, version chains,
* and linking to journal entries. Deletion is blocked by DB triggers
* for documents linked to committed entries.
*/
/**
* Sanitize a filename for use in Supabase Storage keys.
* Replaces spaces and non-ASCII characters with underscores,
* collapses consecutive underscores, and truncates to avoid
* exceeding Supabase Storage path length limits.
*/
function sanitizeFileName(name: string): string {
const dotIndex = name.lastIndexOf('.')
const ext = dotIndex > 0 ? name.slice(dotIndex) : ''
const base = dotIndex > 0 ? name.slice(0, dotIndex) : name
const sanitizedBase = base
.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]/g, '_')
.replace(/_+/g, '_')
.replace(/^_|_$/g, '')
.slice(0, 100) || 'file'
const sanitizedExt = ext.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9.]/g, '_')
return sanitizedBase + sanitizedExt
}
export const MAX_DOCUMENT_SIZE = 10 * 1024 * 1024 // 10 MB
export const ALLOWED_DOCUMENT_TYPES = [
'application/pdf',
'image/jpeg',
'image/png',
'image/webp',
]
/**
* Validate file size and MIME type before upload.
* Returns an error string or null if valid.
*/
export function validateDocumentFile(file: { size: number; type?: string }): string | null {
if (file.size === 0) {
return 'Filen är tom'
}
if (file.size > MAX_DOCUMENT_SIZE) {
return `Filen är för stor (max ${MAX_DOCUMENT_SIZE / 1024 / 1024} MB)`
}
if (!file.type || !ALLOWED_DOCUMENT_TYPES.includes(file.type)) {
return 'Otillåten filtyp. Tillåtna: PDF, JPG, PNG, WebP.'
}
return null
}
/**
* Inspect the first bytes of a buffer to identify the actual file format.
* Defends against callers (typically MCP agents) that base64-encode a text
* placeholder or summary instead of the real binary file: those uploads
* succeed at the storage layer but the bytes are unreadable as a PDF/image.
*/
export function detectFileMagic(bytes: Uint8Array): string | null {
if (bytes.length < 4) return null
// PDF: %PDF- anywhere in the first 1024 bytes. ISO 32000 readers accept a
// preamble before the header (Acrobat scans the first 1 KB), and real-world
// invoice PDFs arrive with leading newlines/junk: requiring offset 0
// rejected files every normal reader opens. Image types stay strict at
// offset 0: genuine image files always start with their signature, and the
// looseness is not needed there to keep the anti-placeholder defense tight.
const pdfScanEnd = Math.min(bytes.length - 5, 1024)
for (let i = 0; i <= pdfScanEnd; i++) {
if (
bytes[i] === 0x25 &&
bytes[i + 1] === 0x50 &&
bytes[i + 2] === 0x44 &&
bytes[i + 3] === 0x46 &&
bytes[i + 4] === 0x2D
) return 'application/pdf'
}
// PNG: 89 50 4E 47
if (bytes[0] === 0x89 && bytes[1] === 0x50 && bytes[2] === 0x4E && bytes[3] === 0x47) return 'image/png'
// JPEG: FF D8 FF
if (bytes[0] === 0xFF && bytes[1] === 0xD8 && bytes[2] === 0xFF) return 'image/jpeg'
// WebP: RIFF<4-byte size>WEBP
if (
bytes.length >= 12 &&
bytes[0] === 0x52 && bytes[1] === 0x49 && bytes[2] === 0x46 && bytes[3] === 0x46 &&
bytes[8] === 0x57 && bytes[9] === 0x45 && bytes[10] === 0x42 && bytes[11] === 0x50
) return 'image/webp'
return null
}
/**
* XHTML/XML has no binary magic number. For the declared type
* application/xhtml+xml (system-generated iXBRL årsredovisningar) we instead
* require the content to start with an XML declaration, an HTML doctype, or
* an <html> root element (after an optional UTF-8 BOM and leading
* whitespace). This branch is consulted ONLY for that declared type: it
* never loosens detection for PDF/PNG/JPEG/WEBP uploads.
*/
function looksLikeXhtml(bytes: Uint8Array): boolean {
const offset = bytes[0] === 0xEF && bytes[1] === 0xBB && bytes[2] === 0xBF ? 3 : 0
const head = Buffer.from(bytes.slice(offset, offset + 256))
.toString('utf8')
.replace(/^[\s]+/, '')
.toLowerCase()
return head.startsWith('<?xml') || head.startsWith('<!doctype html') || head.startsWith('<html')
}
/**
* JSON has no binary magic number either. For the declared type
* application/json (raw PSD2 responses archived as räkenskapsinformation per
* BFL 7 kap) the content must parse as JSON with an object or array root — a
* prose placeholder is not valid JSON, and a bare quoted string still fails
* the root check, so the anti-placeholder defense stays intact. Consulted
* ONLY for that declared type.
*/
function looksLikeJson(bytes: Uint8Array): boolean {
const offset = bytes[0] === 0xEF && bytes[1] === 0xBB && bytes[2] === 0xBF ? 3 : 0
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(bytes.slice(offset)).toString('utf8'))
return typeof parsed === 'object' && parsed !== null
} catch {
return false
}
}
/**
* Verify the buffer actually contains a file of the declared type.
* Returns an error string or null if valid. HEIC has many ftyp brands so
* we skip the check for now: the UI path doesn't allow HEIC anyway, only
* the MCP upload tool does, and corrupted HEIC has not been observed.
*/
export function validateDocumentMagicBytes(buffer: ArrayBuffer, declaredMimeType: string): string | null {
if (declaredMimeType === 'image/heic') return null
if (declaredMimeType === 'application/xhtml+xml') {
if (looksLikeXhtml(new Uint8Array(buffer))) return null
return `Filinnehållet kunde inte verifieras som ${declaredMimeType}. Filen verkar inte vara ett XHTML/XML-dokument.`
}
if (declaredMimeType === 'application/json') {
if (looksLikeJson(new Uint8Array(buffer))) return null
return `Filinnehållet kunde inte verifieras som ${declaredMimeType}. Filen verkar inte vara ett giltigt JSON-dokument.`
}
const detected = detectFileMagic(new Uint8Array(buffer))
if (!detected) {
return `Filinnehållet kunde inte verifieras som ${declaredMimeType}. Filen verkar vara skadad eller inte en riktig binärfil: vid uppladdning via API, kontrollera att file_content_base64 är base64-kodade råbytes, inte en textrepresentation.`
}
if (detected !== declaredMimeType) {
return `Filinnehållet matchar inte den angivna filtypen (förväntade ${declaredMimeType}, hittade ${detected}).`
}
return null
}
let bucketVerified = false
/** @internal Reset bucket verification flag: for testing only */
export function _resetBucketVerified() {
bucketVerified = false
}
/**
* Ensure the 'documents' storage bucket exists, creating it if missing.
* Runs once per process lifetime (same pattern as ensureInitialized).
*
* Uses a cookieless service-role client for bucket admin operations
* (getBucket/createBucket require service-role). This avoids the cookie
* dependency that hangs in API-key auth contexts (e.g. MCP server).
*/
async function ensureDocumentsBucket(): Promise<void> {
if (bucketVerified) return
const serviceClient = createServiceClientNoCookies()
const { data: bucket } = await serviceClient.storage.getBucket('documents')
if (!bucket) {
await serviceClient.storage.createBucket('documents', {
public: false,
fileSizeLimit: 52428800, // 50 MB
})
}
bucketVerified = true
}
/**
* Compute SHA-256 hash of a file buffer
*/
export async function computeSHA256(buffer: ArrayBuffer): Promise<string> {
const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', buffer)
const hashArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer))
return hashArray.map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')
}
/**
* Upload a document and create a record with SHA-256 integrity hash
*/
export async function uploadDocument(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
userId: string,
companyId: string,
file: { name: string; buffer: ArrayBuffer; type?: string },
metadata: {
upload_source?: DocumentUploadSource
journal_entry_id?: string
journal_entry_line_id?: string
} = {}
): Promise<DocumentAttachment> {
await ensureDocumentsBucket()
// Reject corrupt uploads at the boundary: see validateDocumentMagicBytes.
if (file.type) {
const magicError = validateDocumentMagicBytes(file.buffer, file.type)
if (magicError) throw new Error(magicError)
}
// Compute SHA-256 hash
const sha256Hash = await computeSHA256(file.buffer)
// Generate storage path
const timestamp = Date.now()
const storagePath = `documents/${userId}/${timestamp}_${sanitizeFileName(file.name)}`
// Upload to Supabase Storage
const { error: uploadError } = await supabase.storage
.from('documents')
.upload(storagePath, file.buffer, {
contentType: file.type || 'application/octet-stream',
upsert: false,
})
if (uploadError) {
throw new Error(`Failed to upload document: ${uploadError.message}`)
}
// Create document record
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('document_attachments')
.insert({
user_id: userId,
company_id: companyId,
storage_path: storagePath,
file_name: file.name,
file_size_bytes: file.buffer.byteLength,
mime_type: file.type || null,
sha256_hash: sha256Hash,
version: 1,
is_current_version: true,
uploaded_by: userId,
upload_source: metadata.upload_source || 'file_upload',
digitization_date: new Date().toISOString(),
journal_entry_id: metadata.journal_entry_id || null,
journal_entry_line_id: metadata.journal_entry_line_id || null,
})
.select()
.single()
if (error) {
// Clean up uploaded file on record creation failure
await supabase.storage.from('documents').remove([storagePath])
throw new Error(`Failed to create document record: ${error.message}`)
}
const result = data as DocumentAttachment
await eventBus.emit({
type: 'document.uploaded',
payload: { document: result, userId, companyId },
})
return result
}
/**
* Create a new version of an existing document (WORM: old version is superseded)
*
* Uses the create_document_version RPC for atomic versioning with:
* - Row-level locking (prevents concurrent versioning race condition)
* - Cryptographic hash chain (prev_version_hash links to previous version)
* - Single transaction (insert new + mark old superseded)
*/
export async function createNewVersion(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
userId: string,
originalId: string,
file: { name: string; buffer: ArrayBuffer; type?: string }
): Promise<DocumentAttachment> {
await ensureDocumentsBucket()
if (file.type) {
const magicError = validateDocumentMagicBytes(file.buffer, file.type)
if (magicError) throw new Error(magicError)
}
// Compute SHA-256 hash
const sha256Hash = await computeSHA256(file.buffer)
// Upload new file to Storage
const timestamp = Date.now()
const storagePath = `documents/${userId}/${timestamp}_${sanitizeFileName(file.name)}`
const { error: uploadError } = await supabase.storage
.from('documents')
.upload(storagePath, file.buffer, {
contentType: file.type || 'application/octet-stream',
upsert: false,
})
if (uploadError) {
throw new Error(`Failed to upload new version: ${uploadError.message}`)
}
// Atomic version creation via RPC (row lock + hash chain + supersede in one tx)
const { data: newDocId, error: rpcError } = await supabase.rpc('create_document_version', {
p_user_id: userId,
p_original_doc_id: originalId,
p_storage_path: storagePath,
p_file_name: file.name,
p_file_size_bytes: file.buffer.byteLength,
p_mime_type: file.type || null,
p_sha256_hash: sha256Hash,
})
if (rpcError) {
// Clean up uploaded file on RPC failure
await supabase.storage.from('documents').remove([storagePath])
throw new Error(`Failed to create new version: ${rpcError.message}`)
}
// Fetch the complete new version record
const { data: newDoc, error: fetchError } = await supabase
.from('document_attachments')
.select('*')
.eq('id', newDocId)
.single()
if (fetchError || !newDoc) {
throw new Error('Failed to fetch new version record')
}
return newDoc as DocumentAttachment
}
/**
* Link an existing document to a journal entry
*/
export async function linkToJournalEntry(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
documentId: string,
journalEntryId: string,
journalEntryLineId?: string
): Promise<DocumentAttachment> {
// The document is company-filtered below, but the journal entry id arrives
// from the client and the FK only requires existence: verify it belongs to
// the same company so a crafted id can't anchor a document to another
// tenant's verifikation. (RLS hides foreign rows either way; this makes the
// rejection explicit instead of a confusing downstream state.)
const { data: entry, error: entryError } = await supabase
.from('journal_entries')
.select('id')
.eq('id', journalEntryId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.maybeSingle()
if (entryError || !entry) {
throw new Error('Failed to link document: journal entry not found')
}
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('document_attachments')
.update({
journal_entry_id: journalEntryId,
journal_entry_line_id: journalEntryLineId || null,
})
.eq('id', documentId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.select()
.single()
if (error) {
throw new Error(`Failed to link document: ${error.message}`)
}
return data as DocumentAttachment
}
export type DeleteDocumentResult =
| { ok: true; document: Pick<DocumentAttachment, 'id' | 'file_name'> }
| { ok: false; reason: 'not_found' | 'linked_to_entry'; status: number; message: string }
/**
* Delete a document if and only if it is not yet linked to a journal entry.
*
* BFL 7 kap 2§: once a document is attached to a verifikation it becomes
* räkenskapsinformation and may not be deleted within the 7-year retention
* window. Linked docs must be superseded via createNewVersion() instead.
* The block_document_deletion() trigger is the DB-level backstop.
*/
export async function deleteDocument(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
documentId: string
): Promise<DeleteDocumentResult> {
const { data: doc, error: fetchError } = await supabase
.from('document_attachments')
.select('id, file_name, storage_path, journal_entry_id, user_id')
.eq('id', documentId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.maybeSingle()
if (fetchError || !doc) {
return {
ok: false,
reason: 'not_found',
status: 404,
message: 'Underlaget hittades inte.',
}
}
if (doc.journal_entry_id) {
return {
ok: false,
reason: 'linked_to_entry',
status: 409,
message:
'Underlaget är knutet till en verifikation och utgör räkenskapsinformation enligt Bokföringslagen 7 kap 2§. Räkenskapsinformation ska bevaras i minst 7 år och får inte raderas. Använd "Ersätt med ny version" om underlaget behöver korrigeras.',
}
}
const { error: deleteError } = await supabase
.from('document_attachments')
.delete()
.eq('id', documentId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
if (deleteError) {
const msg = (deleteError as { message?: string }).message ?? ''
if (msg.includes('Bokföringslagen') || msg.includes('retention')) {
return {
ok: false,
reason: 'linked_to_entry',
status: 409,
message:
'Underlaget kan inte tas bort på grund av Bokföringslagens bevarandekrav (7 kap 2§).',
}
}
throw new Error(`Failed to delete document: ${msg}`)
}
if (doc.storage_path) {
await supabase.storage.from('documents').remove([doc.storage_path])
}
await eventBus.emit({
type: 'document.deleted',
payload: {
document: { id: doc.id, file_name: doc.file_name },
userId: doc.user_id,
companyId,
},
})
return { ok: true, document: { id: doc.id, file_name: doc.file_name } }
}
/**
* Verify document integrity by re-hashing and comparing
*/
export async function verifyIntegrity(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
documentId: string
): Promise<{ valid: boolean; storedHash: string; computedHash: string }> {
// Fetch document record
const { data: doc, error: docError } = await supabase
.from('document_attachments')
.select('storage_path, sha256_hash')
.eq('id', documentId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
if (docError || !doc) {
throw new Error('Document not found')
}
// Download via the service-role client: the storage SELECT policy only
// covers the uploader's own folder (documents/{uid}/...), so a caller-bound
// client cannot read colleague-uploaded files. The company-filtered row
// fetch above (RLS on document_attachments) is the authorization.
const serviceClient = createServiceClientNoCookies()
const { data: fileData, error: downloadError } = await serviceClient.storage
.from('documents')
.download(doc.storage_path)
if (downloadError || !fileData) {
throw new Error(`Failed to download document: ${downloadError?.message}`)
}
// Re-compute hash
const buffer = await fileData.arrayBuffer()
const computedHash = await computeSHA256(buffer)
return {
valid: computedHash === doc.sha256_hash,
storedHash: doc.sha256_hash,
computedHash,
}
}