accounted/.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml

name: Build and Push Docker Image

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
    tags: ['v*.*.*']

env:
  REGISTRY: ghcr.io
  IMAGE_NAME: erp-mafia/gnubok

jobs:
  build-and-push:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: read
      packages: write
      # OIDC token used by cosign keyless signing.
      id-token: write
      # SARIF upload to the repo's "Security" tab from the Trivy scan.
      security-events: write

    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v7

      - name: Log in to GHCR
        uses: docker/login-action@v4
        with:
          registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}
          username: ${{ github.actor }}
          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

      - name: Extract metadata
        id: meta
        uses: docker/metadata-action@v5
        with:
          images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}
          # On main: push `latest` + commit-sha tags.
          # On v*.*.* tags: push semver tags (1.2.3, 1.2, 1) for production pinning.
          tags: |
            type=raw,value=latest,enable={{is_default_branch}}
            type=sha,prefix=
            type=semver,pattern={{version}}
            type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}}
            type=semver,pattern={{major}}

      - name: Set up QEMU
        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v4

      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v4

      - name: Build and push
        id: build
        uses: docker/build-push-action@v7
        with:
          context: .
          platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
          push: true
          tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
          labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
          build-args: |
            EXTENSIONS_PRESET=self-hosted
          # SBOM (software bill of materials) + SLSA provenance are attached as
          # OCI attestations, queryable via `docker buildx imagetools inspect`.
          provenance: mode=max
          sbom: true
          # Per-branch cache scope so a PR branch can't poison main's cache
          # layers. Fall back to main's cache on first build of a new branch.
          cache-from: |
            type=gha,scope=${{ github.ref_name }}
            type=gha,scope=main
          cache-to: type=gha,scope=${{ github.ref_name }},mode=max

      - name: Install cosign
        uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3.7.0

      - name: Sign the image (keyless OIDC)
        env:
          DIGEST: ${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
        run: |
          cosign sign --yes "${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}@${DIGEST}"

      - name: Scan image with Trivy (report-only)
        id: trivy
        # Decoupled from the publish gate on purpose: this pipeline must stay
        # green so builds are deterministic. The image is already pushed and
        # signed above, so failing here would only redden the run: it would not
        # unship a vulnerable image. exit-code:0 + continue-on-error keep CVEs
        # (and even a Trivy/DB outage) from failing the build; findings still
        # flow to the Security tab below. The real blocking gate is
        # docker-image-scan.yml, which re-scans the published image and fails
        # (notifying admins) on a fixable CRITICAL/HIGH CVE. It runs on a
        # workflow_run trigger the moment THIS workflow completes (so the gap
        # between publish and the blocking scan is the scan's own duration
        # (minutes), not a 24h cron window) plus a daily cron as a safety net.
        # Accepted residual risk: an image is live for that short scan window
        # before the gate fires; see SELF-HOSTING.md / the risk register.
        continue-on-error: true
        uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@v0.36.0
        with:
          image-ref: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }}@${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}
          severity: CRITICAL,HIGH
          exit-code: '0'
          ignore-unfixed: true
          format: sarif
          output: trivy-results.sarif

      - name: Upload Trivy results to GitHub Security tab
        # if: always(), evidence must reach the Security tab regardless of the
        # scan step's exit status. With the previous `outcome == 'success'` guard,
        # a Trivy/DB outage that errored the scan would silently drop findings.
        # Kept non-fatal (continue-on-error) so a missing SARIF or a Security-tab
        # hiccup can't redden an otherwise-good publish.
        if: always()
        continue-on-error: true
        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
        with:
          sarif_file: trivy-results.sarif
          category: trivy