Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 4.8
db843a7a5b
The HTTP routes call requireCapability at every paid chokepoint, but the MCP/agent path bypassed the paywall entirely: the three external-service tools stage operations whose commit calls the email / Skatteverket services directly, with no capability check. After the 2026-07-07 trial cutover a trial-connected non-payer using the gnubok MCP connector could still send invoice emails and file AGI/VAT. Close the gap with two layers, mirroring the existing TOOL_SCOPE_MAP gate: - Dispatch gate (mcp-server/server.ts): MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP, checked right after the scope check, blocks a non-entitled company before any pending op is staged. Emits errorKind='capability_denied' telemetry. - Commit-time gate (commitPendingOperation): PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP, checked before the atomic claim. The real external-service chokepoint — applies to the MCP approve tool AND the UI approval path, and closes the trial-connected-token window (the grant has expired by commit time). A blocked op stays 'pending', so it is re-approvable once the company subscribes. Adds a transport-free capabilityBlockedError() helper (shared bilingual copy) and locks both maps with tests (maps, dispatch gate, commit gate). Only the three write/submit tools are gated; SKV read/local tools stay free per the statutory carve-out. No DB/migration change; self-hosted stays all-on. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
87 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
87 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Capability keys — the single namespace behind the SaaS paywall AND the
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* per-tenant modularity / marketplace vision. Each key names one gateable
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* feature; a company "has" it when an unexpired capability_grant exists
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* (entitlement) and it isn't explicitly disabled (enablement).
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*
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* These keys are a STABLE CONTRACT: grant rows, the future marketplace catalog,
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* and per-tenant module toggles all reference them. Add keys; never rename one.
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*/
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export const CAPABILITY = {
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/** AI assistant chat, onboarding composer, and document field extraction (Anthropic/Bedrock). */
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ai: 'ai',
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/** Bank sync / PSD2 (Enable Banking). Freeze-and-retain: tokens are NOT revoked on downgrade. */
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bank_sync: 'bank_sync',
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/** Skatteverket filing/sync — VAT, AGI, skattekonto — via BankID. */
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skatteverket: 'skatteverket',
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/** Outbound transactional email: invoices, reminders, payslips (Resend). Auth/account email is never gated. */
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email_send: 'email_send',
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/** Org-number lookup / enrichment (TIC). NOT gated — identity/lookup is always free. */
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org_lookup: 'org_lookup',
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/** EU VAT-number validation (VIES). NOT gated — identity/lookup is always free. */
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vat_validation: 'vat_validation',
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/** Riksbanken FX auto-fetch. NOT gated at launch (kept free); manual rate entry is always allowed. */
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currency_rates: 'currency_rates',
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/** Cloud backup to Google Drive. NOT gated at launch (kept free — never hold a customer's data hostage). */
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cloud_backup: 'cloud_backup',
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/** Migration import from other systems (Fortnox/Visma/Bokio/BL/Briox). Kept open so new payers can migrate IN. */
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migration: 'migration',
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/** Bolagsverket iXBRL årsredovisning filing. Reserved (extension not yet enabled). */
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bolagsverket: 'bolagsverket',
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} as const
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export type CapabilityKey = (typeof CAPABILITY)[keyof typeof CAPABILITY]
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/**
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* The set actually withheld from non-payers (manual tier) at the 2026-07-07
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* cutover. Founder decision (2026-06-28): gate the high-value recurring external
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* services only.
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*
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* KEPT FREE on purpose:
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* - identity & lookup: TIC org_lookup, VIES vat_validation, BankID login —
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* they aid onboarding/data quality; gating them is friction in the wrong place.
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* - currency_rates (FX auto-fetch) and cloud_backup.
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* Internal bookkeeping is always fully usable on the manual tier.
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*
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* NOTE: bank_sync and skatteverket stay PAID even though their flows use BankID
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* as an auth step — what's charged for is the bank data sync and the VAT/AGI
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* filing service, not the identity check.
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*/
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export const PAID_CAPABILITIES: readonly CapabilityKey[] = [
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CAPABILITY.ai,
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CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
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CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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CAPABILITY.email_send,
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] as const
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/**
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* Paid MCP tools → required capability. The MCP/agent path is a paid chokepoint
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* just like the HTTP routes, so the dispatcher gates these the same way it gates
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* API-key scope (see mcp-server `tools/call`). Only external-service WRITE tools
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* appear here: send_invoice (email) and the two Skatteverket submissions. The
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* read/local SKV tools (generate_agi, vat_declaration_validate/status, agi_status)
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* stay free — the §4 carve-out forbids blocking a statutory filing obligation.
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*
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* No MCP tool invokes AI or triggers bank sync, so those PAID capabilities have
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* no entry here — they are reachable only via already-gated HTTP routes/handlers.
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*/
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export const MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
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gnubok_send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
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gnubok_vat_declaration_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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gnubok_agi_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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} as const
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/**
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* Paid pending-operation types → required capability. Keyed by
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* `pending_operations.operation_type`. This is the commit-time twin of
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* MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: it gates the actual external-service call inside
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* commitPendingOperation, so an operation staged during the trial cannot be
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* committed once the grant has expired — regardless of caller (MCP approve tool
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* or the UI approval path). Keep the values in sync with MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP.
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*/
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export const PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
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send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
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submit_vat_declaration: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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submit_agi: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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} as const
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