* fix(security): gate replace_sie_import behind owner/admin membership The RPC was SECURITY DEFINER with EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC and anon, no company_members lookup, no auth.uid() reference and no unauthorized raise, while setting gnubok.allow_delete to disarm the BFL immutability and retention triggers. Any caller holding a company_id and an import id could hard delete another tenant's verifikationer. Confirmed live in production. Applies the same fail closed owner/admin guard that undo_sie_import already carries (migration 20260624120000), resolving the actor from COALESCE(p_user_id, auth.uid()) so it denies when the role is NULL, then revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC and anon. search_path and the raised statement_timeout are restated, since CREATE OR REPLACE drops settings that are not repeated. userId is a required parameter on replaceSIEImport: the service client has a NULL auth.uid(), so a caller without an explicit actor now fails to compile rather than hitting the closed gate at runtime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): validate arcim OAuth callback state server side The callback route is skipAuth and decoded the state parameter as plain base64url JSON, trusting consentId and provider from it. A one time code was minted at flow start and never read. An unauthenticated attacker who learned a consent id could run an OAuth flow on their own provider account and post the callback with a forged state, landing their tokens on another tenant's consent, so the victim's next migration imported the attacker's ledger. State is now an opaque randomBytes(32) pointer to a provider_otc row, consumed by a single atomic UPDATE guarded on used_at IS NULL and expires_at, so a replay loses the row lock race and updates nothing. provider is read from provider_consents rather than trusted from the client. provider_otc already existed for exactly this purpose and was never wired up. Also scopes getConsent to an owning company, closing a cross tenant status oracle where the preview and migrate paths echoed a consent's status before the scoped check ran. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): scope documents storage to company_id (phase A) The documents bucket policies matched on auth.uid(), and upload keys were documents/{userId}/..., so company membership was never consulted. Removing a member revoked nothing: their session still authenticated and they kept direct Storage read access to every receipt, supplier invoice and bank statement they had uploaded. The same bug was fixed for sie-files in 20260416120000; this bucket was left behind. Phase A is additive. Company scoped policies are added alongside the uploader scoped ones, uploads move to documents/{companyId}/{userId}/..., and reads accept either layout so nothing breaks mid migration. Phase C, which drops the old policies, is gated on the backfill reporting zero remaining legacy prefix objects. The policy compares the company segment as text rather than casting to uuid the way sie-files does: this bucket holds keys whose second segment is not a uuid (MCP audit packages), and Postgres does not guarantee the bucket prefix qual runs before the cast, so a planner reordering would raise 22P02 and fail the whole query instead of filtering the row out. deleteDocument now removes both candidate keys. Removing only the stored pointer would leave a readable orphan copy of a document the user asked to erase. The backfill script is included but has never been run. It defaults to dry run, refuses .env.local by name, and verifies each copy is readable and SHA-256 identical before repointing the row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): enforce events:read scope and membership on /api/events This was the only one of the three validateApiKey call sites with no downstream guard: v1 and the MCP server both check scope and re-verify company membership, this route did neither. An events:read scope existed and was documented as gating the endpoint but was never called, so a legacy key falling back to DEFAULT_SCOPES read the full log. The bound company id went straight from the api_keys row into a service role query, so a key whose user had been removed from the company kept reading. Adds the scope check before any database access, re-verifies company_members with archived_at IS NULL, honours test mode by stamping X-Gnubok-Mode instead of ignoring it, applies minimisePayload so the pull surface can never return a wider payload than the push surface, and replaces the three flat error strings with the canonical envelope. Test key reads are served rather than blocked: TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED is gated on mutations in with-api-v1, so a read gets the same treatment as every other v1 read endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(bookkeeping): sweep remaining journal_entries!inner embeds A previous refactor removed this pattern from lib/reports and introduced fetchEntryLines, but the class was never swept. Seventeen sites remained and had become the top application consumer of production database time: measured across the resulting query shapes, 32,694 calls and 25,848 seconds of execution, mean 790ms, with shapes averaging 2.6s and 3.0s and maxing at 7,962ms against the 8s statement_timeout, which surfaced to users as 500s on the booking path. PostgREST compiles an embed with filters on the embedded side into a correlated INNER JOIN LATERAL with a parameterized LIMIT, which stops Postgres reordering the join, so each query walked the whole journal_entry_lines table across all tenants. Driving from the entries side instead turns that into two indexed round trips. Converted sites keep their existing shape: the helper reattaches the parent entry under the same key the embed produced. Several conversions also remove a latent silent truncation where an unpaginated query was capped at PostgREST's 1000 row ceiling. Two deliberate exceptions. The free text ilike legs of the MCP display query stay on the embed, because each is capped at legLimit and that cap drives the truncation contract the tool reports, while the helper is unbounded. The accounts route moves to the existing get_account_usage_counts RPC instead, since its embed was a head count and the helper returns rows. commitEntry's write path is untouched: the change there is confined to the read query of the pre-commit dimension rule check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): anchor v1 list cursors on created_at Page two returned page one, forever, while still advertising a fresh next_cursor. The three routes sorted by and encoded a Postgres date column, which serializes as YYYY-MM-DD, but decodeDefaultCursor validates the cursor timestamp as full ISO-8601 and returned null, so the keyset filter was never applied and has_more never went false. An integrator syncing verifikat looped on the newest rows indefinitely. The transactions route already solved this and its comment names the trap; the fix was never ported. All three now order and encode on created_at with an id tie break, matching the transactions keyset predicate exactly. ISO_TIMESTAMP is deliberately left alone: relaxing it would silently change sort semantics on the route that currently works. Default ordering therefore moves from business date to insert order. Every business date is still on the row, and the invoices list gains date_from and date_to filters so a date range is still reachable; the other two already had them. The tests use an in-memory PostgREST that actually evaluates the filters, because the repo's pass-through mock cannot catch this class of bug: the bug is that the filter is never sent. They walk to exhaustion with a hard iteration cap, so an unterminated walk fails instead of hanging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): separate dry run from commit in the idempotency hash The request hash was built from url.pathname, which excludes the query string, so a dry run and its commit hashed identically. Following the flow documented in dry-run.ts, re-issuing the request with the same Idempotency-Key returned the cached preview with Idempotent-Replayed set and wrote nothing, while reporting 200. An agent or integrator saw success for a write that never happened. dry_run is folded into the hash only when true, not as an unconditional boolean. Including it as false would change the hash of every ordinary write, and with a 24h idempotency TTL any key in flight across the deploy would fail the request_hash comparison and 409 on a legitimate retry. Both hash call sites now go through one shared helper so they cannot drift into a permanent cache miss, and dry run responses are no longer stored at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: install the Bedrock SDK out of tree in the compliance review The Swedish accounting compliance gate had failed ten consecutive runs and so was posting nothing. With --no-package-lock npm discarded the lockfile and re-resolved the whole tree from package.json, floating @hookform/resolvers to 5.4.3, whose valibot ^1 peer conflicts with the pinned valibot 0.39.0. Installing into the parent of the checkout resolves only that one package, so an unrelated peer conflict can never take the gate down again. Node still finds it because ESM bare specifiers walk up parent node_modules; NODE_PATH would not have worked, as it is CommonJS only. --legacy-peer-deps was rejected because it masks future genuine peer conflicts and still reifies the full tree. The same step's SDK version is aligned from 0.31.0 back to the 0.29.1 that package.json and check:guards enforce after the streaming outage. That drift went unnoticed because the pin guard only inspects package.json and the lockfile, never workflow files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * build(docker): generate crontabs from vercel.json vercel.json defines 16 cron jobs; both Docker crontabs carried 9, and were byte identical to each other. Self hosted deployments therefore never sent recurring invoices, never dispatched webhooks and never cleaned up idempotency keys. tax-deadlines also ran once a year on 2 January instead of daily, and documents/verify weekly instead of daily. Extension crons are included rather than excluded. The Dockerfile copies the whole tree before building, so every extension cron route is compiled into the image regardless of the enabled preset, and each returns 200 when its extension is unconfigured, so curl -sf logs no failure. Two such entries were already present in the crontab for extensions absent from the preset, which settles the intent. documents/verify is treated as drift rather than a self hosted concession: the weekly cadence was present in the hosted crontab too, and the run is capped at 200 documents walking a nulls-first queue, so weekly drains the integrity queue seven times slower on a check that exists for BFL retention. webhooks/dispatch keeps its per minute cadence, adding 1,440 requests a day on self hosted. A gentler tick would silently stretch the first retry, since the retry ladder opens at 60 seconds. SCHEDULE_OVERRIDES is the one line place to change that. A parity test asserts the path sets match minus a documented exclusion list, and ratchets three cron routes that are currently scheduled nowhere so they are named rather than silently rotting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(observability): add a provider agnostic error sink There is no error tracking in this codebase: logs go to console and Vercel retention and nowhere else, nothing alerts on the 16 cron jobs, and seven code comments across lib, app, components and extensions asserted that Sentry captures errors when Sentry is not a dependency. The two most recent bug fixes on this repo were both discovered by customer email. This adds the sink, not a vendor. No dependency is taken: the interface has a no-op default and a registration point, so behaviour is unchanged until an adapter is registered. Releases are tagged from the build id already inlined by next.config.ts. Redaction moved out of lib/logger.ts into a leaf module that both the logger and the sink import, so there is one denylist and no path from application data to a third party can skip the personnummer regex, including direct sink calls that bypass the logger. That matters here because these logs carry personnummer and financial data. verifyCronSecret now reports its own 401s, which covers all 16 jobs without touching a route file and catches the case where CRON_SECRET is rotated without updating the scheduler and every job silently 401s forever. The threshold is one failure rather than the backup alert's three: suppressing the first occurrence is precisely how an outage stays invisible. The seven misleading comments are corrected to describe what the code actually does, including the two cases that still are not covered: the client side one, since the sink is server side, and a warn level call that is not forwarded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remediate the 2026-07-26 similar-sweep findings across all surfaces Resolves the ~150-finding sweep (dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26.md) with one agent per finding; every behavioural fix carries a regression test proven to fail at HEAD. Full status, corrections to the sweep, refusals and open decisions in dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26-remediation-status.md. Structural roots closed: - resolveSekAmountOrNull(): honest SEK resolution refuses instead of booking 1:1; four duplicated toSek closures now refuse via INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING - ledger-line-amount.ts: journal_entry_lines.currency labels the document, not the amount; SQL pre-filter decoy proven and fixed - sparse-patch.ts: .partial() does not strip .default() in Zod 4.4.3; the exploitable salary payslip-line PATCH and KPI preferences sinks fixed - tests/schema: migration-replay phantom-column guard (13k+ refs, closed CHECK sets, onConflict targets); found 28 real defects, all fixed, all four baselines now empty - three new ratchet guards: sek-labelled-amount, cross-extension-import, ungated-extension-route Highlights: lawful VAT-rate set on all seven invoice surfaces (ML 6 kap), RC input VAT mismatch wired on web + both MCP callers, missing-underlag resource delegates to the shared RPC predicate, push-notifications consent polarity fail-closed, deadlines undo honours requested state, silent-failure and read-side-fabrication classes fixed across settings/KPI/inbox/Stripe/ Arcim/kassaflodesanalys, error-envelope stringification fixed at 10+ sites with isSwedishUserMessage extended. Also includes the parallel session's MCP invoice tools (update_invoice, recurring schedules, invoice deliveries) which share files with the sweep work and are verified green together. 13 new migrations are NOT applied anywhere; they apply via branch merge. 20260726120000 backfills 1247 supplier-invoice rows. pg tests for new DDL are written but unrun (no local Postgres). Verified: 11088 tests / 881 files green, tsc 0 non-test errors, lint 0 errors, check:guards passing, MCP payload 57475/57500. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migrations): rename replace_sie_import migration off main's 20260726090000 version origin/main shipped 20260726090000_agent_quota_rpc_caller_guard.sql; keeping our replace_sie_import migration on the same version would abort the Supabase apply with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate at merge time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): remediate pre-publish deep-review findings across all slices A 13-agent review of the full branch diff surfaced 1 critical, 5 high and ~45 further findings; this commit resolves them in one pass: - replace_sie_import / undo_sie_import: p_user_id honored only for service_role callers; any other caller is pinned to auth.uid() (impersonation gate bypass), authz raise errcode 42501 mapped to a Swedish 403 in the route, new caller-guard migration for undo - bulk_book_transactions refuses homogeneous non-SEK batches instead of writing foreign magnitudes into SEK ledger columns - credit-note cap trigger: company-match on credited_invoice_id, no cross-tenant figures in exception text - link_voucher RPCs resolve NULL invoice currency as SEK end to end - personal-number ciphertext CHECK split into NOT VALID + VALIDATE - same-currency foreign settlements clear 1510 at booking rate and book realized diff to 3960/7960; rate-less foreign write paths refuse - receivables revaluation covers partially_paid and outstanding amounts - period lock guard paginates candidates past the PostgREST 1000 cap - documents: service-client storage removals after authz, dual-layout reads in integrity cron and archive export, backfill delete-source sweep actually deletes with hash verification and shared-key grouping - invoice matching normalizes NULL/lowercase currencies (regression), duplicate candidates stop claiming amount matches they never ran - match-invoice aborts on any booking failure (no paid-without-verifikat) - refresh-exchange-rate reverts on concurrent booking (TOCTOU window) - KPI preferences upsert arbiter aligned to the company-scoped constraint - personnummer_last4 stripped from all salary responses incl. MCP tools - worked-hours batch restores destroyed rows on conflict and error paths - MCP: shared duplicate-claim builder (no more 'null kr'), short-circuit on tag_journal_lines overflow, auto_send schedules stage as high risk - observability sink redacts emails/IBANs/API keys and keeps redacted stacks in prod; assorted small guards (safe-return-to /@, dry_run=True, cursor helper off-by-one, OAuth state TTL 10 min, arcim saveMappings call removed) Full dispositions, deferred items and hand-verified accounting numbers are documented in the PR body and DECISIONS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(personnummer): implement masking and encryption for personal numbers with tests * fix(review): address CI and compliance-bot findings for PR #1215 pg-real: the CI image's auth shim reads the legacy request.jwt.claim.role GUC, so both service-role simulations (runAsServiceRole and the invoice-delivery test's local helper) never satisfied auth.role() = 'service_role' and every legitimate p_user_id path failed closed; the shared helper now sets both GUC shapes plus SET LOCAL ROLE with a fail-loud sanity check, and the delivery test reuses it. The link-voucher migration had recreated both RPCs from pre-rewrite file text, reintroducing the NULL-unsafe membership pattern the null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet bans; both guards now use public.caller_is_company_member() with all currency changes preserved. Compliance bots: the customers export now emits the standard masked form instead of raw AES-256-GCM ciphertext in the Org-/personnummer column, and maskCustomerRow returns a non-round-trippable placeholder on decrypt failure instead of 500ing the list. MCP parity: gnubok_lock_period's staging pre-check now runs the exact countUnbookedInPeriod the commit path enforces (exported from period-service; local mirror deleted), and gnubok_agi_status resolves AGI state run-scoped so a correction run no longer renders as already filed. Declined with evidence: PR-Agent's opening-balances null-zeroing concern (all mergeable columns are NOT NULL with defaults per 20260713101000). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): address codex review findings on PR #1215 - restore 20260726140000 to its preview-recorded content and restate the NULL-safe tenant guard under 20260727130000: a recorded migration version never re-runs, so the in-place edit could not reach the preview branch - replace toFixed() with sv-SE two-decimal formatting in the ROT/RUT cap warning texts and update the pinned test expectations - drop the em dash in the fiscal-periods route comment - strip trailing whitespace in import-existing.test.ts Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(reports): raise timeout on real PDF render tests renderToBuffer does real @react-pdf layout work and exceeds the 5s default when the full suite saturates the CPU; tests pass in isolation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
285 lines
14 KiB
PL/PgSQL
285 lines
14 KiB
PL/PgSQL
-- get_ledger_deep_context: stop counting a foreign amount as kronor.
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--
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-- Both amount expressions in 20260712130000_ledger_deep_context_laplace_share.sql
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-- (itself a CREATE OR REPLACE of 20260708130000_ledger_deep_context.sql, so this
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-- is the only live copy) fell back to the row's own currency amount whenever no
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-- SEK value had been recorded:
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--
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-- abs(coalesce(t.amount_sek, t.amount)) -- counterparty / bank side
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-- coalesce(si.total_sek, si.total, 0) -- supplier / AP side
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--
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-- The coalesce is CORRECT for a SEK row: transactions.amount_sek and
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-- supplier_invoices.total_sek are NULL by design on ordinary Swedish rows, where
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-- the invoice-currency column already IS kronor. The failure case was never
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-- considered: on a non-SEK row with no stored SEK value the same expression
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-- yields the raw FOREIGN magnitude, and that number was then summed into
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-- total_amount and used as a sort key. A 500 EUR supplier invoice entered the
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-- ranking as 500 kr instead of roughly 5 750 kr, understating it by an order of
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-- magnitude and pushing a genuinely smaller counterparty above it.
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--
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-- The AP side is the worse of the two: total_sek is NULL whenever the caller
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-- merely omitted exchange_rate (that is exactly the cohort
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-- 20260726120000_backfill_supplier_invoice_sek_amounts.sql deliberately left
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-- NULL, because inventing a rate after the fact is not defensible), so the
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-- fallback fires on live data rather than on a legacy edge case.
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--
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-- The rule applied here is the one the TypeScript layer already follows
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-- (resolveSekAmountOrNull in lib/bookkeeping/mapping-engine.ts,
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-- resolveTransactionAmountSek in lib/transactions/booking-duplicate-detection.ts,
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-- and the unconverted_fx_count contract in lib/reports/ar-ledger.ts): if no SEK
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-- value can be established, EXCLUDE the row from the money total and COUNT it.
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-- Never guess the unit.
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--
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-- 1. currency is SEK (NULL and '' read as SEK, matching `tx.currency || 'SEK'`
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-- in TypeScript and the COALESCE in bulk_book_transactions)
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-- -> the existing coalesce, unchanged, byte for byte. SEK rows produce
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-- exactly the numbers they produced before this migration.
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-- 2. non-SEK with a stored SEK value -> use it (also unchanged: the old
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-- coalesce already picked it).
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-- 3. non-SEK, no stored SEK value, but an exchange_rate on the row
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-- -> multiply. Deterministic arithmetic
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-- on a rate the row already carries,
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-- same statement 2 of the backfill.
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-- 4. non-SEK, no SEK value, no rate -> NULL. sum() skips it, so it is out
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-- of total_amount and out of the
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-- total_amount sort key.
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--
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-- How the caller learns: each entity gains `unconverted_fx_count`, the number of
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-- its rows that hit case 4. Additive, so no caller breaks: the return type stays
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-- jsonb with the same two top-level keys, the signature is untouched, and
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-- lib/agent-context/ledger-deep.ts maps entities through a spread. total_amount
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-- is COALESCEd to 0 rather than left NULL so `DeepEntity.total_amount: number`
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-- stays true; an entity whose whole history is unconvertible therefore reports
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-- 0 kr WITH unconverted_fx_count > 0, which is the ar-ledger reading of a zero
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-- total: "unknown", not "nothing". The entity is never dropped.
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--
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-- Deliberately NOT excluded: occurrences, cadence_days and the dominant-account
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-- pick. Those are currency-free facts about a booking that really happened to a
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-- real account, and they are the part of this payload the agent leans on hardest.
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-- Only the money magnitude is withheld, because only the money magnitude is
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-- unknown.
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--
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-- Everything else is byte-identical to 20260712130000 (variant merging, cadence,
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-- Laplace-smoothed share, storno/19xx/26xx exclusions, LIMIT 40 / LIMIT 20,
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-- SECURITY INVOKER + RLS scoping).
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--
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-- pg-test: tests/pg/ledger-deep-context-rpc.pg.test.ts
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.get_ledger_deep_context(
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p_company_id uuid,
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p_from_date date DEFAULT NULL
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)
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RETURNS jsonb
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LANGUAGE sql
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STABLE
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SECURITY INVOKER
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SET search_path TO 'public'
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AS $$
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SELECT jsonb_build_object(
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'counterparty_entities',
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(
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WITH booked AS (
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SELECT
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public.normalize_counterparty_key(t.merchant_name) AS k,
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t.merchant_name,
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t.journal_entry_id,
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t.date,
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-- SEK, or NULL when no SEK value can be established. NULL is the whole
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-- point: it drops out of sum() below instead of entering the total at
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-- its foreign face value.
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CASE
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-- SEK row: amount_sek is NULL here by design and `amount` already IS
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-- kronor, so this is the pre-existing coalesce untouched.
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WHEN upper(coalesce(nullif(btrim(t.currency), ''), 'SEK')) = 'SEK'
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THEN abs(coalesce(t.amount_sek, t.amount))
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-- Foreign row converted at ingest.
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WHEN t.amount_sek IS NOT NULL
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THEN abs(t.amount_sek)
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-- Foreign row carrying the rate it was recorded at.
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WHEN t.exchange_rate IS NOT NULL AND t.exchange_rate > 0
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THEN round(abs(t.amount) * t.exchange_rate, 2)
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-- Foreign row with neither: unknown in SEK, never assumed.
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ELSE NULL
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END AS amount
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FROM public.transactions t
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JOIN public.journal_entries je ON je.id = t.journal_entry_id
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WHERE t.company_id = p_company_id
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AND t.journal_entry_id IS NOT NULL
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AND je.status = 'posted'
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AND je.source_type <> 'storno'
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AND t.merchant_name IS NOT NULL
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AND trim(t.merchant_name) <> ''
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AND (p_from_date IS NULL OR t.date >= p_from_date)
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),
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keyed AS (SELECT * FROM booked WHERE k <> ''),
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-- Median gap between distinct booking dates -> recurrence cadence.
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distinct_dates AS (SELECT DISTINCT k, date FROM keyed),
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gaps AS (
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SELECT k, (date - lag(date) OVER (PARTITION BY k ORDER BY date)) AS gap
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FROM distinct_dates
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),
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recur AS (
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SELECT k, round(percentile_cont(0.5) WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY gap))::int AS cadence_days
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FROM gaps WHERE gap IS NOT NULL GROUP BY k
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),
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-- Dominant contra account + its share, over the entity's verifikat lines.
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-- Rows with no SEK value stay in here on purpose: which account a booking
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-- went to is a fact that does not depend on the currency.
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acct_counts AS (
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SELECT b.k, l.account_number, count(*)::bigint AS cnt
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FROM keyed b
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JOIN public.journal_entry_lines l ON l.journal_entry_id = b.journal_entry_id
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WHERE l.account_number NOT LIKE '19%'
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AND l.account_number NOT LIKE '26%'
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GROUP BY b.k, l.account_number
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),
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acct_totals AS (SELECT k, sum(cnt) AS total FROM acct_counts GROUP BY k),
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dominant_account AS (
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SELECT DISTINCT ON (ac.k) ac.k, ac.account_number, ac.cnt, at.total
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FROM acct_counts ac JOIN acct_totals at ON at.k = ac.k
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ORDER BY ac.k, ac.cnt DESC, ac.account_number
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),
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agg AS (
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SELECT
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k,
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mode() WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY merchant_name) AS display_name,
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count(*)::bigint AS occurrences,
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count(DISTINCT merchant_name)::int AS variant_count,
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(array_agg(DISTINCT merchant_name))[1:8] AS variants,
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-- sum() skips the NULLs from case 4. COALESCE keeps the field a number
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-- when every row was unconvertible.
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coalesce(sum(amount), 0) AS total_amount,
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(count(*) FILTER (WHERE amount IS NULL))::int AS unconverted_fx_count,
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min(date) AS first_seen,
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max(date) AS last_seen
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FROM keyed GROUP BY k
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)
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SELECT coalesce(
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jsonb_agg(
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jsonb_build_object(
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'name', a.display_name,
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'key', a.k,
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'variants', to_jsonb(a.variants),
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|
'variant_count', a.variant_count,
|
|
'occurrences', a.occurrences,
|
|
'total_amount', round(a.total_amount)::bigint,
|
|
-- Bookings whose SEK value could not be established, and which are
|
|
-- therefore NOT in total_amount above.
|
|
'unconverted_fx_count', a.unconverted_fx_count,
|
|
'first_seen', a.first_seen,
|
|
'last_seen', a.last_seen,
|
|
'cadence_days', r.cadence_days,
|
|
'dominant_account_number', da.account_number,
|
|
-- Laplace-smoothed: n=1 no longer reads as 100%.
|
|
'dominant_account_share',
|
|
CASE WHEN da.total > 0 THEN round((da.cnt + 1)::numeric / (da.total + 2), 2) ELSE NULL END,
|
|
'dominant_account_count', da.cnt,
|
|
'dominant_account_total', da.total
|
|
)
|
|
ORDER BY a.occurrences DESC, a.total_amount DESC, a.display_name
|
|
),
|
|
'[]'::jsonb
|
|
)
|
|
FROM (SELECT * FROM agg ORDER BY occurrences DESC, total_amount DESC, display_name LIMIT 40) a
|
|
LEFT JOIN recur r ON r.k = a.k
|
|
LEFT JOIN dominant_account da ON da.k = a.k
|
|
),
|
|
'supplier_entities',
|
|
(
|
|
WITH sinv AS (
|
|
SELECT si.id, si.supplier_id, s.name AS supplier_name,
|
|
si.invoice_date, si.vat_treatment,
|
|
-- Same four cases as the counterparty side. total_sek is NULL on
|
|
-- every foreign invoice registered without an exchange_rate, so
|
|
-- case 4 is the live cohort here, not an edge case.
|
|
CASE
|
|
WHEN upper(coalesce(nullif(btrim(si.currency), ''), 'SEK')) = 'SEK'
|
|
THEN coalesce(si.total_sek, si.total, 0)
|
|
WHEN si.total_sek IS NOT NULL
|
|
THEN si.total_sek
|
|
WHEN si.exchange_rate IS NOT NULL AND si.exchange_rate > 0
|
|
THEN round(coalesce(si.total, 0) * si.exchange_rate, 2)
|
|
ELSE NULL
|
|
END AS amount
|
|
FROM public.supplier_invoices si
|
|
JOIN public.suppliers s ON s.id = si.supplier_id
|
|
WHERE si.company_id = p_company_id
|
|
AND si.status NOT IN ('reversed', 'credited')
|
|
AND si.is_credit_note = false
|
|
AND (p_from_date IS NULL OR si.invoice_date >= p_from_date)
|
|
),
|
|
distinct_dates AS (SELECT DISTINCT supplier_id, invoice_date FROM sinv),
|
|
gaps AS (
|
|
SELECT supplier_id,
|
|
(invoice_date - lag(invoice_date) OVER (PARTITION BY supplier_id ORDER BY invoice_date)) AS gap
|
|
FROM distinct_dates
|
|
),
|
|
recur AS (
|
|
SELECT supplier_id, round(percentile_cont(0.5) WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY gap))::int AS cadence_days
|
|
FROM gaps WHERE gap IS NOT NULL GROUP BY supplier_id
|
|
),
|
|
acct_counts AS (
|
|
SELECT v.supplier_id, i.account_number, count(DISTINCT v.id)::bigint AS cnt
|
|
FROM sinv v JOIN public.supplier_invoice_items i ON i.supplier_invoice_id = v.id
|
|
GROUP BY v.supplier_id, i.account_number
|
|
),
|
|
acct_totals AS (SELECT supplier_id, sum(cnt) AS total FROM acct_counts GROUP BY supplier_id),
|
|
dominant_account AS (
|
|
SELECT DISTINCT ON (ac.supplier_id) ac.supplier_id, ac.account_number, ac.cnt, at.total
|
|
FROM acct_counts ac JOIN acct_totals at ON at.supplier_id = ac.supplier_id
|
|
ORDER BY ac.supplier_id, ac.cnt DESC, ac.account_number
|
|
),
|
|
agg AS (
|
|
SELECT
|
|
supplier_id,
|
|
max(supplier_name) AS supplier_name,
|
|
count(*)::bigint AS occurrences,
|
|
coalesce(sum(amount), 0) AS total_amount,
|
|
(count(*) FILTER (WHERE amount IS NULL))::int AS unconverted_fx_count,
|
|
min(invoice_date) AS first_seen,
|
|
max(invoice_date) AS last_seen,
|
|
mode() WITHIN GROUP (ORDER BY vat_treatment) AS dominant_vat
|
|
FROM sinv GROUP BY supplier_id
|
|
)
|
|
SELECT coalesce(
|
|
jsonb_agg(
|
|
jsonb_build_object(
|
|
'name', a.supplier_name,
|
|
'key', a.supplier_id::text,
|
|
'variants', to_jsonb(ARRAY[a.supplier_name]),
|
|
'variant_count', 1,
|
|
'occurrences', a.occurrences,
|
|
'total_amount', round(a.total_amount)::bigint,
|
|
-- Invoices whose SEK total could not be established, and which are
|
|
-- therefore NOT in total_amount above.
|
|
'unconverted_fx_count', a.unconverted_fx_count,
|
|
'first_seen', a.first_seen,
|
|
'last_seen', a.last_seen,
|
|
'cadence_days', r.cadence_days,
|
|
'dominant_account_number', da.account_number,
|
|
-- Laplace-smoothed: n=1 no longer reads as 100%.
|
|
'dominant_account_share',
|
|
CASE WHEN da.total > 0 THEN round((da.cnt + 1)::numeric / (da.total + 2), 2) ELSE NULL END,
|
|
'dominant_account_count', da.cnt,
|
|
'dominant_account_total', da.total,
|
|
'dominant_vat', a.dominant_vat
|
|
)
|
|
ORDER BY a.occurrences DESC, a.total_amount DESC, a.supplier_name
|
|
),
|
|
'[]'::jsonb
|
|
)
|
|
FROM (SELECT * FROM agg ORDER BY occurrences DESC, total_amount DESC, supplier_name LIMIT 20) a
|
|
LEFT JOIN recur r ON r.supplier_id = a.supplier_id
|
|
LEFT JOIN dominant_account da ON da.supplier_id = a.supplier_id
|
|
)
|
|
);
|
|
$$;
|
|
|
|
COMMENT ON FUNCTION public.get_ledger_deep_context(uuid, date) IS
|
|
'Deep entity-resolved ledger analysis behind "Vad din agent vet". total_amount is SEK only: a non-SEK row with neither a stored SEK value nor an exchange_rate is excluded from the sum and from the total_amount sort key, and counted in unconverted_fx_count instead of being added at its foreign face value. occurrences, cadence_days and the dominant-account pick are currency-free and still include those rows.';
|
|
|
|
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.get_ledger_deep_context(uuid, date) FROM PUBLIC, anon;
|
|
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.get_ledger_deep_context(uuid, date) TO authenticated, service_role;
|
|
|
|
NOTIFY pgrst, 'reload schema';
|