* fix(enable-banking): keep bank account mappings across reconnects and surface dead sessions A PSD2 reconnect silently moved the user's ledger mapping. Account identity came from the provider's account uid, which does not survive a re-authorization at every ASPSP, and a fresh connect to an already-connected bank mints a new bank_connections row regardless. Both paths looked like "an account we have never seen", so the allocator handed out the next free 19xx slot and a 1930/1940/1941 mapping came back as 1942-1946 on every consent renewal, roughly quarterly per connection. Match on the IBAN instead. resolvePsd2LedgerAccount() finds the existing cash_accounts row by normalized IBAN before allocating, and upsertFromPsd2 promotes that row in place rather than inserting a second one, so it keeps its id and its linked transactions and is re-pointed at the connection that just authorized. The previous holder's connection status is deliberately ignored: one IBAN is one physical account, and the old row often still reads 'active' because the bank killed the session without telling us. The allocator also stopped treating a 19xx number as free just because no cash_accounts row holds it. A chart imported from SIE carries the company's real bank accounts by name with no PSD2 row behind them, which is how a SEK company account got proposed as an unrelated brokerage account. Overflow now skips chart-occupied numbers, falling back only when nothing unnamed is left. Dead connections kept rendering as "Aktiv": status only ever changed when a transaction fetch failed, so a session killed bank-side stayed healthy-looking with a stale last_synced_at while the user read old balances as current. Add probeSessionHealth() and run it in the daily cron over every connection that run did not prove alive, including the ones the loop skips silently (capability gate, all accounts deselected) and the ones parked in pending_selection that the cron never looked at. It acts only on a definite dead answer; anything ambiguous leaves the row alone, since a wrong flip costs a full BankID re-authorization. The all-accounts-deselected branch is reclassified 'synced' to 'skipped' for the same reason: it never contacts the bank, so it must not count as proof of life. The settings row warns when an active connection has not synced in three days or has never synced. Which company a connection belongs to was invisible. Everything was already scoped to ctx.companyId, so there was no cross-tenant leak, but a bank authorized while the wrong company was active looked identical to the right one. Name the company on the connect surface and in the account picker, and say where the connection went when the callback lands under a different active company. Warn (bypassably) before authorizing a bank where the same user already holds live connections in other companies: several ASPSPs allow one active AIS session per login, so the new authorization can kill the others. The history start date already defaulted to the fiscal-year start; the card above it recommended a mid-year date and contradicted the selected option. It now states the fact and offers the shortcut without presenting it as advice. Not addressed: sharing one PSD2 session across companies. company_id is the tenancy anchor on bank_connections and cash_accounts hangs off (company_id, bank_connection_id), so that needs the session to become its own entity. See DECISIONS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(supplier-invoices): show the posted line description in the voucher preview The "Verifikation som bokförs" preview built its expense debit lines with description set to the raw account number, so the BESKRIVNING column showed "5615" or "6990" where the posted verifikat actually says "Leverantörsfaktura 123, ACME AB". A hardcoded 11-entry ACCOUNT_LABELS map masked this for 2440/2641/26xx, which is why the column read as a mix of friendly labels and bare account numbers, neither of which was the posted text. The preview now renders exactly the line_description the engine writes: the shared invoice-level text on expense lines and 2440, "Ingående moms {rate}% {desc}" on 2641, and the reverse-charge pair taken straight from generateReverseChargeLines instead of being re-derived locally. buildSupplierDescription moves into its own dependency-free module so the client-side preview can call it without pulling the journal engine (and its Supabase server client) into the browser bundle. The account name stays reachable on the AccountNumber hover card. Picked option A from the issue, keeping the fixed invoice-level description rather than propagating each item's own text: the customer-invoice side already writes invoice-level descriptions, so per-item text would create an inconsistency between the two invoice sides rather than remove one, and it would need an aggregation-collision policy in the journal engine. Rationale recorded in DECISIONS.md. Refs #1258 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(bookkeeping): restore the copy icon on verifikat rows The row-language rewrite in #1123 reused the copy icon's slot for the new expand toggle, removing the zero-click copy affordance from the bookkeeping list without mentioning it. The leftover orphaned copy_voucher_tooltip key in both message files is what identifies it as collateral rather than a product decision. Restore a copy icon in the row's right-edge action cell, reusing that key for aria-label and title. stopPropagation keeps the click off the row's expand toggle. The icon is hover-revealed on md+ and always visible below it: #1123 collapsed the desktop table and the mobile card into one responsive table, so hover-only would leave touch users with nothing. Copy is no longer gated on posted. The copy_from handler and the GET journal-entries route never looked at status, so copying a draft already worked end-to-end and only the detail-page button hid it; the two list surfaces were already ungated. Both list affordances now respect canWrite, which previously dropped read-only users into a dialog they could not submit. The repo does not render components in tests, which is why #1123 removed this silently. Pin the source shape instead, the same way the copy-invoice query is pinned. Closes #1266 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(transactions): revalidate stale invoice match pointers before offering a match potential_invoice_id / potential_supplier_invoice_id are written once, at bank import, and never revisited. When one of several identical recurring invoices was settled by a different transaction, every other transaction kept pointing at the now fully paid invoice. The match dialog then measured the bank amount against a 0 kr remaining balance and reported a "Beloppen skiljer sig ... fakturan blir delbetald" partial payment, and the worklist offered the same dead suggestion as a one-click confirm row. Worse, the manual escape hatch was hidden exactly when it was needed: TransactionInboxCard only shows "Matcha mot leverantörsfaktura" when no suggestion exists, so a stale pointer left the user with no way at all to reach the correct invoice. Fixed by revalidating at read time rather than by clearing sibling pointers on settle. Invoices are settled through many paths (both match routes, mark-paid, MCP, bank reconciliation, SIE import), so write-time cleanup leaks the moment one is missed, while the candidate lookup covers every route into the list. The shared accept-lists in lib/invoices/matchable-statuses.ts mirror the CAS guards the match routes already enforce. - listSuggestedMatches and the transactions page candidate fetch filter on status + remaining_amount, so a settled candidate yields no suggestion and the manual picker reappears on its own. - InvoiceMatchDialog blocks a settled target with a distinct message and a disabled confirm. Not advisory: both routes reject it outright with MATCH_INVOICE_ALREADY_PAID / MATCH_SI_ALREADY_PAID, so no override could succeed. - The supplier detail card now shows remaining_amount like the customer branch, instead of total. On a partially paid invoice it used to print "1 250 kr" directly beside "Differens: 1 250 kr". - match-supplier-invoice clears potential_supplier_invoice_id on the transaction it just matched, mirroring the customer route. No bookkeeping was ever at risk: both routes already refused a settled target before creating a voucher. The damage was confined to a misleading dialog and a dead end. createQueuedMockSupabase gains passive call recording (calls / findCall / findCalls) because the proxy swallowed filter and update arguments, which made the new assertions inexpressible. Refs #1259, #1260 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(webhooks): dispatch on emit instead of waiting for the next cron tick (#1256) * feat(webhooks): dispatch on emit instead of waiting for the next cron tick The webhook dispatcher ran only on a per-minute cron, so the floor on delivery latency was up to 60 seconds plus the request. An external consumer that wanted to react as a transaction landed had only one alternative: polling /api/events, which the 100 rpm per-key limit makes expensive and which still cannot beat the tick interval. Schedules one dispatch cycle as soon as deliveries are enqueued. The cron is unchanged and remains the retry and sweep path; this only moves the first attempt forward. Wired into the event-bus fanout plus the two routes that enqueue a delivery directly: the :test verb, whose entire purpose is telling someone whether their receiver works, and the manual delivery retry. Three properties are load-bearing and covered by tests. The kick is never awaited, because eventBus.emit is awaited at ~99 call sites including journal_entry.committed and each delivery can burn a 10 s receiver timeout. It coalesces per function instance, so a bulk booking that emits once per row does not schedule one claim round trip per row. It claims 5 rows rather than the cron's 50, because it runs on the tail of a user-facing request. Double delivery is not a risk: claim_due_webhook_deliveries already claims FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED and flips rows to in_flight in the same statement, so a kick racing the cron sees disjoint rows. Does not close #1201, which asks for a realtime stream for API consumers. This is the cheap half. Refs #1201 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(webhooks): stop claiming the kick makes double delivery impossible Adversarial review of the previous commit caught an overstatement in its own comments. SKIP LOCKED keeps a kick and the cron from claiming the same row at the same moment, but claim_due_webhook_deliveries autocommits before any POST is issued, so from then on ownership is only status='in_flight' and a later cycle's recoverStuckInFlight sweep can re-arm a row still queued behind an earlier cycle's serial loop. Delivery is at-least-once, which is what the public docs already tell receivers ("the same delivery id may arrive more than once ... idempotency is on you"). The comments contradicted that. No behaviour change. The kick does not create this window: the cron claims 50 rows serially against the same 20 s stuck threshold, which is wider than what a batch of 5 can open. Refs #1201 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(bokslut): add bokslut-flow depreciation (78xx) back to the bolagsskatt base (#1253) * fix(bokslut): add bokslut-flow depreciation (78xx) back to the bolagsskatt base sumPostedYearEndDispositions reconstructs resultat fore skatt for the tax calculation, because generateIncomeStatement excludes every source_type='year_end' entry. It summed class 88 and 7533 but not 78xx, so planenlig avskrivning posted by the bokslut flow (lib/bokslut/assets/depreciation-engine.ts) was dropped from the income statement and never added back. The bolagsskatt base and the periodiseringsfond 25 % cap were therefore computed on an overstated result: tax too high by roughly 20.6 % of the depreciation. Also exclude the period's final bokslutsverifikation from the fetch. It carries source_type='year_end' as well and reverses every P&L account, 78xx/88xx/7533 included (verified against production closing entries), so once the year is closed it would cancel the add-back this function exists to produce. That hazard already applied to 88xx and 7533; the fix closes it for all three rather than widening it. Scope is deliberately the tax base only. Making the standalone resultatrakning show bokslut entries is a separate, larger change: the same exclusion is duplicated in the kpi_report_aggregates RPC, it moves displayed profit for every company that ran the bokslut flow, and it means removing the add-back at four call sites. Refs #1051 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(bokslut): scope the closing-entry lookup to the company and fail loudly Review (CodeRabbit + the compliance swarm, ASVS V8.2.1) flagged the new fiscal_periods read in sumPostedYearEndDispositions on two counts, both fair. It filtered only on the period id while every sibling query in the same function carries the tenant scope. Primary key or not, service-role paths have no RLS to fall back on and the repo's rule is to filter company_id explicitly, so it now does. It also discarded the query error. That mattered more than it looks: a failed read fell through to closingEntryId = null, which silently re-admits the closing verifikat's 78xx/88xx reversals and understates the tax base, i.e. exactly the failure this lookup was added to prevent. It now throws, and the surrounding catch turns it into the existing 'Failed to read posted dispositions' error. A wrong bolagsskatt is worse than a loud failure. Two regression tests: the lookup carries both eq filters, and a lookup failure propagates instead of degrading to a wrong number. Refs #1051 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(storage): drop the client-side DELETE policy on the documents bucket (#1254) * fix(storage): drop the client-side DELETE policy on the documents bucket 20240101000024 documents this bucket as WORM: "No UPDATE or DELETE policies". That described the repo, not production. Production carries a users_delete_own_documents policy that exists in no migration file: FOR DELETE TO authenticated USING (bucket_id = 'documents' AND (storage.foldername(name))[2] = auth.uid()::text) Under it, the uploading user can delete the storage bytes of any document they uploaded under the legacy documents/{userId}/... layout, using nothing but their normal browser token. That includes documents linked to a posted verifikat, which are rakenskapsinformation under the BFL 7 kap 2 § seven-year retention duty. deleteDocument()'s linked-check and the block_document_deletion() trigger both guard the document_attachments ROW, not the object: the row survives, still pointing at a file that is gone. Reproduced against a local replay of the full migration stream: with the policy present the uploader's own DELETE removes the object; with it dropped the same statement matches zero rows. Company-scoped keys were never exposed (their second path segment is the company id, not auth.uid()), so this only ever reached the legacy layout, which is where most documents still live. Safe because every in-app remove() on this bucket already runs on the service role, covered by service_role_all_documents. Deliberately narrow: users_read_own_documents and users_upload_own_documents stay. The Phase B backfill from 20260726092000 has not run, so dropping the legacy SELECT policy now would make existing documents unreadable. That is Phase C. The pg-real test asserts no DELETE and no UPDATE policy over the bucket under ANY name: the hole arrived under a name this repo never used, so pinning a name would not have caught it. Refs #1208 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(storage): make the WORM ratchet see FOR ALL and WITH CHECK policies Review caught two blind spots in the ratchet, both fair. It matched only polcmd 'd' and 'w', but polcmd '*' (FOR ALL) grants DELETE and UPDATE just as effectively, and FOR ALL is the shape the one legitimate policy on this table already uses, so a hostile one would look unremarkable in the catalogue. It also read only polqual, so an UPDATE policy carrying its bucket restriction in WITH CHECK was invisible. Both assertions now run through one helper that covers d/w/*, concatenates USING and WITH CHECK, and filters by grantee so service_role_all_documents (how the application does its authorized deletes) is excluded while every client-reachable role is not. A policy granted to PUBLIC has an empty polroles, which is the most permissive case there is, so it is treated as client-reachable rather than as "no roles". Matching on the substring rather than the exact `bucket_id = 'documents'` shape pg_get_expr emits today: a policy written as bucket_id::text or with the comparison reversed would slip past a stricter match, and for a WORM ratchet a false alarm is cheap while a silent hole is not. Adds a probe case that creates a FOR ALL policy and asserts the helper sees it, so the main assertion cannot pass vacuously. That case earned its keep immediately: it caught that node-postgres hands back a raw string for a name[] column, so the role filter needed rolname::text to work at all. Verified against a local replay of the full migration stream: red with the original prod FOR DELETE policy present, red with a FOR ALL probe, green without either. Full pg-real suite 933 passed. Refs #1208 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(storage): catch a destructive policy that names no bucket at all Adversarial review of the previous commit found the ratchet still failed open, and reproduced it: a policy with no bucket_id predicate covers EVERY bucket, documents included, so gating on the bucket name discarded exactly the widest hole. The concrete shape is Supabase's own stock "Enable delete for users based on user_id" template, USING (auth.uid() = owner), which is the single most likely form of a future dashboard edit. A destructive policy is now in scope unless it provably cannot reach this bucket, i.e. only a bucket_id predicate naming some other bucket exempts it. The behavioural assertions had the matching blind spot: fixtures were seeded without an owner, so an owner-based policy matched NULL and the DELETE reported 0 rows for the wrong reason. Objects now carry an owner the way storage-api stamps them in production, so those tests fail loudly instead of passing by accident. Two probes pin both directions: a bucketless policy must be reported (and is shown to really permit the delete), and a policy scoped to another bucket must not be, so the ratchet cannot start crying wolf on receipts or sie-files and get switched off. Verified against a local replay of the full migration stream: red with the stock bucketless template installed, green without it. Full pg-real suite 935 passed. Refs #1208 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(kontoplan): make a deactivated account reachable again (#1262) is_active=false read as "does not exist" on every read path but as "exists" on the (company_id, account_number) unique constraint, so a deactivated account vanished from the kontoplan with no way back and re-creating it answered "Kontonummer X finns redan i din kontoplan." The write side was already correct: POST /accounts/activate has a toReactivate branch and PUT /accounts/[number] accepts is_active:true. Both were simply unreachable, so this opens routes to them rather than relaxing the read filters, which are load-bearing for AccountsNotInChartError. - Kontoplan gets a "Visa inaktiva" filter; inactive rows carry an "Inaktiv" chip and the existing per-row switch reactivates them in one click. - Deactivating an account that has posted lines now warns first, using the usage count already loaded for the Verifikat column. - POST /accounts distinguishes the two collisions and returns the new ACCOUNT_EXISTS_INACTIVE code; AddAccountDialog offers "Aktivera kontot istallet" rather than a dead-end 409. The stored account is left exactly as it was; values typed into the failed create form are not applied. - bas-lookup consults the company's own chart before the static BAS reference, so a deactivated custom account reads as known and "Aktivera och bokfor" is no longer disabled for it. New in_chart / is_active fields let callers tell "will be added" from "will be revived". - BAS-katalog stops showing "Aktiverat" for an account the company holds but has deactivated; it falls through to a relabelled Aktivera button, and the per-class counts follow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(supplier-invoices): flag foreign 0 % lines with reverse charge switched off (#1255) * fix(supplier-invoices): flag foreign 0 % lines with reverse charge switched off A foreign supplier charging no Swedish VAT is normally omvand skattskyldighet. With the reverse-charge switch off, createSupplierInvoiceRegistrationEntry emits neither the 26x4 output leg nor the 44xx/45xx basis lines, so ruta 20-24, 30-32 and 48 all stay empty and the momsdeklaration takes a shape Skatteverket rejects. For a fully deductible purchase the net moms att betala is unchanged, which is exactly why this goes unnoticed. The form already auto-ticks reverse charge for eu_business but not for non_eu_business, so that path slips through silently. Adds a pure helper plus a non-blocking banner cloned from the existing rc_account_warning block. Deliberately silent for swedish_business, where 0 % is a genuine exemption that belongs in no ruta at all, and phrased as a question rather than an assertion: a non-EU goods purchase cleared at customs is legitimately 0 % without reverse charge, and pushing that user into ticking the switch would manufacture a new wrong verifikat. Does not add the exempt/import/other picker the issue proposes: supplier_invoices.vat_treatment is metadata that no booking or ruta mapping reads, and the codebase cannot book import VAT at all, so an import option would imply ruta 50/60 were handled when they are not. Refs #1042 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(supplier-invoices): name the local-VAT case in the foreign 0 % hint Review flagged that the most common foreign document a Swedish small company sees is an invoice carrying the supplier's OWN local VAT, booked at 0 % Swedish VAT with reverse charge correctly off. The banner fires there, and the previous copy only offered "momsfri av annat skal, till exempel en varuimport" as the way out, which does not describe that invoice at all: it is not VAT-free, it carries foreign VAT. Names both legitimate cases explicitly and says 0 % is correct in them, so the hint cannot read as an instruction to tick reverse charge on a purchase where that would produce a wrong verifikat. Title also narrowed to "utan svensk moms" for the same reason. Refs #1042 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(sandbox): call the sandbox assistant Assistenten, not Anna (#1244) A named persona earns its name once someone has been through onboarding and chosen it: it is their assistant and they named it. Nobody in the sandbox chose anything, so a first name reads as a character the product invented and implies a relationship the visitor never opted into. Both halves move together, which is the point. profile_summary is the agent's own self-description inside the system prompt, so leaving it as "Du är Anna" would have the header say one thing while the assistant introduces itself as another in its first sentence. Nothing else in the stack checks that pairing, so a test now does. Scope: this changes the seed, so new sandbox companies get the new name. The 483 sandbox profiles already seeded keep 'Anna' (the seeder returns early once a profile exists, and its caller only runs while verified_at is null). Backfilling those is a production write on demo data and is being raised separately rather than smuggled into a code change. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(reports): show the last posted voucher per series in report headers Adds a "Senaste bokforda verifikat: A 214, B 37" line to the balans- and resultatrapport, so a printed or exported report answers which vouchers are actually in it rather than only which dates it spans (#1267). Reads MAX(voucher_number) over posted entries, never voucher_sequences.last_number. The sequence counter is an allocation high-water mark that drifts from the books in both directions: next_voucher_number burns a number when the follow-up insert fails, delete_last_voucher decrements by one instead of resetting to the new MAX, and pre-RPC SIE imports left it behind. Since the point of the line is avstamning, an allocated number would send a reconciler chasing a gap that does not exist, so the label says plainly that the number is the posted one. Scoped to the report own date range, so a Q1 report printed in November says something true about Q1. The balansrapport keeps the fiscal-year start as its lower bound because it accumulates. Skipped on a dimension-filtered resultatrapport: that report already discloses it is partial, and an unfiltered voucher range beside a filtered result invites the wrong conclusion. Populated in both engines, so the JSON, PDF and XLSX routes all inherit it without signature changes. Best-effort: a header nicety never breaks a report. The pure formatter lives in its own module so the client view does not pull the Supabase query path into the browser bundle. No new i18n keys; both report views and the PDF template are hard-coded Swedish per the "stays Swedish" report surfaces in .claude/rules/i18n.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(customers): stop rendering personnummer ciphertext, make unreadable rows editable, add a reveal path (#1263) customers.personal_number holds AES-256-GCM ciphertext (20260726110000). Three defects compounded into one broken surface for private customers. The list queried Supabase from the browser with select('*') and rendered the raw value, 76-82 chars of hex, into the nowrap identifier cell. It now reads GET /api/customers, which already masks every row, so the ciphertext never leaves the server. Searching by personnummer works again: the client filter had been matching against ciphertext and could never hit. A row whose value cannot be decrypted renders as the placeholder '********-????'. None of the three mask checks recognised it, each having its own '-1234'-only copy, so such a customer could not be edited in ANY field: name and address edits 400'd on a personnummer the user had no way to correct. All three now share one pattern from the new crypto-free lib/customers/mask-personal-number.ts, which the client form can import. Typing a fresh personnummer overwrites the unreadable value, which is the only repair possible: the rejected writes failed whole INSERTs, so there is nothing to backfill. The value was write-only by construction. GET /api/customers/{id}/personal-number is the deliberate drill-in, mirroring the employee convention, gated on the write role because .compliance/ropa.yaml listed no_full_value_read_endpoint as a safeguard for this column; that entry is rewritten rather than left stale, and reveals log actor and customer id but never the value. Also: arcim-migration wrote the identity number as plaintext, which aborts any import containing a Privatperson with 23514 since the constraint flip; and the customer embeds on /api/invoices shipped ciphertext to the browser on every invoice read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: enhance ruta 05 handling for dynamic revenue accounts - Introduced `fetchDynamicRuta05Accounts` to fetch company-specific revenue accounts marked with a VAT rate, addressing issue #1261. - Updated VAT declaration logic to include these dynamic accounts in ruta 05 calculations, ensuring accurate reporting for user-added accounts. - Modified `ACCOUNT_RUTA` to include account 3000 for completeness in ruta 05. - Enhanced tests to validate the inclusion of user-added revenue accounts in ruta 05 and ensure correct VAT calculations. - Seeded default VAT rates for BAS revenue accounts to ensure proper classification in the VAT declaration. * fix: enhance data handling and masking in customer and invoice APIs * fix(vat): resolve the 3000 gruppkonto's rate for the ruta 05 base split 3000 "Forsaljning inom Sverige" is mapped to ruta05 by ACCOUNT_RUTA, so a balance on it is filed in the right box already. What was missing is the rate split: unlike 3001/3002/3003 the account number carries no sats, and fetchDynamicRuta05Accounts skipped it because it is in ACCOUNT_TO_BOX. A company posting to the gruppkonto therefore got a ruta 05 total that breakdown.invoices.base25/12/6 did not add up to. Surface those rates separately as staticRateByAccount: rate-only on purpose, because the static map already sums the account and adding it to the dynamic account list would double the filed figure. A test pins that single-count property. Also add 3000 to the MCP server's RUTA_05_ACCOUNTS, which is the display list behind report.rutor.ruta05: without it a 3000 balance appeared in the filed projection but not in the report the agent reads back. The comment claiming SALES_OUTPUT_VAT_SHORTFALL reads base25/12/6 was wrong and is corrected. That check derives its expected base from the output-VAT rutor (ruta10/0.25 + ruta11/0.12 + ruta12/0.06); nothing reads the per-rate bases, which are reporting metadata. So the incomplete split never affected a filed return or a warning, only the breakdown. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <149234542+jakobwennberg@users.noreply.github.com>
781 lines
28 KiB
TypeScript
781 lines
28 KiB
TypeScript
import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import type { CashAccount, CashAccountSource } from '@/types'
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import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
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import { syncMappedAccounts } from '@/lib/import/account-sync'
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const log = createLogger('cash-accounts')
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/**
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* Suggested BAS account per currency. Single source — the enable-banking
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* callback and the AccountPickerDialog both key off these.
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*/
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export const CURRENCY_LEDGER_DEFAULTS: Record<string, string> = {
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SEK: '1930',
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EUR: '1932',
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USD: '1933',
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GBP: '1934',
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}
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export function defaultLedgerForCurrency(currency: string): string {
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return CURRENCY_LEDGER_DEFAULTS[currency.toUpperCase()] ?? '1930'
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}
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/**
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* Canonical read/write surface for cash_accounts.
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*
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* Replaces ad-hoc reads of bank_connections.accounts_data for routing decisions.
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* UI panels that just display balances may still read accounts_data until the
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* follow-up migration drops that column.
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*
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* All methods accept an authenticated SupabaseClient and rely on RLS for tenancy
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* isolation. Defense-in-depth filter by company_id is applied regardless.
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*/
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export interface ListCashAccountsOptions {
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enabledOnly?: boolean
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}
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export interface UpsertFromPsd2Input {
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bank_connection_id: string
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external_uid: string
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currency: string
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ledger_account: string
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iban?: string | null
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name?: string | null
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balance?: number | null
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balance_updated_at?: string | null
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enabled?: boolean
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/**
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* Existing cash_accounts row this PSD2 account was matched to by IBAN
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* (see resolvePsd2LedgerAccount). The row is promoted in place: it keeps its
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* id, its ledger_account and its linked transactions, and is re-pointed at
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* this connection + external_uid. Without this the reconnect path would try
|
||
* to INSERT a second row on the same ledger and trip the
|
||
* (company_id, ledger_account) UNIQUE constraint.
|
||
*/
|
||
reuse_cash_account_id?: string | null
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Normalize an IBAN for comparison: ASPSPs format the same account both as
|
||
* "SE45 5000 0000 0583 9825 7466" and "SE4550000000058398257466", and a plain
|
||
* string compare would read those as two different accounts. Mirrors the
|
||
* normalization the sync path already applies when deriving external_ids.
|
||
*/
|
||
export function normalizeIban(iban: string | null | undefined): string | null {
|
||
if (!iban) return null
|
||
const normalized = iban.replace(/\s+/g, '').toUpperCase()
|
||
return normalized || null
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
export async function listForCompany(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
opts: ListCashAccountsOptions = {},
|
||
): Promise<CashAccount[]> {
|
||
let q = supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.select('*')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.order('is_primary', { ascending: false })
|
||
.order('ledger_account', { ascending: true })
|
||
|
||
if (opts.enabledOnly) q = q.eq('enabled', true)
|
||
|
||
const { data, error } = await q
|
||
if (error) {
|
||
log.error('listForCompany failed', { companyId, error: error.message })
|
||
return []
|
||
}
|
||
return (data ?? []) as CashAccount[]
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Primary cash account for a company. Filters by currency when provided. Falls
|
||
* back to the global primary (`is_primary = true`) when no currency-specific
|
||
* match exists.
|
||
*
|
||
* Used by skattekonto-booking's __PRIMARY_SEK__ sentinel and by transfer-pairing
|
||
* to identify the company's default settlement account.
|
||
*/
|
||
export async function getPrimary(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
currency?: string,
|
||
): Promise<CashAccount | null> {
|
||
let q = supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.select('*')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.eq('is_primary', true)
|
||
.limit(1)
|
||
|
||
if (currency) q = q.eq('currency', currency.toUpperCase())
|
||
|
||
const { data, error } = await q.maybeSingle()
|
||
if (error) {
|
||
log.warn('getPrimary failed', { companyId, currency, error: error.message })
|
||
}
|
||
if (data) return data as CashAccount
|
||
|
||
if (currency) {
|
||
// Fall back to any-currency primary so a company without a SEK account still
|
||
// resolves the sentinel: rare but possible (manual cash-on-hand only).
|
||
const { data: anyPrimary } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.select('*')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.eq('is_primary', true)
|
||
.maybeSingle()
|
||
if (anyPrimary) return anyPrimary as CashAccount
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return null
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
export async function findByIban(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
iban: string,
|
||
): Promise<CashAccount | null> {
|
||
if (!iban) return null
|
||
const { data, error } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.select('*')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.eq('iban', iban)
|
||
.maybeSingle()
|
||
if (error) {
|
||
log.warn('findByIban failed', { companyId, iban, error: error.message })
|
||
return null
|
||
}
|
||
return (data as CashAccount | null) ?? null
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Of the given bank_connection ids, return the subset whose connection row has
|
||
* status 'revoked'. A revoked connection no longer holds a live claim on its
|
||
* cash_accounts rows: the allocator, the picker-save collision guard, and
|
||
* upsertFromPsd2's promote-in-place path all treat those rows like manual
|
||
* holders so a reconnect can land back on its original ledger account.
|
||
*
|
||
* On lookup failure this returns an empty set (treat every connection as
|
||
* active): the conservative pre-fix behavior.
|
||
*/
|
||
export async function getRevokedConnectionIds(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
connectionIds: readonly string[],
|
||
): Promise<Set<string>> {
|
||
if (connectionIds.length === 0) return new Set()
|
||
|
||
const { data, error } = await supabase
|
||
.from('bank_connections')
|
||
.select('id, status')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.in('id', [...connectionIds])
|
||
|
||
if (error) {
|
||
log.warn('getRevokedConnectionIds lookup failed', { companyId, error: error.message })
|
||
return new Set()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return new Set(
|
||
((data ?? []) as Array<{ id: string; status: string }>)
|
||
.filter(c => c.status === 'revoked')
|
||
.map(c => c.id),
|
||
)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Find a free BAS class-19 slot for a new PSD2 cash account, respecting the
|
||
* UNIQUE (company_id, ledger_account) constraint. A bank returning N
|
||
* same-currency accounts must not map them all to the currency default —
|
||
* that's exactly the collision this prevents.
|
||
*
|
||
* Rules:
|
||
* - The currency default (1930/1932/1933/1934) is available when no
|
||
* PSD2-backed row holds it. A manual holder (the seeded 1930 row) does
|
||
* not block it — upsertFromPsd2 promotes that row in place.
|
||
* Rows held by a REVOKED connection count as manual too: disconnecting a
|
||
* bank releases its ledger claims, so reconnecting the same bank gets its
|
||
* original slot back instead of overflowing to 1939.
|
||
* - Overflow walks the free-use 1931–1959 sub-account slots, skipping the
|
||
* four currency defaults (reserved as suggestions for their currencies)
|
||
* and any slot held by ANY existing row — promoting an unrelated manual
|
||
* account (SIE-imported, kassa) would silently steal it.
|
||
* - Overflow ALSO skips 19xx numbers that already exist in the company's
|
||
* chart of accounts, even when no cash_accounts row holds them. A chart
|
||
* imported from SIE carries the company's real bank accounts by name
|
||
* ("1942 Nordnet", "1938 Danske eSett Settlement") without any PSD2 row
|
||
* behind them, and handing one of those out as "free" is how a SEK
|
||
* företagskonto ended up proposed as 1942 Nordnet. Only when every
|
||
* chart-free slot is exhausted do we fall back to chart-occupied numbers,
|
||
* so a company with a fully populated 19xx chart still gets an answer.
|
||
* - `exclude` carries slots already assigned earlier in the caller's loop
|
||
* but not yet visible in the table.
|
||
*
|
||
* Returns null when no slot is free (or the lookup fails) — callers fall back
|
||
* to their previous behavior and surface the error.
|
||
*/
|
||
export async function findFreeLedgerAccount(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
currency: string,
|
||
exclude: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(),
|
||
): Promise<string | null> {
|
||
const preferred = defaultLedgerForCurrency(currency)
|
||
|
||
const { data: rows, error } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.select('ledger_account, bank_connection_id')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
|
||
if (error) {
|
||
log.error('findFreeLedgerAccount lookup failed', { companyId, error: error.message })
|
||
return null
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Chart accounts are advisory here: a failed lookup must not block
|
||
// allocation, it just costs us the "don't steal a named bank account" guard.
|
||
const { data: chartRows, error: chartError } = await supabase
|
||
.from('chart_of_accounts')
|
||
.select('account_number')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.like('account_number', '19%')
|
||
|
||
if (chartError) {
|
||
log.warn('findFreeLedgerAccount chart lookup failed', {
|
||
companyId,
|
||
error: chartError.message,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
const chartTaken = new Set(
|
||
((chartRows ?? []) as Array<{ account_number: string }>).map(r => r.account_number),
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
const typedRows = (rows ?? []) as Array<{ ledger_account: string; bank_connection_id: string | null }>
|
||
const revokedConnectionIds = await getRevokedConnectionIds(
|
||
supabase,
|
||
companyId,
|
||
[...new Set(typedRows.map(r => r.bank_connection_id).filter((id): id is string => id !== null))],
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
const anyTaken = new Set<string>()
|
||
const connectedTaken = new Set<string>()
|
||
for (const row of typedRows) {
|
||
anyTaken.add(row.ledger_account)
|
||
if (row.bank_connection_id !== null && !revokedConnectionIds.has(row.bank_connection_id)) {
|
||
connectedTaken.add(row.ledger_account)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!exclude.has(preferred) && !connectedTaken.has(preferred)) return preferred
|
||
|
||
const reserved = new Set(Object.values(CURRENCY_LEDGER_DEFAULTS))
|
||
const candidates: string[] = []
|
||
for (let n = 1931; n <= 1959; n++) {
|
||
const candidate = String(n)
|
||
if (reserved.has(candidate)) continue
|
||
if (exclude.has(candidate) || anyTaken.has(candidate)) continue
|
||
candidates.push(candidate)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// First pass: slots the chart has never heard of, so we can create them
|
||
// cleanly. Second pass: chart-occupied slots, the pre-fix behavior, only
|
||
// once nothing unnamed is left.
|
||
const unnamed = candidates.find(c => !chartTaken.has(c))
|
||
if (unnamed) return unnamed
|
||
if (candidates.length > 0) {
|
||
log.warn('findFreeLedgerAccount fell back to a chart-occupied slot', {
|
||
companyId,
|
||
currency,
|
||
ledger: candidates[0],
|
||
})
|
||
return candidates[0]
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
log.warn('findFreeLedgerAccount exhausted 1931–1959', { companyId, currency })
|
||
return null
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Allocate a ledger slot for a new PSD2 account AND make sure that account
|
||
* number exists in the company's chart of accounts — cash_accounts has no FK
|
||
* to the chart, but booking (and the AccountPicker, which only lists chart
|
||
* accounts) breaks on numbers the chart doesn't know. Sub-accounts outside
|
||
* the BAS reference (1931, …) are created with metadata derived from the
|
||
* account number; standard numbers get their BAS name.
|
||
*/
|
||
export async function allocatePsd2LedgerAccount(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
userId: string,
|
||
input: { currency: string; accountName?: string | null; exclude?: ReadonlySet<string> },
|
||
): Promise<string | null> {
|
||
const ledger = await findFreeLedgerAccount(supabase, companyId, input.currency, input.exclude ?? new Set())
|
||
if (!ledger) return null
|
||
|
||
const name = input.accountName?.trim() || `Bankkonto ${input.currency.toUpperCase()}`
|
||
const sync = await syncMappedAccounts(
|
||
supabase,
|
||
companyId,
|
||
userId,
|
||
[
|
||
{
|
||
sourceAccount: ledger,
|
||
sourceName: name,
|
||
targetAccount: ledger,
|
||
targetName: name,
|
||
confidence: 1,
|
||
matchType: 'exact',
|
||
isOverride: false,
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
false,
|
||
)
|
||
if (sync.error) {
|
||
log.error('allocatePsd2LedgerAccount chart sync failed', {
|
||
companyId,
|
||
ledger,
|
||
error: sync.error,
|
||
})
|
||
return null
|
||
}
|
||
return ledger
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
export interface Psd2LedgerResolution {
|
||
ledgerAccount: string
|
||
/**
|
||
* Existing row to promote in place, when the IBAN was already known. Null
|
||
* when the ledger was freshly allocated.
|
||
*/
|
||
reuseCashAccountId: string | null
|
||
source: 'iban' | 'allocated'
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Decide which BAS account a PSD2 account should book to, IBAN first.
|
||
*
|
||
* The IBAN identifies the physical bank account; the provider's account `uid`
|
||
* does not survive a re-authorization at every ASPSP, and a fresh connect to
|
||
* an already-connected bank mints a new bank_connection row regardless. Both
|
||
* cases used to look like "an account we have never seen", so the allocator
|
||
* handed out the next free 19xx slot and the user's mapping (1930/1940/1941)
|
||
* silently moved to 1942-1946 on every consent renewal.
|
||
*
|
||
* Matching on the IBAN instead means a known account keeps its ledger, its
|
||
* cash_accounts row id and therefore its linked transactions. The previous
|
||
* holder's connection status is deliberately NOT considered: one IBAN is one
|
||
* physical account, so the connection that just authorized it is the one that
|
||
* owns it. This matters for the case that motivated the fix, where the old
|
||
* connection still reads 'active' because its session was killed bank-side
|
||
* without telling us.
|
||
*
|
||
* Returns null only when allocation itself fails; callers keep their existing
|
||
* fallback.
|
||
*/
|
||
export async function resolvePsd2LedgerAccount(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
userId: string,
|
||
input: {
|
||
iban?: string | null
|
||
currency: string
|
||
accountName?: string | null
|
||
exclude?: ReadonlySet<string>
|
||
},
|
||
): Promise<Psd2LedgerResolution | null> {
|
||
const exclude = input.exclude ?? new Set<string>()
|
||
const wanted = normalizeIban(input.iban)
|
||
|
||
if (wanted) {
|
||
const { data, error } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.select('id, iban, ledger_account')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.not('iban', 'is', null)
|
||
|
||
if (error) {
|
||
// Fall through to allocation: a failed lookup must not block the
|
||
// connection, it just costs us the reuse.
|
||
log.warn('resolvePsd2LedgerAccount iban lookup failed', {
|
||
companyId,
|
||
error: error.message,
|
||
})
|
||
} else {
|
||
const match = ((data ?? []) as Array<{ id: string; iban: string | null; ledger_account: string }>)
|
||
.find(row => normalizeIban(row.iban) === wanted)
|
||
// A ledger already claimed earlier in the caller's loop cannot be handed
|
||
// out twice, even on an IBAN hit: two rows on one ledger violate the
|
||
// (company_id, ledger_account) UNIQUE constraint.
|
||
if (match && !exclude.has(match.ledger_account)) {
|
||
return {
|
||
ledgerAccount: match.ledger_account,
|
||
reuseCashAccountId: match.id,
|
||
source: 'iban',
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const allocated = await allocatePsd2LedgerAccount(supabase, companyId, userId, {
|
||
currency: input.currency,
|
||
accountName: input.accountName,
|
||
exclude,
|
||
})
|
||
if (!allocated) return null
|
||
return { ledgerAccount: allocated, reuseCashAccountId: null, source: 'allocated' }
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Upsert a PSD2-sourced cash account during connection callback / sync. Keyed on
|
||
* (company_id, bank_connection_id, external_uid). When the row exists, balance
|
||
* and ledger_account are refreshed; the rest of the metadata stays put.
|
||
*
|
||
* Never sets is_primary: that's owned by the user via the AccountPicker or by
|
||
* the initial-backfill migration.
|
||
*/
|
||
export async function upsertFromPsd2(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
input: UpsertFromPsd2Input,
|
||
): Promise<void> {
|
||
const payload = {
|
||
company_id: companyId,
|
||
bank_connection_id: input.bank_connection_id,
|
||
external_uid: input.external_uid,
|
||
iban: input.iban ?? null,
|
||
name: input.name ?? null,
|
||
currency: input.currency.toUpperCase(),
|
||
ledger_account: input.ledger_account,
|
||
balance: input.balance ?? null,
|
||
balance_updated_at: input.balance_updated_at ?? null,
|
||
enabled: input.enabled ?? true,
|
||
source: 'enable_banking' as CashAccountSource,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// create_company_with_owner and the seed_default_cash_account migration plant
|
||
// a manual (bank_connection_id IS NULL) row on the same ledger_account so
|
||
// reconciliation routes work before any PSD2 connection exists, and the
|
||
// disconnect handler demotes a revoked connection's rows to manual the same
|
||
// way. Rows still pointing at a REVOKED connection (orphans from before the
|
||
// disconnect handler released claims) no longer hold a live claim either.
|
||
// In all three cases the PSD2 sync claiming that BAS slot has to promote the
|
||
// holder row in place: a plain upsert on (company_id, bank_connection_id,
|
||
// external_uid) wouldn't match it and the INSERT path then trips the
|
||
// (company_id, ledger_account) UNIQUE constraint. Promoting (instead of
|
||
// inserting) keeps the row id stable so transactions.cash_account_id links
|
||
// and the ledger's history stay attached.
|
||
const { data: holderRow, error: holderLookupError } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.select('id, bank_connection_id')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.eq('ledger_account', input.ledger_account)
|
||
.maybeSingle()
|
||
|
||
if (holderLookupError) {
|
||
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 holder lookup failed', {
|
||
companyId,
|
||
bankConnectionId: input.bank_connection_id,
|
||
externalUid: input.external_uid,
|
||
error: holderLookupError.message,
|
||
})
|
||
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${holderLookupError.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const typedHolder = holderRow as { id: string; bank_connection_id: string | null } | null
|
||
let promotableRowId: string | null = null
|
||
if (typedHolder) {
|
||
if (typedHolder.id === input.reuse_cash_account_id) {
|
||
// Matched by IBAN upstream: this row IS this account, whoever held it
|
||
// last. Promoting keeps its id (transactions.cash_account_id stays
|
||
// linked) and re-points it at the connection that just authorized.
|
||
promotableRowId = typedHolder.id
|
||
} else if (typedHolder.bank_connection_id === null) {
|
||
promotableRowId = typedHolder.id
|
||
} else if (typedHolder.bank_connection_id !== input.bank_connection_id) {
|
||
const revoked = await getRevokedConnectionIds(supabase, companyId, [
|
||
typedHolder.bank_connection_id,
|
||
])
|
||
if (revoked.has(typedHolder.bank_connection_id)) {
|
||
promotableRowId = typedHolder.id
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
// Holder owned by the input connection itself (or by another ACTIVE
|
||
// connection): fall through to the plain upsert. For the former the upsert
|
||
// matches on (company_id, bank_connection_id, external_uid) and updates in
|
||
// place; for the latter the UNIQUE constraint rejects the write and the
|
||
// error surfaces to the caller (the picker-save collision guard should
|
||
// have caught it earlier).
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (promotableRowId) {
|
||
// Promoting the holder makes it THE row for this (bank_connection_id,
|
||
// external_uid). If this connection + uid already has a row on another
|
||
// ledger (the reconnect callback mirrored it onto an overflow slot while
|
||
// the target slot was still wrongly blocked by a revoked connection), that
|
||
// duplicate must be resolved first or the promote trips the UNIQUE
|
||
// (company_id, bank_connection_id, external_uid) constraint.
|
||
const { data: ownRow, error: ownLookupError } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.select('id, is_primary')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.eq('bank_connection_id', input.bank_connection_id)
|
||
.eq('external_uid', input.external_uid)
|
||
.neq('id', promotableRowId)
|
||
.maybeSingle()
|
||
|
||
if (ownLookupError) {
|
||
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 duplicate lookup failed', {
|
||
companyId,
|
||
bankConnectionId: input.bank_connection_id,
|
||
externalUid: input.external_uid,
|
||
error: ownLookupError.message,
|
||
})
|
||
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${ownLookupError.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const typedOwn = ownRow as { id: string; is_primary: boolean } | null
|
||
let transferPrimary = false
|
||
if (typedOwn) {
|
||
// With linked transactions the duplicate is demoted to a plain manual
|
||
// row (deleting it would SET NULL those transactions' cash_account_id
|
||
// links). Without any, it is a leftover mirror from the broken reconnect
|
||
// and is deleted outright so its overflow slot frees up.
|
||
const { data: linkedTx, error: linkedTxError } = await supabase
|
||
.from('transactions')
|
||
.select('id')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.eq('cash_account_id', typedOwn.id)
|
||
.limit(1)
|
||
|
||
if (linkedTxError) {
|
||
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 duplicate transaction check failed', {
|
||
companyId,
|
||
bankConnectionId: input.bank_connection_id,
|
||
externalUid: input.external_uid,
|
||
error: linkedTxError.message,
|
||
})
|
||
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${linkedTxError.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if ((linkedTx ?? []).length > 0) {
|
||
const { error: demoteError } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.update({ bank_connection_id: null, external_uid: null })
|
||
.eq('id', typedOwn.id)
|
||
if (demoteError) {
|
||
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${demoteError.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
} else {
|
||
const { error: deleteError } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.delete()
|
||
.eq('id', typedOwn.id)
|
||
if (deleteError) {
|
||
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${deleteError.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
// A primary duplicate must hand the flag to the promoted row either way:
|
||
// deleted, it would leave the __PRIMARY_SEK__ sentinel unresolvable;
|
||
// demoted, the sentinel would keep resolving to the stale manual row.
|
||
transferPrimary = typedOwn.is_primary
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// .select() so we can detect a 0-row UPDATE: Supabase's update().eq() returns
|
||
// { error: null, data: [] } if the row was deleted between the SELECT above
|
||
// and this UPDATE (rare but theoretically possible under concurrent ops).
|
||
// If that happens, fall through to the normal upsert path instead of
|
||
// silently returning success without persisting anything.
|
||
const { data: promoted, error: promoteError } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.update(payload)
|
||
.eq('id', promotableRowId)
|
||
.select('id')
|
||
if (promoteError) {
|
||
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 promote-holder failed', {
|
||
companyId,
|
||
bankConnectionId: input.bank_connection_id,
|
||
externalUid: input.external_uid,
|
||
error: promoteError.message,
|
||
})
|
||
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${promoteError.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
if (promoted && promoted.length > 0) {
|
||
if (transferPrimary) {
|
||
try {
|
||
await setPrimary(supabase, companyId, promotableRowId)
|
||
} catch (primaryError) {
|
||
// The promote itself succeeded; losing the primary flag is
|
||
// recoverable via the AccountPicker, so log instead of unwinding.
|
||
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 primary transfer failed', {
|
||
companyId,
|
||
cashAccountId: promotableRowId,
|
||
error: primaryError instanceof Error ? primaryError.message : String(primaryError),
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return
|
||
}
|
||
// Holder row vanished between SELECT and UPDATE: fall through to upsert.
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const { error } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.upsert(payload, { onConflict: 'company_id,bank_connection_id,external_uid' })
|
||
|
||
if (error) {
|
||
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 failed', {
|
||
companyId,
|
||
bankConnectionId: input.bank_connection_id,
|
||
externalUid: input.external_uid,
|
||
error: error.message,
|
||
})
|
||
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${error.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Find (or create) a manual cash account for a BAS ledger slot, so transactions
|
||
* ingested outside the PSD2 flow (create_transactions / CSV) can carry a real
|
||
* cash_account_id instead of NULL. Without the link, reconciliation 404s on the
|
||
* account and the match dialog falls back to 1930 (issue #1016).
|
||
*
|
||
* Manual rows (source='manual', bank_connection_id=null) are already first-class:
|
||
* every company is seeded a manual 1930 the same way, and upsertFromPsd2 promotes
|
||
* a manual holder in place if a bank later claims the slot. So pre-creating one
|
||
* here does NOT race the PSD2 sync (the concern noted in lib/transactions/ingest.ts):
|
||
* the worst case is a later connection promoting this row, which is the intended flow.
|
||
*
|
||
* Keyed on the (company_id, ledger_account) UNIQUE constraint: a concurrent
|
||
* insert surfaces as 23505, which we treat as "someone else won the race" and
|
||
* re-read. The row's currency follows the first transaction that created it; a
|
||
* ledger account holds one currency by that same constraint.
|
||
*/
|
||
export async function ensureManualCashAccount(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
ledgerAccount: string,
|
||
currency: string,
|
||
name?: string | null,
|
||
): Promise<string> {
|
||
const existing = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.select('id, currency')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.eq('ledger_account', ledgerAccount)
|
||
.maybeSingle()
|
||
if (existing.error) {
|
||
throw new Error(`ensureManualCashAccount lookup failed: ${existing.error.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
if (existing.data) {
|
||
const row = existing.data as { id: string; currency: string | null }
|
||
// (company_id, ledger_account) is UNIQUE, so a ledger holds exactly one
|
||
// currency. A different-currency transaction pointing at the same ledger is
|
||
// a real conflict (e.g. a SEK row landing on a ledger already claimed for
|
||
// USD): fail loudly instead of binding it to the wrong-currency account.
|
||
if (row.currency && row.currency.toUpperCase() !== currency.toUpperCase()) {
|
||
throw new Error(
|
||
`Cash account ${ledgerAccount} is denominated in ${row.currency}, not ${currency.toUpperCase()}`,
|
||
)
|
||
}
|
||
return row.id
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const insert = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.insert({
|
||
company_id: companyId,
|
||
ledger_account: ledgerAccount,
|
||
currency: currency.toUpperCase(),
|
||
name: name?.trim() || `Bankkonto ${currency.toUpperCase()}`,
|
||
enabled: true,
|
||
is_primary: false,
|
||
source: 'manual' as CashAccountSource,
|
||
})
|
||
.select('id')
|
||
.single()
|
||
|
||
if (insert.error) {
|
||
// Lost the (company_id, ledger_account) race: re-read the winner's row.
|
||
if (insert.error.code === '23505') {
|
||
const reread = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.select('id')
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.eq('ledger_account', ledgerAccount)
|
||
.maybeSingle()
|
||
if (reread.data) return (reread.data as { id: string }).id
|
||
}
|
||
log.error('ensureManualCashAccount insert failed', {
|
||
companyId,
|
||
ledgerAccount,
|
||
error: insert.error.message,
|
||
})
|
||
throw new Error(`ensureManualCashAccount insert failed: ${insert.error.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return (insert.data as { id: string }).id
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Toggle a cash account's enabled flag. Used by the AccountPicker when a user
|
||
* opts in or out of syncing a particular PSD2 account.
|
||
*/
|
||
export async function setEnabled(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
cashAccountId: string,
|
||
enabled: boolean,
|
||
): Promise<void> {
|
||
const { error } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.update({ enabled })
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.eq('id', cashAccountId)
|
||
if (error) throw new Error(`cash_accounts setEnabled failed: ${error.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Remap a cash account to a different BAS ledger account. Triggers RLS + the
|
||
* (company_id, ledger_account) UNIQUE constraint: surface conflict errors so
|
||
* the UI can prompt the user to resolve.
|
||
*/
|
||
export async function setLedgerAccount(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
cashAccountId: string,
|
||
ledgerAccount: string,
|
||
): Promise<void> {
|
||
const { error } = await supabase
|
||
.from('cash_accounts')
|
||
.update({ ledger_account: ledgerAccount })
|
||
.eq('company_id', companyId)
|
||
.eq('id', cashAccountId)
|
||
if (error) throw new Error(`cash_accounts setLedgerAccount failed: ${error.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Mark a cash account as the primary for its company. Delegates to the
|
||
* `set_cash_account_primary` RPC so the clear-old-primary and set-new-primary
|
||
* updates happen inside a single transaction. The intermediate "no primary"
|
||
* state is never visible to concurrent readers: important because
|
||
* skattekonto-booking's __PRIMARY_SEK__ resolver runs through getPrimary() and
|
||
* would otherwise see null in the gap and mis-route the counter account.
|
||
*/
|
||
export async function setPrimary(
|
||
supabase: SupabaseClient,
|
||
companyId: string,
|
||
cashAccountId: string,
|
||
): Promise<void> {
|
||
const { error } = await supabase.rpc('set_cash_account_primary', {
|
||
p_company_id: companyId,
|
||
p_cash_account_id: cashAccountId,
|
||
})
|
||
if (error) {
|
||
throw new Error(`cash_accounts setPrimary failed: ${error.message}`)
|
||
}
|
||
}
|