Files
accounted/lib/cash-accounts/service.ts
T
65c6d4c178 Fix/07 27 (#1271)
* fix(enable-banking): keep bank account mappings across reconnects and surface dead sessions

A PSD2 reconnect silently moved the user's ledger mapping. Account identity
came from the provider's account uid, which does not survive a
re-authorization at every ASPSP, and a fresh connect to an already-connected
bank mints a new bank_connections row regardless. Both paths looked like "an
account we have never seen", so the allocator handed out the next free 19xx
slot and a 1930/1940/1941 mapping came back as 1942-1946 on every consent
renewal, roughly quarterly per connection.

Match on the IBAN instead. resolvePsd2LedgerAccount() finds the existing
cash_accounts row by normalized IBAN before allocating, and upsertFromPsd2
promotes that row in place rather than inserting a second one, so it keeps its
id and its linked transactions and is re-pointed at the connection that just
authorized. The previous holder's connection status is deliberately ignored:
one IBAN is one physical account, and the old row often still reads 'active'
because the bank killed the session without telling us.

The allocator also stopped treating a 19xx number as free just because no
cash_accounts row holds it. A chart imported from SIE carries the company's
real bank accounts by name with no PSD2 row behind them, which is how a SEK
company account got proposed as an unrelated brokerage account. Overflow now
skips chart-occupied numbers, falling back only when nothing unnamed is left.

Dead connections kept rendering as "Aktiv": status only ever changed when a
transaction fetch failed, so a session killed bank-side stayed healthy-looking
with a stale last_synced_at while the user read old balances as current. Add
probeSessionHealth() and run it in the daily cron over every connection that
run did not prove alive, including the ones the loop skips silently
(capability gate, all accounts deselected) and the ones parked in
pending_selection that the cron never looked at. It acts only on a definite
dead answer; anything ambiguous leaves the row alone, since a wrong flip costs
a full BankID re-authorization. The all-accounts-deselected branch is
reclassified 'synced' to 'skipped' for the same reason: it never contacts the
bank, so it must not count as proof of life. The settings row warns when an
active connection has not synced in three days or has never synced.

Which company a connection belongs to was invisible. Everything was already
scoped to ctx.companyId, so there was no cross-tenant leak, but a bank
authorized while the wrong company was active looked identical to the right
one. Name the company on the connect surface and in the account picker, and
say where the connection went when the callback lands under a different active
company. Warn (bypassably) before authorizing a bank where the same user
already holds live connections in other companies: several ASPSPs allow one
active AIS session per login, so the new authorization can kill the others.

The history start date already defaulted to the fiscal-year start; the card
above it recommended a mid-year date and contradicted the selected option. It
now states the fact and offers the shortcut without presenting it as advice.

Not addressed: sharing one PSD2 session across companies. company_id is the
tenancy anchor on bank_connections and cash_accounts hangs off
(company_id, bank_connection_id), so that needs the session to become its own
entity. See DECISIONS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(supplier-invoices): show the posted line description in the voucher preview

The "Verifikation som bokförs" preview built its expense debit lines with
description set to the raw account number, so the BESKRIVNING column showed
"5615" or "6990" where the posted verifikat actually says "Leverantörsfaktura
123, ACME AB". A hardcoded 11-entry ACCOUNT_LABELS map masked this for
2440/2641/26xx, which is why the column read as a mix of friendly labels and
bare account numbers, neither of which was the posted text.

The preview now renders exactly the line_description the engine writes: the
shared invoice-level text on expense lines and 2440, "Ingående moms {rate}%
{desc}" on 2641, and the reverse-charge pair taken straight from
generateReverseChargeLines instead of being re-derived locally.
buildSupplierDescription moves into its own dependency-free module so the
client-side preview can call it without pulling the journal engine (and its
Supabase server client) into the browser bundle. The account name stays
reachable on the AccountNumber hover card.

Picked option A from the issue, keeping the fixed invoice-level description
rather than propagating each item's own text: the customer-invoice side
already writes invoice-level descriptions, so per-item text would create an
inconsistency between the two invoice sides rather than remove one, and it
would need an aggregation-collision policy in the journal engine. Rationale
recorded in DECISIONS.md.

Refs #1258

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(bookkeeping): restore the copy icon on verifikat rows

The row-language rewrite in #1123 reused the copy icon's slot for the new
expand toggle, removing the zero-click copy affordance from the bookkeeping
list without mentioning it. The leftover orphaned copy_voucher_tooltip key
in both message files is what identifies it as collateral rather than a
product decision.

Restore a copy icon in the row's right-edge action cell, reusing that key
for aria-label and title. stopPropagation keeps the click off the row's
expand toggle. The icon is hover-revealed on md+ and always visible below
it: #1123 collapsed the desktop table and the mobile card into one
responsive table, so hover-only would leave touch users with nothing.

Copy is no longer gated on posted. The copy_from handler and the GET
journal-entries route never looked at status, so copying a draft already
worked end-to-end and only the detail-page button hid it; the two list
surfaces were already ungated. Both list affordances now respect canWrite,
which previously dropped read-only users into a dialog they could not
submit.

The repo does not render components in tests, which is why #1123 removed
this silently. Pin the source shape instead, the same way the copy-invoice
query is pinned.

Closes #1266

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(transactions): revalidate stale invoice match pointers before offering a match

potential_invoice_id / potential_supplier_invoice_id are written once, at bank
import, and never revisited. When one of several identical recurring invoices
was settled by a different transaction, every other transaction kept pointing
at the now fully paid invoice. The match dialog then measured the bank amount
against a 0 kr remaining balance and reported a "Beloppen skiljer sig ...
fakturan blir delbetald" partial payment, and the worklist offered the same
dead suggestion as a one-click confirm row.

Worse, the manual escape hatch was hidden exactly when it was needed:
TransactionInboxCard only shows "Matcha mot leverantörsfaktura" when no
suggestion exists, so a stale pointer left the user with no way at all to
reach the correct invoice.

Fixed by revalidating at read time rather than by clearing sibling pointers on
settle. Invoices are settled through many paths (both match routes, mark-paid,
MCP, bank reconciliation, SIE import), so write-time cleanup leaks the moment
one is missed, while the candidate lookup covers every route into the list.
The shared accept-lists in lib/invoices/matchable-statuses.ts mirror the CAS
guards the match routes already enforce.

  - listSuggestedMatches and the transactions page candidate fetch filter on
    status + remaining_amount, so a settled candidate yields no suggestion and
    the manual picker reappears on its own.
  - InvoiceMatchDialog blocks a settled target with a distinct message and a
    disabled confirm. Not advisory: both routes reject it outright with
    MATCH_INVOICE_ALREADY_PAID / MATCH_SI_ALREADY_PAID, so no override could
    succeed.
  - The supplier detail card now shows remaining_amount like the customer
    branch, instead of total. On a partially paid invoice it used to print
    "1 250 kr" directly beside "Differens: 1 250 kr".
  - match-supplier-invoice clears potential_supplier_invoice_id on the
    transaction it just matched, mirroring the customer route.

No bookkeeping was ever at risk: both routes already refused a settled target
before creating a voucher. The damage was confined to a misleading dialog and
a dead end.

createQueuedMockSupabase gains passive call recording (calls / findCall /
findCalls) because the proxy swallowed filter and update arguments, which made
the new assertions inexpressible.

Refs #1259, #1260

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(webhooks): dispatch on emit instead of waiting for the next cron tick (#1256)

* feat(webhooks): dispatch on emit instead of waiting for the next cron tick

The webhook dispatcher ran only on a per-minute cron, so the floor on
delivery latency was up to 60 seconds plus the request. An external consumer
that wanted to react as a transaction landed had only one alternative:
polling /api/events, which the 100 rpm per-key limit makes expensive and
which still cannot beat the tick interval.

Schedules one dispatch cycle as soon as deliveries are enqueued. The cron is
unchanged and remains the retry and sweep path; this only moves the first
attempt forward. Wired into the event-bus fanout plus the two routes that
enqueue a delivery directly: the :test verb, whose entire purpose is telling
someone whether their receiver works, and the manual delivery retry.

Three properties are load-bearing and covered by tests. The kick is never
awaited, because eventBus.emit is awaited at ~99 call sites including
journal_entry.committed and each delivery can burn a 10 s receiver timeout.
It coalesces per function instance, so a bulk booking that emits once per row
does not schedule one claim round trip per row. It claims 5 rows rather than
the cron's 50, because it runs on the tail of a user-facing request.

Double delivery is not a risk: claim_due_webhook_deliveries already claims
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED and flips rows to in_flight in the same statement, so
a kick racing the cron sees disjoint rows.

Does not close #1201, which asks for a realtime stream for API consumers.
This is the cheap half.

Refs #1201

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(webhooks): stop claiming the kick makes double delivery impossible

Adversarial review of the previous commit caught an overstatement in its own
comments. SKIP LOCKED keeps a kick and the cron from claiming the same row at
the same moment, but claim_due_webhook_deliveries autocommits before any POST
is issued, so from then on ownership is only status='in_flight' and a later
cycle's recoverStuckInFlight sweep can re-arm a row still queued behind an
earlier cycle's serial loop.

Delivery is at-least-once, which is what the public docs already tell
receivers ("the same delivery id may arrive more than once ... idempotency is
on you"). The comments contradicted that.

No behaviour change. The kick does not create this window: the cron claims 50
rows serially against the same 20 s stuck threshold, which is wider than what
a batch of 5 can open.

Refs #1201

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(bokslut): add bokslut-flow depreciation (78xx) back to the bolagsskatt base (#1253)

* fix(bokslut): add bokslut-flow depreciation (78xx) back to the bolagsskatt base

sumPostedYearEndDispositions reconstructs resultat fore skatt for the tax
calculation, because generateIncomeStatement excludes every
source_type='year_end' entry. It summed class 88 and 7533 but not 78xx, so
planenlig avskrivning posted by the bokslut flow
(lib/bokslut/assets/depreciation-engine.ts) was dropped from the income
statement and never added back. The bolagsskatt base and the
periodiseringsfond 25 % cap were therefore computed on an overstated result:
tax too high by roughly 20.6 % of the depreciation.

Also exclude the period's final bokslutsverifikation from the fetch. It
carries source_type='year_end' as well and reverses every P&L account,
78xx/88xx/7533 included (verified against production closing entries), so
once the year is closed it would cancel the add-back this function exists to
produce. That hazard already applied to 88xx and 7533; the fix closes it for
all three rather than widening it.

Scope is deliberately the tax base only. Making the standalone
resultatrakning show bokslut entries is a separate, larger change: the same
exclusion is duplicated in the kpi_report_aggregates RPC, it moves displayed
profit for every company that ran the bokslut flow, and it means removing
the add-back at four call sites.

Refs #1051

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(bokslut): scope the closing-entry lookup to the company and fail loudly

Review (CodeRabbit + the compliance swarm, ASVS V8.2.1) flagged the new
fiscal_periods read in sumPostedYearEndDispositions on two counts, both fair.

It filtered only on the period id while every sibling query in the same
function carries the tenant scope. Primary key or not, service-role paths
have no RLS to fall back on and the repo's rule is to filter company_id
explicitly, so it now does.

It also discarded the query error. That mattered more than it looks: a failed
read fell through to closingEntryId = null, which silently re-admits the
closing verifikat's 78xx/88xx reversals and understates the tax base, i.e.
exactly the failure this lookup was added to prevent. It now throws, and the
surrounding catch turns it into the existing 'Failed to read posted
dispositions' error. A wrong bolagsskatt is worse than a loud failure.

Two regression tests: the lookup carries both eq filters, and a lookup
failure propagates instead of degrading to a wrong number.

Refs #1051

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(storage): drop the client-side DELETE policy on the documents bucket (#1254)

* fix(storage): drop the client-side DELETE policy on the documents bucket

20240101000024 documents this bucket as WORM: "No UPDATE or DELETE policies".
That described the repo, not production. Production carries a
users_delete_own_documents policy that exists in no migration file:

  FOR DELETE TO authenticated
  USING (bucket_id = 'documents'
         AND (storage.foldername(name))[2] = auth.uid()::text)

Under it, the uploading user can delete the storage bytes of any document
they uploaded under the legacy documents/{userId}/... layout, using nothing
but their normal browser token. That includes documents linked to a posted
verifikat, which are rakenskapsinformation under the BFL 7 kap 2 § seven-year
retention duty. deleteDocument()'s linked-check and the
block_document_deletion() trigger both guard the document_attachments ROW,
not the object: the row survives, still pointing at a file that is gone.

Reproduced against a local replay of the full migration stream: with the
policy present the uploader's own DELETE removes the object; with it dropped
the same statement matches zero rows. Company-scoped keys were never exposed
(their second path segment is the company id, not auth.uid()), so this only
ever reached the legacy layout, which is where most documents still live.

Safe because every in-app remove() on this bucket already runs on the service
role, covered by service_role_all_documents.

Deliberately narrow: users_read_own_documents and users_upload_own_documents
stay. The Phase B backfill from 20260726092000 has not run, so dropping the
legacy SELECT policy now would make existing documents unreadable. That is
Phase C.

The pg-real test asserts no DELETE and no UPDATE policy over the bucket under
ANY name: the hole arrived under a name this repo never used, so pinning a
name would not have caught it.

Refs #1208

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(storage): make the WORM ratchet see FOR ALL and WITH CHECK policies

Review caught two blind spots in the ratchet, both fair. It matched only
polcmd 'd' and 'w', but polcmd '*' (FOR ALL) grants DELETE and UPDATE just as
effectively, and FOR ALL is the shape the one legitimate policy on this table
already uses, so a hostile one would look unremarkable in the catalogue. It
also read only polqual, so an UPDATE policy carrying its bucket restriction in
WITH CHECK was invisible.

Both assertions now run through one helper that covers d/w/*, concatenates
USING and WITH CHECK, and filters by grantee so service_role_all_documents
(how the application does its authorized deletes) is excluded while every
client-reachable role is not. A policy granted to PUBLIC has an empty
polroles, which is the most permissive case there is, so it is treated as
client-reachable rather than as "no roles".

Matching on the substring rather than the exact `bucket_id = 'documents'`
shape pg_get_expr emits today: a policy written as bucket_id::text or with the
comparison reversed would slip past a stricter match, and for a WORM ratchet a
false alarm is cheap while a silent hole is not.

Adds a probe case that creates a FOR ALL policy and asserts the helper sees
it, so the main assertion cannot pass vacuously. That case earned its keep
immediately: it caught that node-postgres hands back a raw string for a name[]
column, so the role filter needed rolname::text to work at all.

Verified against a local replay of the full migration stream: red with the
original prod FOR DELETE policy present, red with a FOR ALL probe, green
without either. Full pg-real suite 933 passed.

Refs #1208

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(storage): catch a destructive policy that names no bucket at all

Adversarial review of the previous commit found the ratchet still failed
open, and reproduced it: a policy with no bucket_id predicate covers EVERY
bucket, documents included, so gating on the bucket name discarded exactly
the widest hole. The concrete shape is Supabase's own stock "Enable delete for
users based on user_id" template, USING (auth.uid() = owner), which is the
single most likely form of a future dashboard edit.

A destructive policy is now in scope unless it provably cannot reach this
bucket, i.e. only a bucket_id predicate naming some other bucket exempts it.

The behavioural assertions had the matching blind spot: fixtures were seeded
without an owner, so an owner-based policy matched NULL and the DELETE
reported 0 rows for the wrong reason. Objects now carry an owner the way
storage-api stamps them in production, so those tests fail loudly instead of
passing by accident.

Two probes pin both directions: a bucketless policy must be reported (and is
shown to really permit the delete), and a policy scoped to another bucket must
not be, so the ratchet cannot start crying wolf on receipts or sie-files and
get switched off.

Verified against a local replay of the full migration stream: red with the
stock bucketless template installed, green without it. Full pg-real suite 935
passed.

Refs #1208

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(kontoplan): make a deactivated account reachable again (#1262)

is_active=false read as "does not exist" on every read path but as "exists"
on the (company_id, account_number) unique constraint, so a deactivated
account vanished from the kontoplan with no way back and re-creating it
answered "Kontonummer X finns redan i din kontoplan."

The write side was already correct: POST /accounts/activate has a
toReactivate branch and PUT /accounts/[number] accepts is_active:true.
Both were simply unreachable, so this opens routes to them rather than
relaxing the read filters, which are load-bearing for
AccountsNotInChartError.

- Kontoplan gets a "Visa inaktiva" filter; inactive rows carry an "Inaktiv"
  chip and the existing per-row switch reactivates them in one click.
- Deactivating an account that has posted lines now warns first, using the
  usage count already loaded for the Verifikat column.
- POST /accounts distinguishes the two collisions and returns the new
  ACCOUNT_EXISTS_INACTIVE code; AddAccountDialog offers "Aktivera kontot
  istallet" rather than a dead-end 409. The stored account is left exactly
  as it was; values typed into the failed create form are not applied.
- bas-lookup consults the company's own chart before the static BAS
  reference, so a deactivated custom account reads as known and
  "Aktivera och bokfor" is no longer disabled for it. New in_chart /
  is_active fields let callers tell "will be added" from "will be revived".
- BAS-katalog stops showing "Aktiverat" for an account the company holds
  but has deactivated; it falls through to a relabelled Aktivera button,
  and the per-class counts follow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(supplier-invoices): flag foreign 0 % lines with reverse charge switched off (#1255)

* fix(supplier-invoices): flag foreign 0 % lines with reverse charge switched off

A foreign supplier charging no Swedish VAT is normally omvand
skattskyldighet. With the reverse-charge switch off,
createSupplierInvoiceRegistrationEntry emits neither the 26x4 output leg nor
the 44xx/45xx basis lines, so ruta 20-24, 30-32 and 48 all stay empty and the
momsdeklaration takes a shape Skatteverket rejects. For a fully deductible
purchase the net moms att betala is unchanged, which is exactly why this goes
unnoticed. The form already auto-ticks reverse charge for eu_business but not
for non_eu_business, so that path slips through silently.

Adds a pure helper plus a non-blocking banner cloned from the existing
rc_account_warning block. Deliberately silent for swedish_business, where 0 %
is a genuine exemption that belongs in no ruta at all, and phrased as a
question rather than an assertion: a non-EU goods purchase cleared at customs
is legitimately 0 % without reverse charge, and pushing that user into
ticking the switch would manufacture a new wrong verifikat.

Does not add the exempt/import/other picker the issue proposes:
supplier_invoices.vat_treatment is metadata that no booking or ruta mapping
reads, and the codebase cannot book import VAT at all, so an import option
would imply ruta 50/60 were handled when they are not.

Refs #1042

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(supplier-invoices): name the local-VAT case in the foreign 0 % hint

Review flagged that the most common foreign document a Swedish small company
sees is an invoice carrying the supplier's OWN local VAT, booked at 0 %
Swedish VAT with reverse charge correctly off. The banner fires there, and
the previous copy only offered "momsfri av annat skal, till exempel en
varuimport" as the way out, which does not describe that invoice at all: it
is not VAT-free, it carries foreign VAT.

Names both legitimate cases explicitly and says 0 % is correct in them, so
the hint cannot read as an instruction to tick reverse charge on a purchase
where that would produce a wrong verifikat. Title also narrowed to "utan
svensk moms" for the same reason.

Refs #1042

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(sandbox): call the sandbox assistant Assistenten, not Anna (#1244)

A named persona earns its name once someone has been through onboarding and
chosen it: it is their assistant and they named it. Nobody in the sandbox chose
anything, so a first name reads as a character the product invented and implies
a relationship the visitor never opted into.

Both halves move together, which is the point. profile_summary is the agent's
own self-description inside the system prompt, so leaving it as "Du är Anna"
would have the header say one thing while the assistant introduces itself as
another in its first sentence. Nothing else in the stack checks that pairing,
so a test now does.

Scope: this changes the seed, so new sandbox companies get the new name. The
483 sandbox profiles already seeded keep 'Anna' (the seeder returns early once a
profile exists, and its caller only runs while verified_at is null). Backfilling
those is a production write on demo data and is being raised separately rather
than smuggled into a code change.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(reports): show the last posted voucher per series in report headers

Adds a "Senaste bokforda verifikat: A 214, B 37" line to the balans- and
resultatrapport, so a printed or exported report answers which vouchers are
actually in it rather than only which dates it spans (#1267).

Reads MAX(voucher_number) over posted entries, never
voucher_sequences.last_number. The sequence counter is an allocation
high-water mark that drifts from the books in both directions:
next_voucher_number burns a number when the follow-up insert fails,
delete_last_voucher decrements by one instead of resetting to the new MAX,
and pre-RPC SIE imports left it behind. Since the point of the line is
avstamning, an allocated number would send a reconciler chasing a gap that
does not exist, so the label says plainly that the number is the posted one.

Scoped to the report own date range, so a Q1 report printed in November says
something true about Q1. The balansrapport keeps the fiscal-year start as its
lower bound because it accumulates. Skipped on a dimension-filtered
resultatrapport: that report already discloses it is partial, and an
unfiltered voucher range beside a filtered result invites the wrong
conclusion.

Populated in both engines, so the JSON, PDF and XLSX routes all inherit it
without signature changes. Best-effort: a header nicety never breaks a
report. The pure formatter lives in its own module so the client view does
not pull the Supabase query path into the browser bundle. No new i18n keys;
both report views and the PDF template are hard-coded Swedish per the
"stays Swedish" report surfaces in .claude/rules/i18n.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(customers): stop rendering personnummer ciphertext, make unreadable rows editable, add a reveal path (#1263)

customers.personal_number holds AES-256-GCM ciphertext (20260726110000).
Three defects compounded into one broken surface for private customers.

The list queried Supabase from the browser with select('*') and rendered the
raw value, 76-82 chars of hex, into the nowrap identifier cell. It now reads
GET /api/customers, which already masks every row, so the ciphertext never
leaves the server. Searching by personnummer works again: the client filter
had been matching against ciphertext and could never hit.

A row whose value cannot be decrypted renders as the placeholder
'********-????'. None of the three mask checks recognised it, each having its
own '-1234'-only copy, so such a customer could not be edited in ANY field:
name and address edits 400'd on a personnummer the user had no way to
correct. All three now share one pattern from the new crypto-free
lib/customers/mask-personal-number.ts, which the client form can import.
Typing a fresh personnummer overwrites the unreadable value, which is the
only repair possible: the rejected writes failed whole INSERTs, so there is
nothing to backfill.

The value was write-only by construction. GET
/api/customers/{id}/personal-number is the deliberate drill-in, mirroring the
employee convention, gated on the write role because .compliance/ropa.yaml
listed no_full_value_read_endpoint as a safeguard for this column; that entry
is rewritten rather than left stale, and reveals log actor and customer id
but never the value.

Also: arcim-migration wrote the identity number as plaintext, which aborts
any import containing a Privatperson with 23514 since the constraint flip;
and the customer embeds on /api/invoices shipped ciphertext to the browser on
every invoice read.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: enhance ruta 05 handling for dynamic revenue accounts

- Introduced `fetchDynamicRuta05Accounts` to fetch company-specific revenue accounts marked with a VAT rate, addressing issue #1261.
- Updated VAT declaration logic to include these dynamic accounts in ruta 05 calculations, ensuring accurate reporting for user-added accounts.
- Modified `ACCOUNT_RUTA` to include account 3000 for completeness in ruta 05.
- Enhanced tests to validate the inclusion of user-added revenue accounts in ruta 05 and ensure correct VAT calculations.
- Seeded default VAT rates for BAS revenue accounts to ensure proper classification in the VAT declaration.

* fix: enhance data handling and masking in customer and invoice APIs

* fix(vat): resolve the 3000 gruppkonto's rate for the ruta 05 base split

3000 "Forsaljning inom Sverige" is mapped to ruta05 by ACCOUNT_RUTA, so a
balance on it is filed in the right box already. What was missing is the
rate split: unlike 3001/3002/3003 the account number carries no sats, and
fetchDynamicRuta05Accounts skipped it because it is in ACCOUNT_TO_BOX. A
company posting to the gruppkonto therefore got a ruta 05 total that
breakdown.invoices.base25/12/6 did not add up to.

Surface those rates separately as staticRateByAccount: rate-only on
purpose, because the static map already sums the account and adding it to
the dynamic account list would double the filed figure. A test pins that
single-count property.

Also add 3000 to the MCP server's RUTA_05_ACCOUNTS, which is the display
list behind report.rutor.ruta05: without it a 3000 balance appeared in the
filed projection but not in the report the agent reads back.

The comment claiming SALES_OUTPUT_VAT_SHORTFALL reads base25/12/6 was
wrong and is corrected. That check derives its expected base from the
output-VAT rutor (ruta10/0.25 + ruta11/0.12 + ruta12/0.06); nothing reads
the per-rate bases, which are reporting metadata. So the incomplete split
never affected a filed return or a warning, only the breakdown.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <149234542+jakobwennberg@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-28 19:50:16 +02:00

781 lines
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TypeScript
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import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
import type { CashAccount, CashAccountSource } from '@/types'
import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
import { syncMappedAccounts } from '@/lib/import/account-sync'
const log = createLogger('cash-accounts')
/**
* Suggested BAS account per currency. Single source — the enable-banking
* callback and the AccountPickerDialog both key off these.
*/
export const CURRENCY_LEDGER_DEFAULTS: Record<string, string> = {
SEK: '1930',
EUR: '1932',
USD: '1933',
GBP: '1934',
}
export function defaultLedgerForCurrency(currency: string): string {
return CURRENCY_LEDGER_DEFAULTS[currency.toUpperCase()] ?? '1930'
}
/**
* Canonical read/write surface for cash_accounts.
*
* Replaces ad-hoc reads of bank_connections.accounts_data for routing decisions.
* UI panels that just display balances may still read accounts_data until the
* follow-up migration drops that column.
*
* All methods accept an authenticated SupabaseClient and rely on RLS for tenancy
* isolation. Defense-in-depth filter by company_id is applied regardless.
*/
export interface ListCashAccountsOptions {
enabledOnly?: boolean
}
export interface UpsertFromPsd2Input {
bank_connection_id: string
external_uid: string
currency: string
ledger_account: string
iban?: string | null
name?: string | null
balance?: number | null
balance_updated_at?: string | null
enabled?: boolean
/**
* Existing cash_accounts row this PSD2 account was matched to by IBAN
* (see resolvePsd2LedgerAccount). The row is promoted in place: it keeps its
* id, its ledger_account and its linked transactions, and is re-pointed at
* this connection + external_uid. Without this the reconnect path would try
* to INSERT a second row on the same ledger and trip the
* (company_id, ledger_account) UNIQUE constraint.
*/
reuse_cash_account_id?: string | null
}
/**
* Normalize an IBAN for comparison: ASPSPs format the same account both as
* "SE45 5000 0000 0583 9825 7466" and "SE4550000000058398257466", and a plain
* string compare would read those as two different accounts. Mirrors the
* normalization the sync path already applies when deriving external_ids.
*/
export function normalizeIban(iban: string | null | undefined): string | null {
if (!iban) return null
const normalized = iban.replace(/\s+/g, '').toUpperCase()
return normalized || null
}
export async function listForCompany(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
opts: ListCashAccountsOptions = {},
): Promise<CashAccount[]> {
let q = supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.select('*')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.order('is_primary', { ascending: false })
.order('ledger_account', { ascending: true })
if (opts.enabledOnly) q = q.eq('enabled', true)
const { data, error } = await q
if (error) {
log.error('listForCompany failed', { companyId, error: error.message })
return []
}
return (data ?? []) as CashAccount[]
}
/**
* Primary cash account for a company. Filters by currency when provided. Falls
* back to the global primary (`is_primary = true`) when no currency-specific
* match exists.
*
* Used by skattekonto-booking's __PRIMARY_SEK__ sentinel and by transfer-pairing
* to identify the company's default settlement account.
*/
export async function getPrimary(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
currency?: string,
): Promise<CashAccount | null> {
let q = supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.select('*')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('is_primary', true)
.limit(1)
if (currency) q = q.eq('currency', currency.toUpperCase())
const { data, error } = await q.maybeSingle()
if (error) {
log.warn('getPrimary failed', { companyId, currency, error: error.message })
}
if (data) return data as CashAccount
if (currency) {
// Fall back to any-currency primary so a company without a SEK account still
// resolves the sentinel: rare but possible (manual cash-on-hand only).
const { data: anyPrimary } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.select('*')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('is_primary', true)
.maybeSingle()
if (anyPrimary) return anyPrimary as CashAccount
}
return null
}
export async function findByIban(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
iban: string,
): Promise<CashAccount | null> {
if (!iban) return null
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.select('*')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('iban', iban)
.maybeSingle()
if (error) {
log.warn('findByIban failed', { companyId, iban, error: error.message })
return null
}
return (data as CashAccount | null) ?? null
}
/**
* Of the given bank_connection ids, return the subset whose connection row has
* status 'revoked'. A revoked connection no longer holds a live claim on its
* cash_accounts rows: the allocator, the picker-save collision guard, and
* upsertFromPsd2's promote-in-place path all treat those rows like manual
* holders so a reconnect can land back on its original ledger account.
*
* On lookup failure this returns an empty set (treat every connection as
* active): the conservative pre-fix behavior.
*/
export async function getRevokedConnectionIds(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
connectionIds: readonly string[],
): Promise<Set<string>> {
if (connectionIds.length === 0) return new Set()
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.select('id, status')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.in('id', [...connectionIds])
if (error) {
log.warn('getRevokedConnectionIds lookup failed', { companyId, error: error.message })
return new Set()
}
return new Set(
((data ?? []) as Array<{ id: string; status: string }>)
.filter(c => c.status === 'revoked')
.map(c => c.id),
)
}
/**
* Find a free BAS class-19 slot for a new PSD2 cash account, respecting the
* UNIQUE (company_id, ledger_account) constraint. A bank returning N
* same-currency accounts must not map them all to the currency default —
* that's exactly the collision this prevents.
*
* Rules:
* - The currency default (1930/1932/1933/1934) is available when no
* PSD2-backed row holds it. A manual holder (the seeded 1930 row) does
* not block it — upsertFromPsd2 promotes that row in place.
* Rows held by a REVOKED connection count as manual too: disconnecting a
* bank releases its ledger claims, so reconnecting the same bank gets its
* original slot back instead of overflowing to 1939.
* - Overflow walks the free-use 1931–1959 sub-account slots, skipping the
* four currency defaults (reserved as suggestions for their currencies)
* and any slot held by ANY existing row — promoting an unrelated manual
* account (SIE-imported, kassa) would silently steal it.
* - Overflow ALSO skips 19xx numbers that already exist in the company's
* chart of accounts, even when no cash_accounts row holds them. A chart
* imported from SIE carries the company's real bank accounts by name
* ("1942 Nordnet", "1938 Danske eSett Settlement") without any PSD2 row
* behind them, and handing one of those out as "free" is how a SEK
* företagskonto ended up proposed as 1942 Nordnet. Only when every
* chart-free slot is exhausted do we fall back to chart-occupied numbers,
* so a company with a fully populated 19xx chart still gets an answer.
* - `exclude` carries slots already assigned earlier in the caller's loop
* but not yet visible in the table.
*
* Returns null when no slot is free (or the lookup fails) — callers fall back
* to their previous behavior and surface the error.
*/
export async function findFreeLedgerAccount(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
currency: string,
exclude: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(),
): Promise<string | null> {
const preferred = defaultLedgerForCurrency(currency)
const { data: rows, error } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.select('ledger_account, bank_connection_id')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
if (error) {
log.error('findFreeLedgerAccount lookup failed', { companyId, error: error.message })
return null
}
// Chart accounts are advisory here: a failed lookup must not block
// allocation, it just costs us the "don't steal a named bank account" guard.
const { data: chartRows, error: chartError } = await supabase
.from('chart_of_accounts')
.select('account_number')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.like('account_number', '19%')
if (chartError) {
log.warn('findFreeLedgerAccount chart lookup failed', {
companyId,
error: chartError.message,
})
}
const chartTaken = new Set(
((chartRows ?? []) as Array<{ account_number: string }>).map(r => r.account_number),
)
const typedRows = (rows ?? []) as Array<{ ledger_account: string; bank_connection_id: string | null }>
const revokedConnectionIds = await getRevokedConnectionIds(
supabase,
companyId,
[...new Set(typedRows.map(r => r.bank_connection_id).filter((id): id is string => id !== null))],
)
const anyTaken = new Set<string>()
const connectedTaken = new Set<string>()
for (const row of typedRows) {
anyTaken.add(row.ledger_account)
if (row.bank_connection_id !== null && !revokedConnectionIds.has(row.bank_connection_id)) {
connectedTaken.add(row.ledger_account)
}
}
if (!exclude.has(preferred) && !connectedTaken.has(preferred)) return preferred
const reserved = new Set(Object.values(CURRENCY_LEDGER_DEFAULTS))
const candidates: string[] = []
for (let n = 1931; n <= 1959; n++) {
const candidate = String(n)
if (reserved.has(candidate)) continue
if (exclude.has(candidate) || anyTaken.has(candidate)) continue
candidates.push(candidate)
}
// First pass: slots the chart has never heard of, so we can create them
// cleanly. Second pass: chart-occupied slots, the pre-fix behavior, only
// once nothing unnamed is left.
const unnamed = candidates.find(c => !chartTaken.has(c))
if (unnamed) return unnamed
if (candidates.length > 0) {
log.warn('findFreeLedgerAccount fell back to a chart-occupied slot', {
companyId,
currency,
ledger: candidates[0],
})
return candidates[0]
}
log.warn('findFreeLedgerAccount exhausted 1931–1959', { companyId, currency })
return null
}
/**
* Allocate a ledger slot for a new PSD2 account AND make sure that account
* number exists in the company's chart of accounts — cash_accounts has no FK
* to the chart, but booking (and the AccountPicker, which only lists chart
* accounts) breaks on numbers the chart doesn't know. Sub-accounts outside
* the BAS reference (1931, …) are created with metadata derived from the
* account number; standard numbers get their BAS name.
*/
export async function allocatePsd2LedgerAccount(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
userId: string,
input: { currency: string; accountName?: string | null; exclude?: ReadonlySet<string> },
): Promise<string | null> {
const ledger = await findFreeLedgerAccount(supabase, companyId, input.currency, input.exclude ?? new Set())
if (!ledger) return null
const name = input.accountName?.trim() || `Bankkonto ${input.currency.toUpperCase()}`
const sync = await syncMappedAccounts(
supabase,
companyId,
userId,
[
{
sourceAccount: ledger,
sourceName: name,
targetAccount: ledger,
targetName: name,
confidence: 1,
matchType: 'exact',
isOverride: false,
},
],
false,
)
if (sync.error) {
log.error('allocatePsd2LedgerAccount chart sync failed', {
companyId,
ledger,
error: sync.error,
})
return null
}
return ledger
}
export interface Psd2LedgerResolution {
ledgerAccount: string
/**
* Existing row to promote in place, when the IBAN was already known. Null
* when the ledger was freshly allocated.
*/
reuseCashAccountId: string | null
source: 'iban' | 'allocated'
}
/**
* Decide which BAS account a PSD2 account should book to, IBAN first.
*
* The IBAN identifies the physical bank account; the provider's account `uid`
* does not survive a re-authorization at every ASPSP, and a fresh connect to
* an already-connected bank mints a new bank_connection row regardless. Both
* cases used to look like "an account we have never seen", so the allocator
* handed out the next free 19xx slot and the user's mapping (1930/1940/1941)
* silently moved to 1942-1946 on every consent renewal.
*
* Matching on the IBAN instead means a known account keeps its ledger, its
* cash_accounts row id and therefore its linked transactions. The previous
* holder's connection status is deliberately NOT considered: one IBAN is one
* physical account, so the connection that just authorized it is the one that
* owns it. This matters for the case that motivated the fix, where the old
* connection still reads 'active' because its session was killed bank-side
* without telling us.
*
* Returns null only when allocation itself fails; callers keep their existing
* fallback.
*/
export async function resolvePsd2LedgerAccount(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
userId: string,
input: {
iban?: string | null
currency: string
accountName?: string | null
exclude?: ReadonlySet<string>
},
): Promise<Psd2LedgerResolution | null> {
const exclude = input.exclude ?? new Set<string>()
const wanted = normalizeIban(input.iban)
if (wanted) {
const { data, error } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.select('id, iban, ledger_account')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.not('iban', 'is', null)
if (error) {
// Fall through to allocation: a failed lookup must not block the
// connection, it just costs us the reuse.
log.warn('resolvePsd2LedgerAccount iban lookup failed', {
companyId,
error: error.message,
})
} else {
const match = ((data ?? []) as Array<{ id: string; iban: string | null; ledger_account: string }>)
.find(row => normalizeIban(row.iban) === wanted)
// A ledger already claimed earlier in the caller's loop cannot be handed
// out twice, even on an IBAN hit: two rows on one ledger violate the
// (company_id, ledger_account) UNIQUE constraint.
if (match && !exclude.has(match.ledger_account)) {
return {
ledgerAccount: match.ledger_account,
reuseCashAccountId: match.id,
source: 'iban',
}
}
}
}
const allocated = await allocatePsd2LedgerAccount(supabase, companyId, userId, {
currency: input.currency,
accountName: input.accountName,
exclude,
})
if (!allocated) return null
return { ledgerAccount: allocated, reuseCashAccountId: null, source: 'allocated' }
}
/**
* Upsert a PSD2-sourced cash account during connection callback / sync. Keyed on
* (company_id, bank_connection_id, external_uid). When the row exists, balance
* and ledger_account are refreshed; the rest of the metadata stays put.
*
* Never sets is_primary: that's owned by the user via the AccountPicker or by
* the initial-backfill migration.
*/
export async function upsertFromPsd2(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
input: UpsertFromPsd2Input,
): Promise<void> {
const payload = {
company_id: companyId,
bank_connection_id: input.bank_connection_id,
external_uid: input.external_uid,
iban: input.iban ?? null,
name: input.name ?? null,
currency: input.currency.toUpperCase(),
ledger_account: input.ledger_account,
balance: input.balance ?? null,
balance_updated_at: input.balance_updated_at ?? null,
enabled: input.enabled ?? true,
source: 'enable_banking' as CashAccountSource,
}
// create_company_with_owner and the seed_default_cash_account migration plant
// a manual (bank_connection_id IS NULL) row on the same ledger_account so
// reconciliation routes work before any PSD2 connection exists, and the
// disconnect handler demotes a revoked connection's rows to manual the same
// way. Rows still pointing at a REVOKED connection (orphans from before the
// disconnect handler released claims) no longer hold a live claim either.
// In all three cases the PSD2 sync claiming that BAS slot has to promote the
// holder row in place: a plain upsert on (company_id, bank_connection_id,
// external_uid) wouldn't match it and the INSERT path then trips the
// (company_id, ledger_account) UNIQUE constraint. Promoting (instead of
// inserting) keeps the row id stable so transactions.cash_account_id links
// and the ledger's history stay attached.
const { data: holderRow, error: holderLookupError } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.select('id, bank_connection_id')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('ledger_account', input.ledger_account)
.maybeSingle()
if (holderLookupError) {
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 holder lookup failed', {
companyId,
bankConnectionId: input.bank_connection_id,
externalUid: input.external_uid,
error: holderLookupError.message,
})
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${holderLookupError.message}`)
}
const typedHolder = holderRow as { id: string; bank_connection_id: string | null } | null
let promotableRowId: string | null = null
if (typedHolder) {
if (typedHolder.id === input.reuse_cash_account_id) {
// Matched by IBAN upstream: this row IS this account, whoever held it
// last. Promoting keeps its id (transactions.cash_account_id stays
// linked) and re-points it at the connection that just authorized.
promotableRowId = typedHolder.id
} else if (typedHolder.bank_connection_id === null) {
promotableRowId = typedHolder.id
} else if (typedHolder.bank_connection_id !== input.bank_connection_id) {
const revoked = await getRevokedConnectionIds(supabase, companyId, [
typedHolder.bank_connection_id,
])
if (revoked.has(typedHolder.bank_connection_id)) {
promotableRowId = typedHolder.id
}
}
// Holder owned by the input connection itself (or by another ACTIVE
// connection): fall through to the plain upsert. For the former the upsert
// matches on (company_id, bank_connection_id, external_uid) and updates in
// place; for the latter the UNIQUE constraint rejects the write and the
// error surfaces to the caller (the picker-save collision guard should
// have caught it earlier).
}
if (promotableRowId) {
// Promoting the holder makes it THE row for this (bank_connection_id,
// external_uid). If this connection + uid already has a row on another
// ledger (the reconnect callback mirrored it onto an overflow slot while
// the target slot was still wrongly blocked by a revoked connection), that
// duplicate must be resolved first or the promote trips the UNIQUE
// (company_id, bank_connection_id, external_uid) constraint.
const { data: ownRow, error: ownLookupError } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.select('id, is_primary')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('bank_connection_id', input.bank_connection_id)
.eq('external_uid', input.external_uid)
.neq('id', promotableRowId)
.maybeSingle()
if (ownLookupError) {
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 duplicate lookup failed', {
companyId,
bankConnectionId: input.bank_connection_id,
externalUid: input.external_uid,
error: ownLookupError.message,
})
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${ownLookupError.message}`)
}
const typedOwn = ownRow as { id: string; is_primary: boolean } | null
let transferPrimary = false
if (typedOwn) {
// With linked transactions the duplicate is demoted to a plain manual
// row (deleting it would SET NULL those transactions' cash_account_id
// links). Without any, it is a leftover mirror from the broken reconnect
// and is deleted outright so its overflow slot frees up.
const { data: linkedTx, error: linkedTxError } = await supabase
.from('transactions')
.select('id')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('cash_account_id', typedOwn.id)
.limit(1)
if (linkedTxError) {
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 duplicate transaction check failed', {
companyId,
bankConnectionId: input.bank_connection_id,
externalUid: input.external_uid,
error: linkedTxError.message,
})
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${linkedTxError.message}`)
}
if ((linkedTx ?? []).length > 0) {
const { error: demoteError } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.update({ bank_connection_id: null, external_uid: null })
.eq('id', typedOwn.id)
if (demoteError) {
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${demoteError.message}`)
}
} else {
const { error: deleteError } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.delete()
.eq('id', typedOwn.id)
if (deleteError) {
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${deleteError.message}`)
}
}
// A primary duplicate must hand the flag to the promoted row either way:
// deleted, it would leave the __PRIMARY_SEK__ sentinel unresolvable;
// demoted, the sentinel would keep resolving to the stale manual row.
transferPrimary = typedOwn.is_primary
}
// .select() so we can detect a 0-row UPDATE: Supabase's update().eq() returns
// { error: null, data: [] } if the row was deleted between the SELECT above
// and this UPDATE (rare but theoretically possible under concurrent ops).
// If that happens, fall through to the normal upsert path instead of
// silently returning success without persisting anything.
const { data: promoted, error: promoteError } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.update(payload)
.eq('id', promotableRowId)
.select('id')
if (promoteError) {
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 promote-holder failed', {
companyId,
bankConnectionId: input.bank_connection_id,
externalUid: input.external_uid,
error: promoteError.message,
})
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${promoteError.message}`)
}
if (promoted && promoted.length > 0) {
if (transferPrimary) {
try {
await setPrimary(supabase, companyId, promotableRowId)
} catch (primaryError) {
// The promote itself succeeded; losing the primary flag is
// recoverable via the AccountPicker, so log instead of unwinding.
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 primary transfer failed', {
companyId,
cashAccountId: promotableRowId,
error: primaryError instanceof Error ? primaryError.message : String(primaryError),
})
}
}
return
}
// Holder row vanished between SELECT and UPDATE: fall through to upsert.
}
const { error } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.upsert(payload, { onConflict: 'company_id,bank_connection_id,external_uid' })
if (error) {
log.error('upsertFromPsd2 failed', {
companyId,
bankConnectionId: input.bank_connection_id,
externalUid: input.external_uid,
error: error.message,
})
throw new Error(`cash_accounts upsert failed: ${error.message}`)
}
}
/**
* Find (or create) a manual cash account for a BAS ledger slot, so transactions
* ingested outside the PSD2 flow (create_transactions / CSV) can carry a real
* cash_account_id instead of NULL. Without the link, reconciliation 404s on the
* account and the match dialog falls back to 1930 (issue #1016).
*
* Manual rows (source='manual', bank_connection_id=null) are already first-class:
* every company is seeded a manual 1930 the same way, and upsertFromPsd2 promotes
* a manual holder in place if a bank later claims the slot. So pre-creating one
* here does NOT race the PSD2 sync (the concern noted in lib/transactions/ingest.ts):
* the worst case is a later connection promoting this row, which is the intended flow.
*
* Keyed on the (company_id, ledger_account) UNIQUE constraint: a concurrent
* insert surfaces as 23505, which we treat as "someone else won the race" and
* re-read. The row's currency follows the first transaction that created it; a
* ledger account holds one currency by that same constraint.
*/
export async function ensureManualCashAccount(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
ledgerAccount: string,
currency: string,
name?: string | null,
): Promise<string> {
const existing = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.select('id, currency')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('ledger_account', ledgerAccount)
.maybeSingle()
if (existing.error) {
throw new Error(`ensureManualCashAccount lookup failed: ${existing.error.message}`)
}
if (existing.data) {
const row = existing.data as { id: string; currency: string | null }
// (company_id, ledger_account) is UNIQUE, so a ledger holds exactly one
// currency. A different-currency transaction pointing at the same ledger is
// a real conflict (e.g. a SEK row landing on a ledger already claimed for
// USD): fail loudly instead of binding it to the wrong-currency account.
if (row.currency && row.currency.toUpperCase() !== currency.toUpperCase()) {
throw new Error(
`Cash account ${ledgerAccount} is denominated in ${row.currency}, not ${currency.toUpperCase()}`,
)
}
return row.id
}
const insert = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.insert({
company_id: companyId,
ledger_account: ledgerAccount,
currency: currency.toUpperCase(),
name: name?.trim() || `Bankkonto ${currency.toUpperCase()}`,
enabled: true,
is_primary: false,
source: 'manual' as CashAccountSource,
})
.select('id')
.single()
if (insert.error) {
// Lost the (company_id, ledger_account) race: re-read the winner's row.
if (insert.error.code === '23505') {
const reread = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.select('id')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('ledger_account', ledgerAccount)
.maybeSingle()
if (reread.data) return (reread.data as { id: string }).id
}
log.error('ensureManualCashAccount insert failed', {
companyId,
ledgerAccount,
error: insert.error.message,
})
throw new Error(`ensureManualCashAccount insert failed: ${insert.error.message}`)
}
return (insert.data as { id: string }).id
}
/**
* Toggle a cash account's enabled flag. Used by the AccountPicker when a user
* opts in or out of syncing a particular PSD2 account.
*/
export async function setEnabled(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
cashAccountId: string,
enabled: boolean,
): Promise<void> {
const { error } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.update({ enabled })
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('id', cashAccountId)
if (error) throw new Error(`cash_accounts setEnabled failed: ${error.message}`)
}
/**
* Remap a cash account to a different BAS ledger account. Triggers RLS + the
* (company_id, ledger_account) UNIQUE constraint: surface conflict errors so
* the UI can prompt the user to resolve.
*/
export async function setLedgerAccount(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
cashAccountId: string,
ledgerAccount: string,
): Promise<void> {
const { error } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.update({ ledger_account: ledgerAccount })
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('id', cashAccountId)
if (error) throw new Error(`cash_accounts setLedgerAccount failed: ${error.message}`)
}
/**
* Mark a cash account as the primary for its company. Delegates to the
* `set_cash_account_primary` RPC so the clear-old-primary and set-new-primary
* updates happen inside a single transaction. The intermediate "no primary"
* state is never visible to concurrent readers: important because
* skattekonto-booking's __PRIMARY_SEK__ resolver runs through getPrimary() and
* would otherwise see null in the gap and mis-route the counter account.
*/
export async function setPrimary(
supabase: SupabaseClient,
companyId: string,
cashAccountId: string,
): Promise<void> {
const { error } = await supabase.rpc('set_cash_account_primary', {
p_company_id: companyId,
p_cash_account_id: cashAccountId,
})
if (error) {
throw new Error(`cash_accounts setPrimary failed: ${error.message}`)
}
}