Files
accounted/app/api/pending-operations/[id]/reject/route.ts
T
Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 5 ee8ddb3849 fix(assistant): stop cross-user conversation access, bricked threads and lost sessions (#1209)
* fix(assistant): stop cross-user conversation access, bricked threads and lost sessions

Hotfix batch (PR1 of the assistant UI makeover, dev_docs/assistant_redesign_plan.md
section 7). No visual change; each of these is wrong today regardless of which
design lands, and three are unrecoverable per incident.

/api/agent/invoke never checked who owns a resumed conversation_id. RLS on
agent_conversations/agent_messages is company-scoped, not user-scoped
(20260517204000), so a member could post a colleague's conversation id, have
their history loaded into the prompt and read it back, while their own turns
were appended to that thread. The conversations list route filters on user_id
for exactly this reason. Also pins company and intent: resuming a thread from
another company would mix ledgers, and resuming under a different intent would
swap the tool whitelist under history the model has already seen.

A turn persists the assistant message carrying tool_use blocks before the tools
run, and their results only after the batch finishes. Dying in between (client
disconnect terminating the function, a deploy, a slow tool) left history ending
on an unanswered tool_use, which the Messages API rejects on replay: every later
turn 400s, and agent_messages is append-only for the BFL trail, so nothing could
repair it. History is now patched on read by synthesizing is_error tool_results,
leaving the stored trail untouched.

check_and_increment_agent_quota is SECURITY DEFINER in public with a
caller-chosen p_user_id, so any authenticated user could drain a colleague's
minute/day budget and lock them out of every agent endpoint. A plain REVOKE
would break the limiter (all three callers use the user's RLS client) and, as it
fails open, silently remove the spend cap: the function now refuses to act for
anyone but the caller, while service-role connections keep passing an explicit
id.

The single reject route re-read status and then wrote unguarded, so losing the
race with commit's atomic pending -> committing claim stamped `rejected` over an
operation that had already posted a verifikat, invisible to the committing-state
recovery sweep. Guarded on status like bulk-reject already is; a lost race is
now a 409.

The sheet's Escape handler listened on window with no defaultPrevented or target
check while the sheet is deliberately non-modal, so pressing Esc to dismiss the
reject-reason Select inside an approval card, the command palette or any dialog
unmounted the sheet and discarded the conversation, the streaming turn and the
un-actioned proposal. It now yields to open overlays and to focus outside the
sheet.

Verified: 9526 unit tests pass, lint clean on touched files, guards pass, and
the new pg-real test proves the quota guard against real Postgres (attacker
raises 42501, victim counters stay at 0). The four unrelated pg-real failures on
this machine reproduce identically with these changes stashed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(assistant): close anon path on the quota RPC, order the ownership check ahead of writes

Review follow-ups on the hotfix batch.

The caller guard used auth.uid() alone, which is NULL for the `anon` role just
as it is for backend roles, so an unauthenticated caller holding the public anon
key (it ships in the browser bundle) could still pick any p_user_id and drain
that user's quota. The guard now keys on the request role: anon and
authenticated may only ever spend their own quota, backend roles keep passing an
explicit id. The default PUBLIC execute grant is revoked as a second layer, with
execute granted only to authenticated and service_role. Covered by a new pg test
for the anon path.

The ownership check ran after the onboarding.intake stamp, so a request that was
about to be rejected could still write intake_completed_at. It now sits directly
after the capability gate, ahead of every side effect and ahead of the company
and profile reads, which also makes a rejected request cheaper.

The tool-result repair matched ids anywhere in the history, but the API needs
results in the message IMMEDIATELY after the tool_use. A result persisted after
an intervening turn (two turns racing on one conversation) left a shape that
still 400s. The repair is now positional, and orphaned or late-duplicate
tool_results are dropped, since an unmatched tool_result is rejected just as an
unanswered tool_use is.

The Escape guard matched the Radix popper wrapper, which stays mounted when a
popper is force-mounted; it now requires data-state="open" so a closed popper
cannot block Escape for the rest of the session.

Both new route errors are Swedish, per the user-facing error rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 17:48:18 +02:00

124 lines
5.1 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import { z } from 'zod'
import { withRouteContext } from '@/lib/api/with-route-context'
import { getErrorMessage as getUserErrorMessage } from '@/lib/errors/get-error-message'
const RejectBodySchema = z.object({
rejection_category: z
.enum(['wrong_category', 'wrong_amount', 'duplicate', 'wrong_period', 'other'])
.optional(),
rejection_reason: z.string().max(2000).optional(),
})
/**
* POST /api/pending-operations/:id/reject
*
* Reject a pending operation. Optionally accepts a JSON body with
* `rejection_category` (fixed enum) and `rejection_reason` (free text). Both
* are stored on the row so agents can fetch them via gnubok_get_recent_rejections
* and learn from "no". The body is optional: bodyless POSTs from older
* clients still mark the op rejected with NULL category/reason.
*/
export const POST = withRouteContext<{ params: Promise<{ id: string }> }>(
'pending_operation.reject',
async (request, { supabase, companyId }, { params }) => {
const { id } = await params
// Body is optional: accept empty/missing body without rejecting the request.
// Old clients posted no body; the UI dialog will now post a body, but we
// keep accepting both shapes to avoid coupling the API to the UI version.
let rejectionCategory: string | undefined
let rejectionReason: string | undefined
const contentLength = request.headers.get('content-length')
if (contentLength && contentLength !== '0') {
try {
const raw = await request.json()
const parsed = RejectBodySchema.safeParse(raw)
if (!parsed.success) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: parsed.error.issues.map((i) => i.message).join('; ') },
{ status: 400 },
)
}
rejectionCategory = parsed.data.rejection_category
rejectionReason = parsed.data.rejection_reason?.trim() || undefined
} catch {
// Body present but unparseable: fail closed.
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid JSON body' }, { status: 400 })
}
}
const { data: op, error: fetchError } = await supabase
.from('pending_operations')
.select('id, status')
.eq('id', id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
if (fetchError || !op) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Pending operation not found' }, { status: 404 })
}
if (op.status !== 'pending') {
// There is no auto-commit path (removed in 20260505190027), so a non-pending
// status here means the op was resolved explicitly: almost always the user
// pressed Godkänn in the /pending (Att göra) UI in parallel, or another
// client already rejected it. Spell that out so an agent doesn't read the
// generic 409 as "the system committed it behind my back".
const explained =
op.status === 'rejected'
? 'Operation already rejected.'
: op.status === 'expired'
? 'Operation already expired and can no longer be rejected.'
: op.status === 'failed_partial'
? 'Operation already resolved as failed_partial: it failed after posting an ' +
'irreversible voucher. It can no longer be rejected; see result_data.posted_ids ' +
'for what was posted and correct it with a storno if needed.'
: `Operation already ${op.status}: it was approved explicitly (most likely via the ` +
'Att göra / pending UI in parallel), not auto-committed. It can no longer be rejected; ' +
'reverse or correct the resulting verifikat instead.'
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: explained, status: op.status },
{ status: 409 }
)
}
// The status check above is a read, and commit claims rows atomically
// (pending -> committing). Without a status guard on the write, a reject
// that loses that race stamps `rejected` over an operation that has since
// posted a verifikat: a booked entry whose row says rejected, which the
// committing-state recovery sweep will never find. Guard the UPDATE the
// same way bulk-reject does and report a lost race as 409.
const { data: updated, error: updateError } = await supabase
.from('pending_operations')
.update({
status: 'rejected',
resolved_at: new Date().toISOString(),
...(rejectionCategory ? { rejection_category: rejectionCategory } : {}),
...(rejectionReason ? { rejection_reason: rejectionReason } : {}),
})
.eq('id', id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('status', 'pending')
.select('id')
if (updateError) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: getUserErrorMessage(updateError) }, { status: 500 })
}
if (!updated || updated.length === 0) {
return NextResponse.json(
{
error:
'Åtgärden hann behandlas av någon annan och kunde inte avvisas. ' +
'Ladda om sidan och kontrollera resultatet.',
},
{ status: 409 },
)
}
return NextResponse.json({ data: { id, status: 'rejected' } })
},
{ requireWrite: true },
)