Files
accounted/app/api/pending-operations/[id]/reject/__tests__/route.test.ts
T
Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 5 ee8ddb3849 fix(assistant): stop cross-user conversation access, bricked threads and lost sessions (#1209)
* fix(assistant): stop cross-user conversation access, bricked threads and lost sessions

Hotfix batch (PR1 of the assistant UI makeover, dev_docs/assistant_redesign_plan.md
section 7). No visual change; each of these is wrong today regardless of which
design lands, and three are unrecoverable per incident.

/api/agent/invoke never checked who owns a resumed conversation_id. RLS on
agent_conversations/agent_messages is company-scoped, not user-scoped
(20260517204000), so a member could post a colleague's conversation id, have
their history loaded into the prompt and read it back, while their own turns
were appended to that thread. The conversations list route filters on user_id
for exactly this reason. Also pins company and intent: resuming a thread from
another company would mix ledgers, and resuming under a different intent would
swap the tool whitelist under history the model has already seen.

A turn persists the assistant message carrying tool_use blocks before the tools
run, and their results only after the batch finishes. Dying in between (client
disconnect terminating the function, a deploy, a slow tool) left history ending
on an unanswered tool_use, which the Messages API rejects on replay: every later
turn 400s, and agent_messages is append-only for the BFL trail, so nothing could
repair it. History is now patched on read by synthesizing is_error tool_results,
leaving the stored trail untouched.

check_and_increment_agent_quota is SECURITY DEFINER in public with a
caller-chosen p_user_id, so any authenticated user could drain a colleague's
minute/day budget and lock them out of every agent endpoint. A plain REVOKE
would break the limiter (all three callers use the user's RLS client) and, as it
fails open, silently remove the spend cap: the function now refuses to act for
anyone but the caller, while service-role connections keep passing an explicit
id.

The single reject route re-read status and then wrote unguarded, so losing the
race with commit's atomic pending -> committing claim stamped `rejected` over an
operation that had already posted a verifikat, invisible to the committing-state
recovery sweep. Guarded on status like bulk-reject already is; a lost race is
now a 409.

The sheet's Escape handler listened on window with no defaultPrevented or target
check while the sheet is deliberately non-modal, so pressing Esc to dismiss the
reject-reason Select inside an approval card, the command palette or any dialog
unmounted the sheet and discarded the conversation, the streaming turn and the
un-actioned proposal. It now yields to open overlays and to focus outside the
sheet.

Verified: 9526 unit tests pass, lint clean on touched files, guards pass, and
the new pg-real test proves the quota guard against real Postgres (attacker
raises 42501, victim counters stay at 0). The four unrelated pg-real failures on
this machine reproduce identically with these changes stashed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(assistant): close anon path on the quota RPC, order the ownership check ahead of writes

Review follow-ups on the hotfix batch.

The caller guard used auth.uid() alone, which is NULL for the `anon` role just
as it is for backend roles, so an unauthenticated caller holding the public anon
key (it ships in the browser bundle) could still pick any p_user_id and drain
that user's quota. The guard now keys on the request role: anon and
authenticated may only ever spend their own quota, backend roles keep passing an
explicit id. The default PUBLIC execute grant is revoked as a second layer, with
execute granted only to authenticated and service_role. Covered by a new pg test
for the anon path.

The ownership check ran after the onboarding.intake stamp, so a request that was
about to be rejected could still write intake_completed_at. It now sits directly
after the capability gate, ahead of every side effect and ahead of the company
and profile reads, which also makes a rejected request cheaper.

The tool-result repair matched ids anywhere in the history, but the API needs
results in the message IMMEDIATELY after the tool_use. A result persisted after
an intervening turn (two turns racing on one conversation) left a shape that
still 400s. The repair is now positional, and orphaned or late-duplicate
tool_results are dropped, since an unmatched tool_result is rejected just as an
unanswered tool_use is.

The Escape guard matched the Radix popper wrapper, which stays mounted when a
popper is force-mounted; it now requires data-state="open" so a closed popper
cannot block Escape for the rest of the session.

Both new route errors are Swedish, per the user-facing error rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 17:48:18 +02:00

119 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest'
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import {
createMockRequest,
createMockRouteParams,
parseJsonResponse,
createQueuedMockSupabase,
} from '@/tests/helpers'
const { supabase: mockSupabase, enqueue, enqueueMany, reset } = createQueuedMockSupabase()
const requireAuthMock = vi.fn()
vi.mock('@/lib/auth/require-auth', () => ({
requireAuth: (...args: unknown[]) => requireAuthMock(...args),
}))
vi.mock('@/lib/company/context', () => ({
getActiveCompanyId: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue('company-1'),
requireCompanyId: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue('company-1'),
}))
const requireWriteMock = vi.fn()
vi.mock('@/lib/auth/require-write', () => ({
requireWritePermission: (...args: unknown[]) => requireWriteMock(...args),
}))
import { POST } from '../../reject/route'
describe('POST /api/pending-operations/:id/reject', () => {
const routeParams = createMockRouteParams({ id: 'op-1' })
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks()
reset()
requireAuthMock.mockResolvedValue({ user: { id: 'user-1' }, supabase: mockSupabase, error: null })
requireWriteMock.mockResolvedValue({ ok: true })
})
it('returns 401 when not authenticated', async () => {
requireAuthMock.mockResolvedValue({
user: null,
supabase: mockSupabase,
error: NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 }),
})
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
const { status } = await parseJsonResponse(response)
expect(status).toBe(401)
})
it('returns 403 for a viewer without write permission', async () => {
requireWriteMock.mockResolvedValue({
ok: false,
response: NextResponse.json({ error: 'Forbidden' }, { status: 403 }),
})
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
const { status } = await parseJsonResponse(response)
expect(status).toBe(403)
})
it('returns 404 when not found', async () => {
enqueue({ data: null, error: { message: 'not found' } })
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
const { status } = await parseJsonResponse(response)
expect(status).toBe(404)
})
it('returns 409 when already committed', async () => {
enqueue({ data: { id: 'op-1', status: 'committed' } })
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
const { status, body } = await parseJsonResponse<{ error: string }>(response)
expect(status).toBe(409)
expect(body.error).toContain('already committed')
})
it('rejects successfully', async () => {
enqueueMany([
{ data: { id: 'op-1', status: 'pending' } }, // fetch op
{ data: [{ id: 'op-1' }], error: null }, // guarded update returns the row
])
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
const { status, body } = await parseJsonResponse<{ data: { id: string; status: string } }>(response)
expect(status).toBe(200)
expect(body.data.status).toBe('rejected')
})
it('returns 409 when commit claims the row between the status read and the write', async () => {
// The status re-check above the write is a read, and commit claims rows
// atomically (pending -> committing). Losing that race must not stamp
// `rejected` over an operation that has since posted a verifikat, so the
// UPDATE is guarded on status and matches zero rows here.
enqueueMany([
{ data: { id: 'op-1', status: 'pending' } }, // fetch op: still pending
{ data: [], error: null }, // guarded update matches nothing
])
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
const { status, body } = await parseJsonResponse<{ error: string }>(response)
expect(status).toBe(409)
expect(body.error).toContain('hann behandlas')
})
})