* fix(assistant): stop cross-user conversation access, bricked threads and lost sessions Hotfix batch (PR1 of the assistant UI makeover, dev_docs/assistant_redesign_plan.md section 7). No visual change; each of these is wrong today regardless of which design lands, and three are unrecoverable per incident. /api/agent/invoke never checked who owns a resumed conversation_id. RLS on agent_conversations/agent_messages is company-scoped, not user-scoped (20260517204000), so a member could post a colleague's conversation id, have their history loaded into the prompt and read it back, while their own turns were appended to that thread. The conversations list route filters on user_id for exactly this reason. Also pins company and intent: resuming a thread from another company would mix ledgers, and resuming under a different intent would swap the tool whitelist under history the model has already seen. A turn persists the assistant message carrying tool_use blocks before the tools run, and their results only after the batch finishes. Dying in between (client disconnect terminating the function, a deploy, a slow tool) left history ending on an unanswered tool_use, which the Messages API rejects on replay: every later turn 400s, and agent_messages is append-only for the BFL trail, so nothing could repair it. History is now patched on read by synthesizing is_error tool_results, leaving the stored trail untouched. check_and_increment_agent_quota is SECURITY DEFINER in public with a caller-chosen p_user_id, so any authenticated user could drain a colleague's minute/day budget and lock them out of every agent endpoint. A plain REVOKE would break the limiter (all three callers use the user's RLS client) and, as it fails open, silently remove the spend cap: the function now refuses to act for anyone but the caller, while service-role connections keep passing an explicit id. The single reject route re-read status and then wrote unguarded, so losing the race with commit's atomic pending -> committing claim stamped `rejected` over an operation that had already posted a verifikat, invisible to the committing-state recovery sweep. Guarded on status like bulk-reject already is; a lost race is now a 409. The sheet's Escape handler listened on window with no defaultPrevented or target check while the sheet is deliberately non-modal, so pressing Esc to dismiss the reject-reason Select inside an approval card, the command palette or any dialog unmounted the sheet and discarded the conversation, the streaming turn and the un-actioned proposal. It now yields to open overlays and to focus outside the sheet. Verified: 9526 unit tests pass, lint clean on touched files, guards pass, and the new pg-real test proves the quota guard against real Postgres (attacker raises 42501, victim counters stay at 0). The four unrelated pg-real failures on this machine reproduce identically with these changes stashed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(assistant): close anon path on the quota RPC, order the ownership check ahead of writes Review follow-ups on the hotfix batch. The caller guard used auth.uid() alone, which is NULL for the `anon` role just as it is for backend roles, so an unauthenticated caller holding the public anon key (it ships in the browser bundle) could still pick any p_user_id and drain that user's quota. The guard now keys on the request role: anon and authenticated may only ever spend their own quota, backend roles keep passing an explicit id. The default PUBLIC execute grant is revoked as a second layer, with execute granted only to authenticated and service_role. Covered by a new pg test for the anon path. The ownership check ran after the onboarding.intake stamp, so a request that was about to be rejected could still write intake_completed_at. It now sits directly after the capability gate, ahead of every side effect and ahead of the company and profile reads, which also makes a rejected request cheaper. The tool-result repair matched ids anywhere in the history, but the API needs results in the message IMMEDIATELY after the tool_use. A result persisted after an intervening turn (two turns racing on one conversation) left a shape that still 400s. The repair is now positional, and orphaned or late-duplicate tool_results are dropped, since an unmatched tool_result is rejected just as an unanswered tool_use is. The Escape guard matched the Radix popper wrapper, which stays mounted when a popper is force-mounted; it now requires data-state="open" so a closed popper cannot block Escape for the rest of the session. Both new route errors are Swedish, per the user-facing error rule. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
119 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
119 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest'
|
|
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
|
|
import {
|
|
createMockRequest,
|
|
createMockRouteParams,
|
|
parseJsonResponse,
|
|
createQueuedMockSupabase,
|
|
} from '@/tests/helpers'
|
|
|
|
const { supabase: mockSupabase, enqueue, enqueueMany, reset } = createQueuedMockSupabase()
|
|
|
|
const requireAuthMock = vi.fn()
|
|
vi.mock('@/lib/auth/require-auth', () => ({
|
|
requireAuth: (...args: unknown[]) => requireAuthMock(...args),
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
vi.mock('@/lib/company/context', () => ({
|
|
getActiveCompanyId: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue('company-1'),
|
|
requireCompanyId: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue('company-1'),
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
const requireWriteMock = vi.fn()
|
|
vi.mock('@/lib/auth/require-write', () => ({
|
|
requireWritePermission: (...args: unknown[]) => requireWriteMock(...args),
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
import { POST } from '../../reject/route'
|
|
|
|
describe('POST /api/pending-operations/:id/reject', () => {
|
|
const routeParams = createMockRouteParams({ id: 'op-1' })
|
|
|
|
beforeEach(() => {
|
|
vi.clearAllMocks()
|
|
reset()
|
|
requireAuthMock.mockResolvedValue({ user: { id: 'user-1' }, supabase: mockSupabase, error: null })
|
|
requireWriteMock.mockResolvedValue({ ok: true })
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('returns 401 when not authenticated', async () => {
|
|
requireAuthMock.mockResolvedValue({
|
|
user: null,
|
|
supabase: mockSupabase,
|
|
error: NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 }),
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
|
|
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
|
|
const { status } = await parseJsonResponse(response)
|
|
|
|
expect(status).toBe(401)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('returns 403 for a viewer without write permission', async () => {
|
|
requireWriteMock.mockResolvedValue({
|
|
ok: false,
|
|
response: NextResponse.json({ error: 'Forbidden' }, { status: 403 }),
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
|
|
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
|
|
const { status } = await parseJsonResponse(response)
|
|
|
|
expect(status).toBe(403)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('returns 404 when not found', async () => {
|
|
enqueue({ data: null, error: { message: 'not found' } })
|
|
|
|
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
|
|
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
|
|
const { status } = await parseJsonResponse(response)
|
|
|
|
expect(status).toBe(404)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('returns 409 when already committed', async () => {
|
|
enqueue({ data: { id: 'op-1', status: 'committed' } })
|
|
|
|
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
|
|
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
|
|
const { status, body } = await parseJsonResponse<{ error: string }>(response)
|
|
|
|
expect(status).toBe(409)
|
|
expect(body.error).toContain('already committed')
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('rejects successfully', async () => {
|
|
enqueueMany([
|
|
{ data: { id: 'op-1', status: 'pending' } }, // fetch op
|
|
{ data: [{ id: 'op-1' }], error: null }, // guarded update returns the row
|
|
])
|
|
|
|
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
|
|
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
|
|
const { status, body } = await parseJsonResponse<{ data: { id: string; status: string } }>(response)
|
|
|
|
expect(status).toBe(200)
|
|
expect(body.data.status).toBe('rejected')
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('returns 409 when commit claims the row between the status read and the write', async () => {
|
|
// The status re-check above the write is a read, and commit claims rows
|
|
// atomically (pending -> committing). Losing that race must not stamp
|
|
// `rejected` over an operation that has since posted a verifikat, so the
|
|
// UPDATE is guarded on status and matches zero rows here.
|
|
enqueueMany([
|
|
{ data: { id: 'op-1', status: 'pending' } }, // fetch op: still pending
|
|
{ data: [], error: null }, // guarded update matches nothing
|
|
])
|
|
|
|
const request = createMockRequest('/api/pending-operations/op-1/reject', { method: 'POST' })
|
|
const response = await POST(request, routeParams)
|
|
const { status, body } = await parseJsonResponse<{ error: string }>(response)
|
|
|
|
expect(status).toBe(409)
|
|
expect(body.error).toContain('hann behandlas')
|
|
})
|
|
})
|