The documents bucket SELECT policy only covers the uploader's own folder
(documents/{uid}/...), but document_attachments rows are company-scoped.
Every surface that touched storage with the user-bound client therefore
failed for attachments uploaded by another member of the same company
(colleague uploads, email-inbox ingest attributed to the company creator):
- GET /api/documents/:id 500ed with "Failed to create download URL", so
viewing a bilaga on a verifikat or supplier invoice was broken for
every member except the uploader (support case: Odin Aero, where all
40 documents live in the owner's folder and the second member could
open none of them).
- GET /api/documents/:id/integrity 500ed the same way.
- POST /api/documents/:id/verify failed the storage download.
- invoice-inbox retry-extraction could not download the attachment.
- cloud-backup user-triggered syncs silently dropped colleague-uploaded
documents from the Drive archive (manifest rows flipped to 'error').
Fix: authorize on the user client (RLS + explicit company filter, plus
the membership check where present), then do the storage read with the
service-role client. This is the pattern the inline proxy route and the
v1 download route already use; these five call sites were left behind.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
114 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
114 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { z } from 'zod'
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import { requireAuth } from '@/lib/auth/require-auth'
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import { createServiceClient } from '@/lib/supabase/server'
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import { validateDocumentMagicBytes } from '@/lib/core/documents/document-service'
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import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
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const log = createLogger('documents.integrity')
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const ParamsSchema = z.object({ id: z.string().uuid() })
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/**
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* GET /api/documents/:id/integrity
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*
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* Probes the actual stored bytes against the declared MIME type. Used by the
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* Bilagor modal to surface a clear "this file is corrupt: please re-upload"
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* warning instead of relying on the browser's PDF viewer error UI, which
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* only fires after the user has already tried to view the file.
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*
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* Some legacy MCP uploads landed with non-PDF bytes under
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* `mime_type = 'application/pdf'` because magic-byte validation was added
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* after those rows were written. This endpoint lets the UI detect and steer
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* the user toward replacing them.
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*
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* Response shape is intentionally minimal: { valid: boolean } only. The
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* reason for an invalid result is logged server-side rather than returned
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* to the client to avoid information disclosure (V1.2.5 / GDPR Art 25(2))
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* and to keep this from being a probe surface for storage internals.
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*/
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export async function GET(
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_request: Request,
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{ params }: { params: Promise<{ id: string }> }
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) {
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const { user, supabase, error } = await requireAuth()
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if (error) return error
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const rawParams = await params
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const parsed = ParamsSchema.safeParse(rawParams)
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if (!parsed.success) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid document id' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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const { id } = parsed.data
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// Filter to the current version. The integrity check is meaningful only
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// on the live file; superseded versions are archived bytes and should
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// not be re-probed (they're already preserved in the version chain
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// exactly as uploaded).
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const { data: doc, error: docError } = await supabase
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.from('document_attachments')
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.select('id, company_id, mime_type, storage_path')
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.eq('id', id)
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.eq('is_current_version', true)
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.single()
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if (docError || !doc) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Document not found' }, { status: 404 })
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}
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// Tenant membership: even with the user-scoped supabase client below,
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// we want a clear 404 rather than relying on a storage-layer RLS deny
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// (which can present as a generic error). RLS on document_attachments
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// is the primary control; this is defense in depth.
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const { data: membership } = await supabase
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.from('company_members')
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.select('company_id')
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.eq('company_id', doc.company_id)
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.eq('user_id', user.id)
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.maybeSingle()
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if (!membership) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Document not found' }, { status: 404 })
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}
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if (!doc.mime_type) {
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return NextResponse.json({ data: { valid: true } })
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}
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// Download via the service-role client: the storage SELECT policy only
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// covers the uploader's own folder (documents/{uid}/...), so the
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// user-scoped client cannot read colleague-uploaded files even within
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// the same company. The document_attachments RLS fetch plus the explicit
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// membership check above are the authorization (same model as the
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// inline proxy route).
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const serviceClient = createServiceClient()
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const { data: blob, error: downloadError } = await serviceClient.storage
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.from('documents')
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.download(doc.storage_path)
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if (downloadError || !blob) {
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log.error('storage download failed for integrity check', downloadError as Error, {
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documentId: id,
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companyId: doc.company_id,
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})
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Integrity check unavailable' }, { status: 500 })
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}
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// Only the first 16 bytes are needed for magic-byte detection (PDF/PNG
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// use ≤8, WebP needs 12). Trimming here doesn't change bandwidth (the
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// full blob is already downloaded) but it makes the intent explicit and
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// keeps memory churn off the hot path for large PDFs.
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const headerBuffer = await blob.slice(0, 16).arrayBuffer()
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const magicError = validateDocumentMagicBytes(headerBuffer, doc.mime_type)
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if (magicError) {
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log.warn('document failed magic-byte integrity check', {
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documentId: id,
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companyId: doc.company_id,
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reason: magicError,
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})
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}
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return NextResponse.json({ data: { valid: magicError === null } })
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}
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