* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted. - lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync, skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability(). Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant. - lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key). Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins, else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows. getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the hosted trial copy). - Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains 'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly). pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows. - Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated to the new one. Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can be issued). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key. Hosted side: - Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix, org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids, current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count, last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering, separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row) and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role. pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade. - lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping), with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET + POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report, never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines). Instance side: - lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope, expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone. /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key. - Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json, with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates), DECISIONS. Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied. no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(connect): update pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831190000 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): RPC errors answer 503 not 401; X-Connector-Key wins over Authorization A hosted DB error mapped to 401 made the instance sync treat a pooler blip as key revocation and delete its entire connector grant cache, zeroing the 72h offline grace. 503 lands in the sync's keep-grants branch (already test-pinned). Bearer-first extraction hashed the upstream token on dual-header proxied calls, 401ing the exact shape X-Connector-Key exists for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): sync deletes grants only on a body-proven connector rejection, never bare 401/403 A WAF challenge page, edge deployment protection, or an egress proxy answers 401/403 without the hosted app ever running; trusting status alone wiped the instance's 72h offline grant cache within the hour. Deletion now requires the hosted route's own rejection code in the JSON body; codeless 401/403 keeps grants (server_error branch). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): PR #1748 review batch: https-only connect URL, atomic pin, prefix-gated Bearer, deferred metering, entitlements validation, integer months - GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL must be https (http only for loopback); invalid or plaintext URLs disable the connector instead of sending the key. - instance_url pin update filters on IS NULL; a lost race re-reads and reports the winner's pin. - extractConnectorKey: a Bearer is the connector credential only with the gnubok_ck_ prefix; upstream Bearer falls through to X-Connector-Key. - Usage metering runs via after() off the response path (inline outside a request scope). - Sync validates entitlements shape: unknown status or malformed current_period_end keeps grants (server_error), never deletes. - issue-connector-key rejects fractional --months. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
176 lines
7.9 KiB
PL/PgSQL
176 lines
7.9 KiB
PL/PgSQL
-- Connector keys: the hosted side of the sovereign self-host subscription.
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--
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-- A self-hosted Accounted instance runs everything itself except the services
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-- only Accounted can operate (bank sync via our PSD2/AISP credentials, the
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-- Skatteverket API client, TIC org lookup, the migration gateway). A
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-- connector key (`gnubok_ck_...`) is what an instance presents to the hosted
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-- proxy endpoints under /api/connect/*; this table is the registry of those
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-- keys, the proxy's rate-limit state, and the billing hook for the
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-- per-active-company subscription. The instance never stores accounting data
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-- here: bank/SKV tokens and the ledger stay in the instance's own database,
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-- the proxy is stateless. Enforcement is key auth at the proxy, never a
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-- call-home licence check inside the AGPL code.
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--
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-- Service-role only: RLS is enabled with NO policies, so neither anon nor
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-- authenticated can read a row (the hosted UI has no connector-key surface;
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-- keys are issued by scripts/issue-connector-key.ts and, later, the Stripe
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-- webhook). The validate RPC is SECURITY DEFINER and executable by
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-- service_role alone (see the REVOKE/GRANT at the end): this is the lesson
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-- of the SECURITY DEFINER exposure audit, applied up front.
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CREATE TABLE public.connector_keys (
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id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
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-- SHA-256 of the key. The key itself is shown once at issue time and never
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-- stored: the hash IS the credential lookup (same reasoning as api_keys).
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key_hash text NOT NULL UNIQUE,
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-- Display prefix: 'gnubok_ck_' + 8 chars, safe to show in lists/logs.
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key_prefix text NOT NULL,
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-- The licensee. Ten digits, no hyphen.
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org_number text NOT NULL,
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licensee_name text,
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-- The self-hosted instance this key belongs to (pinned: callbacks and
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-- usage are only ever honoured for this origin). NULL until first sync
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-- pins it for a manually issued key.
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instance_url text,
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-- Capability keys the subscription covers. Subset of
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-- CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES in lib/entitlements/keys.ts.
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scopes text[] NOT NULL DEFAULT ARRAY['bank_sync', 'skatteverket', 'org_lookup', 'migration'],
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status text NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active' CHECK (status IN ('active', 'suspended', 'revoked')),
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-- Billing hooks (Stripe self-serve comes later; manual keys leave these NULL).
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stripe_customer_id text,
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stripe_subscription_id text,
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-- End of the paid period. The instance's grants expire at
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-- min(now + 72h, current_period_end + 3d): a lapsed period freezes the
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-- connector capabilities within days even if the sync keeps running.
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current_period_end timestamptz,
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-- Proxy rate limit, per key (requests per minute), same window scheme as
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-- api_keys.
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rate_limit_rpm integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 600,
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request_count integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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rate_limit_window_start timestamptz,
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-- Quantity billing input: the instance reports its active company count on
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-- every sync.
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active_company_count integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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last_seen_at timestamptz,
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last_synced_at timestamptz,
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notes text,
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created_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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updated_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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revoked_at timestamptz
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);
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CREATE INDEX idx_connector_keys_org_number ON public.connector_keys (org_number);
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CREATE INDEX idx_connector_keys_status ON public.connector_keys (status) WHERE revoked_at IS NULL;
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ALTER TABLE public.connector_keys ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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-- No policies on purpose: service role only.
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CREATE TRIGGER set_updated_at_connector_keys
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BEFORE UPDATE ON public.connector_keys
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FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION public.update_updated_at_column();
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-- Usage metering per key: one row per proxied request. Kept separate from
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-- metered_events on purpose: that table's company_id references HOSTED
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-- companies, and a connector key belongs to an instance, not a company here.
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CREATE TABLE public.connector_usage_events (
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id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
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connector_key_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES public.connector_keys(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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-- Which hosted service answered: entitlements | bank | skatteverket | org | migration.
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service text NOT NULL,
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endpoint text,
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status_code integer,
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occurred_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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metadata jsonb NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb
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);
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CREATE INDEX idx_connector_usage_events_key_time
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ON public.connector_usage_events (connector_key_id, occurred_at DESC);
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ALTER TABLE public.connector_usage_events ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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-- No policies on purpose: service role only.
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-- Atomic validate + rate-limit, the connector twin of
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-- validate_and_increment_api_key (20260621130000). Returns no row for an
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-- unknown or revoked key (caller answers 401), the row with its status for a
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-- suspended key (caller answers 403), and rate_limited = true when the
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-- per-minute window is exhausted (caller answers 429).
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CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.validate_and_increment_connector_key(p_key_hash text)
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RETURNS TABLE(
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connector_key_id uuid,
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org_number text,
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instance_url text,
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scopes text[],
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status text,
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current_period_end timestamptz,
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rate_limited boolean
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)
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LANGUAGE plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER
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SET search_path = public
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AS $$
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DECLARE
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v_id uuid;
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v_org_number text;
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v_instance_url text;
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v_scopes text[];
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v_status text;
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v_period_end timestamptz;
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v_rate_limit_rpm integer;
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v_request_count integer;
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v_window_start timestamptz;
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BEGIN
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SELECT ck.id, ck.org_number, ck.instance_url, ck.scopes, ck.status, ck.current_period_end,
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ck.rate_limit_rpm, ck.request_count, ck.rate_limit_window_start
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INTO v_id, v_org_number, v_instance_url, v_scopes, v_status, v_period_end,
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v_rate_limit_rpm, v_request_count, v_window_start
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FROM public.connector_keys ck
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WHERE ck.key_hash = p_key_hash
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AND ck.revoked_at IS NULL
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AND ck.status <> 'revoked'
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FOR UPDATE;
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IF v_id IS NULL THEN
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RETURN; -- unknown or revoked: caller answers 401
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END IF;
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-- A suspended key is reported, not rate-counted: the caller answers 403.
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IF v_status <> 'active' THEN
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UPDATE public.connector_keys SET last_seen_at = now() WHERE id = v_id;
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RETURN QUERY SELECT v_id, v_org_number, v_instance_url, v_scopes, v_status, v_period_end, false;
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RETURN;
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END IF;
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IF v_window_start IS NULL OR v_window_start < now() - interval '1 minute' THEN
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UPDATE public.connector_keys
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SET request_count = 1,
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rate_limit_window_start = now(),
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last_seen_at = now()
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WHERE id = v_id;
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RETURN QUERY SELECT v_id, v_org_number, v_instance_url, v_scopes, v_status, v_period_end, false;
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RETURN;
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END IF;
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IF v_request_count >= v_rate_limit_rpm THEN
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RETURN QUERY SELECT v_id, v_org_number, v_instance_url, v_scopes, v_status, v_period_end, true;
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RETURN;
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END IF;
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UPDATE public.connector_keys
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SET request_count = request_count + 1,
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last_seen_at = now()
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WHERE id = v_id;
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RETURN QUERY SELECT v_id, v_org_number, v_instance_url, v_scopes, v_status, v_period_end, false;
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END;
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$$;
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-- Service role only. Supabase grants EXECUTE on new public functions to PUBLIC
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-- and explicitly to anon/authenticated; anon is a member of PUBLIC, so both
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-- must be revoked for the revoke to bite.
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REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.validate_and_increment_connector_key(text) FROM PUBLIC, anon, authenticated;
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GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.validate_and_increment_connector_key(text) TO service_role;
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COMMENT ON TABLE public.connector_keys IS
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'Hosted registry of gnubok_ck_ connector keys presented by self-hosted instances at /api/connect/*. Service-role only.';
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COMMENT ON TABLE public.connector_usage_events IS
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'Per-request metering for connector keys (entitlements, bank, skatteverket, org, migration). Service-role only.';
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