Files
accounted/lib/salary/personnummer.ts
T
ca93ef3fb6 fix(salary): surface employee-save failures and a typed 503 for the missing encryption key (#1996) (#2009)
* fix(salary): surface employee-save failures in the dialog and type the missing encryption key (#1996)

Pressing Spara in "Ny anställd" could fail without any feedback: a thrown
fetch or a non-JSON 5xx body escaped handleSubmit before setSaving(false)
ran, leaving the button stuck on "Sparar..." and the dialog silent. Even
when the toast did fire, the Radix modal aria-hides the root-layout
Toaster, so assistive tech (and the E2E driver that found this) heard
nothing, and the requestId support needs was never shown anywhere.

- NewEmployeeDialog: fetch + parse run in a never-throwing helper, saving
  is released in finally, the body is parsed with json().catch(() => null)
  so an HTML/plain-text error page still maps through the HTTP-status map,
  and the failure is rendered inline (role="alert" in the footer) with
  "Ärende-id: <requestId>" next to the single destructive toast.
- personnummer.ts: the production "key missing" throw now carries the
  registry code PERSONNUMMER_ENCRYPTION_NOT_CONFIGURED, and the SALARY
  registry gains a 503 entry naming PERSONNUMMER_ENCRYPTION_KEY with a
  "contact support" message and a remediation hint. withRouteContext
  emits the typed envelope automatically instead of INTERNAL_ERROR 500,
  which read as transient and invited retries that can never succeed.
- Tests for the route (401, 400, 503 with requestId and no insert), the
  key guard, the registry entry, errorResponse dispatch on a coded Error,
  and getErrorMessage locale handling of the new envelope.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015nAd8XJ2RPCmG2eKoLBdna

* fix(salary): address review findings (#1996)

- NewEmployeeDialog: fall back to the X-Request-Id response header when the
  body carries no error.requestId. The route hand-builds its 409 (duplicate
  personnummer) and generic insert-failure 500 bodies as flat strings, so the
  inline "Ärende-id" line was hidden for exactly the DB-failure class the
  issue names; withRouteContext sets the header on every response.
- Route tests pin that the 409 and 500 insert-error arms carry X-Request-Id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015nAd8XJ2RPCmG2eKoLBdna

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-28 16:57:54 +02:00

132 lines
5.1 KiB
TypeScript

import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes, scryptSync } from 'crypto'
import { createLogger } from '@/lib/logger'
const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm'
const IV_LENGTH = 12
const TAG_LENGTH = 16
const logger = createLogger('salary/personnummer')
/**
* Registry code (lib/errors/structured-errors.ts) for a production deployment
* that never set PERSONNUMMER_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Carried on the thrown Error so
* withRouteContext -> errorResponse() answers with the typed 503 envelope
* ("krypteringsnyckel saknas, kontakta supporten") instead of the generic
* INTERNAL_ERROR 500, which reads as a transient failure and invites retries
* that can never succeed. #1996
*/
export const PERSONNUMMER_ENCRYPTION_NOT_CONFIGURED = 'PERSONNUMMER_ENCRYPTION_NOT_CONFIGURED'
/**
* Get the encryption key from environment.
* Falls back to a dev-only key for local development.
*/
function getEncryptionKey(): Buffer {
const envKey = process.env.PERSONNUMMER_ENCRYPTION_KEY
if (!envKey) {
if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
throw Object.assign(new Error('PERSONNUMMER_ENCRYPTION_KEY is required in production'), {
code: PERSONNUMMER_ENCRYPTION_NOT_CONFIGURED,
})
}
// Dev-only deterministic key (NOT safe for production)
return scryptSync('dev-only-key', 'gnubok-dev-salt', 32)
}
// Use scrypt to derive a 32-byte key from the env var
return scryptSync(envKey, 'gnubok-pnr-salt', 32)
}
/**
* Encrypt a personnummer for storage.
* Returns a hex string: iv + ciphertext + authTag
*/
export function encryptPersonnummer(personnummer: string): string {
const key = getEncryptionKey()
const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH)
const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)
let encrypted = cipher.update(personnummer, 'utf8', 'hex')
encrypted += cipher.final('hex')
const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag()
return iv.toString('hex') + encrypted + authTag.toString('hex')
}
/**
* Decrypt a personnummer from storage.
*/
export function decryptPersonnummer(encrypted: string): string {
// Tolerate legacy/unencrypted rows. A raw 12-digit personnummer (written by
// a path that skipped encryptPersonnummer, e.g. the v1 REST create route
// before this fix, or a seed) would otherwise be sliced as iv/ciphertext/tag
// and throw ERR_CRYPTO_INVALID_AUTH_TAG ("Invalid authentication tag length:
// 6"), 500-ing every decrypt-on-read path (roster, salary runs, payslips,
// KU, AGI, MCP). Real ciphertext is 80 hex chars, so a 12-digit match is
// unambiguously plaintext. Return it as-is and warn so the backfill can find
// and re-encrypt it. Value is never logged. See DECISIONS.md.
if (/^\d{12}$/.test(encrypted)) {
logger.warn('decryptPersonnummer received an unencrypted personnummer; returning as-is (row needs backfill)')
return encrypted
}
const key = getEncryptionKey()
const ivHex = encrypted.slice(0, IV_LENGTH * 2)
const authTagHex = encrypted.slice(-TAG_LENGTH * 2)
const ciphertext = encrypted.slice(IV_LENGTH * 2, -TAG_LENGTH * 2)
const iv = Buffer.from(ivHex, 'hex')
const authTag = Buffer.from(authTagHex, 'hex')
const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv)
decipher.setAuthTag(authTag)
let decrypted = decipher.update(ciphertext, 'hex', 'utf8')
decrypted += decipher.final('utf8')
return decrypted
}
// Pure parsing, validation and formatting helpers live in ./personnummer-format
// (no Node imports) so client components (via lib/salary/tax-column.ts) can
// use them without pulling this module's `crypto` import into the bundle.
export {
calculateAge,
calculateAgeAtYearStart,
expandPersonnummerTo12,
extractBirthDate,
extractLast4,
formatPersonnummer,
maskPersonnummer,
validatePersonnummer,
} from './personnummer-format'
import { maskPersonnummer } from './personnummer-format'
/**
* Shape a raw `employees` row (or an embedded employee object) for a JSON
* response: drop every personnummer-derived column and expose the display
* form under `personnummer_masked`.
*
* Two columns must go, not one:
* - `personnummer` (the AES-256-GCM ciphertext), and
* - `personnummer_last4`: the mask is 'YYYYMMDD-XXXX', so a response that
* carries the mask AND the last four digits hands the client the full
* personnummer by simple concatenation, defeating the mask entirely.
* No UI reads employees.personnummer_last4; it exists for the DB-side
* uniqueness constraint and Skatteverket-bound documents (payslips, AGI,
* KU), which render server-side.
*
* The mask goes out under `personnummer_masked`, never under the writable
* `personnummer` key: these payloads feed edit forms, and a mask returned
* under the write key could be posted straight back into the encrypt path.
* v1, the MCP tools and lib/salary/employee-commands.ts use the `_masked`
* suffix for the same reason.
*/
export function maskEmployeeForResponse(
employee: Record<string, unknown>
): Record<string, unknown> {
const { personnummer, personnummer_last4: _last4, ...rest } = employee
return {
...rest,
personnummer_masked: maskPersonnummer(decryptPersonnummer(personnummer as string)),
}
}