Files
accounted/extensions/general/enable-banking/index.ts
T
MattssonandClaude Fable 5.1 b68c082ef5 feat(bank-sync): close the F2 report: gap backfill, consent and paused chip states, agent-triggered sync (#2165)
* fix(bank-sync): cron backfills the gap since the last successful sync

The daily incremental sync always asked the bank for the last 7 days. Any
pause longer than that (a lapsed subscription paid again, a consent renewed
after expiry, an outage) silently lost the days in between: the connection
came back, looked healthy, and the missing transactions never arrived.

The lookback now widens to cover the gap since last_synced_at plus one day
of overlap, capped at the 90-day PSD2 limit, and a gap of a month or more
asks for strategy=longest like the manual sync route does. Dedup via
external_id makes the overlap harmless. First syncs keep their 90-day path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* feat(bank-sync): chip warns seven days before a bank consent expires

The transactions-page chip only reacted once a connection was already dead
(expired/error) or had gone stale. A consent that is about to end looked
healthy until the morning it stopped syncing. New "expiring" state when a
live connection's consent_expires is within seven days, the same threshold
as the consent-expiry email in the sync cron. Precedence: attention,
expiring, stale, healthy.

getChipState moves to lib/transactions/bank-sync-chip-state.ts so the
precedence is unit-tested; the component keeps the rendering only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* feat(bank-sync): chip says paused when the subscription lapsed

The daily cron filters connections by the bank_sync capability, so a
company whose trial or subscription ended keeps status=active rows with a
frozen last_synced_at. The chip read that as "stale, check the connection",
which sends the user to re-authorise a connection that is perfectly alive.
56 of 191 active connections on prod were in this state on 2026-09-01.

New "paused" state, ranked above everything else, when the company lacks
bank_sync: hosted points at billing, self-host at the connector key, the
same split BankSyncNowButton already makes. getChipState takes an options
object so the clock stays out of render (react-hooks/purity).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* feat(api): agent-triggerable bank sync in v1 and MCP

Closes the first wish in the F2 report: an integration could read bank
data but never refresh it. New POST /api/v1/companies/{id}/bank-connections/
{connectionId}/sync and MCP gnubok_sync_bank, both on a shared runner
(extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/trigger-sync.ts).

Cost is bounded structurally, not by policy: the window is never
caller-controlled (the cron's gap-aware 7 to 90 day lookback), a connection
synced within 15 minutes answers BANK_SYNC_COOLDOWN with next_allowed_at
(429 + Retry-After on v1; synced=false in-band on MCP so the agent reads on
instead of retrying), and a failing connection is throttled per process by
attempt time. A dead session is flipped to expired with a remediation that
hands the user the connect link: no API call revives a consent.

Gated on bank_sync like gnubok_connect_bank; scope transactions:write.
Registry, scope map, load-routes, spec snapshot and the generated
accounted-api skill updated; five BANK_SYNC_* / BANK_SESSION_EXPIRED codes
added to the structured-error registry. The web Synka-nu route is left as
is (see DECISIONS.md).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* test(bank-sync): use the options object in the remaining chip-state calls

Four multi-line calls still passed the clock positionally after
getChipState moved to an options object; tsc flagged them (vitest did not,
the extra argument was ignored at runtime).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* fix(api): address skeptic findings on the agent-triggered bank sync

Three refutations from the pre-publish skeptic pass:

1. Core imported the extension. The v1 sync route pulled the runner
   straight from @/extensions, which the core-build gate rejects and which
   left a live bank endpoint on zero-extension builds. The route now
   resolves it through the registry's services channel against a contract
   in lib/bank-sync/trigger-sync-contract.ts (same pattern as the
   Skatteverket read service) and answers EXTENSION_DISABLED when the
   extension is absent.

2. The idempotency cache stored the handler-level 429. A same-key retry
   after Retry-After, which is the documented retry, replayed the stale
   cooldown as a 400 for the cache's 24-hour TTL. withApiV1 no longer
   caches 429 responses; regression test added. The endpoint's pitfall no
   longer claims Idempotency-Key is mandatory (it was never enforced).

3. Two cron tests read the clock twice and failed whenever a millisecond
   passed between the reads. They now pin the clock with fake timers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS

* fix(bank-sync): durable cooldown lease and review wording

Resolves the PR #2165 review findings in one pass.

Superagent P1: the attempt throttle was a process-local Map, so two agent
calls on different serverless instances (or a retry after a cold start on
a failing connection) could each bill an Enable Banking call, contradicting
the one-sync-per-15-minutes promise. New bank_connections.sync_lease_until
(migration 20260902150000), claimed with one conditional UPDATE before the
bank is called; Postgres row locking makes exactly one claimer win, the
rest answer BANK_SYNC_COOLDOWN. The lease stays for the full window on
success and failure. Tests cover the claim order, a failed attempt seen
from a second instance, a lost race, and an expired lease.

CodeRabbit: the =1 plural branch now reads "in 1 day" / "om 1 dag"
(daysUntilConsentExpiry rounds a partial day up, so "tomorrow" could be
today); the cooldown pitfall on the v1 endpoint, the MCP description and
the in-band cooldown instruction now say a cooldown can follow a failed
attempt and tell the agent to compare last_synced_at before deciding.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub

* fix(bank-sync): lease claim as a literal filter for the schema guard

CI's no-phantom-columns guard counts runtime-built query expressions and
its ceiling is exact; the templated `.or('sync_lease_until.is.null,...')`
claim added one. The column now defaults to epoch (NOT NULL), so "never
claimed" is just "expired long ago" and the atomic claim is a single
literal `.lte('sync_lease_until', now)` the guard can check. Migration is
unshipped (same PR), so it is edited in place.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub

* fix(bank-sync): runner verifies company membership before the lease

Superagent (round 3): the MCP path reached the shared runner without a
membership check of its own. Both callers do enforce it upstream
(withApiV1's company resolution and resolveMcpCompanyContext in the MCP
dispatcher), but the runner writes transactions and bills a bank call, so
it now checks company_members itself, before the cooldown and the lease
claim, and answers NOT_FOUND for a non-member. The viewer check that was
buried inside the sync block moves up with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 17:17:41 +02:00

1874 lines
83 KiB
TypeScript

import type { Extension, ExtensionContext } from '@/lib/extensions/types'
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import {
startAuthorization,
getASPSPs,
getPreferredAuthMethodDetails,
deleteSession,
isSandboxMode,
SessionExpiredError,
REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE,
SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE,
type ASPSP,
} from './lib/api-client'
import { syncAccountTransactions } from './lib/sync'
import { triggerConnectionSync } from './lib/trigger-sync'
import { findReusableSessions, countLiveSiblings } from './lib/session-sharing'
import {
runUnattendedReconciliationSweep,
toSweepSummary,
} from '@/lib/reconciliation/unattended-sweep'
import {
runReconciliation,
DEFAULT_UNATTENDED_CONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD,
} from '@/lib/reconciliation/bank-reconciliation'
import { resolveCashAccountScope } from '@/lib/reconciliation/cash-account-scope'
import { checkRateLimit } from '@/lib/auth/rate-limit-http'
import { requireCapability } from '@/lib/entitlements/has-capability'
import { CAPABILITY } from '@/lib/entitlements/keys'
import type { StoredAccount } from './types'
import type { Transaction } from '@/types'
// Per-user limits keep one tenant from spamming any single bank handler.
// Sliding 60s windows: generous enough for legitimate retry, tight enough
// to prevent UUID probing or status-machine abuse.
const RATE_LIMIT_ACCOUNTS = { maxRequests: 20, windowMs: 60_000 }
const RATE_LIMIT_SYNC = { maxRequests: 10, windowMs: 60_000 }
const RATE_LIMIT_DISCONNECT = { maxRequests: 10, windowMs: 60_000 }
const RATE_LIMIT_ATTACH = { maxRequests: 10, windowMs: 60_000 }
const MAX_ENABLED_UIDS = 50
/**
* Enable Banking (PSD2) extension
*
* Provides automatic bank transaction sync via PSD2 open banking.
* This is an opt-in extension: uncomment the import in loader.ts to activate.
*
* Required environment variables:
* - ENABLE_BANKING_APP_ID
* - ENABLE_BANKING_PRIVATE_KEY (base64-encoded PEM)
*
* Optional:
* - ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL (default https://api.enablebanking.com; api.tilisy.com = sandbox)
* - ENABLE_BANKING_PSU_TYPE (default business)
*/
export const enableBankingExtension: Extension = {
id: 'enable-banking',
name: 'Enable Banking (PSD2)',
version: '1.0.0',
settingsPanel: {
label: 'Bankintegration (PSD2)',
path: '/settings/banking',
},
// Registry-resolved services for core callers (core cannot import
// @/extensions). Contract: lib/bank-sync/trigger-sync-contract.ts.
services: {
// Agent-triggered sync behind POST /api/v1/.../bank-connections/{id}/sync.
triggerConnectionSync,
},
apiRoutes: [
{
method: 'GET',
path: '/banks',
handler: async (_request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
const log = ctx?.log ?? console
try {
// Detect PSU type from company entity_type
let psuType: 'personal' | 'business' = 'business'
if (ctx?.companyId && ctx?.supabase) {
const { data: company } = await ctx.supabase
.from('companies')
.select('entity_type')
.eq('id', ctx.companyId)
.single()
if (company?.entity_type === 'enskild_firma') {
psuType = 'personal'
}
}
const aspsps = await getASPSPs('SE', psuType)
const banks = aspsps.map((aspsp: ASPSP) => ({
name: aspsp.name,
country: aspsp.country,
logo: aspsp.logo,
bic: aspsp.bic,
}))
return NextResponse.json({ banks, psu_type: psuType, sandbox: isSandboxMode() })
} catch (error) {
log.error('Error fetching banks:', error)
return NextResponse.json({
banks: [
{ name: 'Nordea', country: 'SE', bic: 'NDEASESS' },
{ name: 'SEB', country: 'SE', bic: 'ESSESESS' },
{ name: 'Swedbank', country: 'SE', bic: 'SWEDSESS' },
{ name: 'Handelsbanken', country: 'SE', bic: 'HANDSESS' },
],
sandbox: isSandboxMode(),
})
}
},
},
{
// Live PSD2 sessions the user already holds in their OTHER companies that
// still have unclaimed accounts. Drives the "reuse this connection" offer:
// several ASPSPs allow one active AIS session per PSU, so authorizing the
// same bank again for a second company kills the first company's feed.
// An empty list is the normal case and renders no offer at all.
method: 'GET',
path: '/reusable-sessions',
handler: async (_request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
const log = ctx?.log ?? console
const supabase = ctx?.supabase ?? await (await import('@/lib/supabase/server')).createClient()
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
if (!user) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
}
if (!ctx?.companyId) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Company context required' }, { status: 400 })
}
try {
const sessions = await findReusableSessions(supabase, user.id, ctx.companyId)
// Never ship session_id to the browser: it is the bearer of the PSD2
// consent. The client only needs to name the offer and post back the
// source connection id, which is re-validated server-side on attach.
return NextResponse.json({
sessions: sessions.map(s => ({
connection_id: s.connectionId,
company_id: s.companyId,
company_name: s.companyName,
bank_name: s.bankName,
consent_expires: s.consentExpires,
available_account_count: s.availableAccounts.length,
})),
})
} catch (error) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to list reusable sessions', error)
return NextResponse.json({ sessions: [] })
}
},
},
{
// Attach the ACTIVE company to a session authorized for another of the
// user's companies. No BankID, no new /auth call, nothing revoked: the
// new row shares session_id + consent_expires and carries only the
// accounts no company has claimed. Lands in 'pending_selection' so the
// existing AccountPickerDialog does the ledger mapping, IBAN-aware.
method: 'POST',
path: '/attach',
handler: async (request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
const log = ctx?.log ?? console
const supabase = ctx?.supabase ?? await (await import('@/lib/supabase/server')).createClient()
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
if (!user) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
}
if (!ctx?.companyId) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Company context required' }, { status: 400 })
}
const companyId = ctx.companyId
const blocked = await requireCapability(supabase, companyId, CAPABILITY.bank_sync)
if (blocked) return blocked
const rl = await checkRateLimit({
prefix: 'enable-banking:attach',
identifier: user.id,
...RATE_LIMIT_ATTACH,
})
if (!rl.ok) return rl.response!
const { connection_id } = await request.json()
if (!connection_id) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'connection_id is required' }, { status: 400 })
}
try {
// Re-derive the offer server-side rather than trusting the posted id.
// findReusableSessions re-checks ownership (same user), that the
// source is a DIFFERENT company, that its session is active with a
// live consent, and which accounts are genuinely unclaimed.
const sessions = await findReusableSessions(supabase, user.id, companyId)
const source = sessions.find(s => s.connectionId === connection_id)
if (!source) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'No reusable session available for this connection' },
{ status: 404 }
)
}
// A company already syncing this bank must go through reconnect, not
// attach: a second live row for the same provider would sync the same
// accounts twice into one set of books.
const { data: existingForCompany } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.select('id')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('provider', source.provider)
.in('status', ['active', 'pending_selection'])
.limit(1)
.maybeSingle()
if (existingForCompany) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'This company is already connected to that bank' },
{ status: 409 }
)
}
const { data: created, error: insertError } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.insert({
user_id: user.id,
company_id: companyId,
provider: source.provider,
bank_name: source.bankName,
session_id: source.sessionId,
psu_type: source.psuType,
consent_expires: source.consentExpires,
accounts_data: source.availableAccounts,
status: 'pending_selection',
})
.select('id')
.single()
if (insertError || !created) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to attach shared session', {
message: insertError?.message,
sourceConnectionId: source.connectionId,
companyId,
})
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Failed to reuse connection' }, { status: 500 })
}
log.info('[enable-banking] Attached company to an existing PSD2 session', {
connectionId: created.id,
sourceConnectionId: source.connectionId,
companyId,
bankName: source.bankName,
accountCount: source.availableAccounts.length,
})
// This company gains access to bank data, so it is a consent grant
// from an audit standpoint even though no new consent was signed
// (ASVS V16 / GDPR Art.30), same event the callback emits.
try {
const emit = ctx?.emit ?? (await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus.emit.bind((await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus)
await emit({
type: 'bank_connection.consent_granted',
payload: {
connectionId: created.id,
bankName: source.bankName ?? null,
accountCount: source.availableAccounts.length,
consentExpiresAt: source.consentExpires ?? null,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
},
})
} catch (emitError) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to emit consent_granted on attach', emitError)
}
return NextResponse.json({
connection_id: created.id,
account_count: source.availableAccounts.length,
})
} catch (error) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Attach failed', error)
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Failed to reuse connection' }, { status: 500 })
}
},
},
{
method: 'POST',
path: '/connect',
handler: async (request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
const log = ctx?.log ?? console
const supabase = ctx?.supabase ?? await (await import('@/lib/supabase/server')).createClient()
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
if (!user) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
}
if (!ctx?.companyId) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Company context required' }, { status: 400 })
}
const companyId = ctx.companyId
const blocked = await requireCapability(supabase, companyId, CAPABILITY.bank_sync)
if (blocked) return blocked
const { aspsp_name, aspsp_country, psu_type: explicitPsuType, connection_id: reconnectId, force_new: forceNew } = await request.json()
// Reconnect mode: re-authorize an EXISTING connection in place (no
// disconnect required). The aspsp identity falls back to the stored row
// when the client omits it, so a closed/expired session can be renewed
// with one click. A fresh connect still needs the bank name + country.
const isReconnect = !!reconnectId
if (!isReconnect && (!aspsp_name || !aspsp_country)) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'aspsp_name and aspsp_country are required' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
try {
// For reconnect, load the existing connection up front (company-scoped)
// so we can revoke its dead session and reuse its bank identity.
let existing:
| { id: string; bank_name: string; provider: string; session_id: string | null; psu_type: string | null }
| null = null
if (isReconnect) {
const { data, error: findErr } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.select('id, bank_name, provider, session_id, psu_type')
.eq('id', reconnectId)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
if (findErr || !data) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Connection not found' }, { status: 404 })
}
existing = data
}
// Resolve the aspsp identity. For a reconnect the bank is already
// known, so derive it authoritatively from the stored row and IGNORE
// any client-supplied aspsp_name/aspsp_country: the client
// (BankSyncNowButton) derives the country by string-splitting the
// provider slug, and trusting that back is needless attack surface
// (compliance: ASVS V8.2.1/V4.5). A fresh connect has no stored row,
// so it uses the client values (already required+validated above).
// The provider slug ends with the country code, e.g. "nordea-se".
const resolvedAspspName = isReconnect ? existing?.bank_name : aspsp_name
const resolvedAspspCountry = isReconnect
? existing?.provider?.split('-').pop()?.toUpperCase() || 'SE'
: aspsp_country
if (!resolvedAspspName) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'aspsp_name and aspsp_country are required' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// Detect PSU type: explicit override > stored type (reconnect) >
// company entity_type > default 'business'. Reusing the stored type on
// reconnect is the key fix: re-deriving from entity_type would flip a
// working 'personal' connection (e.g. an AB owner who signs with a
// personal Mobile BankID) back to 'business' on every consent renewal,
// failing at the bank's signing step. The client can still pass an
// explicit psu_type to switch account type in place.
let psuType: 'personal' | 'business' = 'business'
if (explicitPsuType === 'personal' || explicitPsuType === 'business') {
psuType = explicitPsuType
} else if (isReconnect && (existing?.psu_type === 'personal' || existing?.psu_type === 'business')) {
psuType = existing.psu_type
} else {
const { data: company } = await supabase
.from('companies')
.select('entity_type')
.eq('id', companyId)
.single()
if (company?.entity_type === 'enskild_firma') {
psuType = 'personal'
}
}
// Resolve the bank's preferred auth method. Handelsbanken (and some
// other Swedish banks) expose Mobile BankID only as a hidden DECOUPLED
// method; without pinning it, Enable Banking defaults to the REDIRECT
// method, which for Handelsbanken *corporate* PSUs cannot complete
// with Mobile BankID: the user approves in the app and then hits an
// error. Only hidden methods applicable to this psu_type are pinned;
// banks whose decoupled method is visible (e.g. Lunar) get undefined
// so their own working default flow runs untouched.
const preferredMethod = await getPreferredAuthMethodDetails(
resolvedAspspName,
resolvedAspspCountry,
psuType
)
const authMethod = preferredMethod?.name
log.info('[enable-banking] Starting bank connection', {
user_id: user.id,
bank: resolvedAspspName,
country: resolvedAspspCountry,
psu_type: psuType,
auth_method: authMethod ?? '(aspsp default)',
// Chosen method's metadata, so prod logs can verify per-bank pinning
// behavior after deploy (hidden-only + psu_types selection). A
// pinned method with no psu_types (the documented Handelsbanken
// shape) applies to all PSU types and logs '(all)': the
// '(aspsp default)' sentinel is reserved for the unpinned case,
// where it would otherwise contradict auth_method on the same line.
auth_method_approach: preferredMethod?.approach ?? '(aspsp default)',
auth_method_hidden: preferredMethod?.hidden_method ?? '(aspsp default)',
auth_method_psu_types: preferredMethod
? (preferredMethod.psu_types ?? '(all)')
: '(aspsp default)',
reconnect: isReconnect,
})
// Reject if there's already a recent pending connection for this user+bank
// to prevent double-click race conditions that confuse the bank's consent
// flow. Skipped for reconnect: that deliberately re-authorizes a known row.
if (!isReconnect) {
const { data: recentPending } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.select('id, created_at')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('bank_name', resolvedAspspName)
.eq('status', 'pending')
.order('created_at', { ascending: false })
.limit(1)
.maybeSingle()
if (recentPending) {
const pendingAge = Date.now() - new Date(recentPending.created_at).getTime()
const STALE_THRESHOLD_MS = 30 * 1000 // 30 seconds: long enough to cover the redirect handoff, short enough that an abandoned attempt doesn't block the user
if (pendingAge < STALE_THRESHOLD_MS) {
log.info('[enable-banking] Rejecting duplicate connect: recent pending exists', {
existing_id: recentPending.id,
age_ms: pendingAge,
})
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'En anslutning pågår redan. Vänta och försök igen.' },
{ status: 409 }
)
}
}
// Sweep failed attempts that never became a live connection:
// stale 'pending' rows (abandoned redirects past the threshold)
// and 'error' rows left by earlier denied/failed connects.
// DELETE instead of marking 'error': a parked 'error' row renders
// forever as an "Åtgärd krävs" card, so a failed attempt followed
// by a successful retry showed up as two connections to the same
// bank. The session_id/accounts_data guards protect established
// connections (anything that ever completed the callback has
// accounts_data); never-activated rows have no dependents, and
// the transactions/cash_accounts FKs are ON DELETE SET NULL.
const { data: sweptRows } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.delete()
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('bank_name', resolvedAspspName)
.in('status', ['pending', 'error'])
.is('session_id', null)
.is('accounts_data', null)
.select('id')
if (sweptRows?.length) {
log.info('[enable-banking] Swept never-activated connection attempts', {
count: sweptRows.length,
bank: resolvedAspspName,
})
}
// A fresh connect while a DEAD-BUT-ESTABLISHED connection to the
// same bank exists (expired/error/pending_selection) is almost
// always a renewal that should go through the reconnect path: a
// second row duplicates the connection and used to strand the old
// one in "Åtgärd krävs" forever. 409 with the existing id lets
// the client offer "förnya i stället". An ACTIVE row never
// triggers the guard: two legitimate logins at the same bank
// (disjoint account sets, e.g. privat + företag) must remain
// creatable through the UI, and the callback's supersede leaves
// non-overlapping account sets alone. force_new stays as the
// deliberate escape hatch. Runs AFTER the sweep so a
// never-activated zombie cannot block a legitimate fresh connect.
if (forceNew !== true) {
const { data: establishedRow } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.select('id, status')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('bank_name', resolvedAspspName)
.in('status', ['expired', 'error', 'pending_selection'])
.order('created_at', { ascending: false })
.limit(1)
.maybeSingle()
if (establishedRow) {
log.info('[enable-banking] Rejecting fresh connect: dead connection needs renewal', {
existing_id: establishedRow.id,
existing_status: establishedRow.status,
bank: resolvedAspspName,
})
return NextResponse.json(
{
error: `Du har redan en koppling till ${resolvedAspspName} som behöver förnyas. Använd Förnya samtycke på kopplingen i stället.`,
code: 'EXISTING_CONNECTION',
existing_connection_id: establishedRow.id,
},
{ status: 409 }
)
}
}
}
const redirectUrl = `${process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL}/api/extensions/enable-banking/callback`
// Generate cryptographic state token for CSRF protection
const oauthState = crypto.randomUUID()
if (isReconnect && existing) {
// Persist the CSRF state to the existing row BEFORE asking the bank
// to start an authorization. The OAuth callback locates this row only
// by oauth_state, so writing it first guarantees that once the bank
// holds a session bound to this state a matching row already exists.
// If startAuthorization ran first and this UPDATE then failed, the
// bank session would be orphaned with no row to complete it.
//
// Reuse the SAME row: the callback drives it back to
// pending_selection → active, so existing transactions and the
// cash_accounts mirror stay linked. Deliberately keep status
// 'expired' (NOT 'pending') during the round-trip: this row's
// created_at is old and the cron deletes stale 'pending' rows after
// 1h: a reconnect must not be eligible for that. Staying 'expired'
// also keeps it visible in "Åtgärd krävs" so an abandoned reconnect
// is recoverable. The callback's oauth_state lookup accepts 'expired'.
const { error: stateError } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({
oauth_state: oauthState,
status: 'expired',
// session_id is deliberately KEPT here. The callback needs the
// session being replaced to carry the renewed consent across to
// sibling companies sharing it (lib/session-sharing.ts); nulling
// it made the renewal invisible and left the siblings pointing
// at a session the bank had just superseded. 'expired' already
// marks the row dead, and the probe pass skips expired rows.
error_message: null,
psu_type: psuType,
})
.eq('id', existing.id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
if (stateError) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Database error staging reconnect state', {
errorMessage: stateError.message,
errorCode: stateError.code,
connection_id: existing.id,
user_id: user.id,
})
throw new Error(`Failed to update connection: ${stateError.message}`)
}
// Best-effort revoke the dead consent at Enable Banking. A
// closed/expired session is often already gone, so a failure here is
// expected and non-fatal: the new authorization supersedes it.
// Logged at WARN so a systematic revoke failure is visible to
// monitoring (compliance: ASVS V16 / ISO 27001 A.8.15).
// Never revoke a session other companies still hold. On a shared
// consent this revoke would kill their feeds instantly, before the
// replacement session exists, and permanently if the user abandons
// the bank flow. The callback moves the siblings onto the new
// session once it lands; the superseded one lapses on its own.
let oldSessionShared = false
if (existing.session_id) {
const { createServiceClient } = await import('@/lib/supabase/server')
const serviceSupabase = await createServiceClient()
oldSessionShared =
(await countLiveSiblings(serviceSupabase, existing.session_id, existing.id)) > 0
if (oldSessionShared) {
log.info('[enable-banking] Old session shared with other companies: not revoking', {
connection_id: existing.id,
})
}
}
if (existing.session_id && !oldSessionShared) {
try {
await deleteSession(existing.session_id)
} catch (revokeError) {
log.warn('[enable-banking] Old session revoke skipped (likely already expired)', {
message: revokeError instanceof Error ? revokeError.message : String(revokeError),
connection_id: existing.id,
})
}
}
const { url, authorization_id } = await startAuthorization(
resolvedAspspName,
resolvedAspspCountry,
redirectUrl,
oauthState,
psuType,
authMethod,
companyId
)
// Record the bank's authorization_id for audit/traceability. The
// callback matches on oauth_state alone (already persisted above), so
// a failure here cannot orphan the flow: log and continue.
const { error: authIdError } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({ authorization_id })
.eq('id', existing.id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
if (authIdError) {
log.warn('[enable-banking] Could not persist authorization_id on reconnect (non-fatal)', {
errorMessage: authIdError.message,
connection_id: existing.id,
})
}
return NextResponse.json({
connection_id: existing.id,
authorization_url: url,
})
}
// Fresh connect: create the bank authorization, then persist the new
// row carrying its oauth_state so the callback can find it.
const { url, authorization_id } = await startAuthorization(
resolvedAspspName,
resolvedAspspCountry,
redirectUrl,
oauthState,
psuType,
authMethod,
companyId
)
const { data: connection, error } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.insert({
company_id: companyId,
user_id: user.id,
provider: `${resolvedAspspName.toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, '-')}-${resolvedAspspCountry.toLowerCase()}`,
bank_name: resolvedAspspName,
authorization_id,
oauth_state: oauthState,
status: 'pending',
psu_type: psuType,
})
.select()
.single()
if (error) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Database error storing connection', {
errorMessage: error.message,
errorCode: error.code,
errorDetails: error.details,
user_id: user.id,
bank: resolvedAspspName,
})
throw new Error(`Failed to store connection: ${error.message}`)
}
return NextResponse.json({
connection_id: connection.id,
authorization_url: url,
})
} catch (error) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Connect handler error', {
message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
stack: error instanceof Error ? error.stack : undefined,
name: error instanceof Error ? error.name : undefined,
user_id: user.id,
aspsp_name,
aspsp_country,
})
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Connection failed' },
{ status: 500 }
)
}
},
},
{
method: 'POST',
path: '/sync',
handler: async (request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
const log = ctx?.log ?? console
const supabase = ctx?.supabase ?? await (await import('@/lib/supabase/server')).createClient()
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
if (!user) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
}
if (!ctx?.companyId) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Company context required' }, { status: 400 })
}
const companyId = ctx.companyId
const blocked = await requireCapability(supabase, companyId, CAPABILITY.bank_sync)
if (blocked) return blocked
const rl = await checkRateLimit({
prefix: 'enable-banking:sync',
identifier: user.id,
...RATE_LIMIT_SYNC,
})
if (!rl.ok) return rl.response!
// Default 120 days: most callers (Sync Now button, post-activation gap fill)
// want a deep refresh, not a 30-day blip. Cron uses 7-day incrementals separately.
// Bank may still cap at ~90 days per PSD2 without fresh SCA: asking for more
// is harmless and surfaces whatever the ASPSP is willing to return.
const { connection_id, days_back: rawDaysBack = 120 } = await request.json()
const days_back = Math.min(Math.max(1, rawDaysBack), 365)
const { data: connection, error: connectionError } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.select('*')
.eq('id', connection_id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
if (connectionError || !connection) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Connection not found' }, { status: 404 })
}
// 'error' is retryable: a transient upstream failure (e.g. ASPSP_ERROR)
// parks the connection in 'error' while the PSD2 session is still
// alive, so the UI's "Försök igen" must be allowed through; a
// successful sync below restores 'active'. 'expired' stays rejected:
// a dead consent needs re-authorization via /connect, not a retry.
if (connection.status !== 'active' && connection.status !== 'error') {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Connection is not active' }, { status: 400 })
}
try {
// Keep the full list for write-back; sync only the enabled subset.
// undefined enabled === true for back-compat with rows that predate
// the per-account toggle.
const allAccounts = (connection.accounts_data as StoredAccount[] || []).map(a => ({ ...a }))
const accounts = allAccounts.filter(a => a.enabled !== false)
if (accounts.length === 0) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Inga konton är valda för synkning. Öppna "Hantera konton" för att aktivera minst ett.' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
const toDate = new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]
const fromDate = new Date(Date.now() - days_back * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
.toISOString()
.split('T')[0]
const syncStartedAt = new Date().toISOString()
// Use ctx.services.ingestTransactions when available
const ingestFn = ctx?.services.ingestTransactions
// Detect SIE overlap: skip auto-categorization if the sync range
// overlaps with a completed SIE import to prevent double-booking.
// Reconciliation still links bank transactions to existing GL lines.
const { data: sieOverlap } = await supabase
.from('sie_imports')
.select('id')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('status', 'completed')
.gte('fiscal_year_end', fromDate)
.limit(1)
.maybeSingle()
// Check if user is a viewer: viewers get rawInsertOnly (no categorization)
const { data: membership } = await supabase
.from('company_members')
.select('role')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('user_id', user.id)
.maybeSingle()
const isViewer = membership?.role === 'viewer'
// Use strategy=longest when the caller asks for >= 30 days of history
// (initial sync, manual backfill). Short windows get the implicit
// default since there's no older data to surface.
const syncOptions = {
...(sieOverlap ? { skipAutoCategorization: true } : {}),
...(isViewer ? { rawInsertOnly: true } : {}),
...(days_back >= 30 ? { strategy: 'longest' as const } : {}),
}
if (sieOverlap) {
log.info('SIE import overlap detected: suppressing auto-categorization', {
sieImportId: sieOverlap.id,
fromDate,
toDate,
})
}
const results = await Promise.all(
accounts.map(account => syncAccountTransactions(
supabase,
companyId,
user.id,
connection.id,
account,
fromDate,
toDate,
ingestFn,
syncOptions
))
)
const totalImported = results.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.imported, 0)
const totalDuplicates = results.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.duplicates, 0)
// When SIE overlap is detected, run a batch reconciliation sweep.
// The greedy algorithm considers all candidates globally (highest-
// confidence first) and catches matches the inline per-transaction
// pass may have missed due to processing order. One scoped run per
// enabled cash account (issue #1298): the pooled run could persist a
// cross-account journal_entry_id.
// Skip for viewers: reconciliation updates transactions which viewers cannot do.
if (sieOverlap && totalImported > 0 && !isViewer) {
try {
const reconResult = await runUnattendedReconciliationSweep(
supabase,
companyId,
user.id,
{ dateFrom: fromDate, dateTo: toDate },
)
// Stamp the outcome so the UI can render "Vi matchade X av Y" and
// the review surface knows there is something to granska.
await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({
last_sie_sweep: toSweepSummary(reconResult, {
dateFrom: fromDate,
dateTo: toDate,
}),
})
.eq('id', connection.id)
if (reconResult.applied > 0 || reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold > 0) {
log.info('Post-sync batch reconciliation matched additional transactions', {
applied: reconResult.applied,
skippedBelowThreshold: reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold,
accounts: reconResult.accounts.map((a) => ({
accountNumber: a.accountNumber,
applied: a.applied,
skippedBelowThreshold: a.skippedBelowThreshold,
})),
})
}
} catch {
// Non-critical: transactions remain uncategorized for manual review
}
}
const syncedAt = new Date().toISOString()
// Mirror refreshed balances into cash_accounts: the Bank-page source
// picker and the reconciliation status read that table, and without
// this the balance there froze at connect time.
{
const { updateBalancesFromSync } = await import('@/lib/cash-accounts/service')
await updateBalancesFromSync(
supabase,
companyId,
connection.id,
allAccounts.map((a) => ({
external_uid: a.uid,
balance: a.balance,
available_balance: a.available_balance,
balance_updated_at: a.balance_updated_at,
})),
)
}
await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({
accounts_data: allAccounts,
last_synced_at: syncedAt,
// A successful sync proves the session works again: recover an
// 'error' connection to 'active' (so the cron picks it up again)
// and clear any stale failure message from the settings panel.
...(connection.status === 'error' ? { status: 'active' } : {}),
...(connection.status === 'error' || connection.error_message
? { error_message: null }
: {}),
})
.eq('id', connection.id)
if (totalImported > 0) {
const { data: syncedTransactions } = await supabase
.from('transactions')
.select('*')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('bank_connection_id', connection.id)
.gte('created_at', syncStartedAt)
.order('created_at', { ascending: false })
.limit(totalImported)
if (syncedTransactions && syncedTransactions.length > 0) {
const emit = ctx?.emit ?? (await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus.emit.bind((await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus)
await emit({
type: 'transaction.synced',
payload: { transactions: syncedTransactions as Transaction[], userId: user.id, companyId },
})
}
}
return NextResponse.json({
imported: totalImported,
duplicates: totalDuplicates,
last_synced_at: syncedAt,
})
} catch (error) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Sync handler error', {
message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
stack: error instanceof Error ? error.stack : undefined,
name: error instanceof Error ? error.name : undefined,
user_id: user.id,
connection_id,
connectionStatus: connection.status,
bankName: connection.bank_name,
})
// A dead PSD2 session (closed/expired/invalid consent) can't be fixed
// by retrying: the user must re-authorize. Flip the connection to
// 'expired' so the UI surfaces the reconnect affordance, and tell the
// client re-auth is required (reauth_required) so it can offer a
// one-click "Förnya anslutning" instead of a dead-end error. No
// disconnect needed: /connect reconnects this same connection in place.
if (error instanceof SessionExpiredError) {
await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({ status: 'expired', error_message: REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE })
.eq('id', connection.id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
return NextResponse.json(
{
error: REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE,
code: 'SESSION_EXPIRED',
reauth_required: true,
connection_id: connection.id,
},
{ status: 409 }
)
}
// Non-session failure: the settings panel toasts this error verbatim
// and renders error_message on the connection card, so both must be
// the short Swedish message: the raw Enable Banking body (an English
// JSON envelope) is already in the server log above. Refresh the
// stored error_message on rows already in 'error' so a failed retry
// replaces any stale raw body persisted by older code.
if (connection.status === 'error') {
await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({ error_message: SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE })
.eq('id', connection.id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
}
return NextResponse.json({ error: SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE }, { status: 500 })
}
},
},
{
method: 'PATCH',
path: '/accounts',
handler: async (request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
const log = ctx?.log ?? console
const supabase = ctx?.supabase ?? await (await import('@/lib/supabase/server')).createClient()
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
if (!user) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
}
// company_id must come from the verified extension context, never fall
// back to user.id (which is a different identifier dimension and would
// silently mis-scope queries in multi-tenant deployments).
if (!ctx?.companyId) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Company context required' }, { status: 400 })
}
const companyId = ctx.companyId
const rl = await checkRateLimit({
prefix: 'enable-banking:accounts',
identifier: user.id,
...RATE_LIMIT_ACCOUNTS,
})
if (!rl.ok) return rl.response!
const body = await request.json().catch(() => null)
const connection_id = body?.connection_id
const enabled_uids = body?.enabled_uids
const rawLookback = body?.initial_lookback_days
const rawLookbackFromDate = body?.initial_lookback_from_date
const account_mappings = body?.account_mappings
if (typeof connection_id !== 'string' || !connection_id) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'connection_id krävs' }, { status: 400 })
}
if (!Array.isArray(enabled_uids) || !enabled_uids.every(u => typeof u === 'string')) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'enabled_uids måste vara en lista av strängar' }, { status: 400 })
}
if (enabled_uids.length === 0) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Välj minst ett konto, eller koppla bort banken om inga konton ska synkas.' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
if (enabled_uids.length > MAX_ENABLED_UIDS) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: `Max ${MAX_ENABLED_UIDS} konton per anslutning.` },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// account_mappings is optional. When present, it's an array of
// { uid, ledger_account } pairs that route per-account ingest to a
// specific BAS account (e.g. EUR account → 1932 instead of the default 1930).
// Restrict to BAS class 19 (kassa/bank). Accepting e.g. 3001 (revenue)
// or 2640 (input VAT) here would silently misroute every bank-side
// journal-entry leg into a revenue/VAT account, corrupting both the
// ledger and momsdeklaration. The chart-of-accounts existence check
// below is necessary but not sufficient: those accounts likely do
// exist in the chart, but they're the wrong class.
const BAS_ACCOUNT_PATTERN = /^19[0-9]{2}$/
type AccountMapping = { uid: string; ledger_account?: string | null }
let mappings: AccountMapping[] = []
if (account_mappings !== undefined) {
if (!Array.isArray(account_mappings)) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'account_mappings måste vara en lista' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
for (const m of account_mappings) {
if (!m || typeof m !== 'object' || typeof m.uid !== 'string') {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'account_mappings: varje post kräver uid (sträng)' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
if (m.ledger_account != null && (typeof m.ledger_account !== 'string' || !BAS_ACCOUNT_PATTERN.test(m.ledger_account))) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'account_mappings: ledger_account måste vara ett BAS-konto i klass 19 (1900-1999)' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
}
mappings = account_mappings as AccountMapping[]
}
// initial_lookback_days only applies on the pending_selection→active transition.
// Default 120; clamp to [30, 365]. Ignored for selection edits.
// PSD2 obliges ASPSPs to ~90 days without fresh SCA, but many Swedish banks
// return more if asked: request 120 and accept whatever the bank gives back.
//
// If the client sent initial_lookback_from_date (preferred for fiscal-year-anchored
// backfills), derive days from that and reject future dates outright. Otherwise
// fall back to initial_lookback_days (or the 120-day default).
if (typeof rawLookbackFromDate === 'string' && /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/.test(rawLookbackFromDate)) {
const from = new Date(rawLookbackFromDate + 'T00:00:00Z')
if (!Number.isFinite(from.getTime())) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'initial_lookback_from_date är inte ett giltigt datum.' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
const diffMs = Date.now() - from.getTime()
const daysFromDate = Math.ceil(diffMs / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000))
if (daysFromDate <= 0) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'initial_lookback_from_date måste ligga i det förflutna.' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
}
const initialLookbackDays = (() => {
if (typeof rawLookbackFromDate === 'string' && /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}$/.test(rawLookbackFromDate)) {
const from = new Date(rawLookbackFromDate + 'T00:00:00Z')
// Future/invalid dates already rejected above; days > 0 is guaranteed.
const diffMs = Date.now() - from.getTime()
const days = Math.ceil(diffMs / (24 * 60 * 60 * 1000))
return Math.min(365, Math.max(1, days))
}
const n = typeof rawLookback === 'number' && Number.isFinite(rawLookback) ? rawLookback : 120
return Math.min(365, Math.max(30, Math.round(n)))
})()
const { data: connection, error: connectionError } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.select('id, status, accounts_data, bank_name')
.eq('id', connection_id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
if (connectionError || !connection) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Connection not found' }, { status: 404 })
}
if (connection.status !== 'pending_selection' && connection.status !== 'active') {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Anslutningen kan inte konfigureras i nuvarande status.' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
const existing = (connection.accounts_data as StoredAccount[] || []).map(a => ({ ...a }))
const knownUids = new Set(existing.map(a => a.uid))
const unknownUids = enabled_uids.filter(uid => !knownUids.has(uid))
if (unknownUids.length > 0) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'Ett eller flera konton kunde inte hittas.', unknown_uids: unknownUids },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// Mirror the enabled_uids guard for account_mappings: without this,
// a typo'd UID in the mapping list is silently dropped (the entry
// never lands in the resulting accounts_data) while the response is
// still 200, leaving the client to believe the mapping was applied.
const unknownMappingUids = mappings.map(m => m.uid).filter(uid => !knownUids.has(uid))
if (unknownMappingUids.length > 0) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'account_mappings innehåller okända konto-uid.', unknown_uids: unknownMappingUids },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// Verify any provided ledger_account values actually exist in the
// company's chart of accounts. Prevents users from typing arbitrary
// numbers via the API and breaking journal entry creation later.
const requestedLedgerAccounts = mappings
.map(m => m.ledger_account)
.filter((a): a is string => typeof a === 'string')
if (requestedLedgerAccounts.length > 0) {
const { data: chartRows } = await supabase
.from('chart_of_accounts')
.select('account_number')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.in('account_number', requestedLedgerAccounts)
const validAccountNumbers = new Set((chartRows || []).map(r => r.account_number as string))
const invalid = requestedLedgerAccounts.filter(a => !validAccountNumbers.has(a))
if (invalid.length > 0) {
return NextResponse.json(
{
error: 'Ett eller flera bokföringskonton finns inte i kontoplanen.',
invalid_accounts: invalid,
},
{ status: 400 }
)
}
}
const enabledSet = new Set(enabled_uids)
const mappingsByUid = new Map(mappings.map(m => [m.uid, m]))
const updatedAccounts: StoredAccount[] = existing.map(a => {
const mapping = mappingsByUid.get(a.uid)
const next: StoredAccount = {
...a,
enabled: enabledSet.has(a.uid),
// Apply ledger_account from mapping when present. Explicit null clears it.
// Absent mapping leaves the existing ledger_account untouched (back-compat
// with selection-edit calls that don't include account_mappings).
...(mapping
? { ledger_account: mapping.ledger_account ?? undefined }
: {}),
}
// Enabling an account is the deliberate takeover the callback's
// guard flags exist to force: once made, the flags are stale (the
// account syncs HERE now) and would keep rendering a false
// "synkas i annat bolag" note in every later picker.
if (next.enabled) {
delete next.claimed_by_company_id
delete next.claimed_by_company_name
delete next.deselected_elsewhere
}
return next
})
// Accounts the callback guard left disabled AND unmirrored (no ledger
// anywhere) stay that way through a save that does not enable them:
// allocating a 19xx slot and upserting a cash_accounts row for a
// still-disabled claimed account would recreate exactly the state the
// guard exists to prevent (another company's IBAN and name in this
// company's chart and routing table), one screen after the callback
// avoided it. Disabled accounts that already have a ledger or a
// mirrored row keep the existing behavior: their row's enabled flag
// must still flip off.
const neverMirroredDisabledUids = new Set<string>()
// Resolve the effective mirror ledger for every account up front and
// reject collisions with a 400 — the mirror pass below writes into
// cash_accounts, whose UNIQUE (company_id, ledger_account) constraint
// would otherwise fail per-account and get swallowed, leaving accounts
// silently unmirrored.
const { resolvePsd2LedgerAccount, upsertFromPsd2, getRevokedConnectionIds, normalizeIban } =
await import('@/lib/cash-accounts/service')
const { data: companyCashRows } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.select('id, external_uid, bank_connection_id, ledger_account, iban')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
const cashRows = (companyCashRows ?? []) as Array<{
id: string
external_uid: string | null
bank_connection_id: string | null
ledger_account: string
iban: string | null
}>
// Rows that already represent one of THIS connection's accounts, matched
// on IBAN rather than on the provider uid. After a re-authorization (new
// uids) or a fresh connect to an already-connected bank (new connection
// row), these are the user's own mappings wearing a stale owner: they
// must not be treated as another bank's territory, and the mirror pass
// below promotes them in place instead of inserting a second row.
const rowByIban = new Map<string, { id: string; ledger_account: string }>()
for (const r of cashRows) {
const normalized = normalizeIban(r.iban)
if (normalized && !rowByIban.has(normalized)) {
rowByIban.set(normalized, { id: r.id, ledger_account: r.ledger_account })
}
}
const reuseRowByUid = new Map<string, { id: string; ledger_account: string }>()
for (const a of updatedAccounts) {
const normalized = normalizeIban(a.iban)
const row = normalized ? rowByIban.get(normalized) : undefined
if (row) reuseRowByUid.set(a.uid, row)
}
const ownIbanRowIds = new Set([...reuseRowByUid.values()].map(r => r.id))
const existingLedgerByUid = new Map(
cashRows
.filter(r => r.bank_connection_id === connection.id && r.external_uid)
.map(r => [r.external_uid as string, r.ledger_account])
)
// Slots held by OTHER connections' PSD2 accounts — an explicit mapping
// onto one of those would violate the unique constraint. Manual rows
// are not foreign: upsertFromPsd2 promotes them in place. Rows held by
// a REVOKED connection are not foreign either: those are orphaned
// leftovers (disconnect predating the claim release, or a lost demote)
// and upsertFromPsd2 promotes them in place too. Excluding them here
// is the self-heal path for companies whose bank was disconnected
// before disconnect started releasing ledger claims.
const foreignConnectionIds = [
...new Set(
cashRows
.filter(r => r.bank_connection_id !== null && r.bank_connection_id !== connection.id)
.map(r => r.bank_connection_id as string)
),
]
const revokedConnectionIds = await getRevokedConnectionIds(
supabase,
companyId,
foreignConnectionIds
)
const foreignConnectedLedgers = new Set(
cashRows
.filter(
r =>
r.bank_connection_id !== null &&
r.bank_connection_id !== connection.id &&
!revokedConnectionIds.has(r.bank_connection_id) &&
// Same IBAN as one of this connection's accounts: the same
// physical account under a stale owner, not a foreign claim.
!ownIbanRowIds.has(r.id)
)
.map(r => r.ledger_account)
)
const effectiveLedgerByUid = new Map<string, string>()
const usedLedgers = new Set<string>()
const duplicateLedgers = new Set<string>()
const conflictingLedgers = new Set<string>()
// First pass: accounts with an explicit or previously mirrored ledger.
for (const a of updatedAccounts) {
const ledger = a.ledger_account ?? existingLedgerByUid.get(a.uid)
if (!ledger) continue
if (usedLedgers.has(ledger)) duplicateLedgers.add(ledger)
if (foreignConnectedLedgers.has(ledger) && existingLedgerByUid.get(a.uid) !== ledger) {
conflictingLedgers.add(ledger)
}
usedLedgers.add(ledger)
effectiveLedgerByUid.set(a.uid, ledger)
}
if (duplicateLedgers.size > 0) {
return NextResponse.json(
{
error: 'Flera bankkonton kan inte bokföras på samma konto. Välj olika bokföringskonton.',
duplicate_accounts: [...duplicateLedgers],
},
{ status: 400 }
)
}
if (conflictingLedgers.size > 0) {
return NextResponse.json(
{
error: 'Bokföringskontot används redan av ett bankkonto från en annan bankanslutning.',
conflicting_accounts: [...conflictingLedgers],
},
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// Second pass: allocate a free slot for accounts with no ledger at all
// (legacy connections mirrored before allocation existed, or mappings
// explicitly cleared). Allocation failure must never block selection
// save — fall back to the pre-allocator behavior (1930) and let the
// mirror pass surface any collision per-account, as before.
for (const a of updatedAccounts) {
if (effectiveLedgerByUid.has(a.uid)) continue
// See neverMirroredDisabledUids above: a disabled account that has
// never held a ledger or a mirrored row gets neither allocated nor
// mirrored by this save.
if (!enabledSet.has(a.uid) && !reuseRowByUid.has(a.uid)) {
neverMirroredDisabledUids.add(a.uid)
continue
}
let allocated: string | null = null
try {
const resolved = await resolvePsd2LedgerAccount(supabase, companyId, user.id, {
iban: a.iban,
currency: a.currency,
accountName: a.name,
exclude: usedLedgers,
})
allocated = resolved?.ledgerAccount ?? null
} catch (allocErr) {
log.warn('[enable-banking] ledger allocation failed on selection save', {
connectionId: connection.id,
uid: a.uid,
error: allocErr instanceof Error ? allocErr.message : String(allocErr),
})
}
const ledger = allocated ?? '1930'
usedLedgers.add(ledger)
effectiveLedgerByUid.set(a.uid, ledger)
}
// accounts_data mirrors the resolved assignment so the picker
// pre-fills reality on the next open. Skipped disabled accounts keep
// no assignment: their slot is only claimed if they are ever enabled.
for (const a of updatedAccounts) {
if (neverMirroredDisabledUids.has(a.uid)) continue
a.ledger_account = effectiveLedgerByUid.get(a.uid)
}
// State machine: only transition pending_selection → active. Once
// active, the status field is omitted from the update so the same
// endpoint can be reused to change account selection without
// re-asserting a transition that has already happened.
const updatePayload: { accounts_data: StoredAccount[]; status?: 'active' } = {
accounts_data: updatedAccounts,
}
if (connection.status === 'pending_selection') {
updatePayload.status = 'active'
}
const { error: updateError } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update(updatePayload)
.eq('id', connection.id)
if (updateError) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to update account selection', {
errorMessage: updateError.message,
connectionId: connection.id,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
})
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Kunde inte spara kontoval' }, { status: 500 })
}
// Mirror the user's selection into cash_accounts so routing decisions
// and reconciliation pick up the new enabled state + ledger mapping
// without reading the JSONB column.
{
for (const a of updatedAccounts) {
// Never-mirrored disabled accounts (callback-guard leftovers the
// user did not enable) get no cash_accounts row: see above.
if (neverMirroredDisabledUids.has(a.uid)) continue
const ledgerAccount = a.ledger_account ?? '1930'
// Only reuse the IBAN-matched row when it already sits on the
// ledger we are about to write. If the user deliberately remapped
// the account to a different BAS number, promoting the old row
// would move a row out from under the ledger it still holds.
const reuseRow = reuseRowByUid.get(a.uid)
const reuseCashAccountId =
reuseRow && reuseRow.ledger_account === ledgerAccount ? reuseRow.id : null
try {
await upsertFromPsd2(supabase, companyId, {
bank_connection_id: connection.id,
external_uid: a.uid,
currency: a.currency,
ledger_account: ledgerAccount,
iban: a.iban ?? null,
name: a.name ?? null,
balance: a.balance ?? null,
available_balance: a.available_balance ?? null,
balance_updated_at: a.balance_updated_at ?? null,
enabled: a.enabled ?? true,
reuse_cash_account_id: reuseCashAccountId,
})
} catch (cashErr) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to mirror cash_account on selection save', {
connectionId: connection.id,
uid: a.uid,
error: cashErr instanceof Error ? cashErr.message : String(cashErr),
})
}
}
}
const newStatus = updatePayload.status ?? connection.status
log.info('[enable-banking] Account selection saved', {
connectionId: connection.id,
enabledCount: enabled_uids.length,
totalCount: existing.length,
previousStatus: connection.status,
newStatus,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
})
try {
const emit = ctx?.emit ?? (await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus.emit.bind((await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus)
await emit({
type: 'bank_connection.account_selection_changed',
payload: {
connectionId: connection.id,
bankName: (connection as { bank_name?: string | null }).bank_name ?? null,
previousStatus: connection.status,
newStatus,
enabledCount: enabled_uids.length,
totalCount: existing.length,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
},
})
} catch (emitError) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to emit account selection event', {
errorMessage: emitError instanceof Error ? emitError.message : String(emitError),
connectionId: connection.id,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
})
}
// Initial backfill on activation. Run inline so the user has data the
// moment they finish account selection: no 24h cron wait. Failures
// here don't fail the PATCH; the cron will retry on its next run
// (gated on initial_sync_completed_at IS NULL).
let initialSyncSummary: {
imported: number
duplicates: number
auto_matched: number
requested_from: string
returned_min_date: string | null
returned_max_date: string | null
} | null = null
let initialSyncError: string | null = null
if (connection.status === 'pending_selection') {
const accountsToSync = updatedAccounts.filter(a => a.enabled !== false)
const toDate = new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]
const fromDate = new Date(Date.now() - initialLookbackDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
.toISOString()
.split('T')[0]
// Same guard the manual /sync route and the cron apply. This path also
// runs on RENEWAL (reconnect resets status to pending_selection), and a
// fresh consent often makes the bank release history the first connect
// never delivered, straight over an already-bookkept period. Without
// the guard those rows would be auto-categorized into brand-new
// verifikat (double-booking) instead of being linked to the ones that
// already describe them.
const { data: sieOverlap } = await supabase
.from('sie_imports')
.select('id')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('status', 'completed')
.gte('fiscal_year_end', fromDate)
.limit(1)
.maybeSingle()
const { data: membership } = await supabase
.from('company_members')
.select('role')
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('user_id', user.id)
.maybeSingle()
const isViewer = membership?.role === 'viewer'
log.info('[enable-banking] Starting inline initial backfill', {
connectionId: connection.id,
accountCount: accountsToSync.length,
lookbackDays: initialLookbackDays,
fromDate,
toDate,
sieOverlap: Boolean(sieOverlap),
})
let timeoutHandle: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined
try {
const ingestFn = ctx?.services.ingestTransactions
const syncPromise = Promise.all(
accountsToSync.map(account => syncAccountTransactions(
supabase,
companyId,
user.id,
connection.id,
account,
fromDate,
toDate,
ingestFn,
{
strategy: 'longest',
...(sieOverlap ? { skipAutoCategorization: true } : {}),
...(isViewer ? { rawInsertOnly: true } : {}),
}
))
)
// If the timeout wins the race, the underlying Promise.all keeps
// running. Without a registered handler, a late rejection from the
// bank API would surface as an unhandledRejection: Node 22 (the
// self-hosted Docker runtime) terminates the process by default on
// those, taking the whole server down. The cron retries the
// backfill via initial_sync_completed_at IS NULL, so a no-op
// catch is the right policy here.
syncPromise.catch(() => {})
const TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000
const timeoutPromise = new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
timeoutHandle = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('initial_sync_timeout')), TIMEOUT_MS)
})
const results = await Promise.race([syncPromise, timeoutPromise])
const totalImported = results.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.imported, 0)
const totalDuplicates = results.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.duplicates, 0)
// Min/max booking date across all synced accounts
const minDates = results.map(r => r.returnedMinBookingDate).filter((d): d is string => !!d)
const maxDates = results.map(r => r.returnedMaxBookingDate).filter((d): d is string => !!d)
const returnedMin = minDates.length > 0 ? minDates.reduce((a, b) => (a < b ? a : b)) : null
const returnedMax = maxDates.length > 0 ? maxDates.reduce((a, b) => (a > b ? a : b)) : null
// Post-backfill reconciliation sweep, mirroring the manual /sync
// route: link just-imported rows to the verifikat that already
// describe them so a re-released period does not resurface as
// hundreds of "ohanterade" transactions. Unlike the /sync and cron
// sweeps this runs once per enabled ledger account with a resolved
// cash-account scope: the pooled unscoped form can cross-link
// accounts (#1290/#1298). Both a thrown scope resolution AND an
// unresolved cash-account row (found: false) skip that account's
// sweep instead of widening to the pooled form.
//
// The window opens at the OLDEST booking date the bank actually
// returned when that is older than the requested fromDate: some
// ASPSPs over-return history, and rows outside the requested window
// would otherwise be ingested but never swept.
const sweepDateFrom = returnedMin && returnedMin < fromDate ? returnedMin : fromDate
// The sweep writes bank-feed metadata only (transactions.journal_entry_id,
// reconciliation_method, is_business): journal tables are never touched,
// so BFL immutability and period locks (which guard journal entries) are
// not in play. Links to opening-balance verifikat are blocked by the
// check_transaction_link_not_opening_balance trigger, and every link is
// reversible via unlinkReconciliation without any ledger write.
let totalAutoMatched = 0
if (sieOverlap && totalImported > 0 && !isViewer) {
// Filter, not `?? undefined`: an undefined accountNumber makes
// resolveCashAccountScope fall back to the primary account with
// includeUnassigned=true, which is the pooled form this block must
// never widen to. The allocator gives every enabled account a
// concrete ledger_account, so nothing is skipped in practice.
const ledgerAccounts = Array.from(
new Set(
accountsToSync
.map(a => a.ledger_account)
.filter((l): l is string => typeof l === 'string' && l.length > 0)
)
)
for (const ledgerAccount of ledgerAccounts) {
try {
const scope = await resolveCashAccountScope(supabase, companyId, ledgerAccount)
if (!scope.found) {
log.warn('[enable-banking] No cash_accounts row for ledger account; skipping its reconciliation sweep', {
connectionId: connection.id,
ledgerAccount,
})
continue
}
const reconResult = await runReconciliation(supabase, companyId, user.id, {
dateFrom: sweepDateFrom,
dateTo: toDate,
accountNumber: scope.accountNumber,
currency: scope.currency,
cashAccountId: scope.cashAccountId,
includeUnassigned: scope.includeUnassigned,
// Unattended run: nobody reviews a dry-run first, so never
// commit low-confidence (fuzzy / date-range) matches.
confidenceThreshold: DEFAULT_UNATTENDED_CONFIDENCE_THRESHOLD,
// ...but don't DROP them either: the 0.75-0.89 band feeds
// the "Granska förslag" review surface.
persistSuggestions: true,
})
totalAutoMatched += reconResult.applied
if (reconResult.applied > 0 || reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold > 0) {
log.info('[enable-banking] Post-backfill reconciliation linked imported rows to existing verifikat', {
connectionId: connection.id,
accountNumber: scope.accountNumber,
applied: reconResult.applied,
skippedBelowThreshold: reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold,
total: reconResult.matches.length,
})
}
} catch {
// Non-critical: rows stay unmatched for manual review.
}
}
}
// Mirror the balances the backfill just fetched into cash_accounts.
// accounts_data is deliberately NOT re-written here (see below), so
// without this the balances fetched during the initial sync would
// reach neither store until the next scheduled sync.
try {
const { updateBalancesFromSync } = await import('@/lib/cash-accounts/service')
await updateBalancesFromSync(
supabase,
companyId,
connection.id,
updatedAccounts.map((a) => ({
external_uid: a.uid,
balance: a.balance,
available_balance: a.available_balance,
balance_updated_at: a.balance_updated_at,
})),
)
} catch (mirrorErr) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Balance mirror after initial backfill failed', {
connectionId: connection.id,
error: mirrorErr instanceof Error ? mirrorErr.message : String(mirrorErr),
})
}
const completedAt = new Date().toISOString()
// Don't re-write accounts_data here: the first update already wrote it.
// Including it again races with any concurrent writer (e.g. cron firing in
// the sub-60s window) and would silently overwrite their changes.
const { error: metaUpdateError } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({
last_synced_at: completedAt,
initial_sync_completed_at: completedAt,
initial_sync_requested_from: fromDate,
initial_sync_returned_min_date: returnedMin,
initial_sync_returned_max_date: returnedMax,
initial_sync_lookback_days: initialLookbackDays,
})
.eq('id', connection.id)
if (metaUpdateError) {
// The sync itself succeeded (transactions are ingested) but we
// couldn't persist that. Falsely reporting success would tell the
// client "imported N transactions" while the DB still has
// initial_sync_completed_at = NULL, causing the cron to re-run a
// 90-day backfill next morning. Surface this as initial_sync_error
// so the UI shows a "background sync needs retry" warning, and the
// cron's gate (initial_sync_completed_at IS NULL) will self-heal.
initialSyncError = `metadata_update_failed: ${metaUpdateError.message}`
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to persist initial_sync metadata after backfill', {
connectionId: connection.id,
error: metaUpdateError.message,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
})
} else {
initialSyncSummary = {
imported: totalImported,
duplicates: totalDuplicates,
auto_matched: totalAutoMatched,
requested_from: fromDate,
returned_min_date: returnedMin,
returned_max_date: returnedMax,
}
log.info('[enable-banking] Inline initial backfill complete', {
connectionId: connection.id,
...initialSyncSummary,
})
}
} catch (syncError) {
initialSyncError = syncError instanceof Error ? syncError.message : String(syncError)
log.error('[enable-banking] Inline initial backfill failed: cron will retry', {
connectionId: connection.id,
error: initialSyncError,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
})
} finally {
if (timeoutHandle) clearTimeout(timeoutHandle)
}
}
return NextResponse.json({
success: true,
enabled_count: enabled_uids.length,
total_count: existing.length,
...(initialSyncSummary ? { initial_sync: initialSyncSummary } : {}),
...(initialSyncError ? { initial_sync_error: initialSyncError } : {}),
})
},
},
{
method: 'DELETE',
path: '/disconnect',
handler: async (request: Request, ctx?: ExtensionContext) => {
const log = ctx?.log ?? console
const supabase = ctx?.supabase ?? await (await import('@/lib/supabase/server')).createClient()
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
if (!user) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
}
if (!ctx?.companyId) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Company context required' }, { status: 400 })
}
const companyId = ctx.companyId
const rl = await checkRateLimit({
prefix: 'enable-banking:disconnect',
identifier: user.id,
...RATE_LIMIT_DISCONNECT,
})
if (!rl.ok) return rl.response!
const { connection_id } = await request.json()
if (!connection_id) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'connection_id is required' }, { status: 400 })
}
const { data: connection, error: findError } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.select('id, session_id, status, bank_name')
.eq('id', connection_id)
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.single()
if (findError || !connection) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Connection not found' }, { status: 404 })
}
// Revoke the PSD2 consent only when no other company still depends on
// it. Sessions are shared across a user's companies (see
// lib/session-sharing.ts), so a blind revoke here would silently take
// down a sibling company's bank feed: exactly the failure this feature
// exists to remove. countLiveSiblings needs the service client because
// RLS hides a sibling living in a company the user has since left, and
// an unseen sibling would read as "safe to revoke".
let sharedWithSiblings = false
if (connection.session_id) {
const { createServiceClient } = await import('@/lib/supabase/server')
const serviceSupabase = await createServiceClient()
const siblingCount = await countLiveSiblings(
serviceSupabase,
connection.session_id,
connection.id,
)
sharedWithSiblings = siblingCount > 0
if (sharedWithSiblings) {
log.info('[enable-banking] Session still in use by other companies: skipping revoke', {
connectionId: connection.id,
siblingCount,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
})
}
}
if (connection.session_id && !sharedWithSiblings) {
try {
await deleteSession(connection.session_id)
} catch (error) {
// The revoke is best-effort: an expired or already-closed session
// is the normal case here, and the disconnect continues either
// way, so this is a warning and not an error.
log.warn('[enable-banking] Failed to revoke PSD2 session (may be expired)', {
message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
sessionId: connection.session_id,
connectionId: connection_id,
connectionStatus: connection.status,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
})
}
}
const { error: updateError } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({ status: 'revoked', session_id: null })
.eq('id', connection.id)
if (updateError) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to mark connection revoked', {
errorMessage: updateError.message,
connectionId: connection.id,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
})
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Failed to disconnect' }, { status: 500 })
}
// Release the connection's ledger claims by demoting its cash_accounts
// rows to manual (bank_connection_id = null). The rows themselves stay:
// transactions.cash_account_id and the ledger history reference them,
// and upsertFromPsd2 promotes a manual holder in place on reconnect so
// the same bank lands back on its original BAS account (e.g. 1930)
// instead of overflowing to the next free slot.
const { error: releaseError } = await supabase
.from('cash_accounts')
.update({ bank_connection_id: null })
.eq('company_id', companyId)
.eq('bank_connection_id', connection.id)
if (releaseError) {
// Don't fail the disconnect: the connection is already revoked, and
// the allocator / collision guard also skip revoked connections, so
// the orphaned rows self-heal on the next picker save.
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to release cash_accounts ledger claims on disconnect', {
errorMessage: releaseError.message,
connectionId: connection.id,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
})
}
try {
const emit = ctx?.emit ?? (await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus.emit.bind((await import('@/lib/events/bus')).eventBus)
await emit({
type: 'bank_connection.revoked',
payload: {
connectionId: connection.id,
bankName: (connection as { bank_name?: string | null }).bank_name ?? null,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
},
})
} catch (emitError) {
log.error('[enable-banking] Failed to emit revoke event', {
errorMessage: emitError instanceof Error ? emitError.message : String(emitError),
connectionId: connection.id,
userId: user.id,
companyId,
})
}
return NextResponse.json({ success: true })
},
},
],
eventHandlers: [],
}