* fix(bank-sync): cron backfills the gap since the last successful sync The daily incremental sync always asked the bank for the last 7 days. Any pause longer than that (a lapsed subscription paid again, a consent renewed after expiry, an outage) silently lost the days in between: the connection came back, looked healthy, and the missing transactions never arrived. The lookback now widens to cover the gap since last_synced_at plus one day of overlap, capped at the 90-day PSD2 limit, and a gap of a month or more asks for strategy=longest like the manual sync route does. Dedup via external_id makes the overlap harmless. First syncs keep their 90-day path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * feat(bank-sync): chip warns seven days before a bank consent expires The transactions-page chip only reacted once a connection was already dead (expired/error) or had gone stale. A consent that is about to end looked healthy until the morning it stopped syncing. New "expiring" state when a live connection's consent_expires is within seven days, the same threshold as the consent-expiry email in the sync cron. Precedence: attention, expiring, stale, healthy. getChipState moves to lib/transactions/bank-sync-chip-state.ts so the precedence is unit-tested; the component keeps the rendering only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * feat(bank-sync): chip says paused when the subscription lapsed The daily cron filters connections by the bank_sync capability, so a company whose trial or subscription ended keeps status=active rows with a frozen last_synced_at. The chip read that as "stale, check the connection", which sends the user to re-authorise a connection that is perfectly alive. 56 of 191 active connections on prod were in this state on 2026-09-01. New "paused" state, ranked above everything else, when the company lacks bank_sync: hosted points at billing, self-host at the connector key, the same split BankSyncNowButton already makes. getChipState takes an options object so the clock stays out of render (react-hooks/purity). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * feat(api): agent-triggerable bank sync in v1 and MCP Closes the first wish in the F2 report: an integration could read bank data but never refresh it. New POST /api/v1/companies/{id}/bank-connections/ {connectionId}/sync and MCP gnubok_sync_bank, both on a shared runner (extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/trigger-sync.ts). Cost is bounded structurally, not by policy: the window is never caller-controlled (the cron's gap-aware 7 to 90 day lookback), a connection synced within 15 minutes answers BANK_SYNC_COOLDOWN with next_allowed_at (429 + Retry-After on v1; synced=false in-band on MCP so the agent reads on instead of retrying), and a failing connection is throttled per process by attempt time. A dead session is flipped to expired with a remediation that hands the user the connect link: no API call revives a consent. Gated on bank_sync like gnubok_connect_bank; scope transactions:write. Registry, scope map, load-routes, spec snapshot and the generated accounted-api skill updated; five BANK_SYNC_* / BANK_SESSION_EXPIRED codes added to the structured-error registry. The web Synka-nu route is left as is (see DECISIONS.md). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * test(bank-sync): use the options object in the remaining chip-state calls Four multi-line calls still passed the clock positionally after getChipState moved to an options object; tsc flagged them (vitest did not, the extra argument was ignored at runtime). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * fix(api): address skeptic findings on the agent-triggered bank sync Three refutations from the pre-publish skeptic pass: 1. Core imported the extension. The v1 sync route pulled the runner straight from @/extensions, which the core-build gate rejects and which left a live bank endpoint on zero-extension builds. The route now resolves it through the registry's services channel against a contract in lib/bank-sync/trigger-sync-contract.ts (same pattern as the Skatteverket read service) and answers EXTENSION_DISABLED when the extension is absent. 2. The idempotency cache stored the handler-level 429. A same-key retry after Retry-After, which is the documented retry, replayed the stale cooldown as a 400 for the cache's 24-hour TTL. withApiV1 no longer caches 429 responses; regression test added. The endpoint's pitfall no longer claims Idempotency-Key is mandatory (it was never enforced). 3. Two cron tests read the clock twice and failed whenever a millisecond passed between the reads. They now pin the clock with fake timers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * fix(bank-sync): durable cooldown lease and review wording Resolves the PR #2165 review findings in one pass. Superagent P1: the attempt throttle was a process-local Map, so two agent calls on different serverless instances (or a retry after a cold start on a failing connection) could each bill an Enable Banking call, contradicting the one-sync-per-15-minutes promise. New bank_connections.sync_lease_until (migration 20260902150000), claimed with one conditional UPDATE before the bank is called; Postgres row locking makes exactly one claimer win, the rest answer BANK_SYNC_COOLDOWN. The lease stays for the full window on success and failure. Tests cover the claim order, a failed attempt seen from a second instance, a lost race, and an expired lease. CodeRabbit: the =1 plural branch now reads "in 1 day" / "om 1 dag" (daysUntilConsentExpiry rounds a partial day up, so "tomorrow" could be today); the cooldown pitfall on the v1 endpoint, the MCP description and the in-band cooldown instruction now say a cooldown can follow a failed attempt and tell the agent to compare last_synced_at before deciding. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub * fix(bank-sync): lease claim as a literal filter for the schema guard CI's no-phantom-columns guard counts runtime-built query expressions and its ceiling is exact; the templated `.or('sync_lease_until.is.null,...')` claim added one. The column now defaults to epoch (NOT NULL), so "never claimed" is just "expired long ago" and the atomic claim is a single literal `.lte('sync_lease_until', now)` the guard can check. Migration is unshipped (same PR), so it is edited in place. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub * fix(bank-sync): runner verifies company membership before the lease Superagent (round 3): the MCP path reached the shared runner without a membership check of its own. Both callers do enforce it upstream (withApiV1's company resolution and resolveMcpCompanyContext in the MCP dispatcher), but the runner writes transactions and bills a bank call, so it now checks company_members itself, before the cooldown and the lease claim, and answers NOT_FOUND for a non-member. The viewer check that was buried inside the sync block moves up with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
667 lines
26 KiB
TypeScript
667 lines
26 KiB
TypeScript
import { type SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import { createServiceRoleClient } from '@/lib/supabase/service-client'
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import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { syncAccountTransactions } from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/sync'
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import {
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runUnattendedReconciliationSweep,
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toSweepSummary,
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} from '@/lib/reconciliation/unattended-sweep'
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import {
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isConsentExpiringSoon,
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getDaysUntilExpiry,
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probeSessionHealth,
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SessionExpiredError,
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REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE,
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SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE,
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} from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/api-client'
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import { getEmailService } from '@/lib/email/service'
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import {
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generateConsentExpiryEmailHtml,
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generateConsentExpiryEmailText,
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generateConsentExpiryEmailSubject,
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} from '@/lib/email/consent-notification-templates'
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import { ensureInitialized } from '@/lib/init'
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import { getCompanyIdsWithCapability } from '@/lib/entitlements/has-capability'
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import { CAPABILITY } from '@/lib/entitlements/keys'
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import { withCronContext } from '@/lib/api/with-cron-context'
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import { errorResponse, errorResponseFromCode } from '@/lib/errors/get-structured-error'
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import { getBranding } from '@/lib/branding/service'
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import { fetchAllRows } from '@/lib/supabase/fetch-all'
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import { updateBalancesFromSync } from '@/lib/cash-accounts/service'
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import type { StoredAccount } from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/types'
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import {
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INCREMENTAL_LOOKBACK_DAYS,
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MAX_LOOKBACK_DAYS,
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incrementalLookbackDays,
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} from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/cron-lookback'
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ensureInitialized()
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// Without this export the route runs under the platform default (60s), which
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// is why the sync loop used to self-limit to 50s and starve the queue: ~17
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// connections per day against 100+ entitled active connections, so any given
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// connection only got an automatic sync every 4-7 days.
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export const maxDuration = 300
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const MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_RUN = 300
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// Connections synced concurrently within one wave. Enable Banking calls are
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// I/O-bound, so a small fan-out multiplies throughput without hammering the
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// ASPSPs; per-connection error isolation is preserved inside each wave.
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const SYNC_CONCURRENCY = 4
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/**
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* GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/sync/cron
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* Automatic daily bank transaction sync
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* Runs at 05:00 UTC (07:00 Swedish time)
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*
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* Sized so one run covers every entitled active connection (Vercel Pro 300s
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* timeout, 4-way concurrency). Prioritizes connections not synced for the
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* longest time, so anything cut off by the time budget is first tomorrow.
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* Deduplication via external_id makes repeated runs safe.
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*/
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export const GET = withCronContext('cron.bank_sync', async (_request, ctx) => {
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const supabaseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL
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const supabaseServiceKey = process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
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if (!supabaseUrl || !supabaseServiceKey) {
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return errorResponseFromCode('INTERNAL_ERROR', ctx.log, {
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requestId: ctx.requestId,
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details: { reason: 'Missing Supabase configuration' },
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})
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}
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const supabase = createServiceRoleClient(supabaseUrl, supabaseServiceKey)
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// Clean up stale pending connections (older than 1 hour)
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const oneHourAgo = new Date(Date.now() - 60 * 60 * 1000).toISOString()
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const { data: stalePending } = await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.delete()
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.eq('status', 'pending')
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.lt('created_at', oneHourAgo)
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.select('id')
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if (stalePending?.length) {
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ctx.log.info('cleaned up stale pending connections', { count: stalePending.length })
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}
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let candidateConnections
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let entitledCompanyIds
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try {
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candidateConnections = await fetchAllRows(
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({ from, to }) => supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.select('*')
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.eq('status', 'active')
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.order('last_synced_at', { ascending: true, nullsFirst: true })
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.order('id', { ascending: true })
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.range(from, to),
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{ dedupeBy: connection => connection.id },
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)
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entitledCompanyIds = await getCompanyIdsWithCapability(
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supabase,
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candidateConnections.map(connection => connection.company_id),
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CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
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)
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} catch (error) {
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ctx.log.error('failed to build entitled bank sync work list', error as Error)
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return errorResponse(error, ctx.log, { requestId: ctx.requestId })
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}
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// Apply the batch limit only after entitlement filtering. Otherwise old
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// free-tier rows can permanently occupy the head of the queue and prevent
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// every paying connection behind them from syncing.
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const connections = candidateConnections
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.filter(connection => entitledCompanyIds.has(connection.company_id))
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.slice(0, MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_RUN)
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ctx.log.info('bank sync work list built', {
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candidates: candidateConnections.length,
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entitledCompanies: entitledCompanyIds.size,
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selected: connections.length,
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})
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// No early return on an empty set: the health probe below still has work to
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// do (a company whose only connection is parked in 'pending_selection' has
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// nothing to sync but can absolutely have a dead session).
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const startTime = Date.now()
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// 230s of the 300s maxDuration for the sync loop; the rest is reserved for
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// the health probe pass and response teardown below.
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const TIME_BUDGET_MS = 230_000
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const baseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'
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const results: {
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connectionId: string
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userId: string
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bankName: string
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imported: number
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duplicates: number
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errors: number
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// 'skipped' = nothing was fetched from the bank (every account deselected),
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// so this run proves nothing about whether the session is still alive. Kept
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// distinct from 'synced' because the health probe below keys on it.
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status: 'synced' | 'skipped' | 'expired' | 'expiring_soon' | 'error'
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daysUntilExpiry?: number | null
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}[] = []
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// One PSD2 session can back several companies (lib/session-sharing.ts), and
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// they all carry the same consent_expires. Keyed per (user, session) so a
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// user with four companies on one consent gets one warning mail, not four.
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const notifiedSessions = new Set<string>()
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const notifyKey = (c: { user_id: string; session_id: string | null }) =>
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`${c.user_id}:${c.session_id ?? 'none'}`
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const syncConnection = async (connection: (typeof connections)[number]) => {
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try {
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const daysLeft = getDaysUntilExpiry(connection.consent_expires)
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const isExpired = daysLeft !== null && daysLeft <= 0
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if (isExpired) {
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await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.update({ status: 'expired' })
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.eq('id', connection.id)
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// Send expiry notification, once per shared consent
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if (!notifiedSessions.has(notifyKey(connection))) {
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notifiedSessions.add(notifyKey(connection))
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await sendConsentExpiryNotification(
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supabase, connection, 0, true, baseUrl
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)
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}
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results.push({
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connectionId: connection.id,
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userId: connection.user_id,
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bankName: connection.bank_name,
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imported: 0,
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duplicates: 0,
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errors: 0,
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status: 'expired',
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daysUntilExpiry: 0,
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})
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return
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}
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const expiringSoon = isConsentExpiringSoon(connection.consent_expires)
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// Send consent expiry notifications at 7-day and 3-day thresholds
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if (
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expiringSoon &&
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daysLeft !== null &&
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(daysLeft <= 3 || daysLeft === 7) &&
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!notifiedSessions.has(notifyKey(connection))
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) {
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notifiedSessions.add(notifyKey(connection))
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await sendConsentExpiryNotification(
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supabase, connection, daysLeft, false, baseUrl
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)
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}
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const toDate = new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]
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// First sync: 90-day lookback (PSD2 max). Subsequent: 7-day window,
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// widened to cover any gap since the last successful sync (a paused
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// subscription that was paid again, a renewed consent) so the days in
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// between are not lost. See cron-lookback.ts.
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// Gate on initial_sync_completed_at, not last_synced_at: manual "Sync now"
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// sets last_synced_at without doing the deep backfill, and we want the cron
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// to still fall back to 90 days if the inline activation backfill failed.
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const isFirstSync = !connection.initial_sync_completed_at
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const lookbackDays = isFirstSync
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? MAX_LOOKBACK_DAYS
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: incrementalLookbackDays(connection.last_synced_at)
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if (isFirstSync) {
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ctx.log.info('first sync for connection: using 90-day lookback', {
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connectionId: connection.id,
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lookbackDays,
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})
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} else if (lookbackDays > INCREMENTAL_LOOKBACK_DAYS) {
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ctx.log.info('gap since last sync: widening lookback', {
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connectionId: connection.id,
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lastSyncedAt: connection.last_synced_at,
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lookbackDays,
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})
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}
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const fromDate = new Date(Date.now() - lookbackDays * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
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.toISOString()
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.split('T')[0]
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// Keep the full list for the DB write-back so we don't drop accounts
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// the user has opted out of. Sync only the enabled subset (treating
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// undefined as enabled for back-compat with older rows).
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const allAccounts = (connection.accounts_data as StoredAccount[] || []).map(a => ({ ...a }))
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const accounts = allAccounts.filter(a => a.enabled !== false)
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if (accounts.length === 0) {
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ctx.log.info('all accounts disabled: skipping sync', {
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connectionId: connection.id,
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totalAccounts: allAccounts.length,
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})
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results.push({
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connectionId: connection.id,
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userId: connection.user_id,
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bankName: connection.bank_name,
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imported: 0,
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duplicates: 0,
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errors: 0,
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status: 'skipped',
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daysUntilExpiry: daysLeft,
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})
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return
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}
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// Detect SIE overlap: skip auto-categorization if the sync range
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// overlaps with a completed SIE import to prevent double-booking
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const { data: sieOverlap } = await supabase
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.from('sie_imports')
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.select('id')
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.eq('company_id', connection.company_id)
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.eq('status', 'completed')
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.gte('fiscal_year_end', fromDate)
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.limit(1)
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.maybeSingle()
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// First sync uses strategy=longest to pull the deepest history available
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// from the ASPSP, and so does a gap backfill of a month or more (same
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// threshold as the manual sync route). Routine incremental syncs skip
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// it: the implicit default is faster and we already have the older data.
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const syncOptions = {
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...(sieOverlap ? { skipAutoCategorization: true } : {}),
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...(isFirstSync || lookbackDays >= 30 ? { strategy: 'longest' as const } : {}),
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}
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const syncResults = await Promise.all(
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accounts.map(account => syncAccountTransactions(
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supabase,
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connection.company_id,
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connection.user_id,
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connection.id,
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account,
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fromDate,
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toDate,
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undefined,
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syncOptions
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))
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)
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const totalImported = syncResults.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.imported, 0)
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const totalDuplicates = syncResults.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.duplicates, 0)
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const totalErrors = syncResults.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.errors, 0)
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// Batch reconciliation sweep when SIE overlap detected. One scoped run
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// per enabled cash account (issue #1298): a pooled run matched every
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// same-currency account's transactions against 1930's GL lines and could
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// persist a cross-account journal_entry_id.
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if (sieOverlap && totalImported > 0) {
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try {
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const reconResult = await runUnattendedReconciliationSweep(
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supabase,
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connection.company_id,
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connection.user_id,
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{ dateFrom: fromDate, dateTo: toDate },
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)
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// Stamp the outcome so the UI can render "Vi matchade X av Y" and the
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// review surface knows there is something to granska.
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await supabase
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.from('bank_connections')
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.update({
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last_sie_sweep: toSweepSummary(reconResult, { dateFrom: fromDate, dateTo: toDate }),
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})
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.eq('id', connection.id)
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if (reconResult.applied > 0 || reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold > 0) {
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ctx.log.info('batch reconciliation after sync', {
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companyId: connection.company_id,
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applied: reconResult.applied,
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skippedBelowThreshold: reconResult.skippedBelowThreshold,
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accounts: reconResult.accounts.map((a) => ({
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accountNumber: a.accountNumber,
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applied: a.applied,
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skippedBelowThreshold: a.skippedBelowThreshold,
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})),
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})
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}
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} catch {
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// Non-critical
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}
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}
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// Successful sync: update connection and clear any previous error state.
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// Write allAccounts (not accounts) so disabled accounts stay in the row.
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const completedAt = new Date().toISOString()
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let initialSyncFields: Record<string, unknown> = {}
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if (isFirstSync) {
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// Aggregate returned booking dates across enabled accounts so the UI
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// can show "we requested X but the bank returned Y to Z".
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const minDates = syncResults.map(r => r.returnedMinBookingDate).filter((d): d is string => !!d)
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const maxDates = syncResults.map(r => r.returnedMaxBookingDate).filter((d): d is string => !!d)
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initialSyncFields = {
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initial_sync_completed_at: completedAt,
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initial_sync_requested_from: fromDate,
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initial_sync_returned_min_date: minDates.length > 0 ? minDates.reduce((a, b) => (a < b ? a : b)) : null,
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initial_sync_returned_max_date: maxDates.length > 0 ? maxDates.reduce((a, b) => (a > b ? a : b)) : null,
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initial_sync_lookback_days: lookbackDays,
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}
|
|
}
|
|
// Mirror refreshed balances into cash_accounts (what the Bank-page
|
|
// picker and reconciliation read); logs failures instead of throwing.
|
|
await updateBalancesFromSync(
|
|
supabase,
|
|
connection.company_id,
|
|
connection.id,
|
|
allAccounts.map(a => ({
|
|
external_uid: a.uid,
|
|
balance: a.balance,
|
|
available_balance: a.available_balance,
|
|
balance_updated_at: a.balance_updated_at,
|
|
})),
|
|
)
|
|
await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({
|
|
accounts_data: allAccounts,
|
|
last_synced_at: completedAt,
|
|
...initialSyncFields,
|
|
...(connection.error_message ? { error_message: null } : {}),
|
|
})
|
|
.eq('id', connection.id)
|
|
|
|
results.push({
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
userId: connection.user_id,
|
|
bankName: connection.bank_name,
|
|
imported: totalImported,
|
|
duplicates: totalDuplicates,
|
|
errors: totalErrors,
|
|
status: expiringSoon ? 'expiring_soon' : 'synced',
|
|
daysUntilExpiry: daysLeft,
|
|
})
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// A dead PSD2 session (closed/expired/invalid consent) is a re-auth
|
|
// condition, not a transient failure: flip it to 'expired' (same state
|
|
// the consent-elapsed branch uses) so the UI offers a reconnect instead
|
|
// of a retry. Other errors stay 'error'.
|
|
//
|
|
// error_message is rendered verbatim on the settings panel, so it gets
|
|
// the short Swedish user message in both cases: the raw Enable Banking
|
|
// error body (an English JSON envelope) stays in the server log below.
|
|
const isSessionDead = error instanceof SessionExpiredError
|
|
const failureStatus = isSessionDead ? 'expired' : 'error'
|
|
const failureMessage = isSessionDead ? REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE : SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE
|
|
|
|
// An expired PSD2 consent is the normal end of a bank grant and the row
|
|
// is flipped to 'expired' for the user to reconnect: a warning, not an
|
|
// error. Only genuine sync failures belong in the error panel.
|
|
const failureContext = {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
userId: connection.user_id,
|
|
bankName: connection.bank_name,
|
|
consentExpires: connection.consent_expires,
|
|
lastSyncedAt: connection.last_synced_at,
|
|
}
|
|
if (isSessionDead) {
|
|
ctx.log.warn('bank session expired for connection', {
|
|
...failureContext,
|
|
reason: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
|
|
})
|
|
} else {
|
|
ctx.log.error('sync failed for connection', error as Error, failureContext)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({ status: failureStatus, error_message: failureMessage })
|
|
.eq('id', connection.id)
|
|
|
|
results.push({
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
userId: connection.user_id,
|
|
bankName: connection.bank_name,
|
|
imported: 0,
|
|
duplicates: 0,
|
|
errors: 1,
|
|
status: failureStatus,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Concurrency is per COMPANY, not per connection: the unattended sweep after
|
|
// an SIE-overlap sync is company-scoped (it reconciles every cash account of
|
|
// the company), so two connections of one company syncing concurrently would
|
|
// run two identical whole-company sweeps whose read-time "unlinked GL lines"
|
|
// snapshots race, and both can claim the same journal entry for different
|
|
// bank transactions. Grouping keeps one company's connections sequential
|
|
// while unrelated companies still fan out.
|
|
const companyGroups = new Map<string, typeof connections>()
|
|
for (const connection of connections) {
|
|
const group = companyGroups.get(connection.company_id)
|
|
if (group) group.push(connection)
|
|
else companyGroups.set(connection.company_id, [connection])
|
|
}
|
|
const groups = [...companyGroups.values()]
|
|
|
|
const syncCompanyGroup = async (group: typeof connections) => {
|
|
for (const connection of group) {
|
|
// Re-check inside the group too: a company with many connections would
|
|
// otherwise run to completion past the budget and eat the health-probe
|
|
// and teardown margin before the between-waves check fires.
|
|
if (Date.now() - startTime > TIME_BUDGET_MS) return
|
|
await syncConnection(connection)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Waves of SYNC_CONCURRENCY company groups: the budget check sits between
|
|
// waves, and each connection keeps its own try/catch above, so one slow or
|
|
// failing bank affects at most its own wave slot.
|
|
for (let offset = 0; offset < groups.length; offset += SYNC_CONCURRENCY) {
|
|
if (Date.now() - startTime > TIME_BUDGET_MS) {
|
|
ctx.log.info('time budget reached', { processedSoFar: results.length })
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
await Promise.all(groups.slice(offset, offset + SYNC_CONCURRENCY).map(syncCompanyGroup))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Health probe for connections this run did NOT prove alive by syncing them.
|
|
//
|
|
// A sync failure is the only thing that used to move a connection off
|
|
// 'active', which leaves two silent holes: connections the loop skipped
|
|
// (capability not entitled, every account deselected, time budget reached)
|
|
// and connections that never sync at all because they are still parked in
|
|
// 'pending_selection'. Both kept rendering as healthy with a stale
|
|
// last_synced_at while their PSD2 session was already dead bank-side, so the
|
|
// user read old balances as current. Probing costs one cheap session call
|
|
// per connection and only ever acts on a definite 'dead'.
|
|
const probeResults: { connectionId: string; bankName: string }[] = []
|
|
// Total-elapsed ceiling (measured from startTime, like TIME_BUDGET_MS): the
|
|
// probe pass gets whatever the sync loop left of it, with 20s of maxDuration
|
|
// spare for teardown.
|
|
const PROBE_BUDGET_MS = 280_000
|
|
const provenAlive = new Set(
|
|
results.filter(r => r.status === 'synced' || r.status === 'expiring_soon').map(r => r.connectionId)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
const { data: unverified, error: unverifiedError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.select('id, company_id, user_id, bank_name, session_id, status, last_expiry_notification_at')
|
|
.in('status', ['active', 'pending_selection'])
|
|
.not('session_id', 'is', null)
|
|
.order('last_synced_at', { ascending: true, nullsFirst: true })
|
|
.limit(100)
|
|
|
|
if (unverifiedError) {
|
|
ctx.log.error('failed to fetch connections for health probe', unverifiedError, {
|
|
message: unverifiedError.message,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Probe per DISTINCT session, not per connection. One session can back
|
|
// several companies (lib/session-sharing.ts), so probing per row would spend
|
|
// four identical API calls on one consent and mark only one company dead at
|
|
// a time. A session is one live-or-dead fact: the verdict applies to every
|
|
// row holding it.
|
|
type UnverifiedConnection = NonNullable<typeof unverified>[number]
|
|
const probeGroups = new Map<string, UnverifiedConnection[]>()
|
|
// A session that synced successfully for ANY of its companies is alive, so
|
|
// skip the whole group rather than re-probing it through a sibling row.
|
|
const provenAliveSessions = new Set(
|
|
(unverified ?? [])
|
|
.filter(c => provenAlive.has(c.id))
|
|
.map(c => c.session_id as string)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
for (const connection of unverified ?? []) {
|
|
const sessionId = connection.session_id as string
|
|
if (provenAliveSessions.has(sessionId)) continue
|
|
const group = probeGroups.get(sessionId)
|
|
if (group) group.push(connection)
|
|
else probeGroups.set(sessionId, [connection])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (const [sessionId, group] of probeGroups) {
|
|
if (Date.now() - startTime > PROBE_BUDGET_MS) {
|
|
ctx.log.info('probe budget reached', { probedSoFar: probeResults.length })
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Per-session isolation, matching the sync loop above: without it a single
|
|
// network blip aborts probing for every remaining candidate in the batch
|
|
// and the coverage gap stays silent until tomorrow's run.
|
|
try {
|
|
const health = await probeSessionHealth(sessionId)
|
|
if (health !== 'dead') continue
|
|
|
|
const groupIds = group.map(c => c.id)
|
|
const { error: updateError } = await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({ status: 'expired', error_message: REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE })
|
|
.in('id', groupIds)
|
|
|
|
// Only claim the connections were marked dead once the write landed.
|
|
// Notifying (and counting) on an unpersisted update would tell the user
|
|
// to re-authorize while the rows still read 'active'.
|
|
if (updateError) {
|
|
ctx.log.error('failed to mark probed-dead connections as expired', updateError, {
|
|
connectionIds: groupIds,
|
|
})
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// One dead consent, one mail, however many companies share it.
|
|
const first = group[0]
|
|
if (!notifiedSessions.has(notifyKey(first))) {
|
|
notifiedSessions.add(notifyKey(first))
|
|
await sendConsentExpiryNotification(supabase, first, 0, true, baseUrl)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx.log.info('health probe found a dead session', {
|
|
connectionIds: groupIds,
|
|
sharedAcrossCompanies: group.length > 1,
|
|
bankName: first.bank_name,
|
|
})
|
|
for (const connection of group) {
|
|
probeResults.push({ connectionId: connection.id, bankName: connection.bank_name })
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
ctx.log.error('health probe failed for session', err as Error, {
|
|
connectionIds: group.map(c => c.id),
|
|
bankName: group[0]?.bank_name,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const totalImported = results.reduce((sum, r) => sum + r.imported, 0)
|
|
const totalExpired = results.filter(r => r.status === 'expired').length
|
|
const totalExpiringSoon = results.filter(r => r.status === 'expiring_soon').length
|
|
const totalFailed = results.filter(r => r.status === 'error').length
|
|
|
|
ctx.log.info('bank sync summary', {
|
|
processed: results.length,
|
|
totalImported,
|
|
totalExpired,
|
|
totalExpiringSoon,
|
|
totalFailed,
|
|
probedDead: probeResults.length,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
return NextResponse.json({
|
|
processed: results.length,
|
|
totalImported,
|
|
totalExpired,
|
|
totalExpiringSoon,
|
|
totalFailed,
|
|
probedDead: probeResults.length,
|
|
probeResults,
|
|
results,
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Send consent expiry notification email.
|
|
* Guards with last_expiry_notification_at to avoid spamming (2-day cooldown).
|
|
*
|
|
* Paused by default (founder call 2026-07-29, after the probe backlog drain
|
|
* mass-emailed 24 users at once): the settings panel and attention surfaces
|
|
* already flag a dead connection in-app. Set BANK_CONSENT_EXPIRY_EMAILS=true
|
|
* to resume sending; the status transitions below run either way.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function sendConsentExpiryNotification(
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
|
|
supabase: SupabaseClient<any>,
|
|
connection: Record<string, unknown>,
|
|
daysLeft: number,
|
|
isExpired: boolean,
|
|
baseUrl: string
|
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
try {
|
|
if (process.env.BANK_CONSENT_EXPIRY_EMAILS !== 'true') return
|
|
|
|
// Check cooldown: skip if notified within last 2 days
|
|
const lastNotified = connection.last_expiry_notification_at as string | null
|
|
if (lastNotified) {
|
|
const hoursSinceNotified = (Date.now() - new Date(lastNotified).getTime()) / (1000 * 60 * 60)
|
|
if (hoursSinceNotified < 48) return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const emailService = getEmailService()
|
|
if (!emailService.isConfigured()) return
|
|
|
|
const userId = connection.user_id as string
|
|
|
|
// Look up user email
|
|
const { data: userData } = await supabase.auth.admin.getUserById(userId)
|
|
if (!userData?.user?.email) return
|
|
|
|
// Look up company name
|
|
const { data: companySettings } = await supabase
|
|
.from('company_settings')
|
|
.select('company_name')
|
|
.eq('company_id', connection.company_id)
|
|
.single()
|
|
|
|
const emailData = {
|
|
bankName: connection.bank_name as string,
|
|
daysUntilExpiry: daysLeft,
|
|
renewalUrl: `${baseUrl}/settings/banking`,
|
|
companyName: companySettings?.company_name || '',
|
|
isExpired,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await emailService.sendEmail({
|
|
to: userData.user.email,
|
|
subject: generateConsentExpiryEmailSubject(emailData),
|
|
html: generateConsentExpiryEmailHtml(emailData),
|
|
text: generateConsentExpiryEmailText(emailData),
|
|
replyTo: getBranding().supportEmail,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Update last notification timestamp
|
|
await supabase
|
|
.from('bank_connections')
|
|
.update({ last_expiry_notification_at: new Date().toISOString() })
|
|
.eq('id', connection.id as string)
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// Notification failure must not break the cron job: log only.
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
|
|
console.error('[bank-sync-cron] failed to send consent expiry notification:', error)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|